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writing – which, as I later understood was part of the larger effort to 
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Abstract 
This doctoral dissertation seeks to demonstrate how personal and collective ideas 
affect foreign policy. The five original publications making up the dissertation all 
investigate Finnish foreign policy from various ideational aspects. Although the 
publications deal with different periods of Finnish foreign affairs, the dissertation 
places particular emphasis on the end of the Cold War and early post-Cold War 
years.  
 
The dissertation’s main theoretical claim is that in order to reach a comprehensive 
understanding of the significance of ideas in foreign policy, one must concentrate 
on both individual and intersubjective ideas and that this approach is applicable 
at multiple levels of analysis. In other words, the dissertation suggests that one 
must harness the respective strengths of cognitive psychology and 
constructivism, and adopt an integrative approach to the analysis of foreign 
policy. The rationale behind the integrative approach is the viewpoint that 
psychology and constructivism support each other’s weaknesses.  
 
The dissertation builds its theoretical argument on a research program initiated 
by Vaughn P. Shannon and Paul M. Kowert in their book Psychology and 
Constructivism in International Relations: An Ideational Alliance. However, instead of 
an ideational alliance, the dissertation speaks of Ideational Foreign Policy 
Analysis (IFPA). There are two main reasons for this choice. First, IFPA 
incorporates additional theoretical perspectives and levels of analysis into the 
realm of ideational dialogue. Thus, it serves as an umbrella for the various 
ideational approaches of FPA. Secondly, the decision to use another concept is a 
matter of semantics. To imply that a theoretical construct is against something 
sends a strong signal, and it is perhaps unnecessary to see material/rational and 
ideational views as polar opposites.  
 
Moreover, “idea” is too broad and vague a concept to be employed as an 
analytical tool, since ideas are practically infinite and ubiquitous. In order to 
conduct a sound and theoretically solid analysis, one needs more specific 
concepts to simplify the world of ideas and to make it understandable. This 
research taps into the vocabulary of constructivism and political psychology, 
particularly cognitive and social psychology. More precisely, the dissertation 
applies the principles of IFPA to four levels of analysis, and sheds light on four 
different theoretical approaches.  
 
The first section of the theoretical chapter explains the importance of individual 
belief systems in foreign policymaking, and highlights the significance of the 
social environment as a source of individual beliefs. The second theoretical 
contribution relates to national identity. The dissertation advocates a bottom-up 
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view of national identity, in which the basis of collective national self-images is 
in fact individual identifications with a nation state. Furthermore, national 
identity is divided into three components: worldview, political purpose and 
status. The third theoretical question under scrutiny is the public opinion-foreign 
policy nexus. The dissertation outlines three dynamics between public opinion 
and foreign policy. In the bottom-up model, public opinion clearly influences 
foreign policymaking, whereas the top-down dynamic refers to a situation 
whereby leaders actively try to shape public views. The third model is 
disconnection, which describes a condition where there is either a public 
disinterest toward foreign policy, or where decision-makers neglect the opinions 
of the public. In this context, the principles of IFPA elaborate the public opinion-
foreign policy link in two central ways. Firstly, the beliefs of ordinary citizens 
come about in a process akin to elite opinion formation – that is, in the interplay 
between inherent dispositions and the social environment. Secondly, the manner 
in which decision-makers understand the importance of public views is partly 
dependent on their belief systems.  
 
After treating the three intra-state levels, the dissertation moves on to inter-state 
relationships. More precisely, it discusses the issue of trust from three theoretical 
perspectives, and points out how intra-state ideas of trustworthiness may affect 
inter-state interaction, namely foreign policy. In other words, the section’s main 
purpose is to show how certain ideas can affect bilateral relations between two 
states.  
 
The dissertation consists of five publications, which all deal with different aspects 
of Finnish foreign and security policy and which to a varying degree apply the 
principles of IFPA. In addition to the overarching theoretical objective of 
promoting the synthesis of psychology and constructivism, every publication has 
its own theoretical objectives that serve the broader goal of ideational integration. 
The aim of Publication I on the belief system of Mauno Koivisto is to understand 
the effects of the social environment on individual beliefs. It claims that 
Koivisto’s belief system is best described as great-power empiricist. Moreover, 
the article argues that the great transformation caused by the end of the Cold 
War did not considerably change Koivisto’s belief system.   
Publication II links the schools of thought approach to the intra-state competition 
between different national identities, and promotes a bottom-up view of national 
identity rooted in psychology. It outlines the Finnish foreign policy schools of 
thought at the beginning of the post-Cold War era: small state realism, 
integrationism, euro-atlanticism and globalism. Integrationism, which was based 
on a “eurorealist” worldview, was clearly the most powerful school. Finnish early 
post-Cold War foreign policy nevertheless contained elements from all four 
schools.  
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The focus of Publication III is on the historical nexus between public opinion and 
Finnish foreign policy. It claims that three different models of the public opinion-
foreign policy nexus have prevailed in Finland during its independence: a 
disconnection in the years of early independence, the top-down model of the 
Cold War, and a stronger bottom-up dynamic of the post-Cold War era. In other 
words, in the post-Cold War era, public opinion has become a stronger force in 
Finnish foreign policymaking.   
 
Publication IV unpacks Finnish beliefs on the untrustworthiness of Sweden as a 
defense cooperation partner and is thus interested in the interstate-level 
manifestations of individual and collective ideas. The study lays out three main 
theoretical arguments. Firstly, it differentiates between distrust and mistrust. The 
second point the article drives home is that trust is a scalable phenomenon. 
Thirdly and lastly, the article suggests that a sense of disappointment and a feeling 
of being betrayed must be separated. Its chief empirical argument is that the 
Finnish experiences of misplaced trust from October 1990 and Sweden’s surprise 
announcement of its ambition to join the European Communities have now 
manifested as elite-level mistrust towards Sweden as a defense cooperation 
partner. In order to intensify mutual defense cooperation, Helsinki and 
Stockholm must overcome the looming mistrust in their defense relationship.   
 
The final publication, Publication V, explores different aspects of Finlandization. 
The analytical approach to the phenomenon is historical, but it nevertheless 
contains elements from the four levels of analysis. The publication treats 
Finlandization first and foremost as a political culture, which was born in part to 
support the official foreign policy line vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. One can argue 
that the foreign policy strategy of Finland was rather successful but that the 
political culture of Finlandization had excessive features. It is therefore too naïve 
to interpret Finlandization only as a successful foreign policy strategy, as some 
international commentators have done. In fact, it can be said that some of the 
features of the culture actually eroded the hard core, namely Finnish sovereignty, 
which the foreign policy strategy tried to preserve.  
 
As implied, in addition to the interests in the original publications, the 
dissertation has an interest in the end the Cold War and in the early post-Cold 
War years. More specifically, it aims at understanding what the end of the Cold 
War meant in terms of the ideational foundations of Finnish foreign policy. The 
study suggests that it signified three things in particular. First, it led to an 
adjustment from small-state realism to integrationism as the primary orientation 
of foreign policy. In other words, Finland enthusiastically adopted a pro-
European integration policy, but did not forget the core tenets of geopolitical 
realism. Thus, the approach was based on a “eurorealist” worldview. Secondly, 
the end of the era vindicated Finland in terms of its Western-ness in the minds 
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of decision-makers. To put it differently, Finland was finally released from the 
stigma of Finlandization, and was free to pursue its ambitions as an accepted 
Western nation. Thirdly, the ideational milieu of Finnish foreign policymaking 
became more relaxed, as the attempts to shape public opinion and control 
societal debate diminished and as ideas about Finland’s position in the world were 
able to compete more freely. Ever since the end of the Cold War, there have been 
genuine alternatives to the existing policy orientation, and attempts to impose a 
consensus have been less considerable.   
xi 
Tiivistelmä 
 
Tässä väitöskirjassa tutkitaan, miten yhtäältä henkilökohtaiset ja toisaalta jaetut 
ideat sekä ajatusmaailmat vaikuttavat ulkopolitiikan tekoon. Väitöstyön viisi 
itsenäistä tutkimusta tarkastelevat Suomen ulkopolitiikkaa jostain 
ideationaalisesta näkökulmasta. Vaikka artikkelit käsittelevät Suomen ulko- ja 
turvallisuuspolitiikan eri ajanjaksoja, työ on kiinnostunut erityisesti kylmän sodan 
loppuvuosista sekä kylmän sodan jälkeisen ajan alusta.  
 
Työn keskeinen teoreettinen väite on, että kattavan näkemyksen ideoiden 
vaikutuksesta ulkopolitiikkaan voidaan saavuttaa vain lähestymistavalla, joka 
yhdistää ulkopolitiikan analyysin subjektiivisiin sekä intersubjektiivisiin ideoihin 
keskittyvien teorioiden pääperiaatteet. Tutkimus korostaa, että integroiva 
menettelytapa on sovellettavissa eri ulkopolitiikan tutkimuksen analyysintasoilla. 
Yhdistävän lähestymistavan soveltaminen perustuu näkemykseen siitä, että 
yksilökeskeiset psykologiset teoriat ja sosiaalisuutta korostavat konstruktivistiset 
lähestymistavat täydentävät toistensa heikkouksia.  
 
Väitöstyö rakentaa argumenttinsa jatkamalla ja täydentämällä Vaughn P. 
Shannonin and Paul M. Kowertin kirjassaan Psychology and Constructivism in 
International Relations: An Ideational Alliance aloittamaa tutkimusohjelmaa. 
Ideationaalisen allianssin asemesta tutkimuksessa kuitenkin puhutaan 
ideationaalisesta ulkopolitiikan tutkimuksesta (Ideational Foreign Policy Analysis, 
IFPA). Valintaan on kaksi syytä. Ensinnäkin ideationaalinen ulkopolitiikan 
analyysi ottaa teoriaperinteiden väliseen dialogiin mukaan lisää teoreettisia 
näkökulmia sekä analyysin tasoja. Se siis toimii kattokäsitteenä ulkopolitiikan 
analyysin eri ideoiden merkitystä korostaville lähestymistavoille. Toinen syy 
valinnalle on semanttinen. Rationaalisia ja ideationaalisia teorioita ei tule nähdä 
täysin vastakohtaisina, ja tutkimusohjelman rakentaminen jotain käsitystä vastaan 
lähettää turhan vahvan viestin.  
 
Idea itsessään on käsitteenä liian epämääräinen, jotta sitä voitaisiin käyttää 
ulkopolitiikan tutkimuksen työkaluna. Tarkempia ja selitysvoimaisempia 
käsitteitä tarvitaan, jotta ideoiden maailmaa voidaan yksinkertaistaa ja tehdä 
ymmärrettäväksi. Väitöskirja hyödyntääkin konstruktivismin ja psykologisen 
ulkopolitiikan analyysin käsitteistöä. Tarkemmin sanottuna tutkimus soveltaa 
ideationaalisen ulkopolitiikan periaatteita neljällä eri analyysin tasolla. Samalla se 
tarkastelee tarkemmin neljää eri ulkopolitiikan analyysin teoriakokonaisuutta.  
 
Väitöstutkimuksen ensimmäinen teoreettinen osio selittää yksilöiden 
uskomusjärjestelmien merkitystä ulkopolitiikan tekemisessä ja korostaa 
sosiaalisen ympäristön merkitystä yksilön ajatusmaailman lähteenä. Työn toinen 
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teoreettinen panos liittyy kansalliseen identiteettiin. Se kehittää alhaalta ylös 
kumpuavaa kansallisen identiteetin mallin, jossa kollektiivisen kansallisen 
omakuvan perusta on yksilön identifioituminen tiettyyn kansakuntaan. Tämän 
lisäksi tutkimus jakaa kansallisen identiteetin kolmeen komponenttiin: 
maailmankuviin, poliittiseen tarkoitukseen ja statukseen.  
Tutkimuksen kolmas teoreettinen mielenkiinnon kohde on yleisen mielipiteen ja 
ulkopolitiikan suhde, ja se hahmottaa kolme julkinen mielipiteen ja ulkopolitiikan 
välistä dynamiikkaa. ”Alhaalta ylös” –mallissa kansalaismielipide vaikuttaa selvästi 
ulkopolitiikan tekemiseen, siinä missä ”ylhäältä alas” –dynamiikassa valtiojohto 
pyrkii muokkaamaan yleistä mielipidettä. Kolmannessa mallissa ulkopolitiikan 
tekeminen ja julkinen mielipide eivät ole yhteydessä johtuen kansalaisten 
kiinnostuksen puutteesta tai poliittisen johdon välinpitämättömyydestä.  
Käsiteltyään kolmea valtion sisäistä analyysitasoa tutkimus kiinnittää huomiota 
ideoiden rooliin valtioiden välisissä suhteissa. Se käsittelee valtioiden välistä 
luottamusta kolmesta eri teoreettisesta perspektiivistä, ja analysoi, miten 
erityisesti valtioiden välillä koettu epäluottamus voi vaikuttaa niiden keskinäisiin 
suhteisiin. Toisin sanoen osiossa tutkitaan, miten valtiotoimijan piirissä elätellyt 
ideat ilmentyvät kahden maan keskinäisessä kanssakäymisessä.  
Väitöstutkimus koostuu viidestä itsenäisestä tutkimusartikkelista, jotka 
käsittelevät Suomen ulko- ja turvallisuuVSROLWLLNDQ eri aspekteja. 
Laajemman, konstruktivismia ja psykologiaa integroivan, teoreettisen 
tavoitteen ohella artikkeleilla on omat teoreettiset päämääränsä, jotka tukevat 
työn kattavampaa tavoitetta. Julkaisu I tutkii Mauno Koiviston 
uskomusjärjestelmää ja samalla punniskelee, miten sosiaalinen ympäristö 
vaikuttaa yksilön uskomuksiin. Se kutsuu Koiviston ajattelumaailmaa 
suurvaltaempiristiseksi. Lisäksi se väittää, että kylmän sodan loppuminen ei 
sanottavammin muuttanut Koiviston uskomusjärjestelmää, mikä tuki 
jatkuvuutta myös Suomen ulko- ja turvallisuuspoliittisessa linjassa.  
Julkaisu II taas yhdistää koulukuntakäsitteen ja valtioin sisäisessä diskurssissa 
kilpailevat käsitykset valtiolle sopivasta omakuvasta. Samalla se edistää alhaalta 
ylös kumpuavaa näkemystä kansallisesta identiteetistä. Tutkimus hahmottaa neljä 
Suomen kylmän sodan lopussa ja sen jälkeisen ajan alussa vaikuttanutta 
koulukuntaa – pienvaltiorealismin, integrationismin, euroatlantismin ja 
globalismin. Eurorealistiselle maailmankuvalle perustunut integrationismi oli 
koulukunnista selvästi vahvin. Suomen kylmän sodan jälkeisen ajan alkuvuosien 
ulkopolitiikassa oli kuitenkin elementtejä jokaisesta neljästä koulukunnasta.  
Julkaisu III tarkastelee yleisen mielipiteen ja ulkopolitiikan suhdetta Suomen 
ulkopolitiikan historiassa. Se väittää, että Suomen ulkopolitiikasta on 
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löydettävissä kolme erilaista mallia kansalaismielipiteen ja ulkopolitiikan välillä. 
Itsenäistymisen alkuvuosina ja sotienvälisenä aikana ulkopolitiikka ja yleinen 
mielipide eivät juuri kommunikoineet. Tilanne muuttui kylmän sodan alettua, ja 
kyseistä aikakautta leimasikin valtiojohdon vahva pyrkimys muokata yleistä 
mielipidettä. Kylmän sodan loputtua julkinen mielipide voimaantui ja se alkoi 
vahvemmin vaikuttaa ulkopoliittisiin päätöksiin.     
 
Työn seuraava tutkimus, julkaisu IV, analysoi Suomen ja Ruotsin 
puolustusyhteistyössä ilmenevää epäluottamusta. Se toisin sanoen tarkastelee, 
miten Suomessa Ruotsia kohtaan tunnettu epäluottamus vaikuttaa maiden 
väliseen yhteistyöhön turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikassa. Tutkimuksessa on 
kolme teoreettista argumenttia. Ensinnäkin tutkimuksessa on syytä erottaa 
tiettyjen kokemuksien aiheuttamat luottamuksen menetykset (mistrust) 
laajemmasta epäluottamuksen tunteesta (distrust). Toiseksi on huomioitava se, että 
luottamus on skaalattava ilmiö. Valtioiden välistä luottamusta on mahdollista 
arvioida ideaalityyppisten minimaalisen (reliance) ja täyden luottamuksen välillä. 
Kolmanneksi tutkimuksessa olisi syytä erottaa pettymyksen ja petetyksi tulemisen 
tunteet. Artikkelin keskeisin empiirinen argumentti on se, että uusi kireämpi 
turvallisuuspoliittinen tilanne ja lisääntynyt puolustusyhteistyö Suomen ja 
Ruotsin välillä on saanut suomalaisen eliitin keskuudessa nousemaan muistot 
vuodesta 1990, jolloin Ruotsi yllättäen päätti hakea jäsenyyttä Euroopan 
yhteisössä. Tällä kertaa pelkona on Ruotsin yllättävä liittyminen Natoon. Suomen 
ja Ruotsin puolustusyhteistyön keskeinen tavoite onkin syventää maiden välistä 
luottamussuhdetta, ja lisääntyvä luottamus on syvenevän yhteistyön 
ennakkoehto.  
 
Väitöstyön viimeinen tutkimus, julkaisu V, tutkii suomettumisen eri puolia. 
Tutkimuksen lähestymistapa on historiallinen, mutta se sisältää elementtejä 
väitöstyössä käsiteltävistä analyysin tasoista. Tutkimus ymmärtää suomettumisen 
ennen kaikkea poliittisena kulttuurina, joka syntyi Suomen kylmän sodan 
ulkopoliittisen doktriinin kylkiäisenä. Kulttuuri toisin sanoen tuki Suomen ja 
Neuvostoliiton välistä ystävyyspolitiikkaa. Vaikka Suomen kylmän sodan 
ulkopolitiikkaa voidaan pitää onnistuneena, suomettumisen kulttuuri sisälsi 
ylilyöntejä, jotka itse asiassa syövyttivät Suomen ulkopolitiikan keskeisiä 
tavoitteita kuten maan suvereniteetin säilymistä.  
 
Kuten todettua, tutkimus on kiinnostunut erityisesti kylmän sodan lopusta ja 
kylmän sodan jälkeisen ajan ensimmäisistä vuosista. Tarkastelemalla ja 
yhdistämällä viiden yllämainitun julkaisun tuloksia tutkimus pyrkii ymmärtämään, 
miten kylmän sodan loppuminen muutti Suomen ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikan 
ideationaalisia perusteita. Väitöstyö toteaakin, että muutos tapahtui kolmessa 
suhteessa. Ensinnäkin Suomen turvallisuuspoliittisessa orientaatiossa tapahtui 
muutos. Pienvaltiorealismin ajasta siirryttiin integrationismin aikaan. Suomi lähti 
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lopulta innokkaasti mukaan Euroopan integraatioon unohtamatta kuitenkaan 
geopoliittisen realismin pääoppeja. Suomen uusi ulkopoliittinen suuntaus 
perustuikin eurorealismille. Realismin säilymisellä oli konkreettisia vaikutuksia 
Suomen ulkopoliittiseen doktriiniin – erityisesti päätökseen jatkaa 
liittoutumattomuuspolitiikkaa. Toiseksi eritoten suomalaiset politiikantekijät ja 
eliitin edustajat kokivat Suomen länsimaisuuden vahvistuneen. Suomettumisen 
leima katosi, ja maa kykeni ajamaan intressejään täysivaltaisena länsimaana. 
Kolmanneksi suomalaisen ulkopolitiikan teon ideationaalisessa ympäristössä 
tapahtui tietynlainen vapautuminen. Yritykset kontrolloida yleistä mielipidettä ja 
ulkopoliittista keskustelua vähenivät, ja erilaiset ideat Suomen ulkopolitiikan 
perusteista saivat kilpailla vapaammin kuin kylmän sodan aikana. Kylmän sodan 
loppumisen jälkeen suomalaisessa keskustelussa on ollut aitoja vaihtoehtoja 
kulloinkin vallitsevalle ulkopoliittiselle linjalle, ja yritykset luoda ulkopoliittista 
konsensusta ovat vähentyneet.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Research Objectives   
 
One of the most clichéd slogans (if not the most) in the annals of Finnish foreign 
policy is J.K. Paasikivi’s assertion that the beginning of all wisdom is the 
acknowledgement of facts. The statement reflects the typical assertiveness of realism 
and the school’s claim of its alleged superiority in capturing the essential forces and 
features of political reality (see e.g. Bew 2016, 177–181). What the proponents of 
realism are perhaps hesitant to admit is that realism – like any other worldview – is 
a prism through which individuals, practitioners and scholars alike, interpret the 
world. Importantly, individual interpretations are representations of reality, 
containing specific biases and even distortions of the world around us. This also 
applies to Finnish realism, whose figurehead Paasikivi has – deservedly or not – 
become.1   
 
The quote attributed to Paasikivi constitutes an apt bridge between the two major 
research interests of this doctoral dissertation: the role of ideas in the conduct of 
foreign policy and Finnish foreign policy. The theoretical contribution of the thesis 
relates to the influence of ideas in foreign policymaking. Its principal assumption is 
that ideational factors are of utmost importance in understanding state action. In 
other words, “the independent effects of ideas (worldviews, social constructions, 
social cognitions, and so on) are central to accounts of the choices people (and states) 
make” (Kowert 2012, 30). Indeed, both personal and shared ideas influence decision-
making. Whereas individual ideas affect the way in which a person constructs reality, 
collective ideas in turn constitute the societal milieu in which individuals are 
embedded. Thus, the wider ideational environment is a repository of shared 
meanings, and a key source of personal views.   
 
The theoretical approach of this dissertation stems from the tradition of Foreign 
Policy Analysis (FPA), which is a subfield of International Relations (IR). Although 
the boundary between the main discipline and subfield is rather blurred (Houghton 
                                                   
1 According to Osmo Apunen (2014), Paasikivi had both a long and a short line of thought about 
foreign policy. The short line related to both the Russification period of the early 20th century 
and to the immediate post-Second World War Years. The long perspective dates back to the years 
of autonomy in the 19th century. Whereas the short line of thought was concerned with securing 
Finland’s survival amid the pressure of Russia/the Soviet Union, the long insight, according to 
Apunen, endeavored to open windows to Europe, of which Russia was a part. The image of 
Paasikivi as the foremost Finnish practitioner of realpolitik stems from his short line of thought.  
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2007), FPA has certain hallmarks which distinguish it from general IR theory. Put 
briefly, the theoretical approaches of FPA are agent-oriented and actor-specific 
(Hudson 2007). Ideational perspectives have constituted a crucial part of FPA from 
the outset. Scholars have acknowledged that individual perceptions of the security 
environment, the structuration of particular situations, and the norms and values 
reposed in the shared meanings all influence decision-making (see e.g. Snyder 1962, 
5). Within FPA, various ideational theories have unquestionably constituted the 
strongest ideational branch. However, toward the 1990s, social constructivism and 
cultural theories gained a stronger foothold in the field.  
 
Interestingly, the ideational approaches of FPA have been reluctant to communicate 
with each other, although they have a mutual interest in understanding the ways in 
which reality is represented. However, whereas psychological theories have dealt 
with individuals and their beliefs, constructivists have been interested in the social 
world. Regrettably, the absence of communication has implications for the 
theoretical solidity of the approaches, since the lack of dialogue magnifies the 
weaknesses of both branches. Cognitive theories have been criticized for 
reductionism, while constructivism, in turn, has been accused of neglecting the 
significance of human agency. Unsurprisingly, scholars across the fields of IR and 
FPA have called for an approach that could draw together psychological and social 
standpoints. 
 
Strikingly, very few scholars have taken these calls seriously. The most notable 
endeavor to promote ideational dialogue is the 2012 volume edited by Vaughn P. 
Shannon and Paul M. Kowert, Psychology and Constructivism in International Relations: An 
Ideational Alliance. In the book, the authors establish an ideational alliance against the 
rationalist approaches of FPA, by creating an empirical and theoretical basis for a 
synthesis between psychology and constructivism. More specifically, the ideational 
alliance merges the microfoundational elements of cognitive psychology with the 
larger social contexts – namely the social macrostructure of human behavior.  
 
This dissertation and its overarching theoretical objective builds on Shannon and 
Kowert’s work. It agrees with the aforementioned authors that it is high time to cross 
paradigmatic obstacles and immerse oneself in seeking common ground between the 
main ideational branches of FPA. However, instead of an ideational alliance, the 
thesis speaks of Ideational Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA).2 Whereas the original 
ideational alliance is predominantly preoccupied with questions of identity, this study 
gathers a number of ideational approaches under the IFPA label, and duly broadens 
the scope of ideational dialogue. It argues that the main virtue of an ideational 
alliance – the fusion between psychology and constructivism – is applicable to 
various ideational theories of foreign policy and thus to multiple levels of analysis. 
                                                   
2 Benedikt Erforth (2015, 11) has used the term ideational foreign policy analysis in his doctoral 
dissertation. However, he uses the term only once and in an incidental fashion.  
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There are four levels under scrutiny in the dissertation. The intra-state levels include 
the individual, the elite and the public levels – all of which should be approached 
through the principles of ideational dialogue. The inclusion of the inter-state level – 
which is the fourth analytical tier of the dissertation – demonstrates how individual 
and collective ideas at the intra-state level can influence state action vis-à-vis other 
states.  
 
Moreover, ‘idea’ as a concept is too broad and vague to be employed as an analytical 
tool, since ideas are practically infinite and ubiquitous. In order to conduct a sound 
analysis, one needs more specific concepts to simplify the world of ideas and to make 
it understandable. To that end, this research taps into the vocabulary of 
constructivism and political psychology, particularly cognitive and social psychology. 
The analytical concepts the dissertation utilizes include, inter alia, belief and belief 
system, identity, worldview, status, and trust. All of these terms will be elaborated in 
Chapter 3 and also in the original publications of the dissertation.   
 
The dissertation consists of five publications, which all deal with different aspects of 
Finnish foreign and security policy. When it comes to advancing theoretical 
understanding on state action, in addition to the overarching theoretical objective of 
promoting the synthesis of psychology and constructivism, every article in the 
dissertation has its own theoretical objectives that serve the broader goal. The 
purpose of Publication I on the belief system of Mauno Koivisto is to understand the 
effects of the social environment on individual beliefs. Publication II, which outlines 
the Finnish foreign policy schools of thought at the beginning of the post-Cold War 
era, promotes a view of national identity rooted in social psychology. Publication III 
in turn investigates the historical nexus between public opinion and Finnish foreign 
policy. Publication IV unpacks Finnish beliefs on the untrustworthiness of Sweden as 
a defense cooperation partner and is thus interested in the interstate-level 
manifestations of individual and collective ideas. The final study, Publication V, 
explores different aspects of Finlandization, and contains elements from all four 
levels of analysis.  
   
Even though the above-listed publications touch upon the entire period of Finnish 
independence,3 the study has a special interest in the end of the Cold War and early 
post-Cold War years. As each of the individual articles intersect the era – some more, 
some less explicitly – it generates an opportunity for the study to analyze how the 
change of an epoch affected the ideas that underlay Finnish foreign policy during 
the time. In other words, by integrating the results of the five publications, the 
dissertation seeks to understand how the ideational foundations of Finnish foreign 
policy changed during this important period of transition in world politics, and how 
                                                   
3 It must be noted that only Publication III touches upon the (interwar) years of Finland’s early 
independence. The focus of the rest of the publications is on the post-Second World War era.   
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individual and collective ideas shaped Finland’s nascent post-Cold War foreign 
policy.  
 
The main claim is that Finnish foreign policy underwent an ideational adjustment in 
which the premises of Finnish policy were adapted to a new era. More specifically, 
Finland’s foreign policy orientation turned from small-state realism to 
integrationism, which nonetheless included certain elements of traditional 
geopolitical realism. This again was the chief explanation for Finland’s decision to 
stay militarily non-aligned. Furthermore, Finnish policymakers and the elite at large 
felt a certain vindication in terms of Finland’s “Western-ness” and sovereignty, upon 
which many commentators cast doubt, particularly during the years of 
Finlandization. Finally, the dissertation suggests that the ideational milieu of Finnish 
foreign policymaking underwent a process of relaxation. In other words, as internal 
and external constraints loosened, there was more room for competing ideas about 
the foundations of Finnish foreign policy.  
 
1.2 Research Questions 
 
As mentioned above, the dissertation comprises five studies, whose main features 
and results are summarized in Chapter 4. Each study has its own research interests, 
and the publications investigate different aspects of Finnish foreign and security 
policy. This section introduces the research questions of the publications and, 
additionally, the overarching questions concerning the end of the Cold War based 
on the integration of the results and insights of the five publications.  
 
Publication I concentrates on the ideas of an individual, namely on the belief system 
of Mauno Koivisto, the President of Finland from 1982 to 1994. By using qualitative 
operational code analysis as a theoretical framework, it addresses three research 
questions: 
 
x What kind of foreign policy belief system did Mauno Koivisto have? 
x Did the end of the Cold War bring about a change in Koivisto’s belief 
system? 
x How did Koivisto’s life experience and societal factors influence his beliefs 
regarding international politics and foreign policy? 
 
Publication II again explores intersubjective ideas at the elite level, as it outlines the 
Finnish foreign policy schools of thought of the early post-Cold era. It seeks to 
understand how the Finnish foreign policy elite saw the emerging post-Cold War 
world and Finland’s place in it. The article poses two main research questions:   
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x What were the Finnish foreign policy schools of thought at the beginning of 
the post-Cold War era and how did they view the changing world? 
x How did the ideas fostered by the respective schools influence Finnish 
foreign policy during the early post-Cold War years? 
 
Publication III in turn adopts a broader perspective by investigating public opinion’s 
role in Finnish foreign and security policy. It simply probes the question: 
 
x What role has been played by public opinion and its historical evolution in 
Finnish foreign and security policy? 
 
Publication IV investigates how certain ideas can influence bilateral relations 
between two states. More precisely, it is interested in how the idea of 
(un)trustworthiness has influenced the contemporary Finnish-Swedish defense 
relationship. After identifying a curious lack of trust toward Sweden among the 
Finnish foreign policy elite, it poses the question:  
x What are the reasons for the existing mistrust toward Sweden among the 
Finnish foreign policy elite? 
 
Publication V is a reaction to the re-emergence of the model and concept of 
Finlandization, as it was suggested by prominent commentators as a solution to the 
Ukrainian crisis. The study’s aim is to clarify what the Finnish experience of 
Finlandization actually meant, and it addresses three questions:  
 
x Which factors constituted Finlandization? 
x Did the Finnish accommodative attitude toward the Soviet Union go too 
far? 
x What are the lessons learnt regarding Finlandization as a national security 
strategy? 
 
Publication V has a less explicit theoretical framework compared to the first four 
articles.  However, Finlandization is perhaps one of the most well-known ideas in 
the history of Finnish foreign policy, and it deserves to be evaluated from a 
theoretical point of view as well. Thus, in Chapter 4, the dissertation sheds further 
light on Finlandization and evaluates it from the perspective of IFPA.  
 
As all five studies touch upon the end of the Cold War, and as they deal with multiple 
levels of analysis, it gives the dissertation an interesting opportunity to examine 
Finnish foreign policy during the formative period of change. In other words, the 
dissertation seeks to understand what the end of the Cold War meant for the 
ideational environment of Finnish foreign policymaking. Hence, it poses three 
general research questions. 
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x What did the end of the Cold War mean for Finnish foreign policy in terms 
of its ideational foundations? 
x What factors contributed to change on the one hand, and continuity on the 
other? 
x Can ideas explain the key doctrinal decisions of the era such as accession to 
the European Union and adhering to military non-alignment?  
 
1.3 Research Material and Methodological Standpoints 
 
The research material that the dissertation unpacks is comprehensive, and mainly 
comprises textual data. Although the articles contain more specific information on 
the material, it is worth providing a brief overview. Publication I goes through multiple 
primary sources such as official statements and speeches, memoirs, newspaper and 
television interviews, transcriptions of interviews and other archival material from 
the archives of the Office of the President of the Republic of Finland. Moreover, it 
uses information gathered from an oral history session, and also relies on second-
hand insights and existing research. Publication II again analyses op-eds and columns, 
newspaper and magazine articles, speeches and books from the early post-Cold War 
period. In Publication III, the emphasis is more on secondary sources such as historical 
works about various phases of Finnish foreign policy, but also on news material and 
memoirs. Publication IV explores news material and op-eds, official statements and 
memoirs. Moreover, it has analyzed archival material from the archives of the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. Lastly, Publication V examines memoirs, 
diaries, speeches, and material from the archives of the Finnish Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, but it mainly bases its arguments on a thorough review of existing 
historiography and research literature.      
 
The methodological standpoints of the dissertation can best be labelled as qualitative 
content analysis, which is simply “a method for systematically describing the 
meaning of qualitative material” (Schreier 2012, 1). The aim is to draw meaningful 
inferences from the data, namely text or other form of communication (Weber 1990, 
19). The method is widely used across the social sciences, and the approach has also 
become popular and well-established both within IR and FPA (McDermott 2004; 
Pashakhanlou 2017). However, it is worth noting that there are various types of 
qualitative content analysis. Hsieh & Shannon (2005) categorize the method into 
three distinctive approaches: conventional, directed, and summative analysis. In 
conventional qualitative content analysis the analytical categories are derived from 
the textual material. In the directed method, the analysis starts with the theoretical 
framework of the study, which guides the systematic analytical process. The 
summative variant involves counting and comparison of keywords or content, and 
also interpretation of the underlying context.  
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This study employs both directed and conventional approaches, although the 
emphasis is on the former. The type and rigidity of the methodology vary from one 
article to another. In Publications I, II and IV the approach is directed since the 
analytical categories used to analyze the material stem from certain clearly defined 
theoretical frameworks, namely operational code analysis, national identity, and trust. 
Publication III has both deductive and inductive dimensions. Theories of public 
opinion provide direction for the examination, but analytical observations are 
deduced from the text. The method in Publication V is mixed. On the one hand, it 
identifies “models of Finlandization” in a conventional fashion but then applies one 
type of the phenomenon to the study of Finland’s experience. Moreover, since the 
article contains insights from the archives, it has applied the principles of historical 
criticism. 
  
The dissertation has certain focal meta-theoretical standpoints on which the key 
assumptions of the theoretical framework rely. These premises again affect the way 
in which this study approaches theory (Kurki & Wight 2013, 14). First, the most 
obvious position of the work is that in the study of foreign policy, the ideational 
reality is analytically significant, in addition to material structures. Thus, along with 
observable entities, non-observable matters also have ontological significance, and 
are in fact the point of interest of this research. However, importantly, materialist 
and ideational factors are not separate entities but mutually constitutive (Tannenwald 
2005, 20–21). In other words, ideas can shape material factors and, moreover, ideas 
give meaning to material structures. Indeed, without ideational content, the material 
structures are rather hollow. One of the most illuminating encapsulations about the 
role of ideas giving meaning to material structures comes from Alexander Wendt 
(1995, 73), and touches upon perceptions of nuclear weapons. As Wendt argues:  
 
500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States 
than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons, because the British are friends 
of the United States and the North Koreans are not, and amity or 
enmity is a function of shared understandings.  
 
However, although ideas affect material realities, the relationship works in both 
ways, since a change in material realities might well result in transformation in the 
ideational realm. Post-Second World War Germany and its civilian foreign policy is 
perhaps the most illustrative example of how tangible material changes – a total 
defeat in a war – can profoundly transform the foundations of the principles and 
objectives of a nation’s foreign affairs (see e.g. Bagger 2019).  
 
Secondly, as to the explaining-understanding conundrum in IR epistemology, the 
standpoint of the dissertation is on the understanding side. More specifically, instead 
of following scientific methods and identifying general causes, it seeks to understand 
internal meanings, in other words how individual interpretations of reality shape 
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policy and, furthermore, how shared collective understanding influences human 
action. This is not to say that ideas cannot have any causal significance.  
 
The explaining-understanding conundrum has puzzled scholars for decades. Within 
IR, there is no unified way to approach the dilemma. Some scholars have argued that 
one has to choose between either explaining or understanding (Hollis-Smith 1990). 
Other researchers see the problem in a practical light and argue that choosing one’s 
approach is dependent on the research question (Wendt 1987). The third school 
posits that in order for a scholar to conduct meaningful analysis, both explanation 
and understanding are needed (Carlsnaes 1992; Patomäki 1996). Although the 
studies that make up the dissertation stem from the interpretative tradition, it does 
not mean that the study refuses to identify causal mechanisms. In fact, some of the 
research questions imply that an ideational approach can explain certain phenomena. 
One should perhaps remember that – like the levels of analysis problem (see 3.1) – 
the explaining-understanding dichotomy is to a great degree a heuristic tool, not an 
ontological question.  
 
Finally, the third essential meta-theoretical premise of the work is the idea of 
structuration, which lies at the very heart of constructivism. Structuration strikes a 
“third way” between methodological individualism and holism or, to put it 
differently, between the agent and the structure. More precisely, the agent-structure 
debate  
 
emerges from two uncontentious truths about social life: first, that 
human agency is the only moving force behind the actions, events, and 
outcomes of the social world; and second, that human agency can be 
realized only in concrete historical circumstances that condition the 
possibilities for action and influence its course (Dessler 1989, 443).  
 
This study does not deny that “the social world is ultimately the result of many 
individuals interacting with one another” (List & Spiekermann 2013, 629). However, 
as said in the citation above, concrete social circumstances condition and shape 
human action, and no insight explaining or understanding human behavior is 
complete without acknowledging the environment in which the actor is enmeshed. 
As Wendt (1987, 365) distills the idea of structuration: 
 
Agents are inseparable from social structures in the sense that their 
action is possible only in virtue of those structures, and social structures 
cannot have causal significance except insofar as they are instantiated 
by agents. Social action, then, is “co-determined” by the properties of 
both agents and social structures. 
 
As will be pointed out later in the study, the dissertation treats the agent-structure 
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relationship as an intra-state phenomenon, not as a state-international system dyad. 
Hence, the actors are decision-makers and members of an elite, and the structure is 
the ideational environment of a nation-state in which the individuals under scrutiny 
are embedded.  
 
1.4 Structure of the Dissertation 
 
The dissertation consists of five chapters. The Introduction already presented the 
research objective and questions. It also provided an overview of the research 
material, methodology, and meta-theoretical principles. Chapter 2 reviews the recent 
IR and FPA literature on Finnish foreign policy. Furthermore, it examines how the 
end of the Cold War has been treated in previous studies concerning Finnish foreign 
affairs. Lastly, the second chapter demonstrates how the thesis in general and the 
individual publications in particular contribute to the study of Finnish foreign policy.  
 
Chapter 3 presents the analytical framework of the thesis. It begins with an 
introduction to the FPA tradition, followed by an outline of the overarching 
theoretical perspective, namely IFPA. The chapter then moves on to introduce the 
theories applied in the individual publications. It is worth noting that the chapter 
presents the theories as a necessary background to the studies, which apart from 
Publication V contain specific theoretical frameworks. There is some inevitable 
overlap between the chapter and the publications, but unnecessary theoretical 
repetition is avoided. After the introduction to FPA and IFPA, the chapter deals 
with cognitive foreign policy analysis in general and operational code analysis in 
particular. One of the key questions will be how the cognitive and social worlds 
interact. The subsequent section shifts the attention to the next level of analysis, 
taking up the significance of collective ideas in general and the role of national 
identity in particular. Importantly, it sketches a bottom-up approach to national self-
images. From collective ideas and identities, the chapter proceeds to unpack the 
relationship between foreign policy and public opinion. The section demonstrates 
when public opinion likely affects policy-making, when public opinion is 
disregarded, and when public attitudes and foreign policy are disconnected. The 
analysis then proceeds to the inter-state level and puts the issue of trust under 
scrutiny. It presents the various interpretations of trust that stem from different IR 
paradigms and calls for a multi-paradigmatic understanding of trust. Lastly, the 
chapter concludes with a theoretical round-up and reflection on how the principles 
of IFPA should be applied in the analysis of foreign policy.  
 
Chapter 4 consists of summaries of the publication and also presents the key results. 
The sections on Publication III and Publication V contain short theoretical notes, which 
expand and elaborate on the theoretical foundations of the studies. The articles as a 
whole are included at the end of the dissertation. The final chapter integrates the 
results of the individual studies and duly answers the overarching research questions 
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set in the introduction. The final section of the study ends with an epilogue, 
illustrating what the end of the Cold War signified for Finnish foreign policy in light 
of the turbulence in European security that started in 2014 up to the time of writing.  
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2. Finnish Foreign Policy and International Relations  
 
 
 
 
2.1 The Six Strands of Studies on Finnish Foreign Policy   
 
Although Finland is a minor player in international politics and the conduct of its 
foreign affairs rarely gains worldwide attention, there is a surprising amount of 
research dealing with the different aspects and eras of Finnish foreign policy.4 
Indeed, Finnish foreign policy has interested not only IR scholars but also political 
scientists, and diplomatic historians in particular, most of whom come either from 
Finland or other Nordic states. Furthermore, popular books and memoirs are 
published frequently, which feeds lively national public debate on national security 
issues (see e.g. Aaltola 2019; Haukkala 2012; Himanen 2017; Tarkka 2013, 2015; 
Valtasaari 2009).   
 
This chapter presents a brief but comprehensive overview of the recent IR and FPA 
scholarship concerning Finnish foreign policy, and also outlines how the dissertation 
contributes to the literature in question. Since there are comprehensive texts 
summarizing the developments of the scholarship in the Cold War and early post-
Cold War era (see Aaltola 2003; Apunen 2012; Patomäki 1991), the focus of this 
review is primarily on the past two decades (see also Sinkkonen & Vogt 2015). It 
identifies six different strands of research: identity, Europeanization, strategic 
culture, foreign policy decision-making, foreign policy doctrine and practice-based 
analysis, and introduces the key works of each strand in brief. When one examines 
the branches, it becomes clear that studies on Finnish foreign policy have 
predominantly stemmed from ideational theories, namely constructivism. One can 
thus claim that the scholarship suffers from a constructivist bias. On a self-critical 
note, this study does not do very much to remedy this state of affairs, but it 
nonetheless fills notable research gaps in the IR/FPA literature on Finnish foreign 
policy (see 2.3).  
 
The concept of identity has been widely used to unearth the ideational premises and 
conditions of Finnish foreign policymaking. Most notably, Christopher S. Browning 
has published multiple studies on Finnish national identity, with a particular focus 
on the developments that have taken place since the end of the Cold War. These 
trends include the “Westernization” of Finland’s foreign policy and identity, a more 
positive evaluation of Finland’s small-state identity, and the waning of Nordicity in 
                                                   
4 The 2015 bibliography on the webpage of the Finnish Foundation for Foreign Policy Research 
is an extensive list of the various publications about Finnish foreign security and defense policy. 
See <https://www.ulkopolitiikantutkimus.fi/7206>.  
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the respective foreign policies of the Nordic states, including Finland (Browning 
2002, 2006, 2007).5 However, his most noteworthy work on the matter covers 
Finnish foreign policy from the early years of independence to the first two post-
Cold War decades, and pays attention to various identity narratives that have shaped 
Finnish foreign policy during its independence (Browning 2008).  
 
Browning is not the only scholar to explore Finnish foreign affairs from an identity 
perspective. Teija Tiilikainen (1998, 2006) has examined the relationship between 
Finnish identity and its integration policy, particularly vis-à-vis the way in which 
Finland adapted its small-state and state-centric self-image to the requirements of 
EU membership and to the workings of the Union. Teemu Palosaari (2013), who 
also appraised Finnish identity adaptation to the post-Cold War environment, 
concluded that as an EU member Finland has adjusted its identity toward 
“member‐ state alignment” and “small‐ EU‐ member‐ stateness”. Mika Aaltola 
(2011), who to some extent echoes Browning’s views on Finland’s more positive 
evaluation of its national identity, has in turn pointed out that Finnish leaders have 
in fact defined Finland’s identity quite flexibly in order to overcome the constraints 
of geopolitics. In their exploration of Finnish Cold War history, Juhana Aunesluoma 
and Johanna Rainio-Niemi (2016) in turn argue that, in contrast to the views positing 
that neutrality was primarily a foreign policy instrument, neutrality became ingrained 
in the national self-image. Tuomas Forsberg (2016) has observed that several identity 
interpretations exist in the Finnish NATO debate. He claims that the supporters and 
opponents of Finnish membership in NATO have voiced their arguments based on 
some identity interpretations; whereas the supporters claim that membership in the 
Alliance would consolidate Finland’s Western identity, the opponents – who do not 
deny Finland’s Western-ness – say that the country should rather enshrine its 
autonomy and non-alignment and not identify with an allegedly coercive 
organization. Lastly, Marco Siddi (2017) has studied how the different 
representations of Russia have varied in Finland’s identity discourse throughout its 
independence.  
 
In addition to probing Finnish national identity, scholars have paid special attention 
to the Europeanization of Finnish foreign policy – a phenomenon that is closely 
related to the formation and change of Finnish state identity (see e.g. Jokela 2011). 
However, since the concept has been employed so regularly, it merits closer attention 
as an independent analytical endeavor. Palosaari (2011, 2016), who has studied 
Finnish post-Cold War foreign policy comprehensively, has argued that the country’s 
foreign policy has undergone not only a process of “thin” but also “thick” 
Europeanization. This implies that Finland has not only made organizational and 
                                                   
5 In the latest research on the role of “Nordicness” in Finnish foreign policy, Ojanen and Raunio 
(2018) argue that “Nordicness” is still an instrument in Finnish foreign policy. Moreover, the 
country has also stood out somewhat from the Nordic states, since it has traditionally prioritized 
security over traditional Nordic values.  
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policy changes but, through socialization, it has adopted certain aspects from the EU 
as part of its self-image. In practice, this has for example meant a less restricted 
reading of military non-alignment and more civilian and military crisis management 
at the expense of traditional peacekeeping. According to Juha Jokela (2011), 
Finland’s national identity underwent a process of Europeanization during the 
1990s, and the former neutral identity transformed into a more Western self-image. 
However, Hiski Haukkala and Hanna Ojanen (2011) have observed that the 
Europeanization of Finnish foreign policy has not been a straightforward process. 
Rather, the development has been characterized by pendulum swings between 
Europeanization and persistent distinctive national features. Furthermore, Kristi 
Raik (2015) has interestingly claimed that in Finland and Estonia instrumental 
reasons outweigh the ideational standpoints in guiding the nations’ respective 
activities with regard to the EU’s common external policies. Moreover, their national 
identities and perspectives remain strong. Thus, the instrumental attitude and the 
preponderance of national perspectives constitute limits to a deeper 
Europeanization of Finland’s and Estonia’s foreign policies.   
 
Studies on Finnish strategic culture represent the thinnest strand of ideational 
approaches to Finnish foreign policy.6 The most notable analysis of Finnish strategic 
culture is the one conducted by Henrikki Heikka. In his study, he identifies a long 
continuum in Finnish strategic thinking, which he describes as republican realism. 
Although the culture has had different doctrinal manifestations, Heikka concludes 
that the main Finnish strategic objective has been the defense of an anti-hegemonic 
political order in Europe – an aspiration arising from the country’s proximity to 
Russia (Heikka 2005). Antti Seppo and Tuomas Forsberg (2009) have again 
highlighted the pivotal role that national defense plays in Finnish strategic culture 
and also in the construction of Finnish nationhood. Historical experiences, such as 
the wars fought against the Soviet Union, have endowed Finland with a positive aura. 
These experiences continue to serve as an argument for maintaining credible armed 
forces to this day.    
 
Studies dealing with Finnish foreign policy decision-making are scant, which is 
curious given the fairly open access to archival material and a short 25-year period 
of secrecy. There are, however, notable works examining different aspects of Finnish 
foreign policymaking process that are worthy of elaboration. Tuomas Forsberg and 
Christer Pursiainen (2006), for example, have analyzed Finnish crisis decision-
making and concluded that it has been highly concentrated in the hands of a small 
elite group. Fredrik Doeser’s (2017) article about Finland’s decision to refrain from 
Operation Unified Protector in Libya is again a textbook case of a classic decision-
making analysis. According to Doeser, the refusal was a result of two factors, election 
                                                   
6 The emerging debate on the schools of thought in Finnish foreign policy has notable similarities 
with the literature on Finland’s strategic culture. See Publication II, Haukkala & Vaahtoranta 2016; 
Juntunen 2018.  
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timing and Finnish strategic culture. Robust military interventions have not been a 
part of Finnish strategic behavior, and decision-makers did not want to take electoral 
risks ahead of the parliamentary elections. Additionally, there are works clarifying 
the Finnish parliament’s role in foreign policy decision-making (Koivula & Sipilä 
2011; Häkkinen 2015; Raunio 2016; Raunio & Wiberg 2001). Tommi Koivula and 
Joonas Sipilä (2011), for example, have probed how Europeanization has featured in 
Finnish and Swedish parliamentary debates regarding EU crisis management. They 
conclude that the respective parliaments have been rather secondary players in 
foreign policy decision-making and that the debates were “detached from the reality 
of their governments’ official positions and commitments within the ESDP 
[European Security and Defense Policy]”. Tapio Raunio (2016) in turn argues that 
the Eduskunta actually plays a role in foreign policy, and Members of Parliament have 
multiple instruments – such as ministerial hearings and participation in the 
formulation of key foreign policy documents – through which they are involved in 
the Finnish foreign policymaking process.  
 
Interestingly, studies scrutinizing the doctrinal aspects of Finnish foreign policy are 
mostly comparative. For instance, Tuomas Forsberg and Tapani Vaahtoranta (2001) 
sought reasons for why the “post-neutral” Finland and Sweden paradoxically accept 
almost everything in their security and defense policy except collective defense, and 
judged that possible developments in the EU can bring about change in the 
countries’ attitude toward alignment. In 2006, Laura C. Ferreira-Pereira aptly distilled 
that, in terms of their status in the post-Cold War security architecture in Europe, 
Austria, Finland, and Sweden were inside the fence but outside the walls. In other 
words, the former neutrals decided to participate in the European community-
building process through their respective EU memberships and to forge cooperative 
arrangements to enhance their security without joining collective defense efforts 
(Ferreira-Pereira 2006). Ulrika Möller and Ulf Bjereld (2010), in turn, identified two 
institutionalized feedback mechanisms that underpin Finnish and Swedish non-
alignment. They argued that as long as the two mechanisms – strategic usefulness of 
the doctrine and its appropriateness with regard to Sweden’s and Finland’s respective 
identities – do not turn negative, they continue to inform Finnish and Swedish 
foreign policymaking. 
 
Lastly, there is also interesting research drawing on the practice theory of social 
sciences and IR. Anni Kangas (2011) offers a practice-based interpretation of 
Finnish-Russia relations in the interwar era and, more precisely, of how Finland 
learned to come to terms with its proximity to Russia. Tapio Juntunen (2016a) again 
applies the concepts of practice theory to the study of the history of foreign 
policymaking. He points out how the Finnish Cold War initiative to establish a 
nuclear weapon-free zone in Northern Europe slowly grew into an almost 
unchallenged routine-like instrument to maintain regional stability and facilitate 
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security dialogue between the Nordic states, the latter of which in particular had 
intrinsic value for Finland.  
 
2.2 Finland and the End of the Cold War: Change or Continuity? 
 
Keeping the overarching research question posed in the Introduction in mind, it is 
helpful to briefly discuss how the end of the Cold War is seen in the existing literature 
on Finnish foreign policy. The emphasis in the review is on the ideational side of 
this policy. The key decisions of the era are well known, and there are many useful 
overviews of the key post-Cold War decisions (see e.g. Blomberg 2012; Tarkka 2015; 
Valtasaari 2009). Thus, it is not necessary to present a chronology of the turns in 
Finnish foreign policy in the (early) post-Cold War era. Rather, the perspective of 
this short review is what the end of the Cold War signified for Finnish foreign affairs 
in terms of its ideational foundations.  
 
Teija Tiilikainen argues that the Cold War’s state-centric worldview transcended the 
new era, although Finland made a profound political choice to join the EU. 
According to Tiilikainen: 
 
The swift turn-around in official policy, and the transformation of 
European integration from bad to good, were made predominantly in 
the spirit of the old realist world-view which puts a high emphasis upon 
State [sic] security (Tiilikainen 1998, 173). 
 
Thus, when it comes to the ideas guiding Finnish foreign policy, Tiilikainen saw no 
radical change but rather continuity; the old worldview was simply adapted to new 
realities. This is also the conclusion drawn by Railo (2010, 407–410), and which is 
further echoed by Blomberg (2011, 654). Railo claims that the political culture 
behind the ostensibly dramatic decisions remained almost the same as during the 
Cold War. More specifically, the basic underlying values and attitudes of Finnish 
foreign policy did not change. Rather, the transformation of world politics and the 
European security landscape enabled Finland to conduct a policy which was finally 
in line with its key societal values. In other words, Finland was able to align with the 
West, which had already been a tacit objective of its foreign policy. Or as Heikka 
(2005) points out: “Finland’s return to Europe” in the 1990s was part of a longer 
continuum of the republican strategic culture. 
 
Moreover, in their study on the history of Finnish identity politics, Harle and Moisio 
(2001, 178) describe Finland’s EU membership as the climax of a long national 
identity project. After the end of the Cold War, Finland was finally able to join the 
reference group, namely the West – an aspiration dating back to the 19th century. A 
key argument in their volume is that Russia has been the most significant “other” in 
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Finland’s identity. The otherness of Russia grew stronger in the new post-Cold War 
environment where Finland had given up some its old practices of Eastern policy.   
 
Not all scholars have emphasized continuity as forcefully. For example, according to 
Jokela (2011, 46–81), the change in the security environment resulted in a notable 
transformation in Finnish identity discourse. The former neutrality discourse turned 
into speech that highlighted alignment. As part of the change, identification with the 
West and its actors such as the EU and NATO became stronger in Finnish foreign 
and security policy talk. Jokela highlights the speed of the change; the transformation 
in the discourse took place during less than a decade.    
 
Christopher S. Browning (2008) in turn argues that the end of the Cold War was a 
formative period for Finns and their identity project. The collapse of the bipolar 
system effectively cut the ground from under neutrality, and suddenly there was 
more room for novel representations of Finnish identity. Moreover, Browning posits 
that a dominant Westernizing narrative emerged, which depicted Finland’s new 
Western identity against the Finlandized past. A key element of the narrative was the 
claim that Finland was finally able to “come home” to the Western community – a 
place where it belonged due to its identity and social system.   
 
In conclusion, there are two common denominators in the existing ideational 
interpretations of what the end of the Cold War meant for Finnish foreign policy. 
First, the aforementioned scholars did not see any radical break from the Cold War 
era. Although scholars have various opinions on the scope of the change, no one has 
identified a complete re-evaluation of the ideational basis of Finnish foreign policy. 
Secondly, and interrelatedly, many of the previous studies observed a degree of 
“Westernization” in the Finnish self-image, but they saw it as a part of a historical 
continuum and unfulfilled aspiration. In other words, the end of an epoch 
empowered ideas that were bubbling under the official surface during the Cold War 
years.    
 
2.3 Contributions to the Study of Finnish Foreign Policy 
 
Given the inclination toward constructivist and ideational research in Finnish foreign 
policy scholarship, it is worth justifying the kind of novel insights that the 
dissertation could bring to the table. Firstly, one of the most interesting and curious 
gaps in the IR and FPA literature is the lack of studies about the key individual 
decision-makers of Finnish foreign policy. Traditionally, Finnish foreign policy is 
sequenced according to presidencies. Illustratively, the Finnish Cold War foreign 
policy line – the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line – bears the name of the two Cold War 
presidents. Publication I about Mauno Koivisto’s foreign policy belief system fills part 
of the gap by putting a key decision-maker under the analytical spotlight. There is 
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definitely room for further interpretations that investigate the thinking and actions 
of individual Finnish policymakers.7 
 
Secondly, Publication II helps paint a more accurate picture of a vital period in Finnish 
foreign policy. Although studies on Finnish identity are plentiful, the concept and its 
subcategories – which have evolved during the past decade – are useful in analyzing 
Finnish foreign policy thinking in a systematic way. The early post-Cold War period, 
which has again garnered increasing scholarly interest, was formative for Finland in 
terms of situating the country in the new post-Cold War world, and it is important 
to decipher the kind of options that existed and were promoted among the Finnish 
elite. Now, with the benefit of hindsight, it is also possible to see whether Finnish 
decision-makers and commentators were on target with the visions of the future and 
where the decisions made during the time actually led the country.  
 
Publication III is the first organized theoretical effort to probe the public opinion-
foreign policy nexus in Finnish foreign affairs. Furthermore, it elaborates on the 
circumstances that led to either higher or lower relevance of public opinion in 
Finnish foreign policy. Fourthly, Finnish security policy has changed profoundly 
during the post-2014 years, as new forms of defense cooperation have been 
introduced and as ambitions regarding security and defense collaboration have 
clearly grown. This change remains under-conceptualized and under-theorized.8 
Publication IV thus seeks to understand the particular features of the increasingly 
important defense cooperation between Finland and Sweden, and duly sheds 
theoretical light on the recent steps taken in Finnish security policy. 
 
Fifthly, and lastly, a critical and analytical treatment of re-emerged historical concepts 
is essential, which is what Publication V aims to do by evaluating the Finnish 
experience of Finlandization (see also Juntunen 2017). The term is occasionally used 
not only in the Finnish but also in international debate on a range of security issues, 
and it is often treated as a theoretical ideal type not associated with Finnish foreign 
policy. Thus, it is in order to inform the potential audience of the Finnish experience 
of Finlandization, and it is also useful to theorize the Finnish experience. 
 
In terms of the larger research question on the end of the Cold War, the study is 
well-equipped to shed additional light on the matter, owing to its multi-level 
approach to Finnish foreign policy. Previous research has painted the broad 
contours of the developments of the era, which this study does not challenge per se. 
Rather, this study can inject more nuance into the literature by unpacking changes 
                                                   
7 Aino Hakovirta’s (2019) study on Kalevi Sorsa’s operational code is one notable exception in 
this regard. 
8 There are some noteworthy exceptions: Aaltola 2016; Juntunen 2016b; Möttölä 2019; Pesu 
2017b, 2018; Salonius-Pasternak 2018.  
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and continuities in individual and collective ideas that shaped Finnish foreign 
policymaking at the intersection of the two eras of world politics.  
 
On a final note, one could also argue that by studying Finland, the dissertation 
advances a broader theoretical goal. More precisely, FPA is to a great extent a US-
centric endeavor, and there is a need for a broader outlook that widens the scope of 
analysis beyond the US. Indeed, after the waning of the comparative perspectives of 
FPA, foreign-policy scholars increasingly conducted single-country studies, often 
focusing on the United States (Kaarbo 2003, 157). As a result, studies on American 
foreign policy have duly proliferated, and FPA’s theoretical and methodological 
preferences have reflected the North American intellectual predominance in the 
study of foreign policy (Brummer & Hudson 2017). In addition to US-centrism, FPA 
has to a great extent explored the policies of great powers. Although small-state 
action rarely has systemic implications, cases of lesser power strategic behavior 
“might help explain how each copes with security issues in its own neighborhood 
and place within the global economy” (Balzacq et al. 2019, 77). Hence, studies on 
small states do have something to contribute to the FPA literature.  
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3. Introducing Ideational Foreign Policy Analysis 
 
 
 
 
3.1 What is Foreign Policy Analysis? 
 
Before elaborating on how one should study foreign policy, one must first 
understand the analytical focus of the research tradition, namely foreign policy itself.9 
There are obviously numerous ways to define the essence of foreign policy. Deborah 
J. Gerner (1995, 18), for example, describes foreign policy as “the intentions, 
statements, and actions of an actor – often, but not always, a state – directed toward 
the external world and the response of other actors to these intentions, statements 
and actions”. According to Christopher Hill (2003, 3), foreign policy is “the sum of 
official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in 
international relations”. A Finnish textbook describes foreign policy as a state action 
that is oriented toward other states or international organizations or a country’s 
action in the international system (Forsberg & Vaahtoranta 1993, 11). This study 
subscribes to the definitions above and, thus, understands foreign policy as a state’s 
interest-based interaction with state or non-state actors in the various domains of 
the international system.  
 
However, although conceptual definitions matter, this study is primarily interested 
in how the action itself takes shape. These processes have long fascinated historians, 
political scientists, practitioners and other commentators. Hence, research and 
analysis on foreign affairs existed long before a field dedicated to the scientific 
analysis of foreign policy – that is Foreign Policy Analysis – was born. FPA textbooks 
abound and, therefore, it is not necessary to go through the field in detail. Some 
remarks are in order, however, to provide an intellectual and theoretical context for 
the research.  
 
In its early years, FPA was dominated by behaviorist insights. Valerie Hudson (2013, 
17–27) categorizes the history of FPA into three partly overlapping eras. Classic FPA 
scholarship, which flourished from the late 1950s to the early 1990s, laid the 
foundation for the field. Hudson further splits classic FPA scholarship into two 
generations. The first generation took stock of group decision-making, 
organizational process and bureaucratic politics, comparative foreign policy and 
events data, whereas the second generation brought up questions on the 
                                                   
9 In his study on the history of foreign policy as a practice concept, Halvard Leira (2019) treats the 
term critically. According to him, the concept was first used in 18th-century Great Britain and 
France. Leira argues that the term was employed to guard the sphere of foreign affairs from the 
public eye and to secure the executive’s sole rights to conduct policy in the international realm. 
38 
psychological and societal milieu of foreign policy decision-making. The second 
important era for FPA was the 1970s and 1980s, when FPA underwent a period of 
self-reflection.10 In particular, Comparative Foreign Policy’s scientific methods, the 
negligence of non-quantifiable explanatory values, and the failure to produce policy-
relevant results were heavily criticized. Contemporary FPA, according to Hudson, is 
again committed to looking below the nation-state level, to building middle-range 
theories, to pursuing multi-causal explanations, to utilizing social science as a whole, 
and to viewing the decision-making process as being as important as foreign policy 
outputs.   
 
Introductory books to FPA often present the subfield in a rather uniform fashion. 
These works, for example, introduce the key individual-level theories from 
cognitive/psychological models to the rational actor model and game theory. 
Furthermore, from the state level, bureaucratic politics and group decision-making, 
institutions, and culture/identity are frequently incorporated as part of FPA. Other 
approaches considered often include public opinion, the media and the factors of 
domestic politics, such as the social system (see e.g. Alden & Aran 2016; Beach 2012; 
Hill 2003; Hudson 2013; Mintz & DeRouen 2010; Morin & Paquin 2018; Neack 
2013; Pursiainen & Forsberg 2015; Smith et al. 2008). 
 
FPA’s relationship to IR has been more complicated than one would perhaps 
imagine. It is important to note that FPA is not a theory of International Relations 
per se, but rather a subfield, consisting of a set of divergent theories that put the 
emphasis on processes taking place within a state actor. As Beach (2012, 5) has 
pointed out: 
 
FPA investigates questions related to the impact of the international 
system upon foreign policy, the impact of domestic determinants like 
public opinion and institutions, and how different decision-making 
processes matter for foreign policy trends or specific actions. 
 
Christopher Hill (2003, 22) has aptly argued that “foreign policy is a central part of 
our understanding of international relations, even if it is far from being the whole 
story”. The scope of FPA is thus much narrower compared to IR, which “deal[s] 
with almost all political phenomena that cannot be contained within the domestic 
system of a single state” (Beach 2012, 4).11 Interestingly, it has been hard to connect 
                                                   
10 Kaarbo (2003, 157) has stated, “[i]n place of the CFP [Comparative Foreign Policy] perspective, 
foreign policy analysts from the late 1970s until today have tended to adopt middle-range 
theoretical perspectives” with the emphasis on qualitative methodologies and contextual factors. 
11 There is no definitive description of International Relations. The way one defines the discipline 
largely depends on how one understands the object of research, namely international relations. A 
narrow understanding of international relations as an interaction between nation states probably 
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FPA to the theories of IR and, as a result, the subfield has been described as a free-
floating enterprise without a logical connection to the debates of IR (Houghton 
2007).  
 
According to Valerie M. Hudson (2013, 7), FPA has six hallmarks: it is multifactorial, 
multilevel, interdisciplinary, integrative, agent-oriented, and actor-specific. All six 
hallmarks are present in this study. First, the dissertation takes into account both 
psychological and social factors and, additionally, elements pertinent to domestic 
politics, namely public opinion. Multifactoriality is not a mere product of the multi-
study nature of this dissertation; individual publications also incorporate multiple 
factors in the analysis. Secondly, the multifactorial approach quite naturally leads to 
multilevel analysis (see also Neack 2013, 16–17). In this study, there are three intra-
state levels of analysis. The fourth level is the inter-state level. The operational code 
analysis scrutinizes the beliefs of a leader, thus paying attention to cognitive 
processes and personality, which are among the microstructures underlying foreign 
policy-making. The second level is the collective or elite tier and it deals with the 
elite’s intersubjective views on Finland’s self-image. The third level is the public level, 
namely ordinary citizens and their views on foreign policy. Moreover, Publication IV, 
in addition to considering Finnish elite discourse, examines how ideas can influence 
state action at the inter-state level, in this case ideas about the trustworthiness of a 
fellow state. However, as to the nature of the levels of analysis problematique, this 
study sides with Temby’s (2015) assertion that the question is more methodological 
than ontological. In other words, the levels are heuristic devices or tools for 
understanding and managing the subject of foreign policy (Neack 2013, 17). The 
number of tiers is thus not set in stone. Rather, it is up to the scholar to define the 
most fruitful approach to understanding the case at hand.12 
 
Hudson’s third FPA hallmark is interdisciplinarity – an ideal to which this study also 
adheres. The theories utilized in the publications derive from divergent disciplines 
                                                   
leads to a narrower definition of IR, whereas a more comprehensive conception results in a 
broader view of the branch of science (see Brown & Ainley 1997, 3–11). 
12 Within IR and FPA, there have been a number of ways to approach the levels of analysis 
problem. J. David Singer (1961), for example, outlines two levels – the international system and 
the national state. Kenneth Waltz (1959) divides international politics into three tiers, namely 
Man (the individual level), the State, and War (international system). Robert Jervis (1976, 15) – 
one of the most notable foreign policy scholars – is more mindful of the complexities within a 
state. He singles out three intrastate levels, namely decision-making, the workings of bureaucracy 
and the nature of the state and domestic politics, the fourth level being the international 
environment. James Rosenau (1966 43), another FPA heavyweight, goes even further by 
emphasizing five factors or levels: the idiosyncrasies of a decision-maker, the roles they assume, 
the governmental variables limiting or enhancing the choices decision-makers make, non-
governmental aspects of a society and, finally, systemic variables of the international 
environment.  
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such as psychology, social psychology and sociology.13 What follows is that the 
dissertation is also integrative, for it incorporates different information from 
numerous sources and disciplines. In the agent-structure debate (see 1.3), FPA’s 
focus is clearly on agency and thus highlights the primacy of individuals in explaining 
and understanding a state’s foreign policy (Houghton 2007, 25). This is the case with 
the dissertation as well. It is orientated toward agency, more specifically human 
agency. Moreover, it does not “black-box” individuals but rather sees them as central 
agents in determining foreign policy action.  
 
3.2 Ideational Foreign Policy Analysis  
 
As stated, FPA is a theoretically rich tradition of co-existing and sometimes 
competing views about foreign policymaking. It is, however, difficult to aggregate 
the field into different schools or theoretical families.14 There are not only divergent 
ontological and epistemological views, but also different levels of analysis within the 
subfield, which complicates endeavors to categorize the field. One – albeit not all-
encompassing – way to categorize the tradition is to split FPA into two camps: 
ideational and rational/materialist.15 The ideationalist school consists of 
psychological theories that highlight the subjective nature of reality and the 
importance of ideational factors such as norms and shared identities (Shannon 2012, 
7). In turn, materialist and rational approaches differ from ideational theories in 
crucial respects. Most importantly, they downplay the importance of the 
representations of reality for foreign policymaking. According to Browning (2008, 
19),  
 
[d]ominant approaches to FPA share an acceptance of rationalism and a 
materialist ontology. Materialism argues that what exists in the world is 
what we can physically see and touch. Reality is thus viewed as 
comprised of tangible, palpable and perceptible things and objects, with 
materialism consequently often tied to an empiricist epistemology 
(Browning 2008, 19). 
 
                                                   
13 Not only in FPA but also in IR, combining knowledge and tools from divergent disciplines is 
fruitful (see e.g. Aalto et al. 2011). However, one also has to bear in mind that IR, in and of itself, 
is interdisciplinary, given the fact that it is rooted in different philosophical, humanistic, and social 
scientific traditions (see e.g. Knutsen 1997).  
14 Walter Carlsnaes (2001, 334) makes a distinction between two traditions of foreign policy 
analysis. On the one hand, there are theories of Innenpolitk that highlight the role of domestic 
factors in the explanation of foreign policy. On the other hand, there are Realpolitik traditions that 
again put explanatory weight on systemic-level factors. 
15 For example, theories of bureaucratic politics or post-structuralist approaches do not 
necessarily fit into this typology. The former can basically utilize either one of the two views, and 
post-structuralist and critical theories again stem from a different ontological approach.   
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The idea of rationality stems from the premise that individuals are expected-utility-
maximizing agents. This idea is not necessarily problematic per se, but it rests on shaky 
assumptions. First, according to rationalism, actors are conscious of the choices they 
are making. Secondly, they also engage in systematic classification of different 
possible options. Thirdly, actors act in line with the alternative that maximizes their 
utility, by taking into account the risks involved and the information at their disposal. 
Thus, actors should not subdue their interests to prevailing norms or cultural 
traditions (Morin & Paquin 2018, 218–219).  
 
This study does not deny that actors make utility-maximizing choices based on their 
interests. As Kowert (2012, 31–32) has put it, “even the most botched efforts at 
policy-making are usually recognizable as (sometimes faint) approximations of 
rational choice”. However, rational decision-making does not play out similarly 
across the board. Rather, instead of being utility-maximizing agents, humans are 
social actors with limited rationality (see 3.3). In other words, their rationality is 
affected by their belief systems and the social environment in which they are situated. 
These factors should be considered in efforts to analyze foreign policy, and the 
dissertation pays attention to the very ideational factors that permeate rational 
decision-making.  
 
To put it differently, the thesis is interested in how both subjective and collective ideas 
affect foreign policy and how idiosyncratic and shared ideas are related – a task that 
requires an integrated view of ideational theories. So far, surprisingly little dialogue 
and collaboration has taken place among the ideational branches of FPA. This is 
peculiar since there has been an understanding of the potential usefulness of such an 
approach from the start of FPA (Houghton 2007, 31). For example, Richard C. 
Snyder, in one of the classics of the FPA literature, recognized the necessity of taking 
ideational perspectives into account in understanding the roots of action in the realm 
of foreign policy. He argued that  
 
[i]t is difficult to see how we can account for specific actions and for 
continuities of policies without trying to discover how their operating 
environment is perceived by those responsible for choices, how 
particular situations are structured, what values and norms are applied 
to certain kinds of problems, what matters are selected for attention, 
and how their past experience conditions present responses (Snyder 
1962, 5).  
 
In the decades that followed, multiple scholars have shared this conviction and called 
for joint analytical efforts between psychology and constructivism (see e.g. Finnmore 
& Sikkink 1998, 896–899; Flanik 2011; Goldgeier & Tetlock 2001, 83; Houghton 
2007; Hymans 2010; Wendt 1999, 134). Houghton (2007, 27), for example, points 
out that “approaches that emphasize the manner in which reality is constructed are 
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natural bedfellows, even though…social construction and its individual counterpart 
clearly operate at different levels of analysis”. Tannenwald (2005, 18) again claims 
that constructivist and cognitivist approaches both share the view that “the way 
people interpret the world and define their interests is based on ideas”. For one 
reason or another, progress has been rather modest. Perhaps scholars have seen 
divergent ontological standpoints as insurmountable and, moreover, seeking and 
valuing inter-paradigmatic collaboration and “compatibilism” have not been in 
vogue in IR until recently (Lake 2013; Mouritzen 2017; Sil & Katzenstein 2010). 
 
Although progress in the joint ideational effort has been modest, there are solid 
initiatives to bring psychology and constructivism closer together. The most 
significant contribution to promoting and developing ideational dialogue is Vaughn 
P. Shannon and Paul A. Kowert’s (2012) edited volume Psychology and Constructivism 
in International Relations: An Ideational Alliance. The book lays the foundation for an 
“ideational alliance” between cognitive psychology and constructivism. The 
introductory chapters and the ensuing articles convincingly show that it is possible, 
fruitful, and necessary to apply social and psychological theories in order to 
understand the ideational milieu in which foreign policymaking takes place.  
 
The key insight of the opus is that even though psychology and constructivism differ 
in many respects, they are not incompatible. Rather, they support each other’s 
weaknesses, since the paradigms deal with different levels of analysis. Traditional 
applications of cognitive psychology in foreign policy analysis are allegedly 
reductionist, static, universal, and transcultural, and they are said to neglect the social 
and political environment in which decision-makers are situated. Constructivism can 
inform psychological boundaries on how certain cultural or societal values and 
norms constrain or direct an individual’s preferences. Constructivism, again, is often 
structurally biased and might lack insights into agency (see e.g. Sending 2002). 
Sometimes, purely social explanations fail to explain variation in state action, which 
can be caused by divergent individual attitudes. To put it briefly, the point of the 
ideational alliance is to demonstrate  
 
how the virtues of constructivism set macrostructural boundaries on 
the perceptions of values and possible responses based on prevailing 
norms and identity, while psychology provides microfoundations16 for 
the motives behind normative behavior and identity change (Shannon 
2012, 14; see also McDermott 2004, 13).    
 
                                                   
16 According to Lake (2013, 573), “in the last decade or so there has been an increasing and […] 
appropriate demand that mid-level theories have explicit ‘micro-foundations’ or […] a ‘causal 
mechanism’. In other words, theories are preferred which can link the incentives and actions of 
real individuals or possibly groups of relatively homogeneous individuals to policy outcomes in a 
consistent way”. See also Kertzer & Zeitzoff 2017.  
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In other words, although individual policy-makers’ opinions might be rooted in 
social and historical circumstances and although they seek policy options from 
socially and politically appropriate alternatives (see e.g. Legro 1996; Weldes 1996), 
“actors are not [mere] bearers of structural components, but independent agents” 
with their own, sometimes decisive idiosyncrasies (Abe 2012, 683–685).    
 
Furthermore, the primary concerns of the ideational alliance constitute a triangle in 
which obligation, identity, and choice are the vertexes of the tripod. These three 
themes also recur throughout the book. In other words, the premise of the ideational 
alliance is that both psychological and social factors are needed to understand how 
people make choices. Decision-making is shaped by identity, on the one hand, and 
by the sense of obligation, on the other. In other words, personal identity is an 
important guide to one’s intent and, in order to make a choice, one must also reckon 
with normative constraints imposed by the societal environment (Kowert 2012). 
 
This study commends the endeavor by Shannon and Kowert and seeks to advocate 
and complement the dialogue between psychology and constructivism in FPA. 
However, instead of ideational alliance, the dissertation speaks of Ideational Foreign 
Policy Analysis. There are two reasons for the choice. First, Shannon and Kowert’s 
contribution does not encompass individual belief system studies, public opinion, or 
the question of trust, unlike this study, which aims to broaden the ideational horizon. 
In other words, IFPA incorporates additional theoretical perspectives and levels of 
analysis into the realm of ideational dialogue. Thus, it serves as an umbrella for the 
various ideational approaches of FPA. Secondly, the decision to use another concept 
is a matter of semantics. To imply that a theoretical construct is against something 
sends a strong signal, and it is perhaps unnecessary to see material/rational and 
ideational views as polar opposites, which is in fact something the authors of the 
volume note. As the study will soon elaborate, normative compliance requires 
strategic thinking and, moreover, psychological views are based on the idea of limited 
rationality. One could then perhaps state that this study rejects the utility of purely 
rationalist and materialist theories but not the entire idea of rationality.  
 
As the broad theoretical contours of the work have now been drawn, it is in order 
to elaborate what ideas actually are. The term idea is not only vague but also too 
broad to have any analytical value without conceptual specifications. Obviously, in 
IFPA, salient ideas are confined to the world of foreign policy and international 
relations. For instance, ideas about the nature of international politics and its actors, 
and views about one’s nation’s values and position in the international system stand 
out as important ideas guiding foreign policy action. In this particular study, ideas 
refer to individual and public beliefs, collective identities and the perceived 
trustworthiness of other states, for example. These and other important ideational 
concepts will be thoroughly introduced and analyzed later in the study.  
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The basic assumption running through this dissertation is that ideas should be 
divided into individual and collective ideas. In other words, ideas are both mental 
and social phenomena. (Tannenwald 2005, 15). Individual ideas are subjective 
constructs and representations of reality, which, depending on the circumstances, 
might significantly influence an individual’s definition of the situation at hand, his 
decisions and, ultimately, his actions (see 3.3.2). Collective ideas in turn refer to 
intersubjective knowledge. According to Legro’s (2000, 420) description, 
“[collective] ideas are social and holistic” and they “are not simply individual 
conceptions that are shared or added together”. Individuals can influence collective 
ideas, but they also have an intersubjective existence that transcends the individual 
roots. In other words, collective ideas are typically embodied in institutions, symbols, 
and discourse. Another underlying stance of this study is that the individual and 
collective levels are related through multiple mechanisms. There is thus a link 
between the cognitive and social worlds. Through political action, entrepreneurship 
or persuasion individuals can transfer their individual beliefs and preferences to the 
collective level. The intersubjective world again influences the individual level, for 
example via socialization, social conformity and learning. All of these mechanisms 
will be touched upon in the following chapters of the dissertation.   
 
One can approach ideas from two perspectives. Most scholars share the opinion that 
ideas have both causal and constitutive effects. From a causal perspective, ideas 
influence policies or “lead to changes in intersubjective understandings”. Ideas 
operate through either individual or collective causal mechanisms such as 
socialization or learning (see 3.3.2) or identity (see 3.3.3). From a constitutive 
perspective, ideas are those structures that define actors and their properties. 
According to this point of view, ideas are not mere guidelines, but they give meaning 
to material circumstances and they also generate conditions for action (Tannenwald 
2005, 29–30, 33). 
 
It is noteworthy that although the focus of this investigation is on ideas that exist 
within the “black box” of the state, it must be highlighted that ideas are transnational. 
Thus, the image of a purely domestic ideational landscape is a necessary 
simplification. States are not hermetical entities but are rather influenced by the 
international environment also in ideational and normative questions. Ideas 
penetrate borders and spread globally, for example through transnational networks 
and international institutions, in which policymakers and other important individual 
actors are involved. How international ideas take root in societies is a complex 
question. Their localization, acceptance or rejection can, for instance, depend on the 
domestic structure of the “target state” (see e.g. Acharya 2004; Checkel 2005; Risse-
Kappen 1994). 
 
Next, the dissertation will introduce the ideas that are examined in the specific 
studies. It starts from the individual level, and deals with the literature on cognitive 
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psychology and belief systems. The first section is followed by an analysis of the elite 
level, namely constructivism in general and the concept of national identity in 
particular. The third part concerns the nexus between public opinion and foreign 
policy, making the case for why the public level should also be included in the IFPA. 
The last section explores the importance of trust in foreign policy, thus moving to 
the inter-state level, where intra-state ideas finally materialize and turn into foreign 
policy.  
 
3.3 Individual Ideas: Beliefs and Foreign Policy 
 
3.3.1 Psychology and FPA  
 
Theoretical approaches that build on cognitive psychology study the ideas and beliefs 
held by individuals. The proponents of these theories claim that these very factors 
are of utmost importance in explaining foreign policy behavior. Judging by their 
popularity, the arguments of political psychologists have held strong appeal, and the 
theories drawing on psychology have become a quintessential part of FPA since the 
inception of the tradition (Pursiainen & Forsberg 2015, 223). According to Robert 
Jervis (2017, 2–6), perhaps the most famous political psychologist within IR/FPA, 
political psychology has five distinctive elements. Firstly, it holds that in order to 
understand human behavior, one has to study “how people think, interpret their 
environments, and reach decisions”. Secondly, political psychology searches for 
common patterns and generalizations that also apply to individual idiosyncrasies, not 
only to groups. The third feature of the approach according to Jervis is its interest in 
the nexus between people’s behavior and their identities. Fourthly, political 
psychology acknowledges the importance of hot cognitions such as emotions, 
namely fear, anger, and pride. Lastly, political psychology appreciates the limits of a 
priori reasoning and is committed to empirical reasoning.   
 
Out of several psychological approaches,17 the study is especially interested in 
cognitive psychology, an approach that emphasizes “the content of people’s 
knowledge structures in shaping decision-making and behavior”, in other words the 
dynamics of the mind. According to an apt description of the branch, 
 
[t]he paradigmatic assumption of [cognitive psychology], supported by 
considerable empirical reality across cultures, is that humans acquire 
cognitive belief structures that tend to remain stable through selective 
memory, perception, and causal inference (Rosati 2000, 72). 
 
                                                   
17 In addition to cognitive psychology, the subdisciplines of psychology include developmental 
psychology, personality psychology, social psychology, and neurological, neurocognitive and 
physiological psychology. See e.g. McDermott (2004, 49–50).   
46 
Cognitive approaches have dominated the field of political psychology since the early 
1980s, having overshadowed personality studies and political attitudes and voting 
behavior studies (Houghton 2009, 26, 30). In IR and FPA, cognitive theories have 
also formed the backbone of psychological analysis. In short, cognitive analysis has 
focused not only on cold cognitions, such as beliefs and cognitive structures and 
styles, but also on hot cognitions like emotions. Moreover, one important strand has 
been perceptions, especially biases and heuristic shortcuts18 that individuals resort to 
in making sense of the world around them.19  
 
At the core of the cognitivist research program in FPA is the claim that “’subjective 
representations of reality’ matter in the explanation of world politics” (Schafer & 
Walker 2006, 4). In other words, the cognitivist view of foreign policy holds that 
subjective representations, such as a leader’s belief system, have causal value and that 
beliefs as microfoundations are in fact important causal mechanisms affecting the 
conduct of foreign policy.20 Shapiro and Bonham (1973, 47) describe the primary 
concerns of the approach21 as follows: 
 
The cognitive process approaches […] have attempted, in varying 
degrees, to map out the belief structures of decision makers and explore 
the implications of these structures for the way international events are 
understood and policy alternatives are considered. 
 
The cognitive approach to decision-making is underpinned by the idea of bounded 
rationality – the term coined by Herbert Simon in 1957. Bounded rationality assumes 
that people are not omniscient but limited in their cognitive abilities and 
computational skills. Rather, when it comes to the way in which bounded rationality 
sees individuals, it paints a picture of  
 
a person who is limited in computational capacity, and who searches 
very selectively through large realms of possibilities in order to discover 
what alternatives of action are available, and what the consequences of 
each of these alternatives are. The search is incomplete, often 
inadequate, based on uncertain information and partial ignorance, and 
                                                   
18 Cognitive shortcuts include, inter alia, stereotypes and historical analogies. On the latter, see e.g. 
Khong 1992.  
19 Interestingly, perception research has had a normative agenda in developing methods for the 
ways in which decision-makers could avoid misperceptions that can potentially cause serious 
consequences in international politics. See e.g. Jervis 1976.  
20 On causal mechanisms in social sciences, see Hedström & Ylikoski (2010).  
21 In his article evaluating the explanatory power of cognitive psychology in world politics, Jerel 
A. Rosati (2000) introduces five basic ways in which human cognition matters in foreign policy: 
1) through the content of individual beliefs and 2) through the organization and the structure of 
the belief system; 3) through patterns of perception and misperception; 4) through flexibility and 
rigidity of belief systems; and 5) through the impact on policymaking.   
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usually terminated with the discovery of satisfactory, not optimal, 
courses of action (Simon 1985, 295). 
 
Thus, cognitive perspectives treat the decision-maker as a Homo Psychologicus. In 
contrast to Homo Economicus, the ideal type that the rational choice theory promotes, 
the former is only a boundedly rational actor, possessing not only imperfect 
information about the environment but also limited abilities to process information 
emanating from the external milieu. As a result, Homo Psychologicus must employ 
different cognitive shortcuts in order to cope with information abundance as well as 
shortage. Moreover, according to the cognitivist school, decision-makers are 
exposed to social pressure, which might drive them to behave irrationally, and even 
against their values (Houghton 2009, 32). Thus, within psychology, there is virtual 
unanimity on the fact that the human mind is susceptible to errors (Kahneman 2011, 
10).22 
 
Although psychological theories have been successful in establishing themselves as 
an integral part of FPA, they have also been subject to criticism. Reductionism is one 
of the recognized pitfalls of applying psychology to the study of foreign policy. In 
other words, cognitive factors alone are not sufficient when it comes to explaining a 
decision or political strategy. The criticism should be taken seriously and, therefore, 
the dissertation has adopted a contextualist approach to the cognitive world. This 
means that 
 
[p]sychological arguments acquire explanatory force only when they are 
systematically assimilated into political frameworks that take into 
account the structural, economic, and cultural conditions within which 
policy makers [sic] work (Goldgeier & Tetlock 2001, 68). 
 
The structural conditions in which decision-makers are situated are indeed 
 
important sources of beliefs, expectations, role perceptions, values, 
mind-sets, time perspectives, and cognitive and operational styles, and 
in general they provide the decisionmaker [sic] with the needed 
“symbolic sources of illumination to find his bearings in the world” 
(Vertzberger 1990, 260). 
 
                                                   
22 On the other hand, when it comes to good judgement in international politics, Tetlock (1992) 
argues that there are three different schools. “The sceptics” think that good judgement in world 
politics is rare, whereas “the complexifiers” are of the opinion that good judgement is possible if 
cognitive biases are somehow transcended. The third school, “the fundamentalists”, view 
judgement as a process-oriented matter and omit short-term distractions such as heuristics and 
biases.  
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As pointed out earlier, culture and shared ideas constitute a significant contextual 
factor in which individuals are embedded, and their subjective ideas receive powerful 
stimuli not only from personal experiences but also from external ideational 
influences.   
 
3.3.2 What Are Beliefs and Why Do They Matter in Foreign Policy? 
 
Jonathan Renshon (2011, 171) simply defines beliefs as something we hold to be 
true. Belief systems, according to Rokeach (as cited in Nykänen 2016, 99), “represent 
all the beliefs, sets, expectancies, or hypotheses, conscious and unconscious, that a 
person at a given time accepts as true of the world he lives in”. Ole Holsti (1962, 
245) maintains that belief systems “may be thought of as the set of lenses through 
which information concerning the physical and social environment is received”. 
Compared to other concepts – such as attitudes – beliefs do not include evaluative 
components but are purely cognitive (see e.g. Larson 1994, 18–19). Individuals have 
a number of different belief systems, ranging from religion to politics. The focus of 
this dissertation is obviously on foreign policy belief systems, containing information 
and insights on the world of international politics in which states – represented by 
certain individuals – must navigate.23 
 
The very basic assumption of cognitive FPA is that beliefs indeed matter in foreign 
policymaking. Alexander L. George (1969, 191) highlights that 
 
[Beliefs] serve, as it were, as a prism that influences the actor’s 
perceptions and diagnoses of the flow of political events, his definitions 
and estimates of particular situations. These beliefs also provide norms, 
standards, and guidelines that influence the actor’s choice of strategy 
and tactics, his structuring and weighing of alternative courses of action. 
Such a belief system influences, but does not unilaterally determine, 
decision-making; it is an important, but not the only, variable that 
shapes decision-making behavior. 
 
In essence, George argues that beliefs influence the judgments policymakers draw 
from their environment, duly shaping ensuing decisions and, subsequently, policy 
outcomes. This is also the view held by Eun (2013, 373), who claims that 
 
the central political beliefs – that is to say, core views on the nature of 
political and social life and images of other political partners or 
opponents (other states or their leaders in the context of international 
relations) – held by individual national leaders can have a significant 
                                                   
23 Contemporary cognitive psychology assumes that an individual can have multiple states of 
mind that activate in different situations. In other words, a decision-maker might have not one 
but multiple belief systems concerning foreign policy (see e.g. Walker 2003).  
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influence on their actions and decisions as regards how their respective 
nations should behave in world politics. 
 
Due to limited human cognitive abilities, beliefs thus serve as tools for making sense 
of the external environment.24 As Brodin (1972, 99) puts it:  
 
[a b]elief system thus serves as an instrument that enable us to impose 
a degree of order on the constant stream of impulses we receive from 
the outer world. It facilitates our orientation towards the environment 
and makes it easier for us to determine our position in a given social 
and political context. 
 
The influence of belief systems is greatest in novel situations, demanding more than 
the application of prevailing standard operating procedures. Moreover, beliefs may 
play an important role in uncertain, non-routine situations when the information at 
the disposal of the decision-maker is scarce, contradictory, unreliable, or too 
abundant. Stressful situations, in which the decision-maker is caught off guard, or 
periods of emotional pressure may also highlight the underlying function of belief 
systems (Holsti 1977, 16–18). 
 
Although scholars have listed a number of situations where beliefs are assumed to 
play a fundamental role, it is nonetheless complex to draw a watertight link between 
beliefs and behavior, and the proponents of cognitive approaches readily 
acknowledge this fact (Jervis 2006, 657). There are situations in which the effect of 
beliefs can be called into question. First, people can sometimes act against their 
beliefs and they may have conflicting attitudes and emotions. There are also other 
environmental forces that can affect human behavior, and individuals have various 
tendencies to follow or not follow their convictions. Secondly, human action can be 
influenced by factors outside consciousness. To put it differently, there are many 
implicit mechanisms and processes influencing behavior. Thirdly, ideas are 
ubiquitous and pervasive by nature. Thus, scholars must recognize ideas that carry 
the most weight in terms of having an impact on human action. For example, beliefs 
and attitudes that come about from personal experience have a stronger influence 
on behavior than ideas that originate from observation or education. Moreover, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, ideas that stem from vested interests tend to be efficacious 
(McDermott & Lopez 2012, 198–200).   
 
                                                   
24 Separating foreign policy beliefs from domestic policy beliefs is a simplification of the more 
complex and interdependent reality of individual belief systems. According to Rathbun (2007), 
domestic and foreign policy views might share a common basic structure, in which two basic 
values – hierarchy and community – guide the (American) elite’s domestic and foreign policy 
attitudes.  
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Beliefs come in various forms and they also serve different functions. Robert Jervis 
(206, 642) maintains that beliefs can in fact refer not only to outer realities but also 
inner states. Furthermore, beliefs can also be exhortatory, meaning that stating them 
can be used to urge others and ourselves. Thirdly, and lastly, many beliefs contain an 
element of commitment and faith. Goldstein and Keohane (1993, 8–11) again divide 
beliefs into three types, which are somewhat different from Jervis’s views. The first 
type is worldviews, which define the possible universe for action. They are embedded 
in culture, and evoke deep emotions and loyalties.25 Hence, worldviews have a broad 
impact on human action. The second category introduced by Goldstein and 
Keohane is principled beliefs, which simply refer to normative ideas, for example 
about justice. Principled beliefs mediate between more fundamental worldviews and 
policy outcomes by translating doctrines into guidance of human actions. The final 
category that the two scholars bring up is causal beliefs, which concern cause-effect 
relationships. So-called causal beliefs, drawing their authority from elite consensus, 
guide individuals on how to achieve their goals and objectives. Moreover, compared 
to more fundamental worldviews and principled beliefs, causal beliefs are prone to 
change.   
 
The fact that different beliefs exist and that some views change more easily than 
others implies that not all of our beliefs are of equal weight. Rather, belief systems 
are hierarchical, meaning that some of the beliefs are fundamental in a sense that 
they define other beliefs of the same belief system. According to Larson (1994, 19), 
“belief systems are organized in concentric rings, from more central to more 
peripheral beliefs and opinions”. For example, Blum (1993, 375–377) identifies six 
“core beliefs” – ranging from the image of the individual’s own nation to images of 
allies and adversaries – and a number of intermediate beliefs primarily giving 
normative direction to policy. Blum’s third category, peripheral beliefs, includes 
“tactically relevant information about the political world”.26 Alexander L. George 
(1969), whose views the dissertation will illustrate thoroughly later on in the analysis, 
again suggests that the individual’s belief in the nature of the political world is the 
“master belief” which influences the substance of other, less weighty beliefs.27  
 
Whereas the types, structures and content of beliefs have been under the scrutiny of 
psychologically oriented foreign policy scholars, the formation of beliefs has 
garnered much less interest. Perhaps owing to the reductionist inclination of 
                                                   
25 Hiski Haukkala (2010, 36) argues along the same lines by pointing out that worldviews act as a 
bridge between cognitive processes and the cultural/social world.  
26 Tetlock’s (1991, 27–31) views on the hierarchy of beliefs echo Blum’s three-level categorization. 
At the highest level, there are fundamental assumptions and policy objectives. The second, 
intermediate level comprises strategic policy beliefs and preferences. The lowest level again 
consists of purely tactical beliefs.  
27 Importantly, foreign policy beliefs can readily be connected to other beliefs and orientations. 
According to Rathbun et al. (2016), general personal values also affect how people understand 
world politics.  
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cognitive psychology, the process of how beliefs come about is often neglected in 
the relevant research literature (Walker 1983, 180–181). Given the assertion of IFPA 
that the individual mind and the surrounding world are connected, the emergence of 
beliefs should also be studied in earnest within psychological approaches to FPA. 
Consequently, in order to understand belief formation, this study claims that both 
nature and nurture need to be taken into account; people have inherent dispositions 
and idiosyncrasies that are shaped and supplemented by new information from the 
social milieu and life experiences. As Horowitz et al. (2015, 31–32) argue, a 
“combination of situational incentives, life experiences, social forces and 
neurobiological dispositions interact to result in our actions and choices”. Thus 
innate dispositions, personal experiences and environmental forces – social contexts, 
training, schooling, parenting, and the situation at hand – influence worldviews and 
human behavior.28 This applies not only to people at the highest echelons of power 
but also to ordinary citizens.  
 
The respective processes of belief formation and change are closely connected. In 
the context of foreign policymaking, it is safe to hypothesize that when a policymaker 
assumes an office entailing foreign policy responsibilities, he already has at least some 
beliefs about international politics dating back to adolescence and education. Henry 
Kissinger (1979, 54), for example, noted that “the convictions that leaders have 
formed before reaching high office are the intellectual capital they will consume as 
long as they continue in office”.29 Therefore, when one analyzes the formation and 
change of belief systems, one is studying how existing beliefs evolve and how 
individual systems are complemented with new information. The literature on 
cognitive psychology views belief systems as being rather resistant to change (see e.g. 
Jervis 1976, 291–296). Humans are hesitant to tolerate cognitive dissonance – that 
is, possessing contradicting beliefs and attitudes – and, thus, have a tendency to 
interpret information in light of their existing beliefs and to disregard information 
that contradicts the prevailing views. This phenomenon is called confirmation bias 
and is underpinned by various processes such as information-processing shortcuts 
(heuristics), limited human information processing capability, social influence, and 
emotional and moral motivations (see e.g. Kahneman 2011; Nickerson 1998; 
Tversky & Kahneman 1974).  
 
Granted, it is an impossible task to provide a firm explanation of how an individual’s 
beliefs develop or how they change. In fact, research has been unable to provide 
solid explanations for how, when and why beliefs change, and the focus of cognitive 
                                                   
28 For an interesting journalistic overview of how education can affect stances on political issues, 
in this specific case Brexit, see Kuper 2019.  
29 However, even a well-developed belief system may not be useful in the world of policymaking. 
Justin Vaïsse (2018) has argued, for instance – not entirely convincingly – that the belief system 
Zbigniew Brzezinski developed in academia did not particularly guide his decisions as the national 
security adviser of Jimmy Carter. 
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foreign policy analysis has been rather on the stability of belief systems (Renshon 
2008, 823). Nevertheless, it is possible to offer a partial elucidation of the matter, 
since we do know that certain mechanisms play a role in the formation of beliefs. 
Personal experiences and idiosyncrasies unarguably matter, but, importantly, the 
respective and interconnected processes of belief formation and change are closely 
connected to the characteristics and developments of the environment in which an 
individual operates. This study singles out three underpinning and influencing 
factors: personal needs to adapt to the world, learning, and socialization.  
 
First, behind the belief systems, there is more than the mere need to grasp the 
complex world, although this fundamental need unarguably plays a role. As Jervis 
(2006, 641) notes, “[p]eople adopt opinions not only to understand the world, but 
also to meet the psychological and social needs to live with themselves”. In other 
words, beliefs, in addition to instrumental and heuristic value, have motivational 
foundations. According to Walker (1983), such foundations can be the need for 
power, affiliation, and achievement. This is to say that people develop and embrace 
beliefs, for example, in order to have influence; to maintain, establish or restore 
relationships; to perform accomplishments; and to attain long-term goals.  
 
In addition to the instrumental, heuristic and motivational explanations, there are 
other, more context-sensitive views about belief formation. In the literature dealing 
with the cognitive-social nexus, two important dynamics are identified: (political) 
learning and socialization. Here the direction of the dynamic is rather from the social 
world to the cognitive realm. The dissertation will discuss the reverse dynamic in the 
next section on identity and intersubjective knowledge (see 3.3.3).   
 
According to Levy (1994, 283), learning refers to “a change of beliefs (or the degree 
of confidence in one’s beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills, or 
procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience”. He 
makes a distinction between causal and diagnostic learning: 
 
“Causal learning” refers to changing beliefs about the laws (hypotheses) 
of cause and effect, the consequences of actions, and the optimal 
strategies under various conditions. “Diagnostic learning” refers to 
changes in beliefs about the definition of the situation or the 
preferences, intentions, or relative capabilities of others (Levy 1994, 
285). 
 
Another line runs between simple and complex learning (Levy 1994; Stein 1994). In 
simple learning, new information received by the individual leads to modification of 
means and methods, but not of ends. Complex learning – which recognizes conflict 
among values – results in a change not only in means but also in ends. In her article 
on learning, Stein (1994, 170–173) makes a noteworthy and important point by 
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underlining that “[l]earning is a subset of cognitive change: not all change is learning, 
but all learning is change”. Moreover, she presents two different models of learning, 
with the first referring to ill-structured problems becoming well-structured through 
a representation process. In this model, learning can be deemed successful if “the 
relevant community of problem solvers” accept the explanation. The second model 
is learning through trial and error. Failures and rounds of trial-and-error experiments 
can eventually bring about learning, not in a linear but in a rather messy, dynamic 
and interactive way. It is important to note that not all policymakers learn similarly. 
What matters is not necessarily the complexity and substance of their belief system,30 
but their willingness and openness to adopt new ideas. Some thinkers are more 
“uncommitted” in questions of foreign policy and, thus, readily embrace new 
information to guide their thinking and policies (Stein 1994).  
 
To date, research on socialization has mainly focused on how the international 
system socializes states to comply with specific roles and norms and, consequently, 
scholars have focused on individual socialization to a lesser extent (Murdoch et al. 
2018). Moreover, there is a significant overlap between learning and socialization. 
Both refer to a change of individual beliefs. Socialization, however, goes further in 
the learning process, since “it presupposes that what is to be learnt is already 
practiced”. Often, socialization processes are asymmetric; internalizing new norms 
and ideas can happen in a master-novice/generational relationship, where 
newcomers acquire knowledge and practices from the group to which they aspire to 
belong (Flockhart 2004, 366). Thus, in essence, “socialization is aimed at creating 
membership in a society where the intersubjective understandings of the society 
become taken for granted” (Johnston 2001, 494). In other words, through 
socialization, intersubjective knowledge turns into subjective knowledge. Successful 
socialization leads the socialized individuals to internalize the suggested ideas about 
the nature of the world and also the purpose of their polity (Gheciu 2005, 982).  
 
Scholars have identified mechanisms through which intersubjective understanding 
diffuses to the individual level. Teaching brings (new) socializees into a specific 
cultural framework. It disseminates particular conceptual categories and behavioral 
dispositions. “These meanings enable socializees to define subjects and objects that 
populate the world and identify ‘normal’ relations and attitudes vis-à-vis them” 
(Gheciu 2005, 979–980). Persuasion again refers to a more symmetrical relationship, 
whereby through communicative action a legitimate partner persuades an actor to 
accept novel knowledge (see Risse 2000). A socializee can be convinced, for example, 
that taking a certain action is the right thing to do. Persuasion thus does not 
necessarily include any coercion or rewards (Gheciu 2005, 982). 
 
 
                                                   
30 On cognitive complexity, see e.g. Dyson (2009); Herrman (1980). 
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3.3.3 How to Study Beliefs: The Operational Code Analysis  
 
A scholar interested in beliefs and foreign policy faces at least two challenges. First, 
the inquiry must usually be conducted “at a distance” without direct access to 
policymakers and their deliberations. Secondly, decision-makers can in principle 
have an infinite number of beliefs, which, on top of that, might not be consistent 
but rather in mutual contradiction. Thus, in order to carry out meaningful research, 
the scholar needs to insulate the most pertinent beliefs from the policymaker’s belief 
system. To that end, scholars have used a host of different concepts and methods in 
order to grasp the essential features of political belief systems and to link the actor’s 
psychological and operational environments. For example,  “images”, “cognitive 
maps” and “operational code” are not entirely synonymous but largely deal with the 
same questions and phenomena (Smith 1988, 12).  
 
This study applies the framework of operational code analysis. Out of the three 
abovementioned concepts, it is by far the most researched and developed conceptual 
framework and method, around which an impressive body of literature has 
accumulated.31 The concept of operational code was originally coined by Nathan 
Leites (1951; 1953) in his two works on Soviet foreign policy and strategic thinking. 
Through textual analysis, he identified important strategic concepts that drove Soviet 
foreign policy. However, being too complex a tool to be used in other studies, 
Leites’s books passed into oblivion for almost two decades until Alexander L. 
George reformulated Leites’s key views into a more applicable theoretical 
framework. George’s 1969 article became the cornerstone of operational code 
studies, and has been the standpoint of the expanded research program ever since.   
 
In the study, George introduced a two-level political belief system. The first level – 
philosophical beliefs – consists of five beliefs. Similarly, the second level – 
instrumental beliefs – comprises five beliefs.  
 
Philosophical beliefs  
 
1. What is the “essential nature” of political life? Is the political universe 
essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character 
of one’s political opponents? 
2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental 
values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic 
on this score; and in what respects the one and/or the other? 
3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent? 
                                                   
31 Importantly, the study argues that operational code analysis is first and foremost a method for 
studying beliefs. In other words, there are no “operational code beliefs” per se, but the method 
is a useful tool for identifying relevant beliefs in terms of foreign policymaking. See Pursiainen & 
Forsberg 2015.  
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4. How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over historical 
development? What is one’s role in “moving” and “shaping” history in the 
desired direction? 
5. What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical development? 
 
Instrumental beliefs 
 
1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political 
action? 
2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively? 
3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted? 
4. What is the best “timing” of action to advance one’s interests? 
5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests? 
 
The idea behind George’s grouping is rather simple and intuitive; philosophical 
beliefs are more general views of the political world, whereas instrumental beliefs 
concern the ways of navigation in the political world. Of the ten beliefs, the first 
philosophical belief is the master belief influencing the content of the other, 
subordinate beliefs. In terms of Goldstein and Keohane’s typology (see 3.3.2), 
George’s questions map worldviews, and principled and causal beliefs, but remain 
poor regarding the normative content of belief systems (see e.g. Mercer 2010). There 
have been some attempts to complement George’s framework. Aino Hakovirta 
(2015), for example, adds a question on morality to the original set to fill the vacuum. 
 
The first generation of operational code studies used qualitative methods to analyze 
textual material produced by policymakers (see e.g. McLellan 1971; Walker 1977). 
The framework kept developing, however. First, Holsti (1977), based on George’s 
views, constructed a typology comprising six different ideal-type belief systems. In 
1983, Walker, tapping into the progress made in cognitive psychology, paid attention 
to the motivational foundations behind belief systems (Walker 1983; see also Walker 
& Falkowski 1984). Furthermore, he streamlined Holsti’s belief system, and reduced 
the number of ideal types from six to four. This progress notwithstanding, the late 
1980s and 1990s witnessed a waning interest in operational code analysis. However, 
in 1998, Walker, Schafer and Young published a study which dramatically changed 
the dominant methods of studying beliefs and which, subsequently, resulted in a 
substantial proliferation of studies utilizing operational code analysis – a trend 
continuing to this day. In the article, Walker et al. introduced a quantitative method 
–Verbs in Context System (VICS) – to analyze textual data. Instead of focusing on 
the substance of beliefs, the primary attention shifted to attributions retrieved and 
identified from speech acts. The method pays attention to transitive verbs, coding 
the direction and scaling the intensity of the verbs. This again yields a general view 
of the key features of a leader’s belief system (Walker et al. 1998; Schafer & Walker 
2006).   
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The underlying aim of the method was laudable: to inject systematicity and 
comparability into the study of beliefs. At least in terms of the quantity of research, 
the endeavor has been a success. The number of operational code studies has 
skyrocketed, most likely due to VICS’s applicability.32 An overwhelming majority of 
contemporary operational code studies are indeed quantitative, and VICS has all but 
overshadowed the qualitative approach. Nevertheless, although the quantitative 
method has unarguably brought robustness to the study of beliefs, it has also 
generated challenges and even flaws for the research program. First, not all languages 
are compatible with VICS and its emphasis on transitive verbs.33 Second, and more 
importantly, the popularity of quantitative methods has aggravated the problem of 
reductionism, by reducing the belief system of a leader to mere attributions and by 
omitting the substance of beliefs, which, in fact, can be powerful indicators of the 
effects of the social environment on an individual’s thinking.  
 
There have been multiple attempts to simultaneously utilize both quantitative and 
more socially sensitive methods. For example, Anne Nykänen (2016), in her 
dissertation on Angela Merkel’s operational code, not only uses VICS but 
complements it with the theory of Europeanization. He and Feng (2015), again, 
combine the quantitative approach with socialization theory in their study on China’s 
multilateral foreign policy. Another way forward is to revert to the original qualitative 
method, and analyze the text in a more interpretative manner. This decision would 
obviously weaken the systematicity and comparability of the studies, but it would 
also help highlight the social embeddedness of individuals. Moreover, a qualitative 
analysis can also reveal individual idiosyncrasies, and employing a qualitative more 
socially oriented method does not mean exclusive reliance on nurture.  
 
3.4 Collective Ideas: Identity and Foreign Policy  
 
3.3.1 Constructivism and FPA 
 
Whereas the previous section dealt with the individual and subjective realm of 
foreign policy, this section investigates the intersubjective and social world around 
decision-makers. Within IR and FPA, the social realm has been the domain of 
constructivists. However, constructivism is clearly more of an IR paradigm than an 
FPA approach. It is true that the structural variants of constructivism leave very little 
room for the intra-state processes that fascinate FPA scholars. Nonetheless, it is 
                                                   
32 One factor that has further accelerated the growth in studies was the introduction of the 
Prolifer Plus service – a program that automatically analyzes texts uploaded into the software. 
Obviously, this makes research much less time-consuming and labor-intensive. See 
<https://profilerplus.org/>. 
33 This is the case with Publication I. See also Özdamar 2017. 
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equally true that agent-oriented constructivism in general and the concept of 
(national) identity in particular offer interesting and useful encapsulations of the 
social and intersubjective environment in which policymaking takes place and in 
which individual actors are embedded.  
 
There is no unified constructivist theory of international politics, let alone of foreign 
policy. Rather, constructivist approaches have divergent views on the agent-structure 
debate and epistemology (Adler 2002; Bertucci et al. 2018). As Peltonen (2017, 1) 
points out, “constructivism has been characterized by plurality from the start”.34 As 
a result, constructivist scholars have adopted different approaches to analyzing a 
state’s external behavior (see e.g. Houghton 2007). Nonetheless, the bulk of 
constructivist literature has revolved around questions of identity35 on the one hand, 
and norms on the other (Katzenstein 1996). In addition to identity and norms, other 
key concepts of constructivism include deliberation, discourse, persuasion, 
socialization and arguing (Checkel 2005, 72) – all related to the social world and the 
interaction between agent and structure.  
 
Another division within the paradigm is the one between conventional and critical 
constructivism. Critical, more linguistically-oriented constructivism remains closer 
to its roots in critical theory. Critical constructivists are more inclined to unmask the 
exercise of power, whereas conventional constructivism is more analytically neutral 
as to authority. Moreover, critical constructivists highlight self-consciousness 
regarding their own participation in the constitution and reproduction of the social 
entities that they observe, whereas conventional constructivists are preoccupied with 
the question to a lesser extent (Hopf 1998, 181–185). The two different strands also 
differ in their interpretations of identity. Cho, for example, points out that   
 
[t]he key difference between these two constructivisms is that identities 
are often treated as explanatory variables for certain security 
phenomena in conventional constructivism, but in critical 
constructivism the identities themselves are to be explained to make 
sense of the cultural productions of insecurities (Cho 2009, 96–97).   
 
Constructivism’s plurality notwithstanding, there are very basic premises that guide 
constructivist views on international relations and foreign policy. Fundamentally, 
                                                   
34 Constructivism as a paradigm was introduced into IR in late 1989. Two important works stand 
out in this regard: Nicholas Onuf’s The world of our making and Friedrich Krachtowil’s Rules, Norms, 
and Decisions. The former has been recognized as the one who coined the term (see e.g Peltonen 
2017, 3). The history of socially-informed analysis in IR is longer, however. The 1950’s works of 
Karl Deutsch and Ernst Haas can also be seen as anticipations of modernist constructivism 
(Adler 2002, 99). 
35 According to Lebow (2016), “identity is as central to the constructivist paradigm as power is 
to realism and wealth to liberalism”.  
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constructivists assert that the world needs to be denaturalized. According to Checkel 
(1998, 325–326) constructivism is “based on two assumptions: (1) the environment 
in which agents/states take action is social as well as material; and (2) this setting can 
provide agents/states with understandings of their interests (it can “constitute 
them”)”. That is to say, in addition to the material reality there is a social reality that, 
in fact, gives meaning to the material structures of international politics. Without 
social meaning, material structures are – to paraphrase Wendt (1999, 249) – empty 
vessels that have no intrinsic logic or specific form.  
 
Furthermore, the second assumption points to a process of mutual constitution 
between agents and the structure. In other words, the micro- and macrostructures 
of human behavior are related. Mutual constitution is a two-way dynamic in which 
individuals “make the world what it is” but in which “social relations make or 
construct us” (Onuf 1998, 59). In the context of foreign policy, this suggests that 
state preferences emerge from its interaction with structural factors and, importantly, 
state preferences have the potential to shape international structures as well. 
Moreover, importantly, agent-structure interaction can also take place within a state; 
as the study soon argues, intrastate interactions between decision-makers and the 
social context should be the primary concern of students of foreign policy.   
 
For scholars practicing FPA, the lesson of constructivism is rather simple: foreign 
policy cannot be analyzed without acknowledging social factors such as identities, 
culture and norms. In order to analyze a state’s foreign policy, one duly needs to pay 
attention to the social context and intersubjective knowledge in which decision-
makers are situated. As Kubalkova (2001, 23) puts it: 
 
By defining both foreign policy and international politics as social, they 
[constructivists] see that both must start with people interacting in, and 
with, a world that is inextricably social and material.  
 
Furthermore, Beach (2012, 87–88) summarizes the constructivist approach to 
foreign policy as follows:  
 
Social constructivist theories examine the process whereby collectively 
held (intersubjective) ideas as understandings of the foreign policy 
interests of the state are constructed and reconstructed through 
processes of social interaction, meaning that they can be termed 
‘endogenous’ to processes of social interaction within and between 
states. 
 
In FPA, which treats decision-makers as the main agent – the agent-structure linkage 
is perhaps more complex than in traditional IR, which builds on the idea of a 
coherent, “black box” state actor. The puzzle is that decision-makers may well be 
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embedded in multiple social contexts such as a bureaucracy or national or 
international society (see e.g. Beyers 2005), and ideas are also transnational (see e.g. 
Sikkink 1998). Hence, the object of socialization and the “source” of beliefs might 
be hard to identify. However, in order to conduct meaningful analysis, one needs to 
simplify and isolate social contexts. Most of the constructivist research on foreign 
policy has understandably given priority to the national societal context (Clunan 
2009; Hopf 2002), which encompasses various “sub-contexts”. However, as already 
highlighted earlier in the dissertation, national contexts are not hermetic, and ideas 
transcend national borders.  
 
3.3.2 National Identity and Foreign Policy: From Structure to Agency  
 
Constructivist scholars are in mutual disagreement about the formation and role of 
identity in foreign policy. As a result, too often, the term is used in an unspecified 
manner. However, there is little divergence on the basic argument, which is that 
before we – or the representatives of the state – know what we want, we have to 
know who we are (Pursiainen & Forsberg 2015, 292). As Ringmar (1996) points out, 
“[i]t is only as some-one that we can want some-thing, and it is only once we know who 
we are that we can know what we want”. Thus, according to constructivists, identities 
are a basis not only for human action but also national preferences (Weldes 1996). 
 
The broader logic behind the constructivist claim about the fundamentality of self-
image is the axiom that human behavior is also rule-driven. According to this 
standpoint, foreign policy refers to “the application of rules associated with 
particular identities to particular situations” (March & Olsen 1998, 951). As March 
and Olsen (2011, 689) summarize their concept of the logic of appropriateness: 
 
Rules are followed because they are seen as natural, rightful, expected, 
and legitimate. Actors seek to fulfill the obligations encapsulated in a 
role, and identity, a membership in a political community or group, and 
the ethos, practices, and expectations of its institutions. Embedded in a 
social collectivity, they do what they see as appropriate for themselves 
in a specific type of situation.  
 
Following the rules of an identity involves thoughtful and reasonable cognitive 
processing, but this reasoning is not so much connected to the anticipation of 
consequences, the logic behind rational explanations of human behavior (March & 
Olsen 2011, 690). Equally importantly, the logic of appropriateness does not deny 
the existence of the logic of consequences, because 
 
within a logic of appropriateness there is often substantial room for 
agent choice. Actors may face varied conflicting rules and norms all 
making claims for different courses of action […] Actors often must 
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choose between very different duties, obligations, rights and 
responsibilities with huge social consequences, but understanding the 
choice depends on an understanding, not of utility maximization, but 
of social norms and rules that structure that choice (Finnemore & 
Sikkink 1998, 914).  
 
Furthermore, it is crucial to note that identity is both a cognitive heuristic and an 
analytical concept. First, identities – understood as simplifying images about the self 
and others – are necessary for individuals to make sense of the world. Ted Hopf 
(1998, 174–175) crystallizes this need somewhat dramatically:  
 
Identities are necessary, in international politics and domestic societies 
alike, in order to ensure at least some minimal level of predictability and 
order. Durable expectations between states require intersubjective 
identities that are sufficiently stable to ensure predictable patterns of 
behavior. A world without identities is a world of chaos, a world of 
pervasive and irremediable uncertainty, a world much more dangerous 
than anarchy. Identities perform three necessary functions in a society: 
they tell you and others who you are and they tell you who others are.  
 
As a tool of analysis, identity again is a well-suited concept to encompass key 
intersubjective ideas and beliefs that influence a state’s preferences in international 
politics. From an analysist’s perspective, having such an analytical tool is necessary 
since the number of intersubjective ideas can practically be boundless.36  
 
The concept of identity was introduced to IR literature in the early and mid-1990s. 
However, the idea that self-images may have a role in foreign policy and international 
politics is older and dates back at least to the 1970s. In fact, Kalevi Holsti’s role 
theory acts as a conceptual heritage for the theories of identity, although the 
resemblance between the approaches is only partial (Morin & Paquin 2018, 271). In 
his theory, Holsti (1970)37 argued that policymakers have conceptions of their 
nation’s role on the world stage and these ideas influence the state’s foreign policy 
behavior. The theory also included initial thoughts on the agent-structure 
conundrum, but it took two decades for the question to develop into a major subject 
of debate within the IR community. 
 
                                                   
36 Identity is not the only concept suited to such a purpose. Strategic culture, for example, has 
the same aim but in a more limited context. See e.g. Gray 1999; Zaman 2009.  
37 There is a subtle difference between a role and an identity. Whereas identities are more genuine 
and fundamental, roles can be a “faked” reflection of true identity. Roles can intentionally confuse 
true identities in order to gain benefits and advantages. Moreover, an actor can possess multiple 
and even contradictory roles (Pursiainen & Forsberg 2015, 300–301).  
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The pioneers of identity research in IR laid the foundation for future explorations. 
Wendt (1992, 397–398), in his seminal article, argued that identities – “relatively 
stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self” – are the basis of 
interests. Moreover, he specified that actors have many identities whose salience 
depends on the context. Identities take shape in interaction with the structure – “that 
is collective social meanings”. In 1994, Wendt touched upon the possibility of 
collective identity formation between states. He claimed that we should not take the 
traditional argument of state egotism for granted, because interaction at the systemic 
level can produce collective identities that transcend narrow territorial identities and 
expand across national borders. Such interaction might well produce mutual interests 
or even security communities, where war between the members has become 
unthinkable (Wendt 1994; see also Adler & Barnett 1998). Neumann (1996) also 
took notice of the potential formation of collective identities. More importantly, he 
reasoned that identity gave ontological status to human collectives and, additionally, 
made it possible to study how those collectives constituted and maintained 
themselves.  
 
However, Alexander Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics is unarguably the first 
extensive elaboration on the role of identity in international politics. According to 
him (1999, 230), identities have a specific function: 
 
Each [identity] is a script or schema, constituted to varying degrees by 
cultural forms, about who we are and what we should do in a certain 
context. If they all pressed upon us equally at every moment we surely 
should be confused, but fortunately most identities are activated 
selectively depending on the situations in which we find ourselves.  
 
In the book, Wendt (1999, 224–233) outlines four different identities. Corporate 
identities are constituted by those structures – in the case of a state or territory – that 
make conscious actors separate entities. The other three identities build on corporate 
identity. Type identity, again, refers to the special characteristics of the actor. These 
features must, however, have social content or meaning, which is provided by 
“membership rules that define what counts as a type identity”. In international 
politics, type identities can correspond to social systems or regime types. 
Importantly, type identities – or the characteristics that underlie them – are intrinsic 
to actors. This is not the case with role identities, which depend on culture and exist 
only in relation to “others”. Role identities, obviously referring to Holsti’s theory, 
are based on a position in a certain social structure or setting. Roles have behavioral 
norms which are manifested in relationships with other actors, having relevant 
counter-identities. For example, a small-state identity becomes relevant in an 
asymmetric relationship in which the other actor is bigger and more powerful. In 
other words, there is no smallness in the absence of bigness. Wendt’s fourth identity 
is the already mentioned collective identity, where the Self and Other identify: 
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Identification is a cognitive process in which the Self-Other distinction 
[sic] becomes blurred and at the limit transcended 
altogether…Collective identity...is a distinct combination of role and 
type identities, one with the causal power to induce actors to define the 
welfare of the Other [sic] as part of that of the Self [sic] to be “altruistic” 
(Wendt 1999, 229).  
 
These first identity accounts did not have an obvious link to the FPA tradition even 
though identity was connected to foreign policy behavior right after it began to gain 
more theoretical prominence (see e.g. Katzenstein 1996). Interestingly, the concept 
of identity has “foreign policy-zated” over the course of recent decades (see Kaarbo 
2003, 160), and it has been embraced as part of the FPA canon. This may be a result 
of a trend where – within the identity literature – perspectives stressing the 
importance of domestic factors in identity construction have proliferated. Indeed, 
the Wendtian approach to identity does not exclude the possibility that internal 
factors may also constitute state identity (Wendt 1999, 224). Nevertheless, his view 
is clearly more inclined to the structure and, hence, his theory has become a subject 
of criticism.    
 
In 2002, Ted Hopf published his work, declaring that it was time to bring society 
back to constructivism. His basic argument is persuasive. Decision-makers of a state 
are embedded in a social-cognitive structure – a somewhat problematic concept38 – 
which again contains various identity discourses (see also Siddi 2017; Tsygankov 
2014). As Hopf (2002, 22) puts it: “[e]very society is a social cognitive structure, 
every society comprises particular discursive formations that constitute that 
structure”. These formations shape the policy-maker’s understanding of himself and 
also his view of external others. From the structure, individuals embrace rules and 
habits, and it also guides what decision-makers see as intelligible, thinkable and 
imaginable.  
 
Hopf’s work was an important step toward scholarship, which treats the individual 
– not the abstract state – as the possessor of national identity. Essentially, in terms 
of foreign policy, the individuals who act in the name of a state matter, not the 
imagined community of a state (Anderson 1983). However, shared meanings 
attached to the community do affect individual actors, and thus, studying the 
intersubjective context is imperative. Moreover, Hopf’s thesis was a much-needed 
illumination of the way in which domestic factors, not mere interaction with external 
others, shape identity and preferences. Indeed, state identity does “not always mirror 
the identity that Others [sic] have for them” (Larson 2012, 61), as the structural 
variant of constructivism presumes. 
                                                   
38 Given that the link between the social and cognitive worlds is not necessarily simple, Hopf 
omits to elaborate on the connection in-depth, and uses the concept somewhat 
unproblematically.  
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In addition to Hopf’s research, alternative views on the domestic sources of identity 
have emerged. In her theory of aspirational constructivism, Anne L. Clunan outlines 
a model of identity formation different from that of Hopf. Clunan (2009, 10) 
summarizes her argument in the following fashion: 
 
Members of the political elite develop aspirations based on common 
historical memories. Motivated by value rationality and the need for 
collective self-esteem, they introduce competing national self-images 
into the political discourse. National self-images are sets of ideas about 
the country’s political purpose and international status. These self-
images deploy an identity management strategy […] to enhance national 
self-esteem. Members of the political elite propagate national self-
images in an effort to define “the” national identity and interest. 
 
Moreover, in order for a self-image to be established, it needs to pass a process of 
testing. More specifically, the image needs to correspond with political realities and 
historical aspirations. That is to say, a state cannot develop an identity that is not 
politically realistic. A nation with limited resources cannot be a great power, for 
example. Additionally, according to Clunan, an identity should also be correct and 
compatible in terms of historical memories. 
 
Clunan’s theory is rooted in Social Identity Theory (SIT). According to SIT, the 
inherent need for status drives individuals to identify with social groups such as 
nation states. In order to gain status, individuals again aspire to improve their group’s 
position vis-à-vis their peers. This “identity management” happens through three 
strategies39: mobility, competition, and creativity. Social mobility refers to a situation 
in which a negative laden group is left in order to seek membership in another more 
positive group. The competitive strategy aims to achieve a more positive evaluation 
in relation to other groups.40 Sometimes groups also turn to social creativity in which 
they try to redefine the existing attributes of their group in order to improve their 
relative standing (Clunan 2009, 34–36; see also de Carvalho et al. 2017; Larson & 
Shevchenko 2003).   
 
Aspirational constructivism has several strengths and weaknesses. An obvious 
strength is Clunan’s decision to break the concept of identity into two parts, namely 
into international status and political purpose. In fact, some scholars have called for 
such a move (Lebow 2008). In and of itself identity is an inexplicit concept, which 
does not reveal much about the content or particularities of the different collective 
                                                   
39 Steven Ward (2019) suggests a different model of identity management in which four logics 
inform responses to national identity and status dissatisfaction: identification change, emulation, 
transformation, and rejection. 
40 Mercer (1995) claims that a group’s need for status and the competition that this tendency 
evokes constitute the cognitive basis of an international system based on self-help.  
64 
self-images that the representatives of states hold. Political purpose and international 
status, however, enable a deeper analysis of the underlying social content behind 
identities. Moreover, they illuminate which values the actor holds important and how 
it perceives its role in the international context vis-à-vis other actors. A second 
strength of Clunan’s framework is the way in which she simplifies a state’s foreign 
policy discourse. According to Clunan, in national foreign policy discourse, there are 
multiple and competing identities – self-images – containing ideas of international 
purpose and social status. This competition of ideas results in identity change when 
alternative views become politically stronger (see also Tsygankov 2014).41  
 
All of the strengths notwithstanding, aspirational constructivism also has its 
weaknesses. Clunan’s theory is partly a counterargument to Hopf’s theory, which 
she sees as too structural. Allegedly, Hopf’s arguments on identity lack individual 
agency. She herself attests that policymakers can propagate self-images for 
instrumental reasons. There is no denying that identity can be intentionally harnessed 
for political purposes,42 and indeed the advocacy of certain identity views is 
important in terms of identity institutionalization. However, crucially, ideas and 
beliefs often work subconsciously, and this is precisely where their power lies. The 
second weakness of Clunan’s theory is its emphasis on historical aspirations. 
Although it is clear that historical aspirations and memories can be powerful drivers 
of policy as well as identity formation, it is doubtful whether they constitute a solid 
basis for a general theory of foreign policy and identity. In other words, the question 
remains under-addressed and under-theorized in Clunan’s work, and it is therefore 
questionable whether strong historical aspirations always exist and are salient for 
identity construction.  
 
Both Hopf’s and Clunan’s works are important contributions to the debate on the 
power of national identity. The domestic view is indeed crucial for understanding 
national self-perceptions. Nevertheless, neither author is particularly detailed when 
it comes to investigating the microstructures of identities, more specifically the 
individual and cognitive underpinnings of state identity. They do acknowledge that 
personal self-esteem needs, for example, drive identity formation, but they go no 
further in examining these microstructures. Next, the study weighs in on the question 
of identity and clarifies how identities come about. It starts the analysis with 
individual identification with a state and then proceeds to dealing with intersubjective 
self-perceptions and identity institutionalization.  
 
 
                                                   
41 Lisel Hintz (2016) points out that identity contestation can also take place in international fora, 
if the domestic scene is “blocked” for some reason.  
42 For example, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that “strategic social construction” is part 
of any politically salient process.  
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3.3.3 A Bottom-Up Approach to Identity  
 
The remedy for uncovering the microstructures of state identities is to rely more 
heavily on psychologically-informed analysis and to recognize that ideas are 
constructed from the bottom up (Nau 2011). For instance, Kaarbo (2003, 160) has 
stated that “research on identity and foreign policy could make better use of 
psychological research, just as studies of beliefs, images, and decision making have 
in FPA’s past”. To this end, concepts such as person-based identity and collective 
identity43 come in handy. Moreover, acknowledging the role of worldviews as the 
underpinnings of shared self-images provides necessary cognitive content for 
identity.  
 
National identity is fundamentally a person-based identity, meaning that individual 
identification with a nation results in the acquisition of customs, beliefs, 
psychological traits and ideologies, which are in one way or another associated with 
a nation. In other words, national identification gives additional substance to the 
individual self-concept (Brewer 2001, 117–118). Crucially, national identification 
influences individual interpretations of the environment. Herrmann (2017), for 
example, shows how attachment to a nation brings about emotions, which again 
shape the way individuals interpret the unfolding of outside events. This 
motivational interpretation also affects the normative basis on which individuals act. 
It is, however, essential to understand that identification with a state does not result 
in similar beliefs. Rather, depending on the homogeneity of the nation, there are 
possibly multiple representations of nationhood with which one can identify. In 
other words, if one is a leftist cosmopolitan, one’s views about the nation and about 
oneself as a citizen of the nation likely differ from the views of a conservative 
nationalist. Individual worldviews are thus important factors affecting the formation 
of national identities.  
 
In addition to being personal identities, national self-images are also collective by 
nature. This is to say that when individuals identify with a nation, they have an 
understanding not only about the normative and ideological aspects identification 
entails, but also about the values and principles their nation stands for. As Brewer 
(2001, 119) puts it: 
 
[T]he concept of collective identity involves shared representations of 
the group based on common interests and experiences, but it also refers 
to an active process of shaping and forging an image of what the group 
stands for and how it wishes to be viewed by others.  
 
                                                   
43 In this case, collective identity refers to shared representations between individuals. In the 
constructivist IR literature, the focus is on the collective identification between states.   
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The bottom line is that nationality potentially has a deep impact on individual beliefs 
and traits. However, the effects are filtered through a more extensive belief system 
– the worldview – and thus, the identification might cause divergent views on 
nationhood. Moreover, stemming from their personal identifications with a nation, 
individuals have opinions about the underlying norms and values of their nation and 
about how their nation should be seen and positioned vis-à-vis its peers.   
 
The fact that there are varying identifications lays the foundation for Clunan’s view 
on competing national self-images, which are, basically, different understandings of 
a national self-image. The idea of the existence of rival candidate national identities 
comes close to a more traditional conceptualization of schools of thought. Decision-
makers bear or tap into different self-images, which influences how they see the 
world and their nation’s place in it (Tsygankov 2013, 16). Often, but not necessarily, 
these competing images are also attached to political movements, bureaucracies, or 
epistemic communities. The members of a certain party or, alternatively, a peace 
movement might have a certain idea of the collective identity of their nation (see 
Kertzer & Zeithoff 2017).  
 
Consequently, a nation’s domestic system and political balance of power determine 
which self-images influence foreign policymaking (Hopf 2012). External changes 
might also cause pressure to evaluate one’s self-image. In consensual societies, one 
self-image may be dominant, but more often a state’s foreign policy is a compromise 
between various identity views. However, only rarely – at least in the political 
mainstream – are self-images polar opposites. Rather, certain key ideas are often 
shared. This brings continuity to foreign policy, although certain policy emphases 
might change along with political winds. 
 
One reason for the tendency of continuity is identity institutionalization. As we have 
learned, beliefs are slow to change. That is the case with intersubjective beliefs as 
well. Through action by “norm entrepreneurs”, such as politicians or other 
significant domestic players, identities are established and become ingrained in 
national discourse – that is, official white papers, national monuments, the media, 
education and public opinion. Eventually, certain ideas can even develop into habits, 
meaning that they become almost unchallenged (see e.g. Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; 
Hopf 2010).  
 
Moreover, and importantly, identity establishment is also external. If a nation’s 
external other reciprocates the state’s identity views, it reinforces the existing identity 
(Wendt 1999).  Mutual understanding on respective identities again underlies stable 
interaction between the nations at hand. If there is again divergence between internal 
and external understandings, this identity discrepancy might even become a source 
of tension and conflict (Lebow 2016, 4). At a great-power level, this inconsistency 
can lead to devastating consequences if the competition results in a major war (see 
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e.g. Larson et al. 2014). With minor powers, the consequences would be less dire, 
but identity mismatch might cause diplomatic friction for interstate relations.      
 
As implied earlier, identity as a concept is rather imprecise. It refers to an actor’s self-
understanding but reveals little about the content of national perceptions. Breaking 
the term down into different “sub concepts” helps analyze the different elements of 
identity in a more nuanced and sophisticated manner (Abdedal et al. 2006). Clunan’s 
(2009) decision to divide (collective) identity into political purpose and status is 
consequently a sound move. Status views reveal relational comparisons and the way 
in which decision-makers position their nations vis-à-vis other (state) actors. Political 
purpose again sheds light on the values that guide and direct the policymaking 
process, on the one hand, and that act as constraints, on the other. However, 
Clunan’s division is not yet comprehensive enough. The concept of identity should 
also acknowledge the role of underlying worldviews.44 It is crucial to ask not only 
who we are but also who we are in what kind of world. Thus, national identity has 
cognitive, normative, political, and relational content, and rests on three pillars: 
worldview, political purpose, and (international) status.  
 
A worldview is the cognitive content of national identity that “allows members of a 
group to make sense of social, political, and economic conditions” (Abdedal et al 
2006, 699). Worldviews affect individual perceptions of how the world works and, 
consequently, of how the nation should operate in the world. As implied earlier in 
the analysis, members of a nation are not necessarily unanimous on the nature of the 
world, and varying worldviews underlie different conceptions of a nation’s collective 
identity. Moreover, worldviews strongly influence how policymakers see political 
purpose and status questions. It is hence the foundation upon which other contents 
of identity build. 
 
Identities have both political and normative meaning. Political purpose refers to the 
purposive content of identity and “encompasses beliefs about the appropriate system 
of political and economic governance for one’s country and whether this system is 
also universally appropriate”. Moreover, in Clunan’s definition, political purpose also 
incorporates normative aspects such as “ideas about what values, principles, traits 
and symbols characterize the country and what values and principles should govern 
relations between countries” (Clunan 2009, 31; Abdedal et al. 2006, 698). Political 
purpose comes close to the idea of principled beliefs (see Goldstein & Keohane 
1993), which serve as the normative basis from which the state entity conducts 
foreign policy, and also influence the appropriateness of specific policy choices 
(March & Olsen 1998).   
                                                   
44 Abdedal et al. (2006) divide social identity into four elements: constitutive norms, social 
purpose, relational comparisons, and worldviews. In terms of policy-making and national identity, 
intergroup constitutive norms do not necessarily play that big a role, and hence the study 
understands state identity in light of three, not four elements. 
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Policymakers also evaluate their nation’s position vis-à-vis other states. Here, the 
concept of status comes into play. Fundamentally, international status can be 
understood as filling a place in the social hierarchies of international politics or as an 
actor’s membership or rank in a particular social group or society, such as an 
international institution (Forsberg et al. 2014; Kang 2010; Neumann & de Carvalho 
2015, 4). More specifically, status can refer to an attribute of a role, social or 
individual, referring to a position in relation to a comparison group (Dafoe 2014 et 
al., 374). These valued attributes can be things such as wealth, coercive capabilities, 
culture, demographic position and diplomatic clout. 
 
In international relations, the manifestation of status takes place in two distinct but 
interrelated ways: first, being a member in a defined club of actors and, second, 
having a relative standing within a club or, more specifically, in its more or less 
formalized positional rankings  (Larson et al. 2014: 7). In terms of practiced policy, 
status certainly matters; it informs policymakers on patterns of deference and 
expectations of behavior, rights and responsibilities, and “provides a useful heuristic 
for actors to understand their relations with others” (Dafoe et al. 2014, 377). For 
example, Anne Clunan (2009, 32) argues that “international status involves ideas 
about the proper position, respect, deference, rights and obligations that one’s 
country should be accorded, based on the groups one believes it belongs to”. Larson 
et al. (2014, 10) again assert, echoing Clunan, that “status is [also] manifested in 
voluntary deference directed towards the higher-status actor”. In short, status views 
are key determinants of policy formation in relation to other states. 
 
3.5 Public Ideas: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy 
 
3.5.1 From the Idea of Volatility to Stability and Coherence 
 
An integrated ideational approach to foreign policy should not omit views on foreign 
policy matters held by the public. Like decision-makers and the elite more broadly, 
ordinary citizens have opinions on the conduct of foreign affairs, and beliefs that the 
public possess take shape in a process akin to elite belief formation. Public opinion 
simply refers to beliefs and attitudes held by the public. It can also be defined as the 
collective views of a group on a certain policy issue. In this study, the realm is foreign 
policy and international politics, and the group refers to the ordinary citizens of a 
state. Naturally, citizens are not unanimous and different opinions exist among the 
public. Moreover, the public can be divided into two categories. There is the attentive 
minority which “takes a persistent and knowledgeable interest in international 
affairs” and the inattentive majority for which foreign policy is not a major concern. 
The latter group is usually considerably larger than the former (see e.g. Hill 2003).  
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The public opinion-foreign policy nexus is not necessarily clear-cut. In fact, it is a 
two-way street, as the study will soon elaborate. According to Christopher Hill (2003, 
262), public opinion “refers at once to an actor in the political process and to an 
object of influence”. In other words, public opinion is a factor that affects, 
constrains, and even directs foreign policymaking. However, public opinion is also 
something that policymakers can manipulate given that public support for a 
government’s or regime’s approach to foreign affairs can be a powerful source of 
legitimacy for power holders.  
  
The literature on public opinion and foreign policy is extensive. The interest toward 
the role of public opinion in foreign policy began to surge in the post-Second World 
War period. Interestingly, scholars analyzing the question soon arrived atto a shared 
understanding named after two notable commentators, Walter Lippman and Gabriel 
Almond. According to Ole Holsti (1992, 442), the so-called Almond-Lippman consensus 
revolved around three claims: 
 
1) Public opinion is volatile and, hence, does not provide strong foundations 
for the conduct of a stable foreign policy. 
2) Public views on foreign policy lack structure and coherence. They might thus 
well be called “non-attitudes”. 
3) Public opinion has limited influence on foreign policy.  
 
This consensus chimed well with the realist view of the ideal conduct of foreign 
policy; foreign policy was the business of political leaders, and the moody and 
moralistic public should not have a say on matters of national interest. Subsequent 
research has challenged the pessimistic consensus, however. As regards the alleged 
instability of public opinion, Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro (see e.g. 1982, 1992) 
have shown – based on an extensive data set – that mass opinion is in fact quite 
stable. Furthermore, when attitudes change, they change as a reaction to real-world 
events such as wars. The fact that public opinion is stable should come as no surprise, 
since cognitive psychology has proved that beliefs are resistant to change. 
Interestingly, the applications of cognitive psychology to analyze foreign policy and 
earlier works on mass opinion and foreign policy did not really communicate. 
Indeed, there is no reason to assume that rather well-established views on the 
stability of belief systems would not apply to ordinary citizens.  
 
Public views on foreign affairs are also more coherent and structured than early 
research, such as Converse’s (1964) seminal study, implied. Hurwitz and Peffley 
(1987), for example, argued that (American) public attitudes toward specific foreign 
policy issues derive from certain distinctive core values such as ethnocentrism, the 
morality of war, militarism, anticommunism, and isolationism. Hence, the traditional 
liberal-conservative spectrum is not necessarily relevant to the structure of foreign 
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policy views. Subsequently, additional research has emerged to back Hurwitz and 
Peffley’s arguments, as will soon be pointed out.  
 
When it comes to the third point concerning the actual influence of public opinion, 
scholars are still not unanimous about how public opinion exerts an effect on policy 
(see e.g. Kertzer & Zeitzoff 2017). In his literature review about the pre-1990 public 
opinion literature, Holsti (1992) concludes that “the impact of public opinion has 
increased during recent decades”. However, some scholars such as Risse-Kappen 
(1991) have been more confident about the linkage. He maintains that policymakers 
will not make a decision against an overwhelming majority of opposing citizens. 
However, there is little research on how public opinion is actually addressed in a 
decision-making process (see e.g. Hobolt & de Vries 2016). This is understandable, 
since without access to decision-making or relevant documents, conducting such 
research is onerous.  
 
Due to somewhat mixed results on the influence of public opinion, scholars should 
perhaps accept that its significance in foreign policy varies. Thus, it is more fruitful 
to recognize conditions that lead to either the impotence or influence of public 
attitudes in foreign policymaking. To this end, the research identifies factors that 
affect the role of public opinion, and it discusses three models of public opinion-
foreign policy linkage: top-down, bottom-up, and disconnection. First, however, it 
deals with the process of public opinion formation.  
 
3.5.2 The Formation of Public Opinion 
 
The study has already analyzed belief formation at the elite level. The principles of 
IFPA also apply in this process. As pointed out, beliefs take shape in the interplay 
of idiosyncratic factors and the social milieu. Many of the same dynamics play out at 
the public level, albeit with some key differences. For instance, ordinary citizens 
rarely have motivational needs to adopt certain foreign policy views and, due to 
information asymmetry, they have limited access to information. Their learning and 
socialization is thus more superficial compared to members of the elite, perhaps 
excluding the most attentive faction of the public who actively seek and adopt 
information about foreign affairs.  
 
There is a good deal of research probing the structure and formation of attitudes at 
the public level. First, some studies – such as that by the abovementioned Hurwitz 
and Peffley – show that certain core values affect the emergence of foreign policy 
views. Basing their argument on the Moral Foundation Theory, Kertzer et al. (2014) 
again highlight how various moral values – harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, 
authority/respect, ingroup/loyalty, and purity/sanctity – drive people’s foreign 
policy attitudes toward certain broader orientations. Hence, importantly, moral 
values underpin all foreign policy approaches, not only openly normative 
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orientations such as liberalism. Offering a European perspective on belief formation, 
Irondelle et al. (2015) hold that individuals have general “strategic postures”  – such 
as globalism or pacifism – that shape their opinions on specific foreign policy 
questions, such as the case handled in their study, namely that of the European 
Union’s security and defense policy.  
 
Another interesting angle on the endogenous sources of foreign policy opinions 
concerns personality traits. Schoen (2007), who analyzes German public attitudes in 
his article, claims that certain traits such as openness, agreeableness, and 
conscientiousness are linked to foreign policy opinions on various questions such as 
international cooperation, European integration and the use of military force. More 
specifically, traits are capable of affecting an individual’s worldview. Indeed, they 
shape people’s motivations, goals, and values, and thus have an impact on how 
individuals evaluate external stimuli like elite persuasion or major international 
events. Personality traits alone are nonetheless insufficient to explain foreign policy 
views. As Schoen (2007, 423) notes 
 
Personality traits are deep-seated characteristics that are at least partially 
inherited and hard to change. By affecting foreign policy attitudes, 
personality thus tends to provide stability to them, so that it may be a 
factor that contributes to what nowadays is the common wisdom in the 
field of public opinion on foreign policy: ordinary citizens hold much 
more structured and stable attitudes than traditional accounts claim. 
 
Values and traits are not the only inherent factors that influence personal foreign 
policy views. Sex and age may also play a role. Nevertheless, although individuals’ 
innate tendencies are important in the belief formation process, they are not immune 
to external inputs. Elite and peer persuasion and, additionally, the larger societal 
environment also shape the public’s attitudes on foreign policy. 
 
Ordinary citizens can, for example, take cues from the elite. Groeling and Baum 
(2009) maintain that elite rhetoric is a key factor that influences public views about 
foreign policy. However, the persuasiveness of the rhetoric varies and depends on 
prevailing circumstances. Berinsky (2007) again argues that in order to avoid 
complex cost/benefit calculations ordinary citizens look to elites. The result is that 
a divided elite opinion leads to a divided public, whereas elite consensus preserves 
unanimity among the broader public. Paying attention only to elite persuasion and 
rhetoric will not suffice, however. In addition to general predispositions and elites, 
Kertzer and Zeitoff (2017) urge scholars to focus on the mesofoundations of public 
opinion – that is, the groups and networks in which they operate and are embedded. 
Social networks and groups – for example parties, NGOs and religious organizations 
– can be important sources of information and influence. Indeed, social peers might 
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well appear more trustworthy than elites, particularly if the receiver of information 
is critical of the political elite.  
 
Lastly, like decision-makers, ordinary citizens are not immune to the influence of the 
social world, which again encompasses different discourses on foreign policy and 
international politics (see e.g. Hopf 2002).45 The social structure is all but inescapable 
and affects people’s understanding of societal matters. This fact also applies to 
foreign affairs (Herrmann et al. 1999). For example, school textbooks, fiction and 
non-fiction works, and different media outlets (see Baum & Potter 2008; Soroka 
2003) all contain information on foreign policy and international politics. If certain 
foreign policy views dominate in the media or education, it is unlikely that the 
majority of citizens will adopt opinions that are in striking contrast to the mainstream 
views.  
 
3.5.3 Top Down or Bottom Up: (How) Does Public Opinion Influence Foreign 
Policy? 
 
As implied, existing research has confirmed that public opinion is not volatile, and 
that it does not lack structure or coherence. However, there is no consensus on how 
it actually influences foreign policy. This research maintains that the impact of the 
public mood on a nation’s foreign affairs actually varies; sometimes there is a 
bottom-up dynamic, while at other times it is the leaders who dominate and actively 
shape public attitudes. Furthermore, from time to time, public opinion and foreign 
policy are disconnected due to public disinterest or elite negligence. A number of 
conditions define the nature of this public opinion-foreign policy linkage. Based on 
a review of the literature on public opinion and foreign policy, Morin & Paquin 
(2018, 174–175), for instance, suggest three broad conditions that increase or reduce 
the influence of public opinion: a state’s independence vis-à-vis other actors, the 
visibility of the foreign policy matter at hand and leaders’ belief systems. Their list is 
not exhaustive. In addition to these variables, threat perceptions, a state’s domestic 
structure, and electoral threats should also be taken into account.  
 
As to the first condition brought up by Morin and Paquin, evidence is not yet that 
strong. However, there are good arguments that a state’s domestic structure – 
political institutions, structure of society and policy networks – is a factor that has 
an impact on the salience of public opinion in Western democracies. Risse-Kappen 
(1991), for instance, says that in strong states, which have a predominant role in their 
                                                   
45 Constructivist studies investigating the foreign policy-public opinion nexus are surprisingly 
scant. One notable exception is James Strong’s (2017) work on the British decision to join the 
Iraq War in 2003. The basic claim of constructivist public opinion research is that public opinion 
exists if the society and the elite particularly consider that it exists. The volume’s focus is, 
however, more on the public legitimacy of a given policy course, not on public opinion formation 
per se.  
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domestic structure, the public have more limited access to the policymaking process. 
This does not imply that societal demands cannot affect policy outcomes. Moreover, 
strong leaders have additional persuasive power and, thus, the concentration of 
political power can downplay the importance of public opinion.  
 
Secondly, some foreign policy questions draw more public attention than others. 
Hence, salience matters. In other words, major decisions such as joining international 
institutions can animate the public, whereas routine and less dramatic decisions 
might go practically unnoticed by the broader public. Two factors in particular 
increase public attentiveness. First, the immediacy of the issue at hand and, secondly, 
the openness of the political decision-making process (see e.g. Knecht & 
Weatherford 2006). In other words, major events that draw plenty of media coverage 
arouse considerable interest. Moreover, a lively elite debate can also spark curiosity 
in foreign policy issues. Additionally and importantly, salience has two determinants: 
issues and countries. Some issues, such as important international events like the 
9/11 terrorist attacks in New York, capture attention across the globe. However, 
one must also pay attention to country-specific factors. National intra-elite dissent 
can, for example, fuel domestic public interest in foreign policy issues. Additionally, 
a foreign policy question is likely to provoke interest in a country where the effects 
are palpable or in which the representative government is somehow involved. Thus, 
the salience of a foreign policy matter is the result of an interplay between issue- and 
country-specific determinants (Oppermann & Viehrig 2009, 928–931).  
 
Thirdly, it is crucial to take the individual level into account if one wants to 
understand the public opinion and foreign policy linkage. In other words, the beliefs 
that policymakers hold about the desirability and necessity of public opinion as an 
anchor of foreign policy determine how they are influenced by the public mood in 
their decision-making (see e.g. Foyle 1997; Powlick 1991). Foyle (1997, 145–147), 
for example, points out that when it comes to considering public opinion in foreign 
policymaking, there are four kinds of leaders. Delegates believe that it is both desirable 
and necessary to gain public support for the successful conduct of foreign policy, 
whereas executors recognize the desirability but think that public support is not 
necessary. Pragmatists again do not necessarily see public input as desirable but they 
acknowledge that ignoring it is impossible. Those leaders who are the most lukewarm 
toward public opinion are guardians, who wittingly disregard public attitudes in 
directing their nation’s foreign policy.  
 
Besides the aforementioned factors, the potency of public opinion might also 
depend on existing threat perceptions. Davis (2012, 322–323) argues that “security 
threats confound the establishment of an opinion-policy nexus, while relaxation of 
the threat environment allows for a foreign policy that more closely mirrors public 
opinion”.  The logic behind the argument is quite simple. A government’s 
responsiveness to the wishes of the public is clearly an ideal in established liberal 
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democracies. In an era of high tensions and risks, such ideals can nonetheless be 
sacrificed in order to secure very basic national interests such as sovereignty or 
survival. However, it also seems that during a crisis people tend to “rally around the 
flag”46 and support their leaders. Thus, serious threats can render public opinion 
homogenous (Cheng & Lee 2017, 17).  
 
What kind of issues do, in fact, determine the dynamics between public opinion and 
foreign policy? When is the foreign policy-public opinion nexus likely to be top-
down, bottom-up, or disconnected? There are no simple or definitive answers, but 
tentative assertions can be made. Moreover, one should remember that such 
dynamics are always simplifications and the reality is much less clear-cut. In other 
words, the dynamics are not completely mutually exclusive, but they can co-exist to 
some extent.  
 
The top-down dynamic refers to a situation where policymakers clearly drive the 
policymaking process and where they actively shape public opinion. The reasons for 
such an attitude can be manifold. First, the top-down mentality most likely prevails 
in nations where the role of the state is strong and civil society is clearly subservient 
to political leadership. Moreover, the leaders may also be pragmatists and think that 
they need public support for the national foreign policy line, and thus they actively 
seek to shape public attitudes through communication and persuasion (see e.g. 
Rothschild & Shafranek 2017). Furthermore, leaders consider that public support 
can afford official policy additional legitimacy.47  
 
The bottom-up model is again most likely dominant under circumstances where 
leaders think that public support for their policies is both desirable and necessary.48 
A strong civil society and a de-centralized state also can amplify the dynamic. A 
relaxed threat environment and the emergence of salient foreign policy cases may 
further play into the bottom-up pattern. As to the salience of foreign policy 
questions, visible matters might also gain electoral importance, which affects how 
elected leaders handle those issues. As Oppermann and Viehrig (2009, 926) put it:  
 
The ability of electorates to shape foreign and security policy decision 
depends on the credibility of their threat to sanction the government 
for these decisions. Governments will only have a powerful political 
                                                   
46 Rallying around the flag refers to a phenomenon in which public support of a leader increases 
during a major foreign policy crisis or other international event. See Mueller 1970.  
47 It must be noted that political leadership sometimes fails in its endeavors to change public 
opinion. See e.g. Paris 2014.  
48 However, from the perspective of decision-makers, due to cacophony and various channels, 
public opinion can be confusing. Opinion polls are useful in this regard, but particularly in media 
discourse, it is often difficult to recognize which opinions are representative of the majority (Hill 
2003, 262). 
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incentive to devise foreign and security policies that are in line with the 
public’s preferences if they would otherwise have to expect negative 
consequences for their prospects of remaining in power. 
 
When the bottom-up model prevails, it acts as a constraint for decision-makers, and 
they are thus less able to make controversial decisions without a public pushback. 
The wider the gap between elite and public preferences, the stronger the constraint 
(see e.g. Trumbore 1998).  
 
The third model – disconnection – is also a result of multiple factors (see e.g. Doeser 
2013). It refers either to the public’s negligence regarding foreign affairs or the 
leadership’s disregard of public views. Citizens may view most of the foreign policy 
questions as being low in salience, and more tangible and immediate issues such as 
social or labor policies can outweigh foreign policy matters. From the perspective of 
elites, consensus among the leaders on a certain matter can also lead to action 
irrespective of public disapproval. Furthermore, a state’s leadership can also consist 
of guardian-like decision-makers who disregard the importance of public attitudes 
altogether. Lastly, a looming threat can also lead to ignorance of public opinion; a 
threat perceived as existential might cause the leadership to disregard democratic 
ideals in order to guard territorial integrity or even the existence of their country.  
 
3.6 Ideas and Relationships: Trust and Foreign Policy 
  
3.6.1 Perspectives of Trust within IR  
 
So far, the dissertation has dealt with levels of analysis within a state. This section 
aims to point out how individual and collective ideas at the intra-state level can shape 
policies toward other state actors. Hence, the analytical focus moves beyond the 
intra-state level to capture the inter-state-level dynamics as well. As has already been 
pointed out, decision-makers’ belief systems may contain views about fellow states. 
Furthermore, certain ideas concerning a state might have stratified over time and 
duly become dominant in societal discourse. These convictions can again affect 
policies vis-à-vis the state in question (see e.g. Holsti 1962). Depending on their 
content, individual and collective beliefs may either complicate or facilitate state-to-
state interaction. Needless to say, negative images can seriously thwart the efforts to 
build a constructive relationship, whereas positive ones are critical enablers of 
sustainable and cordial relations between nations (see e.g. Harle 2000).  
 
This study investigates how the specific idea of trustworthiness or untrustworthiness 
influences foreign policy. Trust is a rather novel subject of study within IR. It is no 
surprise therefore that also in the FPA literature, trust – although a relevant 
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phenomenon for the study of foreign policy – has thus far been all but ignored.49 
Moreover, trust is an elusive concept that defies a simple and categorical definition 
(Booth & Wheeler 2007, 228; Haukkala et al. 2018, 1). This is partly due to the fact 
that different theoretical approaches have their own divergent understandings of the 
nature of trust. However, according to Forsberg (2018, 158), scholars from various 
theoretical backgrounds seem to share the view of “[t]rust as a belief that the other 
does what it should do and at least does not intend to cheat or cause harm”. 
Therefore, questions of reciprocity, risk, and vulnerability are pertinent to the 
majority of trust studies in IR.  
 
Both trust and mis/distrust have real implications for foreign affairs. Trust is, for 
example, imperative for establishing and institutionalizing peaceful interaction 
between states and societies, and is thus one of the underpinnings of so-called 
security communities (Booth & Wheeler 2008). Conversely, the lack of trust can 
again further aggravate security dilemmas (see e.g. Tang 2009) and underlie enemy 
images between states. In diplomatic negotiations, the existence of trust between 
parties may lead to positive outcomes (Weinhardt 2015). Trust is also a prerequisite 
for interstate cooperation; the deeper cooperation becomes, the more trust it 
requires. Furthermore, politically sensitive action – such as defense collaboration and 
military alliances – requires an even more comprehensive trusting relationship, since 
defense issues lie at the heart of a state’s national interests (Zandee et al. 2016, 4; see 
also Kegley & Raymond 1990). One’s disposition to trust rather than distrust other 
people may also influence whether decision-makers opt for a unilateral or multilateral 
approach (Rathbun 2011a), which may again be consequential in terms of global 
stability.    
 
Although the major paradigms of IR contain implicit assertions about the role of 
trust in foreign policy and international relations (see Rathbun 2009), scholars of 
international politics have only recently begun to pay attention to the concept. The 
2000s and 2010s have witnessed a steady accumulation of trust literature within IR. 
For the most part, research has clustered around three perspectives – those of 
rationalism, constructivism, and psychology (Haukkala et al. 2018a; Ruzicka & 
Keating 2015). However, the first pioneers introduced the concept to IR literature 
in the late 1990s (see Forsberg 1999; Larson 1997a, 1997b). Although early trust 
studies stemmed from social psychology and constructivism, the rationalist approach 
gained the strongest foothold in the research program (see e.g. Kydd 2000; 2001; 
2007). As a result, rationalist interpretations of trust became the benchmark toward 
which criticism from other approaches has most frequently been directed.  
 
Representatives of the three paradigms all suggest their own definitions of trust, 
which partly overlap. However, the various paradigmatic definitions also differ in 
                                                   
49 One exception is a textbook by Pursiainen and Forsberg (2015), which includes trust as one of 
the approaches to studying foreign policy.  
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many noteworthy respects. A rational definition of trust highlights that “trust is a 
belief that the other side prefers mutual cooperation to exploiting one’s own 
cooperation…[t]o trust someone…is to believe that they would prefer to reciprocate 
cooperation” (Kydd 2007, 6–7). Ruzicka and Keating (2014, 14) crystallize the 
rational definition of trust in the following way: 
 
trust is a rational prediction about the nature or characteristics of the 
other state, be they its status quo orientation, the willingness to 
reciprocate or the compatibility of its interests. In all instances, the 
importance of trust rests in its direct contribution to the success or 
failure of international cooperation.  
 
In the rational model – which can also be termed calculative or strategic – trust duly 
boils down to risk-taking and (situational) calculation. “To reduce the risk of losing, 
individuals seek to acquire information about the trustworthiness of others” 
(Wheeler 2018, 5). Acquiring information again takes place through cooperation – 
either inside or outside institutions. Nevertheless, in highlighting the importance of 
cooperation, the calculative model of trust sides with liberal institutionalism, whose 
key works draw their inspiration from rational choice theory (see Axelrod 1981; 
Keohane 1984). 
 
The diverse constructivist approach to trust criticizes the idea of strategic rationality. 
Rather, it notes “how trust takes familiarity with another from the past, and instead 
of merely drawing inferences from it, goes beyond the information given to define 
the future” (Keating 2015, 7). Hence, proponents of the social approach interpret 
trust first and foremost as a social phenomenon and, for social theorists, trusting 
relationships are the primary manifestations of trust in international politics. The 
main argument in this respect is that trust cannot be reduced to mere risk-taking. 
Rather, trust involves not only taking risks but also a strong element of obligation.50 
Thus, a “social conceptualization of trust implies a willingness to take risks on the 
behavior of others based on the belief that potential trustees will do what is right” 
(Hoffman 2002, 375). Socially oriented trust scholars have also paid attention to the 
linguistic manifestations of trust. Vuorelma (2018), for example, points out that trust 
narratives can be powerful sources of individual trust or mistrust; second-order 
representations in particular construct trusting images that are in connection with 
the actual foreign policy practice. Furthermore, Brugger also sees state-level trust as 
a discourse in which trusting images dominate and in which mistrusting ones are 
absent. Thus, his argument is that “trust is an idea that is proposed and defended in 
speech acts by individual actors” (Brugger 2015, 82).  
 
                                                   
50 Instead of obligation, Ruzicka and Wheeler talk about a binding approach to trust and 
underscore the importance of promises in trusting relationships (Ruzicka & Wheeler 2010).  
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When speaking of trust in light of social constructivism, identities should not be 
omitted. There are indeed views that recognize the connection between identity and 
trust. According to Weinhardt, trust is in fact relational and has a social ontology. 
She claims that “shared values, perceived similarity, sympathy or a common vision 
facilitate identification more generally, and therefore the emergence of identification-
based trust”. Mutually constituting identity relationships also build trust between 
actors, increase the willingness to take risks and, furthermore, ease cooperation 
processes between states (Weinhardt 2015, 36). 
 
Lastly, scholars adopting a psychological view of trust “favor the individual actors 
who act on behalf of the collective units such as states” (Ruzicka & Keating 2015). 
Psychologically-oriented scholars of trust have mostly focused on either individual 
predispositions or the emotive foundations of trust. Deborah Welch Larson (1997a; 
1997b) was the first IR scholar to adopt a psychological framework for trust. Her 
assertion was that trusting is impossible without interpretation, and one cannot make 
an interpretation without psychological factors – such as beliefs – affecting the 
process. In other words, trust – or mistrust – can be rooted in beliefs, cognitive 
biases, and historical analogies. According to her definition, trust is therefore “the 
subjective probability that the other will perform an action upon which the success 
of one’s own decision depends, and in a context where one must decide before the 
other’s behavior can be monitored” (Larson 1997b, 12). 
 
In his multiple works on trust, Brian Rathbun draws his insights from social 
psychology. His “dispositionalist” account views trust as an individual disposition; 
some people are just more prone to trust than others. In his analysis, he employs the 
concept of generalized trust – an ideological belief about the trustworthiness of 
others in general – which he sees as a factor preceding cooperative behavior in 
international politics (Rathbun 2011a). Furthermore, Rathbun has also applied the 
term ‘moralistic trust’ in explaining the sustainability of certain multilateral 
arrangements. Moralistic trust is again “based on the belief that others will feel 
morally bound to reciprocate cooperation and comply with their agreements” 
(Rathbun 2011b, 327). 
 
Another strand of the psychological trust literature concentrates on emotions. In his 
article, Torsten Michel makes an important distinction between reliance and trust, 
the latter being “an emotive attitude that precedes rational decision-making”. He 
contrasts this “subjective, personal, inarticulate, emotive and moralistic disposition 
[of trust]” with the “objective, structural, deliberate, rational and strategic 
[phenomenon of reliance]” (2012, 18). Mercer again perceives trust as a belief 
underpinned and strengthened by emotions, and he argues that a feeling of warmth 
helps bring about trust. Furthermore, he claims that “[t]rust based on feelings of 
warmth and affection allows one to go beyond the incentives or evidence and to risk 
being wrong” (Mercer 2010, 6). 
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There is indeed a plethora of views on trust within social sciences in general and IR 
in particular. Seeing IR trust scholarship in light of the rationalism-constructivism 
psychology typology is illuminating as it reveals how rich and complex the 
phenomenon of trust is. However, the paradigmatic presentation of trust blurs the 
fact that in reality studies often – implicitly or explicitly – draw on more than one 
paradigm (see e.g. Elhardt 2015; Rathbun 2011; Pursiainen & Matveeva 2016; 
Wheeler 2018). This is no surprise since different views on trust are in fact 
complementary to a great degree. As Rathbun (2009) has put it, it takes all types of 
theory to build better insights regarding trust and international politics at large. This 
is fully compatible with the principles of IFPA. In terms of trust as a factor in foreign 
policy, this implies that individuals strive for rationality, which, as pointed out earlier 
in the dissertation, is limited and takes place in a milieu that is stratified with 
intersubjective knowledge and norms. Rational decision-making surely involves 
calculations concerning the trustworthiness of others, but this process is also 
affected by societal discourse and narratives and the images they entail, experiences 
of disappointment and behavior, as well as cognitive factors. A “purely” rational 
approach is thus too parsimonious. However, no perspective of trust alone suffices 
to explain why states – or actors acting on behalf of a state – trust or do not trust 
each other. In order to conduct meaningful analysis, different approaches need to be 
merged.     
                                   
3.6.2 Analytical and Methodological Questions Concerning Trust Research  
 
Trust can exist in multiple tiers and, consequently, scholars have found it useful to 
tackle the subject at different levels of analysis. The choice concerning which level 
of analysis to focus upon depends on the scholar’s theoretical preferences. As already 
implied, psychologically-oriented scholars tend to favor the individual perspective, 
which is also the case with rationalists. Constructivists, again, are prone to 
emphasizing the societal level and collective ideas, in addition to narratives 
containing trusting images. 
 
In his study, Ville Sinkkonen approaches trust as a multi-layered phenomenon. Based 
on extensive analysis of the literature, he identifies three layers of trust: interpersonal, 
organizational and societal. The interpersonal level of trust refers to a trusting 
relationship between two individuals, and this variety of trust manifests itself as an 
elite-level trusting relationship.51 Paying attention to the organizational level again 
acknowledges the importance of the role of organizations in the day-to-day conduct 
of foreign policy. Sinkkonen posits that “institutions and their concomitant norms 
and rules function as the vehicles through which regularized relationships and the 
eventual institutionalization of trust between states takes place” (Sinkkonen 2018, 
                                                   
51 The presence of interpersonal trust may again assist the formation of trust between collective 
actors, such as states (see e.g. Pursiainen & Matveeva 2016). 
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13–14). The third level, the societal tier, goes beyond individuals and institutions. 
Sinkkonen aptly notes that  
 
it is through acknowledging that trust can only become truly entrenched 
between two political communities when the interpersonal bonds 
between leaders, established at the interpersonal and organizational 
levels, are transcended and trust diffuses into the domestic arena 
(Sinkkonen 2018, 15). 
 
Thus, societal trust refers to collective beliefs that have been institutionalized into 
societal discourse. These narratives and images, as noted earlier, might affect 
individual accounts of trust. 
 
Bearing the heuristic nature of the level of analysis question in mind, it is partly a 
matter of preference as to how multi-layered trust is viewed. Moreover, it also boils 
down to the selection of the case. In countries where there are strong institutions 
and where foreign policy is an outcome of bureaucratic power battles, such as the 
United States, it may be well worth paying attention to organizational cultures as the 
repositories of trusting images. In states such as Finland, where foreign policy is 
largely based on societal consensus and rather weak bureaucratic politics, seeing trust 
as a two-level phenomenon that is interpersonal and societal might again be 
encompassing enough.  
 
In addition to the level of analysis question, trust research has faced a tricky 
methodological question on how to measure trust. How can a trusting relationship 
be identified? Scholars have put forward different measures and methods for 
identification. Hoffman, for example, has proposed three conjunctive measures to 
identify trusting relationships. The key indicator in his method is the acceptance of 
vulnerability. First, one must pay attention to whether a state pursues policies 
granting discretion over outcomes that it previously controlled itself. It must also be 
demonstrated that the rationale behind such a move is the perceived trustworthiness 
of the counterpart. Such motives can be identified, for example, from private 
statements (Hoffmann 2002, 385–387). Hoffman’s (2002, 388–389) second measure 
is to follow the oversight mechanisms that states use to oversee how discretion is 
exercised. He singles out two ways to conduct such oversight: before-the-fact 
oversight and after-the-fact oversight. Actors concerned about their counterpart’s 
behavior tend to prefer the before-the-fact method since it limits the freedom of 
maneuver of the actor. After-the-fact oversight again grants the counterpart more 
options regarding its policies. Indeed, as Chan (2017, 22) points out, “when [a state] 
is relatively free to behave without constraints […it] tends to reveal its true character 
and hence its trustworthiness”.  
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The third measure proposed by Hoffmann (2002, 391–393) refers to rules. His point 
is that agreements between actors contain certain rules, and the rules might again 
indicate something about the nature of the trusting relationship at hand. Agreements 
themselves do not signal either trust or mistrust, but rules and codes do. The more 
detailed and specific the rules, the less leeway they give the signatories. Thus, 
framework-oriented agreements comprising basic structure, procedures, and rights 
are more consistent with trusting relationships than statute-oriented agreements, 
which consist of specific codes regulating behavior under particular circumstances.  
 
Hoffman’s measures do not necessarily point toward any paradigm of trust, unlike 
Brugger’s discursive method. The latter argues that “the prominence of trusting 
images compared to mistrusting or neutral images” indicates the existence of a 
trusting relationship. He outlines two dimensions that make up “the complex of 
trust”. The first dimension is “a positive expectation about the feasibility of 
cooperation with the trusted other”. The second aspect again refers to “assumptions 
about the character of the other state”. Characterizations can be either positive, 
neutral or negative. Naturally, a trustworthy actor is attributed with positive 
characteristics such as honesty, credibility and peacefulness. Moreover, ingroup 
identifications and emotional expressions are also linked to trusting expectations 
(Brugger 2015, 87–91). 
 
A third method to identify trusting relationship is to focus on so-called hedging 
strategies. Keating and Ruzicka (2014), having criticized52 the two abovementioned 
methods, suggest that in the absence of trust, states rely on hedging strategies. Stiles 
(2018, 11) defines hedging as “an attempt to limit one’s commitment to something 
(i.e. the degree of trust) as well as to protect against risk by diversifying one’s 
commitments”. The aim of hedging strategies is to reduce uncertainty and 
vulnerability. As Keating and Ruzicka (2014, 761) point out,  
 
hedging strategies allow states to self-insure against possible defection 
or opportunism by other states, allowing them to act more securely in 
a risky environment because the ‘worse-case’ outcomes are both 
anticipated and accounted for.   
 
                                                   
52 Keating and Ruzicka’s criticism is somewhat unfounded. It is partly true that in a trusting 
relationship states should be unaware of vulnerabilities. However, such a relationship would 
indicate the existence of a maximalist form of trust, which is a mere ideal type. That is to say, in 
a trusting relationship, actors can be aware of vulnerabilities, but the relationship can still be 
depicted as a trusting one. As to Brugger’s method, Keating and Ruzicka are right that one must 
be careful in drawing conclusions from political speech, since it can be highly strategic and it 
might conceal true motives. Moreover, political rhetoric which emphasizes trust can in fact be a 
sign of mistrust between two actors (see also Forsberg 2018). However, for a researcher, it should 
not be an insurmountable task to identify cases where political speech is strategic and when talk 
about trust is insincere.  
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Therefore, in the presence or emergence of a trusting relationship, states should not 
resort to but rather eliminate different forms of hedging. An analyst who seeks to 
recognize hedging strategies must, however, pay attention to several questions prior 
to drawing conclusions. First, the social meaning of a hedge needs to be understood. 
More precisely, the social and cultural context matters and, moreover, the 
perceptions of the relevant leaders must be taken into account. Secondly, “the 
geographical and historical situatedness” of the nation in question is also important. 
Furthermore, the state’s resources also determine the strategies it is able to choose 
in order to hedge against uncertainty (Keating & Ruzicka 2014, 763–764).53  
 
Again, the methods introduced are not mutually exclusive. Given the multifaceted 
and multilevel nature of trust, researchers should not neglect any of these methods 
straightaway. The research question, the case selection, and the level of analysis in 
focus all direct methodological choices.   
 
3.7 Conclusion: Ideas Matter at all Levels 
 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the key claim of IFPA is that 
representations of reality matter in foreign policymaking. In order to fully understand 
the role of ideas in the conduct of foreign affairs, one needs to consider both 
individual beliefs and intersubjective ideas and, thus, harness the respective strengths 
of both cognitive psychology and constructivism in the study of foreign policy. The 
objective of this chapter was to point out that these goals are pertinent to different 
theories and to various levels of analysis – an aspect that the previous endeavors to 
promote a political psychology-constructivism dialogue have insufficiently 
addressed.  
 
In the chapter, the treatment of the levels was categorized into four parts: individual 
ideas, intersubjective ideas at the elite level, and ideas at the public level constituted 
the intra-state tiers. The fourth, inter-state level aimed at demonstrating how specific 
ideas – in this case the idea of trustworthiness – can affect state action. In other 
words, it presented an example of how intra-state ideas can manifest themselves in 
inter-state interaction, namely how they translate into foreign policy. 
 
With regard to the individual level, the study demonstrated how every policymaker 
has a belief system, through which they filter the outer reality and which affects the 
judgments they make regarding various policy issues. Under the right circumstances, 
individual conclusions colored by the idiosyncrasies of personal worldviews manifest 
                                                   
53 The methodological emphasis on hedging is not without its problems. Measures that can be 
seen as hedging strategies are not necessarily indicative of distrust. Moreover, such strategies do 
not necessarily point toward any specific actor. Thus the object of mistrust can be hard to identify. 
Furthermore, hedging does not indicate anything about personal-level trust, which might precede 
the emergence of trusting relationships between nations. 
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as a consequential foreign policy decision. However, it is crucial to acknowledge that 
no matter how distinct the belief systems may be, they are always constructed in a 
social context. Thus, in addition to personal needs and motivations, personal belief 
systems are formed through learning and socialization.  
 
When it comes to intersubjective ideas, the study investigated national identity. It 
adopted a bottom-up view, in which an individual identification with a nation state 
was seen as the foundation of (collective) national identity – a shared interpretation 
about what the nation is and what it represents in international politics. Thus, in 
order to fully understand the origin of shared national identities, individual beliefs 
must be appreciated as essential micro-structures of collective images. Furthermore, 
national identity was also understood as the sum of three interrelated factors: 
worldview, political purpose, and international status. These elements affect how 
decision-makers see the nature of the world, view the values their nation stands for, 
and understand their state’s position vis-à-vis other actors. Crucially, all of these 
aspects shape policymakers’ understandings of their country’s interests and 
appropriate action in international relations.  
 
The principles of IFPA should also underlie the efforts to understand the role of 
public opinion in foreign policy. More precisely, ordinary citizens possess beliefs, 
which take shape in a process similar to elite belief formation – that is, in the interplay 
between inherent and contextual factors. Moreover, the ways in which the decision-
makers appreciate public attitudes is again partly dependent on their personal beliefs. 
Some policymakers regard it as necessary to consider public views an integral part of 
making foreign policy decisions, whereas others are inclined to disregard public 
guidance. Thus, ideational factors, in addition to threat perceptions, electoral threats, 
the structure of society, and issue salience, determine which of the three models – 
top-down, bottom-up or disconnection – is dominant in the foreign policy-public 
nexus.  
 
Moreover, it was argued above that individual and shared ideas can profoundly 
influence interstate relations. The issue was approached from the angle of trust, 
which is essentially a belief that others do not do harm, but rather what is right and 
agreed upon. Unsurprisingly, various paradigms have divergent definitions of trust, 
which all describe part of the broad phenomenon. Rationalist theories advocate a 
rather narrow view of trust by seeing it as an interest-based willingness to reciprocate 
cooperation. Ideational theories – namely psychology and constructivism – offer 
more extensive views of trust and, in fact, any interpretation of trust without 
ideational content is unavoidably too narrow. Psychology sheds light on individual 
dispositions and the emotive foundations of trust, whereas constructivism 
underlines the social nature of trust. In other words, constructivists link trust to 
obligation and to the question of what is right. Moreover, they pay attention to the 
discursive and narrational manifestations of trust in society and, additionally, argue 
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that similar identities facilitate the emergence of a trusting relationship between 
actors. The narrowness of rationalism notwithstanding, one should not exclude the 
calculative interpretation of trust from the analysis. Rather, calculations regarding 
the other’s trustworthiness are affected by psychological and social factors.  
 
Lastly, it is worth asking how scholars should apply the principles of IFPA in 
conducting research on foreign policy. Essentially, the manner hinges on the chosen 
theoretical and conceptual framework and, ultimately, on the research questions. 
Ideational theories come in handy if one seeks to understand the premises of a 
decision or how a certain action became possible in the first place. If one wants to 
understand how individual beliefs change or come about, then one must pay 
attention to both inherent and contextual factors. This study has suggested 
qualitative analysis as a possible solution for producing a more context-sensitive 
analysis. Another alternative is to employ quantitative and qualitative methods in 
parallel (see e.g. Nykänen 2016). As to identity and foreign policy, the precept is that, 
fundamentally, it is individuals who carry national identities, and identities have both 
social and cognitive content. Moreover, one should never neglect the significance of 
the domestic context for the construction of institutionalized state identities. As to 
public opinion and foreign policy, the formation of public attitudes does not 
dramatically differ from the process of elite belief development. Context and 
personal inclinations matter. If one seeks to understand how policymakers 
acknowledge public sentiments, besides factors such as electoral threat or domestic 
structure, one must also pay attention to decision-makers’ beliefs about the necessity 
of taking public views into account. Lastly, although there is an undeniable element 
of rational calculation in a trusting relationship, one cannot simply understand the 
quality of a relation without considering respective identities and the shared history 
of the trustor and trustee.  
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4. Results 
 
 
 
 
This chapter summarizes the individual studies in the dissertation. Moreover, it 
introduces the main arguments and, more importantly, the results of the 
publications. It also elaborates on the theoretical assumptions of Publications III and 
V, and places them more firmly in the context of IFPA.  
 
4.1 Publication I. Mauno Koivisto’s Belief System 
 
The first publication in the dissertation investigates the belief system of Mauno 
Koivisto, the President of Finland from 1982 to 1994. The article poses three 
research questions: 
 
x What kind of foreign policy belief system did Mauno Koivisto have? 
x Did the end of the Cold War cause a change in Koivisto’s belief system? 
x How did Koivisto’s life experience and societal factors influence his beliefs 
regarding international politics and foreign policy? 
 
Putting Mauno Koivisto’s beliefs under scrutiny is well justified. Firstly, he piloted 
Finnish foreign policy through an uncertain era, namely the end of the Cold War. 
Secondly and interrelatedly, in an era of such high uncertainty, the idiosyncrasies of 
a leader tend to be important in explaining his or her actions. Thirdly, Koivisto’s 
status as the leader of Finnish foreign policy was basically unchallenged, which 
obviously makes him an important subject of study.  
 
The study utilizes operational code analysis (see 3.3.3) to identify and isolate 
Koivisto’s key beliefs about international politics. In order to better understand the 
role of the social environment in individual belief formation – a chief objective of 
IFPA – the article applied qualitative content analysis instead of the more popular 
quantitative method.  
 
The operational code analysis systematized by Alexander L. George consists of ten 
questions, which also formed the backbone of the analysis in the article.  
  
Philosophical beliefs  
 
1. What is the “essential nature” of political life? Is the political universe 
essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character 
of one’s political opponents? 
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2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental 
values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic 
on this score; and in what respects one and/or the other? 
3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent? 
4. How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over historical 
development? What is one’s role in “moving” and “shaping” history in the 
desired direction? 
5. What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical development? 
 
Instrumental beliefs 
 
6. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political 
action? 
7. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively? 
8. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted? 
9. What is the best “timing” of action to advance one’s interests? 
10. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests? 
 
When it comes to philosophical beliefs, Koivisto had developed fairly nuanced views 
on the fundamentals of international politics. His worldview was clearly centered on 
great powers and their role in maintaining international order and harmony, and he did not see 
either international politics in general or the Cold War era in conflictual terms, 
although he recognized that the existing and rather stable era of the 1980s would not 
necessarily last forever. Moreover, the fact that great powers ruled the global system 
was not intrinsically good or bad. Rather, Koivisto seemed to take it as a given. As 
for Finland’s position in a world led by great powers, Koivisto saw no major threats 
– not even in the tense years of the early 1980s, let alone in the late 1980s, which 
were characterized by optimism.   
 
Moreover, as a small-state leader, Koivisto acknowledged that the state of great power 
relations determined whether minor states, such as Finland, could realize their aspirations in world 
politics. According to him, great-power détente does not necessarily create 
opportunities for small states, but rather times when great powers “are taking a 
breath”. Contrary to some popular views, in office, Koivisto was not particularly 
pessimistic. In his rhetoric, Koivisto left room for Finland’s agency and he even 
recognized Finland’s contributions in creating trust between great powers. Thus, in 
terms of foreign policy and Finland’s role in international relations, Koivisto 
displayed cautious optimism. 
 
Koivisto also regarded international politics as unpredictable, and the unexpected end of 
the Cold War seemed to confirm his view. During his presidency, Koivisto did not 
publicly ponder the questions of historical development or the role of chance in 
international relations. However, after he had left office, Koivisto wrote that the role 
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of the individual in changing the course of history is rather small, but he did not fall into the 
trap of determinism. Interestingly, he was of the opinion that the significance of chance 
might again be high. Koivisto asserted that even minor turns and incidents could later prove to 
be consequential historical events.  
 
As to instrumental beliefs, Koivisto’s belief system was much less developed. This 
did not come as a surprise, since he himself had multiple times stressed that small 
states cannot have doctrines. Koivisto nonetheless had some principles that guided 
his decisions regarding political action. Firstly, he called for consistency in politics. 
Secondly, when it came to conducting foreign policy, he highlighted risk-aversion and 
thought that one should always proceed systematically and with circumspection when making 
decisions. Moreover, he stressed that one should at all times to be able to see what consequences 
a decision will have and that, ideally, decisions should not be made when the information available 
is scarce. Interestingly, secondary insights about Koivisto’s modus operandi tend to 
support the views deduced from his own remarks.  
 
Given this asymmetry between Koivisto’s philosophical and instrumental beliefs, the 
publication chose to call Koivisto a great power empiricist. Furthermore and 
interestingly, the study did not detect any major transformation in Koivisto’s belief 
system, although international politics underwent a systemic change during his 
presidency. Thus, the end of the Cold War was not a “cognitive punch” that would 
have forced Koivisto to rethink his worldview. This may have had something to do 
with the cornerstones of Koivisto’s belief system. He often referred to Finland’s 
geographic location and the country’s historical experiences, both of which are rather 
static benchmarks.  
 
As to the formation of Koivisto’s belief system, the article suggested some contextual 
factors that might have shaped his foreign policy views in addition to inherent 
qualities. Firstly, he fought at the front against the Soviet Union in the Continuation 
War. By his own account, this instilled in him a strong motivation to seek a peaceful 
way of living with the socialist neighbor. Secondly, after the Second World War, 
Finland underwent a significant doctrinal transformation in foreign policy. Small-
state realism was adopted as a national creed guiding the nation’s foreign policy. 
Koivisto, who began to have political ambitions, had a strong motivation to embrace 
cooler and less antagonistic views of the Soviet Union in order to advance in his 
political career. Given the ideological circumstances in the post-Second World War 
Finland, it was thus hardly surprising that Koivisto embraced the key tenets of 
political realism as a part of his thinking.54  
                                                   
54 After the publication of the article, an interesting study by Juho Ovaska (2017) on Koivisto’s 
rise to the helm of Finnish politics was published. It tells an interesting story about how Koivisto 
– who during the Second World War perceived the Soviet Union as an antichrist and who was 
also an adamant anticommunist – became a bridge-builder among the quarrelsome Finnish left 
and, more importantly, learned to make his connections to the eastern neighbor a trump card in 
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4.2 Publication II. Competing Finnish Foreign Policy Schools of 
Thought in the early Post-Cold War Era  
 
The second publication in the dissertation concentrates on the evolution of Finnish 
foreign policy thinking at the beginning of the post-Cold War era (1989–1997). Its 
primary objective is to systematically analyze how the Finnish foreign policy elite – 
policymakers, researchers, and journalists – perceived the changing world and 
Finland’s place in it. More specifically, by scrutinizing Finnish foreign policy 
discourse extensively, it identifies the competing foreign policy schools of thought 
of the era and explores how the ideas of the different schools were manifested in the 
key dimensions of Finnish foreign affairs.  
 
The article seeks answers to two main questions: 
 
x What were the Finnish foreign policy schools of thought at the beginning of 
the post-Cold War era and how did they view the changing world? 
x How did the ideas fostered by the respective schools influence Finnish 
foreign policy during the early post-Cold War years? 
 
During the Cold War, Finnish foreign policy was based on the principles of small-
state realism, even to the extent that realism achieved a hegemonic standing. In other 
words, there were no genuine alternatives to the prevailing national identity and, 
thus, the ultimate foundations of Finnish foreign policy – the policy of neutrality and 
primacy of Finnish-Soviet relations, for example – were not criticized or publicly 
debated. The end of the Cold War, and the waning and subsequent collapse of the 
Soviet Union generated more intellectual space for debate on the fundaments of 
                                                   
Finnish politics. According to Ovaska (2017, 36; 47–53), in the late 1950s at the latest, Koivisto 
came to the conclusion that he needed to accept new domestic and international realities, and 
started to see the Soviet Union in a more benevolent light, although he had publicly criticized 
Moscow’s actions in Hungary in 1956. The so-called Night Frost Crisis in 1958 was likely one 
major event that revealed Finland’s limited room for maneuver vis-à-vis its neighbor. This 
intellectual turn almost became a personal conviction for Koivisto, and he restarted his Russian 
language studies, joined the Finland-Soviet Union Society, and began to visit the Soviet Union 
and make personal contacts with the representatives of the Soviet Communist Party. Moreover, 
Koivisto was determined to change the foreign policy line of his own party, the Social Democrats. 
He tried to convince the party leaders that the Social Democrats must improve their relations 
with Moscow and that the Soviet Union was not a threat to Finland. Part and parcel of Koivisto’s 
endeavor was also to establish a cordial rapport with President Urho Kekkonen, who was the 
main architect of friendly relations with the Soviet Union. The primary motivation for the change 
in Koivisto’s thinking seemed to be aspirations to increase his own and the party’s power in 
Finnish domestic politics. This transformation took place through foreign policy; Koivisto and 
the Social Democrats had to adopt new mainstream ideas behind Finnish foreign policy in order 
to gain a stronger foothold in Finnish political life. 
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Finnish foreign policy. From 1992 onwards, multiple options appeared regarding the 
fundamentals of the policy. Furthermore, Finland faced concrete and consequential 
choices. The most important of these was membership in the European Union. 
Furthermore, the alternative and competing views about Finland’s place in the 
emerging new world clearly crystallized and stabilized as the post-Cold War security 
landscape began to take shape.  
 
In IR and foreign policy literature, it is commonplace to portray competing set 
preferences and ideas on foreign policy held by a certain group as “schools of 
thought”. This has been done by various studies regarding a number of countries. 
Finnish foreign policy has historically been seen as a competition between two 
schools: the small-state realists and the more legalist and liberal constitutionalists. A 
contemporary study by Hiski Haukkala and Tapani Vaahtoranta has again identified 
three schools of thought: the small-state realists, the globalists and the 
euroatlanticists. 
 
Thus far, scholarship has not theorized the concept of schools of thought, which 
can be seen as heuristic devices for understanding key foreign policy tensions within 
states. This article connects the concept with the term self-image, both of which are 
essentially competing views on national identity. Moreover, in order to develop the 
identity research program in IR/FPA and in order to shed light on the 
microstructures of collective identities, the study sorts identity into three 
subcategories: political purpose, status, and worldviews.55 Treating national identity as an 
aggregate of different elements also shows that collective self-images have cognitive 
underpinnings, which is an argument in line with the key assertions of IFPA. The 
publication employs these three terms – purpose, status, and worldviews – to analyze 
the Finnish foreign policy debate in 1989–1997, and seeks to identify the schools of 
thought of the era. Thus, the analysis aims to reveal the broad but focal tensions 
among the Finnish elite concerning the overall direction of Finnish foreign policy in 
the early post-Cold War years.56  
 
The early post-Cold War years were formative for Finnish foreign policy. The 
hegemony of small-state realism began to crumble when it became evident that the 
Soviet Union was indeed declining and disintegrating. During Mauno Koivisto’s 
presidency, there were fewer efforts to enforce foreign policy consensus, and the so-
called Finlandization slowly started to evaporate. The actual changes in Europe 
transformed Finland’s security landscape dramatically. The bipolar world was no 
                                                   
55 In the article, worldviews are related to three particular issues: whether the world is seen in 
realist or liberal institutionalist terms, the nature of Russia as a polity, and views on the emerging 
post-Cold War security architecture in Europe. 
56 Tapio Juntunen (2018) echoes this by arguing that instead of having explanatory power for 
certain foreign policy behavior, the schools of thought approach is appropriate for revealing intra-
state tensions in central foreign policy questions.   
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more, and for contemporaries Finnish foreign policy seemed to be a free-floating 
enterprise without benchmarks.  
 
The article sides with Haukkala and Vaahtoranta’s tripartite categorization and 
argues that small-state realism, globalism and euroatlanticism were all present even 
in the post-Cold War era. However, there was also a fourth school, integrationism, 
which in fact became the dominant school behind Finnish foreign policy. All four 
schools had different assumptions about the nature of post-Cold War international 
politics, and they suggested different ideas about how to manage the relationship 
with Russia, for example. 
 
The small-state realists called for continuity in Finnish foreign affairs, and they held that 
Finland should also adhere to the key tenets of its Cold War foreign policy in the 
new era. Their worldview stemmed from geopolitical realism. Small-state realists did 
not give much weight to international institutions and some of them anticipated the 
return of traditional European great-power politics. The loss of superpower standing 
notwithstanding, the geopolitical realists viewed Russia as a great power, which had 
major implications for Finland’s status; Finland was still a small state that needed to 
pay deference to Russia and its strategic interests were considered legitimate. As a 
result, according to the realists, Finland should carry on as a neutral nation. When it 
came to Finland’s political purpose, small-state realists were not unanimous, but 
generally, the Nordic model and the values it entailed were supported among its 
adherents.  
 
The integrationists were the biggest and most powerful group. In terms of their 
worldview, they balanced between geopolitical realism and liberal institutionalism. 
Thus, their worldview can be seen as “eurorealism”. For the integrationists, a 
qualitative change in the European security environment was a fact, and they eagerly 
supported European integration and Finland’s membership in the European 
Community/Union. However, not all power political realities had withered. 
Although the eurorealists did not long for neutrality or any special status within the 
European Union, they saw that Finland should show some respect for Russia’s 
interest and thus remain non-aligned. As to Finland’s purpose, the integrationists 
understood Finland as a Western democracy, which membership in the European 
Union would further solidify. 
 
The euroatlanticists were the most pro-Western group of the era. Their worldview was 
a mixture of (muscular) liberalism and balance-of-power realism, which differed 
from the geopolitical realism of small-state realists. Like the integrationists, the 
euroatlanticists supported European integration. Power politics was still very much 
present in Europe but according to the proponents of euroatlanticism, institutions 
could be used to manage security. Euroatlanticists were of the opinion that Finland’s 
status should not be limited by Russian great powerhood, and Finland was sovereign 
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and free to make its own decisions without considering Russia’s interests. 
Concomitantly, some of them supported closer identification with the United States 
and, subsequently, membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In terms 
of Finland’s purpose, it was a genuine and full-fledged Western democracy, not a 
former satellite like the countries in the post-Soviet space.  
 
The globalists were the most normative school of the era. They claimed that 
international politics had undergone a major qualitative transformation and that 
power politics had been replaced by new realities and concerns, such as the 
environment, migration, and the global economy. Some globalists argued that power 
politics had become fiction. Moreover, they were critical of great powers and 
European integration alike. For them, Finland’s status and purpose were closely 
intertwined. According to the globalists, Finland should have profiled itself as a 
defender of human rights and, consequently, built its status as a moral and normative 
power. The purpose of Finland was to be an open democracy, which respects human 
rights and the rights of minorities, and which builds on a strong civil society.  
 
How then did the views of the four schools of thought manifest in Finnish foreign 
policy? One could argue that the integrationists called the shots generally, but every 
school managed to leave distinct fingerprints on the Finnish policy line. First, 
Finnish policy toward Russia followed the integrationist and, to some extent, small-
state realist views. Finland continued to be mindful of Russia’s interests and called 
for Russia’s integration into the European security order. However, slowly, Finland 
started to give up the strict bilateralism, while multilateralism – that is, the EU’s 
Russia policy – became a more important framework for its Russia policy. Secondly, 
the main objective of integrationists and euroatlanticists was ultimately accomplished 
when Finland joined the EU in 1995. Moreover, Finland gave up its neutrality, and 
defined itself as militarily non-aligned instead.  
 
Thirdly, Finland did not cash in the post-Cold War peace dividend, but continued to 
prepare for the worst under the new circumstances as well. In other words, 
traditional defense policy remained at the core of Finnish security policy. Indeed, the 
integrationists, small-state realists, and euroatlanticists did not expect power politics 
to just wither away. Fourthly, in certain domains of defense policy, which was mostly 
controlled by the euroatlanticists, Finland began to get closer to Western actors. 
Major weapon procurements tied Finland to the United States, and Finland also 
joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace program and became an active participant in 
NATO-led crisis management operations. Fifthly, and lastly, the globalists were 
successful in imprinting their broader security agenda as an integral and legitimate 
part of Finnish foreign policy. In actual fact, in the course of the 1990s, the globalist 
agenda grew stronger, and peaked at the beginning of the 2000s.  
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4.3 Publication III. The Role of Public Opinion in Finnish Foreign 
and Security Policy 
 
Finland’s geopolitical position in Russia’s armpit is unarguably tricky. Throughout 
the nation’s history, its location has rendered the Finnish polity vulnerable, not only 
to Russia’s strategic ambitions but also to the reverberations of larger great-power 
competition in Europe. Thus, geopolitical reasoning has always been prevalent in 
Finland’s foreign and security policy thinking. But does this glaring geopolitical 
asymmetry leave any room for other policy determinants such as public opinion? 
The third publication in the dissertation deals with the nexus between public opinion 
and Finnish security policy. More specifically, it asks: 
 
x What role has been played by public opinion and its historical evolution in 
Finnish foreign and security policy? 
 
The article claims that it is possible to identify three different relationships between 
public opinion and foreign policy, and the models are attached to particular historical 
periods. First, during the interwar years of Finland’s early independence, public 
opinion and foreign policy existed autonomously. The Second World War changed 
the nature of the public attitudes-foreign policy connection and ushered in an era 
during which the Finnish leadership tried to shape public opinion vigorously. The 
top-down model lasted until the end of the Cold War and was eventually replaced 
by a bottom-up model in which public opinion has been a more notable force 
restricting and legitimizing Finnish foreign and security policy. 
 
From Finland’s 1917 independence to the rapid deterioration of European security 
in the 1930s, Finland’s foreign policy was rather fluctuating. It oscillated from the 
late 1910’s pro-German orientation, to the short period of so-called “rimstate policy” 
in the early 1920s, which was again followed by a more abstract orientation toward 
the League of Nations later in the 1920s. In the 1930s, Finland’s aspirations toward 
neutrality grew, but it failed to anchor its nonalignment to a Nordic orientation, 
namely cooperation with Sweden. According to historians, the contemporary view 
driving Finland’s foreign policy was legalism and a belief in international law and 
justice. During the period, Finnish leaders made multiple important decisions, none 
of which was explicitly based on public views, let alone pressure from the populace.  
 
As to the role of public attitudes, there are multiple reasons why public opinion – 
conceived at that time more or less as the opinion of the press and key interest 
groups – and Finnish foreign policy were largely unconnected in the interwar era, 
although Finland’s democratic form of governance was secured in the 1919 
constitution. First, both the elite and the public were divided. There was hardly any 
common ground among the members of the political elite and their political 
sentiments. The elite’s standpoints were ideological and based on feelings of 
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sympathy toward different European states such as Germany, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom. These sympathies were the crucial underpinnings of the preferable 
policy options. In other words, there was no room for considering public attitudes, 
which again – as a matter of fact – were indifferent to foreign policy and international 
politics. In the 1920s, Europe was in a rather peaceful situation and, importantly, the 
Finnish domestic situation – more important than foreign policy for the ordinary 
citizen – was still precarious and volatile.  
 
The perils of the Second World War broke the autonomous model. As early as the 
Winter and Continuation Wars, Finnish political and military leaders were interested 
in monitoring and controlling public opinion, but key and obviously consequential 
decisions made during the wars were not based on public opinion. During and after 
the wars, Finland made decisions, such as allying with Nazi Germany and signing 
the 1948 Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) treaty with the 
Soviet Union, which were unpopular among the Finnish public. Moreover, Finnish 
leaders did not hold public views in high esteem, a sentiment which was embodied 
in J.K. Paasikivi’s assertion that “the sense of political realism is not the strongest 
trait of the Finnish people”. 
 
However, as early as the 1950s, previous disregard for public opinion transformed 
into a strong top-down model, in which the political leadership saw public support 
as an essential condition for successful foreign policy in general, and for the 
credibility of the policy of neutrality in particular. Furthermore, strong public 
support for the policy line allegedly acted as a deterrent, resisting possible Soviet 
attempts to interfere in Finland’s internal matters and, more importantly, reflecting 
a strong will to defend the country by armed means if necessary.  In particular, 
President Urho Kekkonen was convinced that Finland’s official foreign policy 
needed the unwavering backing of the Finnish public. As a result, the Finnish foreign 
policy leadership bent over backwards to imprint the official foreign policy line – the 
policy of neutrality and a positive view of the Soviet Union – in the public 
consciousness.57 Moreover, the efforts were intertwined with the phenomenon of 
“Finlandization” (see 4.5), and the measures included self-censorship and control 
over the public debate.  
 
The efforts by Finnish leaders were double-edged, however, and stemmed from 
realpolitik. Thus, the officials hoped that ordinary Finns would understand that the 
governmental rhetoric was not the whole truth but rather a method to pursue 
Finland’s interests vis-à-vis its big neighbor. Nonetheless, the endeavors to cajole the 
Finnish public into supporting the official foreign policy were successful. For 
                                                   
57 There was also a similar but less strong effort in Sweden, where the leaders educated the people 
about the official doctrine of “non-alignment in peacetime aiming at neutrality in war”. The 
substantial covert cooperation with the United States and NATO went unmentioned, however. 
See Yden et al. 2019. 
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example, in 1971, 96% of Finns thought that the conduct of Finnish foreign policy 
was good. In addition, in 1974, 80% of the public were of the opinion that the FCMA 
treaty had a positive effect on Finnish security – a notable 23% rise from 1964, when 
the consensus around the official policy was still less consolidated. 
 
The end of an era in international politics again resulted in a change in the Finnish 
public opinion nexus. Debate regarding Finnish foreign policy intensified (see 4.2). 
Moreover, a more liberal mindset began to overshadow Hegelian collectivism, and 
public opinion polls were conducted more frequently. This time, a bottom-up model 
emerged and public opinion began to affect foreign policy in central questions in 
particular. The turning point comprised the parallel independence processes of the 
three Baltic republics. Finns sympathized with Estonia’s endeavors in particular, and 
the official circumspect policy line – which prioritized a cordial relationship with the 
Soviet Union and Mikhail Gorbachev – was met with considerable criticism.  
 
The new bottom-up model has, however, truly manifested itself in two major post-
Cold War issues: Finland’s accession to the EU and adherence to non-alignment. 
Eventually, in 1992, Finland’s leadership moved rapidly with the announcement of 
the country’s aspiration to seek membership in the then European Community. The 
decision was preceded by official caution. Throughout 1990 and 1991 Finland’s 
leaders, especially President Mauno Koivisto, wanted to avoid public discussion on 
European integration, although public opinion polls showed increasing readiness 
from Finns to take a step toward closer European integration. Finally, the failed coup 
d’état in Moscow and the collapse of the Soviet Union dramatically changed political 
circumstances, and the elite also started to get ready to move with the potential 
accession. During the process, gaining public backing was imperative for the Finnish 
leadership. The decision to join the EU was duly put to a referendum, and the 
supporters of EU membership won handsomely, by 57% to 43%. Although the top-
down element was not absent in the membership process, it is clear that “no” from 
the Finns would have led to Finland staying outside the EU.  
 
Concerning non-alignment, Finns have consistently remained against Finland’s 
NATO membership throughout the past three decades, and not even Russia’s 
actions in Georgia or Ukraine have served to change the public mood. Rather, the 
connection between Russia’s actions and Finnish public opinion is rather weak. The 
United States’ actions have again consolidated Finns’ negative opinions on NATO. 
That said, public opinion has constrained and discouraged changing incumbents to 
promote Finnish NATO membership in earnest. Moreover, it has been made clear 
by the majority of Finnish politicians that in the event that Finland ever decides to 
consider NATO membership, the decision should be put to a public vote. 
Furthermore, and interestingly, although Finns have signaled that they might support 
NATO membership if it was promoted by the leadership, the leaders themselves 
have remained doubtful. President Sauli Niinistö, for example, has mentioned on 
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numerous occasions that he or other leaders could not necessarily sway Finns to 
accept military alignment through NATO membership – an attitude which was also 
entertained by his predecessors.  
 
4.3.1 A Theoretical Note on the Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Nexus in 
Finnish Foreign Policy 
 
In terms of theory, the publication raised several factors that have influenced the 
public opinion-foreign policy link in the history of Finnish foreign policy, but it did 
not discuss theoretical issues in depth. In this section, the theoretical underpinnings 
of the three models – disconnection, top-down and bottom-up – are briefly touched 
upon. Here, IFPA provides valuable insights into how foreign policy and public 
opinion are connected. Leaders’ personal beliefs and threat perceptions are crucial 
determinants in constituting the link between policies and public views. However, 
although the principles of IFPA would be even better suited to examining how 
public opinion takes shape, the focus of the article lay elsewhere.  
 
As implied, the autonomous model was the result of a number of factors. First, 
contemporary elites were, using Foyle’s typology, guardian-like leaders who did not 
place much value on public attitudes58 and who considered other foreign 
determinants more pressing and important. Secondly, from the public’s perspective, 
questions of international politics were not salient compared to rather volatile 
domestic politics in which there were major issues that needed to be tackled.   
 
The bottom-up level of the Cold War era again stemmed from Kekkonen’s personal 
belief that a credible foreign policy needs strong, almost unanimous public support. 
Not only Kekkonen but also Paasikivi and Koivisto – all adherents of realism – saw 
that public opinion should be educated to understand the realities of international 
politics. Moreover, Finland had one looming foreign policy challenge, the Soviet 
Union, which gave a powerful incentive to the Finnish leadership to steer Finnish 
policy, while the populace’s role was to submit to the elite’s leadership. Furthermore, 
due to the control of the public sphere and the general tendency of Finnish civil 
society and the media to support and not challenge the official policy, the conditions 
for the formation of alternative foreign policy views were not fruitful. Lastly, 
especially during Kekkonen’s reign, the Finnish system was centralized around his 
leadership, which was bound to limit public opinion’s independent role in foreign 
policy.  
 
                                                   
58 Public ignorance in Finland reflects a more general international trend, where – after the 
nascent optimism of the early 1900s, the appreciation of public opinion as a positive force in 
international politics declined. See e.g. Speier 1950.  
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As to the bottom-up model, key explanations certainly include the relaxation of the 
threat environment, which followed the end of the Cold War. Moreover, Finland 
suddenly faced a number of salient foreign policy questions such as EU membership 
and possible military alignment, which attracted considerable public and media 
interest. It also seems that the new generation of Finnish leaders had slowly grown 
to appreciate public opinion as a genuine factor that needs to be respected, or at least 
they were less confident in their abilities to shape public views. With military 
alignment, it is also clear that too positive views on Finland’s membership also 
constitute an electoral threat to Finnish politicians given the critical NATO views of 
the majority of the Finnish constituency.  
 
4.4 Publication IV. Trust and Finnish-Swedish Defense Cooperation 
 
The relationship between Finland and Sweden unarguably represents one of the 
closest and most cordial intergovernmental relationships in the world. The countries 
share a border, history, identities, and interests and, moreover, Fenno-Swedish 
political and societal interaction is lively at all possible levels. Interestingly, one 
domain of interaction has traditionally been characterized by circumspection, namely 
defense. It is only during the past decade that Fenno-Swedish defense cooperation 
has gained increasing momentum. However, cooperation has thus far been 
pragmatic, and it has made progress incrementally. It has nonetheless intensified 
recently. Increased cooperation notwithstanding, there seems to exist an underlying 
lack of trust toward Sweden in Finland, which needs to be overcome if the states 
want to develop their existing cooperation even further, for example toward a 
military alliance. This underlying mistrust manifests itself as a fear in the Finnish 
political discourse that Sweden might desert the thus far fruitful cooperation in 
defense and apply for membership in NATO.  
 
Consequently, this article seeks an answer to one major question:  
 
x What are the reasons for the existing mistrust toward Sweden among the 
Finnish foreign policy elite? 
 
The Finnish mistrust is indeed puzzling, since Sweden and Finland basically belong 
to a model security community, which represents perhaps the most mature 
intergovernmental relationship that is achievable in international politics. To date, 
the burgeoning trust research in IR has focused on conflictual relationships, often 
between great powers. However, it is important to acknowledge that mistrust and 
suspicion can also exist in profoundly non-conflictual relationships.  
 
In the spirit of IFPA, the publication merges psychological and social approaches to 
international trust. It is skeptical of the claims by liberal institutionalist scholars that 
the formation of a trusting relationship primarily hinges on the recognition of mutual 
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self-interest to reciprocate cooperation. Moreover, the study holds that cooperation 
does not begin from a state of distrust, but some preliminary trust must actually 
precede cooperation. Thus, instead of focusing only on rational calculations, one 
needs to pay attention to relational variables that supersede the rational weighing of 
self-interests as the main source of trust. Importantly, interstate trust is thus not only 
a situationally isolated moment of calculation, but it also builds on historical 
experiences, beliefs, norms, and expectations that others will do what is right. 
 
The study lays out three main theoretical arguments. Firstly, it differentiates between 
distrust and mistrust. Whereas distrust refers to a more general condition between 
states, mistrust again stems from historical experiences of misplaced trust. In order 
to understand the nature of trust more extensively, we must increase our 
understanding of circumstances in which experiences of mistrust evolve into full-
blown distrust between states. 
 
The second point the article drives home is that trust is a scalable phenomenon. In 
theory, the scale of trustfulness ranges from complete distrust to a habitual sense of 
trust. Thus, it is also possible and necessary to make a distinction between situations 
where trust is rather an instrument of confidence-building between distrusting 
parties, and where trust is, in turn, habitualized and internalized and thus an 
inarticulate disposition. The study calls the former type minimal trust and the latter 
maximal trust.59 A minimal level of trust exists when two or more actors believe that 
others can be relied upon to abstain from behavior that would be harmful to the 
actors’ interests and values. In other words, there is minimal trust when actors avoid 
inflicting harm on one another. Maximalist trust again refers to a relationship in 
which habitual care prevails and in which actors mutually promote each other’s 
interests and values. Minimal and maximalist trust are, of course, ideal types but 
useful heuristic devices to illustrate the nature of different trusting relationships.  
 
Thirdly and finally, the publication suggests that a sense of disappointment and a 
feeling of being betrayed must be separated. A feeling of disappointment can follow 
when minimalist and strategic trust is broken. Importantly, disappointment does not 
necessarily have an impact on the general and fundamental feeling of trustworthiness 
felt by an actor toward another actor. Betrayal is again a deeper and more profound 
feeling in which a trusting relationship has been seriously broken. Feelings of being 
betrayed are more emotional than mere disappointments and, thus, betrayal can 
undermine a trusting relationship based on strong moral and even maximalist trust.   
As to the history of the Fenno-Swedish trusting relationship, the seeds of Finnish 
mistrust toward Sweden were sown in October 1990 when Stockholm caught 
Helsinki off guard by announcing its intention to seek membership in the then 
                                                   
59 This division echoes other classifications made by previous scholars between reliance and trust, 
strategic and moralistic/generalized trust, and trust-as-predictability and trust-as-bond. 
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European Communities (EC), now known as the European Union. Finnish leaders 
were surprised to say the least, although they were aware of the trajectories in Sweden 
that were nudging the country toward the Community. President Mauno Koivisto 
was left shocked by the announcement and, according to his view, Sweden not only 
broke an unspoken promise but also fundamental tacit rules between the two 
Nordics by not informing Finland beforehand about its intentions. In the late Cold 
War years, Finnish leaders had invested a great deal of generalized and moralistic 
trust in Fenno-Swedish relations, which suddenly suffered a major blow. The bottom 
line is that the incident in October 1990 became an experience of misplaced trust or 
an event of betrayal for the contemporary Finnish elite. Finns truly felt that Sweden 
had broken some fundamental and tacit rules of Nordic cooperation. The sense of 
betrayal and its subsequent social stratification in the Finnish security policy 
discourse thus had personal and individual highly emotive origins.  
The question of trust between Finland and Sweden has become more prevalent as 
bilateral defense cooperation has intensified considerably during the last half decade. 
In the late 2000s, financial pressures to rationalize expenditures initiated bilateral 
talks on forging deeper collaboration in defense. However, it was the annexation of 
Crimea and the subsequent war in Ukraine that pushed Finland and Sweden closer 
together in defense policy. Bilateral cooperation has made incremental and steady 
progress, and the way of proceeding in small steps might indicate that cooperation 
itself is a trust-building exercise, which can again feed a positive, reciprocal cycle of 
trust.  
In order to understand the circumstances in which Finnish mistrust has emerged, 
one must pay attention to developments in the security environment. Russia’s 
maneuvers in the Baltic Sea region and the transformed and tense European security 
landscape at large triggered debate in Sweden, which had wound down its territorial 
defense capabilities. Polls began showing higher support for NATO membership 
among Swedes and, moreover, the center-right coalition closed ranks and lent their 
support to military alignment.   
These developments in Sweden did not go unnoticed in Finland. Multiple Finnish 
decision-makers and commentators began to frame the existing situation as being 
analogous to the early 1990s. This time, however, the fear was an unexpected 
Swedish bid for NATO membership. Former and incumbent ministers, other 
foreign policy experts, columns and editorials warned that Sweden might be on the 
brink of a major foreign policy reappraisal. Interestingly, Finnish ministers, such as 
former Prime Minister Juha Sipilä and former Defense Minister Jussi Niinistö, 
stressed during their first visits to Sweden that the neighbors should keep each other 
informed and make important decisions hand in hand, which could be seen as efforts 
to reinforce certain social norms between the countries. In Sweden, leading political 
figures have noticed the unease in Finland. Not only the Prime Minister but also the 
99 
Foreign and Defense Ministers have reassured Finland that Sweden will stick to its 
current doctrine of military non-alignment and not apply for NATO membership. 
The comments stemming from the Finnish security policy community indicate that 
the trusting relationship between Finland and Sweden is, in fact, not very deep. 
Rather, the Finnish foreign policy elite cannot exclude the possibility of Sweden 
potentially making a decision against Finland’s interests. Thus, the level of trust 
between the nations falls short of the moralistic/maximalist grade of mutual trust. 
Rather, one can speak of minimal or strategic trust between the parties. However, 
the step-by-step progress made in defense cooperation seems to point toward 
strategic trust-building efforts to mitigate mistrust and to increase mutual trust in the 
realm of national security – a goal of defense cooperation explicitly mentioned in an 
official Finnish defense policy document.60 The overall identification- and norm-
based trust facilitates this process of consolidating trust.  
Finally, the Finnish-Swedish case shows that trust, in addition to being a condition 
for collaboration, can also be a result of the objective of cooperation. Moreover, as 
argued by psychologically- and socially-oriented trust scholars, trust never starts 
from a historical and social void. In fact, dealing with past experiences of mistrust is 
crucial in forming a new relationship characterized by deeper trust and more intense 
cooperation.  
 
4.5 Publication V. The Key Features of Finlandization   
 
As the war in Ukraine commenced in 2014 and as international commentators 
started to ponder a possible political solution to the crisis, the concept of 
Finlandization – or, alternatively, the “Finland model” – re-emerged from the Cold 
War dustbin. Most often, Finlandization refers to a national security strategy 
whereby a minor state adjusts its policy to the preferences of a larger, possibly 
neighboring country. Finnish Cold War foreign policy exemplified that kind of 
strategy. However, Finlandization has also developed into an abstract ideal-type and 
scholarly concept without a direct reference to Finland. 
 
The fifth publication in the dissertation deals with Finland’s own experience of 
Finlandization. It asks three questions: 
 
x Which factors constituted Finlandization? 
x Did the accommodative Finnish attitude toward the Soviet Union go too 
far? 
x What are the lessons learnt regarding Finlandization as a national security 
strategy? 
                                                   
60 See Prime Minister’s Office 2017, 16: “Trust, a necessary requisite for defense cooperation, is 
established through tenacious and enduring action.” 
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The concept of Finlandization, which in fact originates from 1950’s German-
speaking Europe, has had at least three meanings. Firstly, for some commentators, 
Finlandization plainly meant Finland’s Cold War foreign policy of voluntarily 
accommodating its interests and restricting its sovereignty in the face of its mighty 
neighbor, the Soviet Union. This realist approach to Finlandization has viewed the 
phenomenon mostly in a positive light. 
 
Secondly, Finlandization has also been regarded abroad as a political remote control. 
This negative view played an important role in the Western European security debate 
in particular. Thinkers such as Raymond Aron and Walter Laqueur and politicians 
like Franz Josef Strauss saw Finland as a warning example of a semi-independent 
state – a danger that, according to them, would also loom elsewhere in Europe if the 
Soviet Union was given too much ground in the process of détente. Finally, 
especially in Finland, Finlandization has been associated with a specific political 
culture, which blossomed in the country from the mid-1960s to early 1980s. Among 
other things, the culture buttressed the official foreign policy by promoting and 
ensuring abstinence from allegedly anti-Soviet manifestations.  
 
In Finland, Finlandization was and continues to be a pejorative term. During the 
Cold War, Finnish decision-makers and officials fought hard against its usage. 
Finnish leaders, primarily President Kekkonen, did their best to imbue 
Finlandization with a positive meaning. Kekkonen suggested that the Finnish-Soviet 
relations were an example of peaceful coexistence between states with different 
social systems. Moreover, the archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 
reveal multiple incidents where Finnish diplomats contacted someone who had 
uttered the term in negative fashion. The archives also disclose how meticulously 
Finnish diplomats followed the occurrence of the term in various national media 
across the globe.  
 
The article elaborates on two specific dimensions of the phenomenon – namely 
Finlandization as a foreign policy strategy and a political culture, which were closely 
intertwined and that partly existed in parallel. Finlandization as a foreign policy 
strategy simply refers to the policy that Finland practiced throughout the Cold War 
and practically until the early 1990s when the country’s orientation became 
“Europeanized”. In practice, Finland stayed out of the organization that the Soviet 
Union considered hostile. Bilateral economic, political, and societal tracks with 
Moscow were strong, and Finland also refrained from criticizing the Soviet Union’s 
decisions and actions. Official parlance was sugarcoated with pro-Soviet and pro-
peace references. Importantly, the policy was based on the FCMA treaty, which 
stated for example that under special circumstances Finland and the Soviet Union, 
with one accord, could join forces and fight an aggressor on the Finnish territory. 
However, in peacetime, Finland was adamant about not cooperating with the Soviet 
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Union in defense. Finnish accommodative political realism has always contained 
separatist elements drawing red lines vis-à-vis small-state flexibility.  
 
Whereas Finlandization as a foreign policy strategy originated in the immediate post-
Second World War years – and in this sense Finland was “Finlandized” in the late 
1940s – the political culture of Finlandization started to arise later, in the 1960s, 
reaching its climax in the 1970s when the Soviet Union became more active in 
tightening its grip on Finland. The culture was a multifaceted phenomenon, but it 
had some notable prominent features. First, to begin with, it was the objective of the 
Finnish leadership to bring about a culture that embraced the official friendship 
between Finland and the Soviet Union. In other words, Finnish leaders aimed to 
“de-antagonize” Finnish society and the populace with regard to anti-Soviet 
sentiments. The leadership fervently hoped, however, that the public would 
understand that the flattering pro-Soviet talk was purely instrumental. 
 
The objective of promoting the official foreign policy line served President 
Kekkonen, who was eager to consolidate his status and dominance as the sole leader 
of Finnish foreign policy. The most tangible and politically consequential implication 
of Finlandization was the growing Soviet influence on Finnish domestic affairs; 
loyalty to the Soviet Union became a de facto necessity for pursuing a significant 
career in Finnish politics. Furthermore, the National Coalition Party, considered 
anti-Soviet by Moscow, was omitted from the government for more than 20 years. 
Perhaps the most obnoxious feature of Finlandization was self-censorship, however, 
which removed references critical of the Soviet Union from the Finnish press, 
television, radio, and also, to some extent, from literature.  
 
Some Finns were more “Finlandized” than others. Many individual politicians took 
pro-Soviet initiatives that went a long way toward extirpating allegedly anti-Soviet 
policies and practices – such as the notorious peace address commemorating the 
signing of the 1944 Moscow armistice. Moreover, a group of Finnish baby boomers 
born in the late 1940s or early 1950s embraced a version of Stalinism. The group 
represented the minority block in the Communist Party of Finland, but gained a 
rather strong foothold in academia and the media. They largely failed in their 
objectives, but managed, for example, to undermine certain efforts to build up the 
civic foundations of Finnish defense. In addition to pro-Soviet elements, there was 
also resistance. Part of civil society enshrined patriotic and conservative values. 
Moreover, through different scholarship programs, thousands of Finns were 
educated in the United States, where they embraced Western pluralism and 
subsequently promoted these values in academia, for instance. Most ordinary Finns 
were also aware of the true state of socialism in the Soviet Union.    
 
Finlandization began to evaporate in the 1980s. President Kekkonen was replaced 
by Koivisto, who was a staunch parliamentarian and less eager to control the public 
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debate. Moreover, a new and de-politicized generation arose and overshadowed the 
radical baby boomers. Furthermore, the shortcomings of the socialist system became 
increasingly evident, which detracted from communism’s appeal. Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s policies were the final nail in Finlandization’s coffin; the Moscow card 
lost its value in domestic power battles in Finland and, furthermore, the Soviet 
interest in Finnish affairs began to lessen. Notably, from time to time, accusations 
of Finlandization have also appeared in the post-Cold War era. In Finland, some 
have argued that the country is not Finlandized toward the West. Others have again 
asserted that Finland is still too compliant with Russia’s interests.  
 
Did Finlandization bring success to Finland or did it go too far? If understood as a 
mere foreign policy strategy, Finlandization was rather successful, or at least it did 
not destroy Finland’s sovereignty. First, Finland managed to retain and develop its 
independent defense capability and, the FCMA treaty notwithstanding, was not 
drawn into the Soviet security system. Secondly, eastern trade largely benefitted 
Finland, although too heavy a reliance on the Soviet market backfired in the 1990s 
when it became apparent that not all Finnish products were competitive in European 
or global markets. Thirdly, the existing Russian emigrant minority in Finland 
remained critical of the communist rule and, moreover, the cultural ties between the 
Finnish and Soviet societies were at the end of the day weak. Finally, most of the key 
decision-makers understood the name of the game and even the majority of 
communists supported Finnish sovereignty. The bottom line is that Finlandization 
was not a policy of limitless adjustment, which invalidates some of the key arguments 
of the group who understood Finlandization as a sheer remote control.   
 
The success of the foreign policy strategy notwithstanding, one can claim that the 
political culture of Finlandization had excessive features, and it is too naïve to 
interpret Finlandization solely as a successful foreign policy strategy. The 1970s in 
particular showed that a “Finlandization of consciousness” – a genuine adoption of 
the instrumental ideas – was potentially looming. Some acts of courtesy went 
unnecessarily far, however. Additionally, Kekkonen’s behavior exceeded his 
constitutional powers, and the arbitrary foreign policy suitability criteria were clearly 
a form of corruption. The Finnish media again failed to play a role as the fourth 
estate, as it faithfully echoed the official foreign policy. One can of course contend 
that the culture was necessary to implement Finnish eastern policy successfully. 
However, the transition from Kekkonen’s to Koivisto’s presidency, with the waning 
of the phenomenon, seems to suggest that the extent of domestic accommodation 
for foreign policy purposes was exaggerated. In fact, the culture of Finlandization 
was detrimental to the overall goal of Finnish foreign policy, since it ironically began 
to erode the hard core of Finnish sovereignty, which the very policy was intended to 
preserve. 
 
103 
What are the lessons learnt from the Finlandization of Finland? In terms of foreign 
policy, it was a relative success, but it came at a price and considerable risks. For 
small states willing or forced to pursue such a strategy, the Finnish case teaches some 
lessons. First and foremost, the hard core needs to be preserved. That is to say, the 
military and defense realm must be kept intact, too deep an economic 
interdependence must be avoided, and the broader society should maintain a cultural 
distance from the larger actor. That said, one should also bear in mind that Finland 
also needed luck to survive the tricky Cold War era. Had the Soviet power remained 
well into the 1980s and had the culture of Finlandization remained robust, the hard 
core could have eventually yielded and thus eroded.   
 
4.5.1 A Theoretical Note on the Finlandization of Finland 
 
Since the article was published in a diplomatic history journal, the analytical approach 
did not contain an explicit theoretical framework. Nonetheless, the Finnish case of 
Finlandization – and thus also the study at hand – has multiple dimensions that are 
interesting from the point of view of IFPA. In fact, it is impossible to fully 
understand Finlandization without an ideational perspective.    
 
Internationally, the debate on Finlandization was about Finland’s status in general 
and its sovereignty in particular. Sovereignty is the ultimate status which, essentially, 
makes a state a state, and hence it is a crucial factor of recognized statehood in 
international politics. Whereas Finnish policymakers saw and presented Finland as a 
neutral democratic state having friendly relations with the Soviet Union, many 
influential Western security commentators understood Finland as a country with 
limited sovereignty. Thus, the prolific Finlandization talk of the 1970s undermined 
Finland’s status as a sovereign and neutral country, and actually became a stigma (see 
Adler-Nissen 2014) that the Finnish leadership had to bear. In other words, Finland 
was not seen as a “normal” Western nation, and therefore its neutrality also became 
tainted.  
 
Obviously, the stigma of Finlandization was a blow to the collective self-esteem of 
Finnish decision-makers. Finnish diplomats did their best to correct such 
impressions but their success was limited. Kekkonen’s solution was to rely on the 
strategy that Social Identity Theory would call social creativity (see 3.3.3). More 
specifically, he tried to turn the alleged weakness of overly close Soviet ties into a 
strength and signals of status. Kekkonen presented Finlandization in a positive 
fashion as successful and peaceful co-existence between two nations having different 
domestic systems. In Kekkonen’s interpretation, the so-called Finlandization was a 
success of which Finns should be proud.  
 
One can argue that in terms of identity-building, the Finnish case represented a 
textbook example of a situation in which there is a clear discrepancy between 
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domestic and international views on a nation’s identity; Finns saw their country as a 
neutral nation, whereas many international commentators called Finnish neutrality 
and even its sovereignty into question.  
 
Domestically, Finlandization was part and parcel of the top-down approach to public 
opinion formation (see 3.5.3; 4.3). Finnish officials and politicians imprinted the key 
tenets of the official foreign policy on the national consciousness. More precisely, 
the leadership strove to entrench the dominant worldview of geopolitical realism 
(see 4.2) in the Finnish public and society in order to render Finnish foreign policy 
more credible in the eyes of the Soviet Union, which underlines that identity-building 
can be instrumental to some extent. The norms that the culture of Finlandization 
entailed became institutionalized and, effectively, established as the societal context 
where Finns – the public and elite alike – were embedded, affecting their worldviews.  
 
However, Finlandization did not really have a significant effect on the Finnish 
political purpose, which revolved around securing the democratic form of 
governance. In other words, the socialization effect remained limited. At any rate, 
Finnish leaders were rather successful in their efforts, as Publication IV suggested, 
since neutrality turned out to be a persistent idea, so durable in fact that it outlived 
the Cold War era in the minds of the public and elites.   
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5. Concluding Remarks: The End of the Cold War and 
the Ideational Environment of Finnish Foreign Policy   
 
 
 
 
5.1 From Small State Realism to Integrationism  
 
This section seeks to integrate the results of the individual publications. The aim is 
to present a comprehensive view of the end of the Cold War’s influence on the 
ideational foundations of Finnish foreign policy. To that end, the study set three 
research questions: 
 
x What did the end of the Cold War mean for Finnish foreign policy in terms 
of its ideational foundations? 
x What factors contributed to change on the one hand, and continuity on the 
other? 
x Can ideas explain the key doctrinal decisions of the era, such as accession to 
the European Union and adherence to military non-alignment?  
 
To put it briefly, the collapse of the Cold War brought about three notable ideational 
developments:  
 
1) an adjustment from small-state realism to integrationism as the primary 
orientation of foreign policy;  
2) the vindication of Finland’s Western-ness; 
3) the relaxation of the ideational milieu of Finnish foreign policymaking.  
 
The new Finnish foreign policy orientation, which was adopted in the early and mid-
1990s, can be called integrationism after the most powerful school of thought of the 
era (see 4.2). It replaced the Cold War small-state realism, which would have 
provided rather different foundations for Finland’s post-Cold War foreign policy. 
Should the small-state realists have prevailed, it is unlikely that Finland would have 
become an EU member. Rather, Finland would likely have adhered to a more 
restrictive interpretation of neutrality resembling the Cold War policy of balancing 
between the East and West.  
 
Integrationism that eventually carried the day was based on a “eurorealist” 
worldview. It recognized that a profound change had taken place in Finland’s 
security environment, but that geopolitical realities that characterized the Cold War 
had not vanished altogether. Integrationism contained a less restrictive definition of 
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neutrality, which enabled political alignment with the EU. In addition to material 
arguments such as economic benefit or an increase in power, ideational factors were 
used to argue for Finnish EU membership. As Paavo Lipponen (2001, 151–156) – 
perhaps the most visible integrationist and an important entrepreneur of Finnish 
Europeanization – wrote in his 1994 defense of Finnish EU membership, the old 
world no longer existed and there was no place for the old comfortable neutrality. 
Rather, Finland belonged to the club of stable Western European democracies,  had 
a European identity, and was a nation equal to its peers.            
                                                         
Almost equally as important as the push for EU membership was the fact that 
integrationism contained a “pinch” of the traditional geopolitical realism. Although 
the primacy of Finnish foreign policy gravitated toward Europe, Finland also 
continued to defer to Russia’s security interests as an EU member. In other words, 
vis-à-vis Russia, Finland was still a minor power, and part and parcel of Finnish 
(small-state) realism was the recognition of this fact. This was the key ideational 
motivation for staying militarily non-aligned outside NATO. For instance, one of 
the key architects of the Finnish policy writes in his memoirs that it was “natural” 
that the recognition of Russia’s interests was carried over into the new era: 
 
During the entire Cold War, one of the key meanings of the policy of 
neutrality was to refrain from actions that would have violated Soviet 
security interests. Membership in the European Union did not remove 
this motive of Eastern policy, but it was accompanied by new ones 
(Blomberg 2011, 658).61  
 
Although this “natural recognition” was not a quintessential Finnish phenomenon, 
it was absent from the consideration of former Soviet satellites and republics, for 
example, which were anxious about the re-emergence of Russia’s geopolitical 
ambitions and thus made NATO membership the absolute priority of their 
respective foreign policies (see e.g. Asmus 2004). Finnish leaders in turn understood 
NATO membership as a potentially confrontational move against Russia (Blomberg 
2011, 644). It is clear that a solely materialist approach to the foreign policies of the 
states in Russia’s proximity cannot explain the variation in the policies. Rather, a 
central factor was the ideas the representatives of the states held about Russia.  
 
As Publication V elaborated, Finnish leaders fought hard against the stigma of 
Finlandization during the Cold War. At the heart of the Finlandization talk was the 
questioning of Finnish sovereignty and, essentially, its status as a neutral Western 
power that was not a quasi-satellite of the Kremlin. The end of the Cold War and 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and Finland’s successful integration vindicated 
Finland’s “Western-ness” in the minds of Finnish policymakers and the members of 
                                                   
61 Translation by the author.  
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the country’s elite. Finally, a full-fledged identification with Europe and the West 
was possible. A new and weakened Russia was much less proactive in intervening in 
Finnish domestic politics, and the nature of the bilateral relationship between the 
two countries changed profoundly. The awkward label of Finlandization faded, and 
Finland’s sovereignty was no longer under speculation. One could argue that Finnish 
policymakers felt a certain status boost, which, in addition to the integrationist 
orientation, was reflected in key foreign policy documents such as the Government’s 
1995 white paper on foreign policy: 
 
Resting on the lessons of history and geopolitics, and seizing the 
opportunities offered by change, Finland’s foreign and security policy 
has adapted smoothly to the end of the Cold War and the subsequent 
transformation. Finland has worked actively and independently to clarify 
and strengthen its international status, and to enhance its capability to pursue 
its security interests and bear its share of responsibility for international 
security (The Council of State 1995, 65).62 
 
The perceptions of the increased room for maneuver in foreign policy and the 
evaporation of the stigmas of the past generated fertile ground for Westernization 
narratives, and Browning (2002, 2008) is right that the narratives were political and 
contained a specific reading of history against which the contemporary identity was 
partly built. The narratives are indeed worth unpacking, but one cannot deny that 
Finnish policymakers and members of the elite felt a genuine sense of justification 
regarding their nation’s Western identity after the end of the Cold War. This was 
evident in the public debate analyzed in Publication II.  
 
Interestingly, these new interpretations of Finnish subjectivity were connected to 
another change that came at the end of the Cold War, namely the relaxation of the 
ideational environment of Finnish foreign policymaking. In practice, this meant the 
greater importance of public opinion and, furthermore, the emergence of various 
competing schools of thought with divergent visions of ideal foreign and security 
policy. In other words, Publication III identified a new bottom-up dynamic in the 
foreign policy-public opinion nexus, while Publication II demonstrated how the 
hegemony of small-state realism broke down and how there were suddenly opposing 
ideas about the very bedrocks of Finnish security. Moreover, as pointed out in 
Publication V, the process of relaxation had already started in the mid-1980s, when 
Finlandization and the practice of self-censorship associated with the phenomenon 
began to wane. It is possible to find internal and external causes of the relaxation. 
Domestically, partly owing to the personality of Mauno Koivisto and his successor 
Martti Ahtisaari, there was less inclination to control public opinion and debate. 
Externally, the easing of the threat environment, namely the collapse of the Soviet 
                                                   
62 Emphasis added.  
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Union, reduced the outside pressure to control the competition of ideas. Moreover, 
the concrete choice regarding Finland’s possible membership in the EU empowered 
the public, who had their say in the consultative referendum.  
 
These changes notwithstanding, one can hardly call the ideational transformation 
revolutionary but rather an adjustment of old ideas to new material and ideational 
realities of the post-Cold War world, in which international politics was not 
characterized by ideological competition but rather by a consolidation of US 
hegemony and the benevolent liberal world order (see e.g. Brands 2016; Ikenberry 
1996). In the Finnish case, a full-fledged transatlantic orientation coupled with a 
disregard for Russia’s security interests, or the wholehearted adoption of a normative 
globalist worldview would have qualified as profound ideational change.  
 
Why did the collapse of the Cold War – a major shift in the material and ideational 
realities of world politics – not result in a bigger change in Finnish foreign affairs? 
First, and most importantly, Finland’s social system did not change, and domestic 
preferences ingrained in the societal value system indeed count as one pillar of 
national identity. As mentioned in Publication II, Finland’s political purpose – the core 
value system of the society – was not really debated. Thus, in a sense, Finland was 
like any other Western European democracy. None of the established democracies 
in Europe made complete reversals in their respective foreign policies. Rather, only 
minor adjustments occurred.63  
 
Secondly, although the Soviet Union collapsed and a much weaker Russia emerged 
from the ruins of the former Soviet empire, the power asymmetry between Finland 
and Russia continued to be a fact to be reckoned with in the minds of Finnish 
policymakers. Given the success of the policy of neutrality during the Cold War in 
stabilizing Finland’s international position compared to the labile early post-Second 
World War years, the hard core of the doctrine, military non-alignment, seemed a 
feasible policy line in the new circumstances as well, particularly when Finland was 
free to realize its political and economic objectives as a member of the EU without 
any unnecessary flattering of its neighbor or any accusations of Finlandization.  
 
Thirdly, the question of change and continuity ultimately boils down to individual 
decision-makers and their beliefs. Although some of the policymakers and members 
of the elite, notably those among the globalists and euroatlanticists, advocated a 
thorough re-evaluation of the core aspects of Finnish foreign policy based on novel 
ideas, neither the majority of the elite nor the public saw an urgent need for a major 
ideational turnaround. An adjustment was enough for most. Mauno Koivisto – the 
                                                   
63 Denmark is an example of a minor policy change in a Western country. After the Cold War, 
and owing to an active policy by Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Denmark adopted an 
active transatlantic stance, which replaced the critical “endnote” policy of the Cold War era. See 
Doeser & Eidenfalk 2013. 
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most powerful figure in Finnish foreign policy and a potential entrepreneur of 
change – is a case in point, as Publication I discussed. 
  
5.2 Epilogue: The End of the Cold War in Light of the Post-2014 Era  
 
Before putting the end of the Cold War into a contemporary perspective, it must be 
noted that the period has by no means been the only era during which the guiding 
ideas of Finnish foreign policy have changed.64 In the interwar years, the 
foundational ideas of Finnish foreign policy oscillated as a reaction to international 
and domestic changes, which resulted in various foreign policy orientations. 
Alignment with Germany collapsed along with Germany’s defeat in the First World 
War. The so-called “Rimland policy” with the Baltic states and Poland was a solution 
almost dead on arrival. Thereafter, without clear alignments, Finland pursued rather 
isolationist policies and leaned on the League of Nations. When the impotence of 
the League of Nations became evident, Finland tried to safeguard its neutrality with 
a Scandinavian orientation. The only ideational factor that Finnish political factions, 
excluding the Communists, shared was Russia as the hereditary enemy of the country 
(Browning 2008, 115–168; Kallenautio 1985; Jussila et al. 1995).  
 
As we now know, Scandinavian neutrality did not save Finland from the perils of 
the new war. The major shock of the Second World War and Finland’s narrow 
survival changed the ideational basis of the country’s foreign policy. More 
specifically, Finnish policy moved from “emotionalism to rationalism”, meaning the 
adoption of geopolitical small-state realism (Browning 2008; Apunen & Wolff 2009). 
In terms of ideas, the Cold War was much more stable than the interwar years. In 
fact, the main story of Finnish Cold War foreign policy is the stabilization of 
Finland’s international position by drawing on the principles of realism.  
 
The end of the Cold War unarguably marked a profound shift in Finland’s security 
environment. Moreover, as described earlier, it also shaped the individual and 
collective ideas influencing Finnish policy. One of the advantages of this study 
compared to previous works is the age in which it is written. The era between the 
late 1990s and the early 2010s was the heyday of the ideational analysis of Finnish 
foreign policy. The world has since changed, as have the ideas that underlie Finnish 
foreign affairs. In other words, the events of 2014, namely the Russian annexation 
of Crimea and the war in Ukraine, inaugurated a new era not only in European 
security but also in Finnish national security policy (see e.g. Aaltola 2019). Indeed, 
these new realities add a new perspective to the end of the Cold War and, particularly, 
to the processes it set in motion. 
                                                   
64 The foreign policy of independent Finland is specifically referred to here. Foreign policy 
questions were also debated during the Grand Duchy era, and many of the ideas that have 
prevailed originated in the 19th century. However, as a political entity, Finland did not practice 
independent foreign policy in the traditional sense of the term.   
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First, the decision associated with Russia’s actions, namely the sanctions the EU 
enacted after the annexation of Crimea and the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 
MH17, revealed the true effects and level of the Europeanization of Finnish foreign 
policy. Interestingly, as brought up in Publication II, the Finnish elite had already 
pondered prior to EU membership what Finland’s reactions would be in case the 
EU was forced to impose sanctions on Russia. At that time, even the supporters of 
membership were of the opinion that sanctioning Russia would be a bridge too far 
for Finland. However, when the scenario actually materialized, adopting a common 
stance with other EU allies was a rather uncontroversial decision for Finnish 
policymakers. Interestingly, in early 2019, every leader of a major Finnish party 
supported the maintenance of sanctions in the existing circumstances (Hara 2019). 
The level of support and the indisputability of the necessity for the sanctions regime 
is a strong indicator of the Europeanization process (see 2.1), in which both the 
Finnish elite and the public have gradually adopted European views as the basis of 
foreign policy. Had the events of 2014 taken place a decade or so earlier, the Finnish 
position would have been less straightforward.  
 
Second, the process that led to Finnish EU membership was the first occasion when 
Finnish decision-makers decided to redefine the country’s neutrality after the policy 
was incepted during Kekkonen’s first term. The old doctrine was stripped of most 
of its content and only the “hard core” – military non-alignment – remained. 
However, this was hardly the last instance when the substance of non-alignment was 
reimagined. In the mid-1990s and 2000s, as a response to new international 
developments in crisis-management, Finnish leaders amended the state legislation in 
order to make Finnish non-alignment less restrictive in terms of Finland’s 
participation in out-of-area operations. Moreover, as the Lisbon Treaty with its 
mutual assistance clause 42.7 entered into force, military non-alignment was replaced 
by a new status of “not being a member of any military alliance”. The year 2014 and 
Russian assertiveness were, however, also turning points in this regard – a game 
changer as one prominent Finnish decision-maker noted (Nieminen 2019). In 2017, 
Finnish legislators passed an amendment that enabled the provision of military 
assistance by combat forces. The new modification of the legislation and the 
emergence of robust bi-, mini- and multi-lateral defense cooperation, which are 
aimed at improving the chances of receiving military assistance in a crisis, 
demonstrate that military non-alignment is all but a dead letter a quarter of a century 
after the end of the Cold War (Pesu 2017a; 2017b).   
 
Thirdly, although the new more benevolent post-Cold War world pushed some 
traumas aside, a more precarious era made them reappear. As Publication IV 
demonstrated, memories of 1990 resurfaced among the Finnish security policy elite, 
which manifested as mistrust toward Sweden in the realm of defense. Moreover, 
Publication V in turn pointed out how Finlandization made a brief reappearance in 
the international security lexicon in the form of a “Finland model”, as the foremost 
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experts of international politics were seeking a solution to the Ukraine crisis. In 
Finland, the re-emergence of the old stigma was not regarded positively. Key 
policymakers reminded the international audience that Finland was no longer neutral 
and it was thus not a feasible model for Ukraine or any other Eastern European state 
for that matter. Moreover, the discussion that revolved around Finlandization 
revealed that the reading of the past neutrality had become even more negative than 
before among Finnish decision-makers. In some of the Cold War neutrals, such as 
Austria, the situation is not the same, but the image of neutrality is still positive and 
politically appealing (Rainio-Niemi 2014). 
 
What, then, does the contemporary perspective on the end of the Cold War tell us? 
First, ideational change can be incremental and even latent. The collapse of the 
bipolar world indeed forced Finnish decision-makers to rethink their country’s place 
in the world. The result was an adjustment of old ideas to new realities. One could 
also say that the ideational horizon of Finnish decision-makers was broadened, 
which was a crucial enabler of novel decisions. However, the end of an era initiated 
partly inconspicuous processes that needed more external stimuli to fully materialize. 
This began to happen in 2014, a quarter of a century after the annus mirabilis of 1989, 
when Russia annexed Crimea and started the war in Eastern Ukraine. Secondly, ideas 
can also be resilient. Old images such as neutrality die hard, particularly if one is an 
outside observer of Finnish foreign policy. Moreover, ideas are even more resistant 
if they are loaded with emotional substance – the belief about Sweden’s 
untrustworthiness is a prime example.  
 
To conclude, it remains to be seen what kind of events will force Finns to re-evaluate 
the ideas constituting the country’s foreign policy in the future. Certainly, there will 
be transformative periods akin to 1944–5, 1989 and 2014, which will change the 
standpoints of Finnish foreign and security policy. That said, it is probably prudent 
to refrain from further speculation. International politics has a tendency to surprise 
its observers. To paraphrase Mauno Koivisto’s words in Strasbourg in 1990, in the 
face of the unpredictability of international affairs, even the foremost experts on the 
subject regularly feel like amateurs (Koivisto 1995, 329).  
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Matti Pesu
Artikkelissa hahmotan Mauno Koiviston ulkopoliittista uskomusjärjestelmää hyödyntämällä viiteke-
hyksenä operationaalisen koodin analyysiä, joka kohdistuu johtajien yleislaatuisiin uskomuksiin po-
litiikan luonteesta ja siinä käytetyistä parhaista toimintatavoista. Analyysin tarkoituksena on luoda
ymmärrystä niistä lähtökohdista, joista Koivisto johti Suomen ulkopolitiikkaa paikoin suvereenilla
tavalla. Tutkimus on operationaalisen koodin analyysin valtavirrasta poiketen menetelmältään laa-
dullista sisällönanalyysiä, ja erityispaino on Koiviston uskomusten sisällön kuvaamisessa. Koiviston
omaleimaisin piirre on kansainvälisen politiikan näkeminen suurvaltakeskeisenä. Instrumentaalisia
uskomuksia – vakiintuneita näkemyksiä siitä, miten ulkopolitiikassa olisi hyvä toimia – Koivistolla
on sen sijaan varsin vähän. Koiviston uskomuksiin ovat vaikuttaneet muun muassa hänen sotakoke-
muksensa ja laaja oppineisuutensa sekä suomalaisessa ulkopolitiikassa tapahtuneet käänteet toisen
maailmansodan jälkeen.
Avainsanat: Mauno Koivisto, operationaalisen koodin analyysi, Suomen ulkopoliittinen historia,
uskomusjärjestelmät
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∂←° ±;×∂ ⊂°″≡± ↓≡↑∂″″;∂←≡±; ↑⎯≥≥∂←←°±÷≡≥″⎯±⎯ ⎟⊃∂←↑∂ ⎩⎛⎛⎢⌠ ⎣⎧™ 
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Matti Pesu
⊂≡±⏐;…× ⎩⎛⎛⎢⌠ ⎣⎝⎞〉 ¬≥°⏐⎯⎯≥∂ ×≡•∂ƒ←×ƒ←ƒ″ƒ×←≡ ←≡×; ↓⎯×°≥⎯∂←⎯←∂⎯ °≥∂⎯ ™°∂∂←°± ↓≡↑←↓≡×∫
∂∂∂←; °∂←←∂∝⎯∂←∂⎯ •°≥∂″⎯⎯ •;±≡± ←°←∂⎯≥∂≈≡″°×↑⎯⎯∂←≡←⎯ ⎯←⎯←⎯⎯± ⎟∉⎯⎯←∂° ⎩⎛⎛⎡⌠ ⎧⎛⎞〉
⊇≥×°↓°≥∂∂∂←∂←←⎯ ≥°←≥°∂←←⎯⎯± ™°∂∂←° ×°↑°←∂ ≡±←∂″″;∂←≡± ×⎯≡±←⎯ ⎯≥←⎯ ≥;•∂≡± 
⎯∂±⎯ °∂←≡± ×⎯≡±←⎯ ≥°↓↓± ⎯←∂ •ƒ∂; ±⎯⎯↓↑∂←•≡∂⎯ ←≡×; ″⎯⎯±∂≡≡≡± ∝⎯ •∂←°↑∂⎯± ↑°°≥∂⎯ 
⊂°″≡± ≥×°↓°≥∂∂∂←≡± ≥∂±∝⎯± ⎯←⎯≡×∂∝)∂±; ⎟⊄⎯←⎯⎯≥≥⎯± ↓↑≡←∂≈≡±∂± ⎟⊄∉⎞ ↓•≡ ⎡〉⎩⎨〉⎩⎛⎛⎨™ 
™°∂∂←° ƒ″〉 ⎩⎛⎛⎧⎞〉 ∇;″; ⎯↑←∂± ″″⎯°″⎯ ↓≡↑←≠±≈⎯″≡±∂ ≡∂; ⎯∂•±≡≡ ×ƒ≥∫
″;± ←°≈⎯± ≥°↓⎯⌠ ∇≡°←°≥∂∂°± ″⎯ ⊃≡±;∝;×←∂ ≡∂×; ⊂°″≡± •⎯≡⎯ ∨↑°°↓⎯± 
ƒ•≡∂←)± ∝;←≡±ƒƒ;〉
®∂×; °± ⎯↑∂××≡≥∂±∂ ↓⎯±°← ™°∂∂←°± ≥×°↓°≥∂∂∂×⎯←⎯ ∝⎯ •;±≡± å≥∂±∝⎯←⎯⎯±å ×;ƒƒƒ± ≥⎯⎯∫
∝≡″↓⎯⎯± ×≡←×←≡≥±◊ ⊂ƒ←≡″⎯⎯∂←≡≥≥⎯ ⎯±⎯≥ƒƒ←∂≥≥; °∂≈⎯⎯± ∝°×° •⎯⎯←⎯⎯ ⎯∂ ≡±∂←≡←;;± ⎯•∫
∂←⎯⎯ °≥≡″⎯←←⎯ °≥≡∂⎯ ≥×∂±°∝⎯ ∝⎯ °∂←⎯⎯≥⎯ ≥°≈⎯ ≥⎯⎯∝≡″↓⎯⎯ ×⎯⎯ ←≡×; ƒ″″;↑↑ƒ←; ™°∂∫
∂←°± ≥×°↓°≥∂∂∂×⎯←⎯ ∝⎯ ←≡± ⎯←⎯≡×∂∝)∂←;〉 ⊃≡↑⏐⎯⎯≥∂←≡←⎯ ⎯∂±≡∂←°←⎯ °∂≈⎯⎯±×∂± °←°∂⎯⎯ 
±∂∂; ×⎯±←⎯∂±;≥∂←≡± ↓°≥∂∂∂×⎯± ↓∂∂↑≡∂;⌠ ∝°×⎯ ™°∂∂←° ±;×∂ °≥≡±±⎯∂←≡±⎯ ∝⎯ ∝°×⎯ °⎯ ×≡±∂≡← 
∝;;±≡≡ ;•≡″″;≥≥≡ •°″∂°≥≥≡〉
∨↑;← ×≡←×←≡≥⌠ ∝°•°± °↓≡↑⎯∂°±⎯⎯≥∂←≡± ×°°≈∂± ⎯±⎯≥ƒƒ←∂≥≥; °∂≈⎯⎯± °←⎯≥≥∂←⎯⌠ ×°←×≡≡ 
™°∂∂←°± ←•≈≡⎯ ≈°×↑∂∂±≡∂•∂±〉 ™°∂∂←° ∂←≡ ←•⎯∂ ×↑∂∂∂←≡←∂ °↓↓∂≡± ″°≈°←⎯″∂←≡≡±〉 
®∂←≡≥″∂←←⎯⎯± •;± °± °≈≡±±⌠  ≡;  ⎯∂±⎯ ≡≈≡← ∂←°∂≥≥⎯  ″⎯∂≥≥⎯  ≡∂  °≥≡  ⎯↑⎯⎯ ≈°×↑∂∂±≡∂•∂± ∝⎯  
≡; ↓∂≡±⎯≥∂°∂≈≡± ≥≡≡ ×⎯±←⎯∂±;≥∂←≡←←; ↓°≥∂∂∂×⎯←←⎯ ≥;•∂±±; ←°∂⎯⎯ ∝⎯ ↑≡⎯÷°∂≈⎯ ⎟™°∂∫
∂←° ⎩⎛⎛⎢⌠ ⎨⎡⎞〉 ∠←⎯ ×≡←×←≡≥∂∝°∂←⎯ °± ƒ•ƒ±ƒ ™°∂∂←°± ″∂≡≥∂↓∂≡≡←≡≡±⌠ °∂←≡ ⎯⎯← ≡∂;〉 
∏⎯⎯××° ™⎯≥≡≥⎯ ⎟⎩⎛⎛⎧⌠ ⎨⎣⎝ä⎨⎣⎜⎞ ×≡≡ ™°∂∂←°± °″⎯⎯ ±;×≡″ƒ←; ≈°×↑∂∂±∂°″≈≡←⎯〉 ⋅;± 
°± °≈≡±±⌠ ≡; ™°∂∂←° ≡∂ •⎯≥±± ×⎯±°±∂←°∂≈⎯ ″∂≡≥∂↓∂≡∂;;± ∝⎯ •;± ↓ƒ↑×∂ ;∂;″;;± 
⎯←∂°∂≈≡± °∂←°⎯〉 ⊄;←; ±;×)×≥″⎯←⎯ ™°∂∂←°± ≡←∂ƒ←⎯⎯± ↓≡↑←≡≡≥≥⎯ ≡∂ ←∂∂← °≥∂←∂ ″⎯•≈°≥≥∂←⎯ 
•⎯•″°⎯⎯ ″∂;;± ×°×°±⎯∂←⎯≥⎯∂←⎯ °↓↓∂⎯〉 ⊂≡×; ∉⎯⎯° ⊃;ƒ↑ƒ±≡± ⎟⎩⎛⎛⎢⌠ ⎣⎨⎞ ≡; ∉≡××⎯ ⊃∂←∫
↑∂ ⎟⎩⎛⎛⎢™ ⎨⎪⎩⎢⎞ ↓°≥≡←⎯⎯± °⎯ ⎯↑÷″≡±°∂±≡≡⌠ ≡; ™°∂∂←°≥≥⎯ °≥∂ ≈°×↑∂∂±∂〉 ⊃;ƒ↑ƒ±≡± ≡∂ 
°←∂± ⎯⎯⎯ ;∂≡;;±⌠ ∝⎯ ⊃∂←↑∂ ⎟⎩⎛⎛⎢⌠ ⎣⎢⎞ ƒƒƒƒ °≡⎯″⎯⎯±⌠ ≡; ≈°×↑∂∂±∂ °± å≡↑↑⎯≡± ←≡≥;←∂ 
↓;;≡≥;∂←←; ×;ƒ;±±)± °∂″≡±↓∂≡∂←;å〉 
∨″∂≥ƒ ∠〉 ¬°≥≈″⎯±∂± ∝⎯ ©⎯↑↑ƒ ⇑≡↑″⎯±∂± ⎟⎨⎪⎪⎪⌠ ⎨⎧⎢⎞ ″×⎯⎯± ƒ≥≡∂←∂± ⎯↓⎯ ″;;↑∂;; ≥∫
×°↓°≥∂∂∂±≡± ≈°×↑∂∂±∂ °± ±;•≈; ←≡ å∝°××°±⎯ ←;;±)∝;⌠ ∝°×⎯ ″;;↑∂;; ⎯↑×≡″″∂±⌠ ″∂≡± 
≡↑∂≥⎯∂←∂⎯ ×≡∂±°∝⎯ °∂≈⎯⎯± ×;ƒ;; ←↑⎯≡÷∂⎯± ↓⎯≥≡≥×←≡←←⎯ ∝⎯ ∝°×⎯ °•∝⎯⎯⎯ ↓;;)×←≡±≡×°⎯å〉 
⇒±⎯≥ƒƒ←∂←←; •°″∂° ×⎯±±⎯⎯⎯ ←∂∂← ×∂∂±±∂;; ≡↑∂ƒ∂←≡←∂ ;≥∂±≡≡≥≥∂←∂∂± ←×°″×←∂∂±⌠ ∝°∂≈≡± ↑⎯∫
⎯↑÷″≡±°∂≈⎯⌠ ×≡± ™⎯≥≡≥⎯⌠ ≡; ™°∂∂←° ≡∂ •⎯≥±± °≈⎯ ≡←∂∂± ″∂;;± ƒ≥≡∂←↓;≡∂; ×≡∂±°∝⎯ 
≥×°↓°≥∂∂∂←≡± ⎯°∂≡∂≈≡± ←⎯⎯⎯″∂←≡×←∂⌠ ≡∂×; •;±≡≥≥; ;≡± ⎯↑←∂±⎯∂←≡←∂ °≥≥ °↓↓∂⎯〉 
Koiviston uskomusjärjestelmä
™°∂∂←°± ←×°″←∝;↑∝≡←≡≥″;± ←∂←;≥≥)←←; ≡∂ °≥≡ •⎯⎯∂⎯∂←←⎯ ←↑∂⎯ ″°×←∂⎯⌠ ⎯∂××⎯ ≡←∂∫
″≡↑×∂×←∂ •;±≡± ↑⎯≥≥∂←←×;←∂ƒ×←≡±←; ←⎯±°⎯⎯± ↓↑≡←∂≈≡±∂ƒ≈≡± ⎯∂×⎯±⎯ ≥⎯⎯∝≡±±≡≡± ⎟⊂∂∫
↓°≥⎯ ⎩⎛⎛⎨⌠ ⎧⎪ä⎧⎩⎞〉 ™ƒ≥″;± ←°≈⎯± ≥°↓± ″≥≥∂←←≡± ∝;≥×≡≡± ↓•≡∂←←⎯ °←∂± ≡←∂∂±ƒ∂ •∂≡″⎯± 
;•≡″″;± ⊂°″≡± °∂″∂∝≡≡± ≥∂∂ƒ∂; ←≡×; ←×°″←∝;↑∝≡←≡≥″;± ←∂←;≥≥)←; ×≡↑°∂⎯ •°∫
″∂°∂⎯〉 ®°←≡± ;•;∂←ƒƒ← ≡∂ ←∂±;±←; °≥≡ ƒ≥≥;;;;〉 ™≡± ≡←∂″≡↑×∂×←∂ ™°∂∂←°± ƒ←;; 
∝⎯ ƒ)°≡↑∂ ⊂≡↓↓° ©∂±≈⏐≥°″ ⎟⎨⎪⎪⎛⌠ ⎨⎣⎞ °± °≈≡±±⌠ ↓;;⎯←∂⎯←←⎯ ≥×≡±≡∂←≡≡± ∝⎯ °↓↓∂″∂∫
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Suurvaltaempiristi pienvaltion johtajana
←≡≡± ↓≡↑←± ™°∂∂←°± ⎯∝⎯≡≥″⎯⎯∂≥″⎯ °± ↓ƒ←ƒ±ƒ °←∂≡± ←⎯⎯°←←⎯ ∝°•≈°±″×⎯∂←≡±⎯〉 
™°∂∂←°± ←×°″←≡± ″″⎯°″≈≡± °∂ ±;•≈; ×≡↑°⎯± ←∂∂;⌠ ≡; ×ƒ≥″;± ←°≈⎯± 
≥°↓↓″∂±≡± ≡∂ °≥≥ •;±≡≥≥≡ ±∂∂± ←⎯±°←∂ å×°÷±∂∂∂∂±≡± ∂←×å ⎟⇒≈≥≡↑ ⎨⎪⎪⎢⌠ ⎝⎢⎞ ä ;×∂≥≥∂±≡± 
⎯↓⎯•″⎯⌠ ∝°×⎯ °≥∂←∂ ×ƒ←≡≡±⎯≥⎯∂←⎯± ⎯∂≡″″⎯ ←×°″×←≡ ±∂∂≈≡± ×⎯±←←⎯ ↑∂←∂↑∂∂≈⎯←←⎯ °≥≡⎯± 
°∂″∂±⎯ƒ″↓;↑∂←)± °≈≡≥≥∂←≈≡± ×⎯±←←⎯〉 ⊄;″; °∂ ∝°•⎯ ←∂∂;⌠ ≡; ™°∂∂←°≥≥≡ ″⎯⎯±∂≡≈≡ 
∝⎯ •∂←°↑∂⎯≥≥∂±≡± ×°×≡″← ±;ƒ;ƒƒ; ⎯↑←∂± ←⎯⎯∂←∂±⎯ ≥;•)×°•∂±⎯⌠ ∝°∂≈≡± ↓°•∝⎯≥⎯ •;± 
•⎯•″°∂ ⊂°″≡± ⎯←≡″⎯⎯ ″⎯⎯∂≥″⎯←←⎯ ↓↑≡←∂≈≡±∂×⎯≡±←⎯ ⎯≥←⎯ ≥°↓↓± ⎯←∂ ⎟™°∂∂←° ƒ″〉 
⎩⎛⎛⎧⎞〉
Uskomukset ulkopolitiikan luonteesta ja toimintatavoista
⎯⎯← ∂±←↑″≡±⎯⎯≥∂↓°≥≡± ←×°″×←∂⎯ ≥≡≡ ∂≥″∂ ;•;±〉 ™± ™°∂∂←°± ≡×←≡∝; ∝⎯ ≥⎯←±°∝⎯ 
∫
″ƒ×←∂∂±⌠ ∝°×⎯∂←≡≡± ±∂∂←; ≥)ƒƒƒ ∝°±×∂±≥⎯∂←∂⎯ ⎯←⎯×←∂⎯〉 ⊃;≥∂±≡≡≥≥∂←≡± ←×°″←≡± ;•;∂←ƒƒ← 
∉°≥∂∂

∂←≡± ±∂≡↑←″∂± ∝⎯ ⎯←
⎯↓°≥
≡± ≥°±
≡≡
 ⎟∧⎩⎞∑ ←↑⎯≥
°∝≡± ƒ≥≥;↓∂
;″; •⎯↑″°±∂⎯〉
⊄°∂←∂± ×∂± ≡←∂″≡↑×∂×←∂ ™≡××°±≡± ⎟⎩⎛⎝⎝⌠ ⎝ä⎜⎞⌠ ∝°×⎯ ±;×∂ ″⎯⎯∂≥″⎯± °↓↓∂×∂↑∝⎯″⎯∂←≡←∂ ⎯±⎯↑×∂∫
⎯± ⎯≥°←←⎯⌠ ™°∂∂←° ≡∂ ±;ƒ;±ƒ ←×°⎯±⌠ ≡; ×⎯±←⎯∂±;≥∂←≡± ↓°≥∂∂∂×⎯± ≥°±±≡ °≥∂←∂ ≡↑∂ƒ∂←≡± 
≥;•∂±±; ⊃≡±;∝;←;〉 ™°∂∂←° °± ←≡⎯⎯± °≡≡←≡≡± °≈≡±± ⊃≡±;∝;± °≥≡⎯± •ƒ; ±⎯⎯↓↑∂〉 ⊄°∫
≡⎯″←⎯ °± ⎯∂×≡⎯ ±;•≈; ↓≡≥××;±; ≥∂↑÷∂⎯±⎯⌠ ×°←×⎯ •;± °∂ ″∂≡≥∂↓∂≡≡±←; ≡←∂≥≥≡ ″ƒ)← ×⎯•∫
≈≡±;≥∂←≡←←; ×≡←×←≡≥←←⎯ ≡↑∂ •≡±×∂≥)∂≈≡±⌠ ×≡± ⇒↑±°≥≈ ⊆##≡≥∂±⌠ ×⎯±←←⎯ ⎟™°∂∂←° ⎩⎛⎛⎢™ 
⎨⎪⎪⎩⎞〉 ™°∂∂←°± ↓↑≡←∂≈≡±∂×⎯≈≡± ⎯∂×⎯∂±≡± ⊃≡±;∝;∫×;←∂ƒ← °± ≡↑∂≥⎯∂±≡± ×∂± •;±≡± ←°≈⎯±∫
⎯∝⎯± ⊃≡±;∝;∫×⎯±←⎯〉 ∨↑;;←←; ←°≈⎯±⎯∂×⎯∂←≡←←⎯ ×∂↑∝≡≡←←;;± ™°∂∂←° ±∂″∂;∂± ×←∂ ⊃≡±;∝;; 
⎯±∂×↑∂←×←≡×←∂ ∝⎯ ≡↓;∂≥∂ ←≡± ⎯≥∂←⎯⎯± ⊂°″≡± ←°≈⎯± ≥°↓⎯〉 ⊂⎯″⎯←←⎯ ≡°×←≡←←⎯ ™°∂∂←° 
″ƒ)← ×≡↑°°⌠ ≡; ≥°⎯″← ±⎯⎯↓↑∂∂± ×⎯←°∂ ←∂; ″ƒ);⌠ ×± •;± ←ƒ≡±ƒ∂ ←≡± ←∂←;∂←≡≡± ∂≥⎯⎯± 
∝⎯ ×ƒƒ××ƒƒ×←∂∂± ⎟™°∂∂←° ⎩⎛⎛⎜⌠ ⎨⎩⎝⎞〉 ⊄°∂←∂± ←⎯±°≡± ″°← ™°∂∂←°± ⊃≡±;∝;∫×⎯←←⎯ ⎯∫
↓⎯•∂ °↓↓∂″∂←≡± ×⎯⎯ ⎟≡←∂″〉 ⊂≡∂± ⎩⎛⎛⎣⎞〉 
™°∂∂←°± ×;←∂ƒ×←∂←; ↓°≥∂∂∂←≡←⎯ ±∂≡↑←″∂←⎯ ×≡↑°° ″ƒ)← ∝°⎯∂± ←≡⌠ ≡; ×⎯≡±←⎯ 
⎯≥×↓°≥≡≥≥⎯ •;± °≡←∂⌠ ≡≡∂ ⊂°″≡⎯ •×⎯∂←∂ ″∂×;;± ⎟⊄∉∑± ↓•≡ ⎧〉⎧〉⎩⎛⎜⎧⎞〉 ⊂⎯″⎯ ≥∂±∝⎯ ∝⎯×∂ 
≥;↓∂ ↓↑≡←∂≈≡±∂×⎯≈≡±⌠ ∝⎯ °±±⎯ ⎩⎛⎜⎛ •;± ←⎯±°∂ ⎯×⎯≈≡± ∝⎯ ↑⎯≥≥∂←≈≡± °≥≡⎯± ⎯•≡″∫
↓∂ ×∂± ×°←×⎯⎯±〉 ⋅;± ″ƒ)← ↓⎯∂±°∂ ←∂;⌠ ″∂≡± ⊂°″∂ ≡≥;; ƒ←;∂≡± ƒ″↓;↑∂≥≥; ∝⎯ ″∂≡± ←≡ °± 
∂←≡ ∂≥⎯±≡≡←≡≡± ×ƒ≡±±ƒ ⎯∂×⎯″⎯⎯± ⎟⊄∉∑± ↓•≡ ⎩〉⎩〉⎩⎛⎜⎛™ ⊄∉∑± •⎯⎯←⎯≡≥ ⎨⎢〉⎛〉⎩⎛⎜⎛⎞〉 
®∂←≡≥″∂←←⎯⎯± •;± ⎯⎯← ↓⎯∂±°∂⌠ ≡; ∂↑×⎯⎯± ⎯←≡←←⎯⎯± å⊂°″≡± ×⎯±←⎯∂±;≥∂←↓°≥∂∂∂←≡←←⎯ 
∂≥⎯±≡≡←←⎯ ≡∂ °≥≥ ⎯≥∂⎯″∂←⎯å™ ←∂≥≥; °≥∂ ⎯×∂∂±±≡≡ ±⎯⎯↓↑∂←•≡≡ ∝⎯ ±±←≡ ×⎯±←⎯∂±∫
;≥∂±≡± ↑°°≥∂ ⎟™°∂∂←° ⎩⎛⎛⎢⌠ ⎨⎧⎞〉 ∇;∂; •°″∂°∂⎯ ≥×∂≡←←⎯ ™°∂∂←°± ↓°≥∂∂∂±≡± ±∂≡↑←″∂⌠ 
∝°←←⎯ ⊂°″∂ °± ≥)ƒ;±ƒ ←°↓∂⎯± ↓⎯∂×⎯±⌠ ±;ƒ;; ∝°×←≡≡±×∂± •⎯↑″°±∂←≡≥⎯⌠ ≡∂×; ↓°≥∂∂∂←∂⎯ 
⎯←⎯↓°≥∂⎯ ±;•≈; ≥°±≡≡≥⎯⎯± •×⎯⎯∂±⎯〉
™°∂∂←°± ±;×≡″ƒ×←≡± ″×⎯⎯± ←↑⎯≥≥⎯ ƒ≥≥;↓∂;; ×⎯±←⎯∂±;≥∂←≡± ⎯←°± •⎯↑″°±∂⎯⎯〉 
™± ×ƒ≥″;± ←°≈⎯± ←↑⎯≥⎯∝;±±∂≡≡ ⎯≥×°∂⎯ ≥∂≡±ƒ;⌠ ™°∂∂←° ⎯≥×°∂ ±;•≈; ←∂⎯ ″⎯⎯≥⎯″∫
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″⎯± ⎯←°± ∝;±±∂≡∂; ∂≥″≡←ƒ;± ⎟⊄∉∑± ↓•≡ ⎩〉⎩〉⎩⎛⎛⎪⎞〉 ⊂↑⎯≥⎯↓°≥∂∂×⎯± ″⎯⎯∂≥″⎯ ≡∂ °←∂± 
°≥≡ ™°∂∂←°≥≥≡ •ƒ; ⎯∂ •°±°〉 ™⎯≡±←⎯ ⎯≥←←⎯ •;± °≡←∂⌠ ≡; ←↑⎯≥°∝≡± ↑∂←∂↑∂∂≈°∂←←⎯ ≡∂ 
∂←≡←←;;± °≥≡ ″∂;;± ←≡≥≥⎯∂←⎯⌠ ″∂←; °≥∂←∂ ≡≥°≥≥∂←← ↓ƒ←ƒ; ↓°∂←⌠ ≡•≈≡± ±;∂± ↓≡←;≡↑°⎯ ∉⎯⎯←∂×∂∫
≡≡±〉 ⊂°″≡± ≡∂ ⎯↑∂±± ″⎯⎯ ×⎯±°∝⎯⎯± ⎯∂± ←≡± ⎯×∂⎯⌠ ≡; ←↑⎯≥≥°∂≥≥⎯ ←ƒ±ƒƒ ∝°←⎯∂± 
⎯←∂⎯←⎯ ≡↑∂″∂≡≥∂←ƒƒ×←∂; ⎟⇒↓±≡± ⎨⎪⎪⎢⌠ ⎧⎩⎛⎞〉 ⊃⎯∂××⎯ ←↑⎯≥°∝≡± ;≥∂±≡± å∂≥⎯å ≡∂ ;≥;″;; 
⎯°″⎯⎯∂←≡←∂ °≥≡ ←≡≥≥⎯∂±≡±⌠ ∝°•°± ↓∂≡±⎯≥∂° ≡∂ °∂←∂ ←°×≡⎯⌠ ←°×≡″∂←≡± ←•≡≡± ↓∂;; 
×∂≡±×∂± °≥≥⎯ ⎯↑°⎯∂±≡±⌠ ×°←×⎯ ←↑⎯≥°∝≡± ×⎯±←←⎯ å×∂≡≥∂ °∂ ↓⎯≥⎯⎯å ⎟⊄∉∑± ∝⎯ ↓;;°∂″∂⎯∝∂≡± 
⎯↓⎯⎯″∂±≡± ⎨⎪〉⎩⎩〉⎩⎛⎜⎣⎞〉
⊃⎯∂××⎯ ↓°≥∂∂∂±≡± ±∂≡↑←″∂ ±;ƒ∂×∂± •⎯↑″°±∂←≡≥⎯⌠ ←°↓←°∂±∂±≡± ∂≥⎯ ≡∂ ™°∂∂←°± 
″∂≡≥≡←; °≥≥ ;≥;″;; ↓ƒ←ƒ;〉 ™∂↑∝≡≡←←;;± ∅•≈ƒ←⎯≥⎯∂± ↓↑≡←∂≈≡±∂≥≥≡ ¬≡°↑÷≡ ⋅〉∪〉 ⇑←•∫
∂≥≥≡ ⎯″″∂×←←⎯ ⎩⎛⎛⎪ •;± °≡⎯⎯⌠ ≡; ″≡←←∂⎯⎯±∂±≡± ∝⎯ ≥°←↓;∂±←±⎯± ⊃≡±;∝; °± °≥≥ 
⊂°″≡≥≥≡ °±÷≡≥″⎯≥≥∂±≡± ⎟™°∂∂←° ⎩⎛⎛⎢⌠ ⎧⎜⎩⎞〉 ™°∂∂←° ←∂∂← ×∂∂±±∂∂ •°″∂°⎯ ↓°≥∂∂∂←≡± ⎯←∫
⎯↓°≥≡± ⎯≥≥∂←≡⎯⎯± ←∂←;∂←≡≡± ∂≥⎯±≡≡←≡≡± ∝⎯ ⎯⎯≡″⎯⎯∂≥″⎯⎯±⌠ ∝°×⎯ •≡∂∝⎯←≡←←⎯⎯± ×⎯±←⎯∂±;∫
≥∂←≡≥≥≡ ⎯←°≥≥≡ ″°××⎯⎯⎯ ↓°≥∂∂∂←≡± ±∂≡↑←″∂± ≥°±±≡⎯〉 ⊂⎯″⎯ ←∂←;∂←≡± ∂≥⎯±≡≡± ⎯∂×← 
≥≡≡ ≡←∂≥≥≡ ↓⎯↑∂ °⎯ ″ƒ)•≡″″∂±〉 ⇒≥×°≈≡←⎯ ⎩⎛⎛⎩ ™°∂∂←° °≡←∂ °∂″∂⎯∝⎯⎯↓⎯⎯″∂∫
←≡←←⎯⌠ ≡; å∝°← ∇≡°←°≥∂∂°± ×≡•∂ƒ← °± ×°∂± •°±°⌠ ƒ•≡∂←×±±⎯≥≥∂←≡←∂ ∝⎯ ⎯≥°≈≡≥≥∂←≡←∂⌠ 
±∂∂± ←∂∂; ≥≡≡ •°±°∝⎯ •≡∂∝⎯←←⎯∂××←∂⎯ ″≡∂≥≥≡ ⊗⊂°″≡≥≥≡ℜå ⎟⊄∉∑± ∝⎯ ↓;;°∂″∂⎯∝∂≡± ⎯∫
↓⎯⎯″∂±≡± ⎨⎣〉⎩〉⎩⎛⎛⎩⎞〉
®⎯•≈°≥≥∂←≈≡
 ↓°≥∂∂

∂←
≡± ⎯↑°∝≡± ↑≡⎯≥∂←°∂±±∂≥≥≡ ⎟∧⎨⎞∑ ←↑⎯≥
⎯←•
≡∂≈≡± ×≡←×≡∂←ƒƒ← ∝⎯ 
⎯↑°⎯∂±≡± °↓
∂″∂←″∂〉 ™°∂∂←° ±;×∂ ←∂∂← ↓°≥∂∂∂←≡± ±∂≡↑←″∂± ⎯↑←∂± •⎯↑″°±∂←≡±⎯⌠ ≡∂×; 
•;± ≡≥;≡≥≥ƒ ∂•°≥≥∂←×∂⎯〉 ⊂↑⎯≥≥°∂≥≥⎯ °± °←≡±←⎯ •⎯↑″°±∂⎯± ƒ≥≥;↓∂≈°←←⎯ ∝⎯ ;≡± ″ƒ)← 
±∂≡↑←″∂± ≥°±≡≡←≡≡± ⎯∂×⎯″∂←≡←←⎯〉 ⊂↑⎯≥°∝≡± ↑°°≥∂ ≡∂ ×∂≡±×⎯⎯± ∝;; ;•;±⌠ ⎯⎯± 
±∂∂≈≡± ;≥∂←≡ ←•≡≡ ≥∂∂ƒ; ″ƒ)← °″∂≡± ↓;;″;;↑∂≡± ↑≡⎯≥∂←°∂″∂←≡≡±〉 ™ƒ←ƒ″ƒ← ←↑⎯≥°∫
∝≡± ⎯∂××←≡←⎯ ⊂°″≡± °∂″∂±⎯″⎯•≈°≥≥∂←×←∂∂± ≥≡≡ ≡←∂∂± ≥;↓∂ ↓↑≡←∂≈≡±∂×⎯≈≡± ∝⎯ ←≡± 
∝;≥×≡≡±×∂±〉
⊃°±±⎯ ⎩⎛⎜⎨ ™°∂∂←° °≡←∂ •⎯⎯←⎯≡≥←←⎯⌠ ≡; ″∂; ↓⎯↑≡″↓∂ ←↑⎯≥°∝≡± ;≥∂±≡± ∂∫
≥⎯±±≡ °±⌠ ←∂; ↓⎯↑≡″″⎯ ″⎯•≈°≥≥∂←≈≡ ⊂°″≡≥≥⎯ °± ⎯↑∝°⎯ ↓⎯≥≡≥×←∂⎯⎯± ⎟⊄∉∑± •⎯⎯←⎯≡≥ 
⎨⎨〉⎛〉⎩⎛⎜⎨⎞〉 ⊄°∂←∂± ←⎯±°≡± °″⎯⎯± °∂″∂∝≡≡± ∝⎯ ⎯°∂≡∂≈≡± ←⎯⎯⎯″∂←≡≡± °± ←ƒƒ; ←•∫
⎯⎯ °↓∂″∂←∂←≡″″∂±⌠ ×± ←↑⎯≥⎯∂≥⎯±±≡ °± •ƒ;〉 ⊃°±±⎯ ⎩⎛⎜⎣⌠ ×± ⊂°″≡⎯ °≥∂ ″°∂∫
∂ ↓⎯←←∂∂∂←≈≡←⎯ ≥×°↓°≥∂∂∂×⎯←←⎯⌠ ™°∂∂←° ⎯↑×≡±←∂ ±;×≡″ƒ←;;± ⋅≡≥←∂±÷∂± ⊂⎯±°″∂←←⎯〉 
⋅;±≡± ″×⎯⎯±←⎯ å⊗≡ℜ∂ °∂≈⎯ ←⎯±°⎯ ±∂∂±⌠ ≡; ×≡≡;″↓∂ ×⎯±←⎯∂±;≥∂±≡± ∂≥⎯±±≡ ∝°≥≥⎯×∂± ⎯⎯≥≥⎯ 
≡↑∂ƒ∂←≡←∂ ⎯⎯∂←∂ ″⎯•≈°≥≥∂←×←∂⎯ ⎯×∂∂∂←≡≡±〉 ∉∂×≡″″∂±×∂± °± ±∂∂±⌠ ≡; ⎯×∂∂∂←≡≡± 
°± ←∂≥≥°∂± ∂≥⎯∂←×←∂⎯⌠ ×± ×⎯±←⎯∂±;≥∂←≡←←; ↓°≥∂∂∂×⎯←←⎯ ≡≈≡;;± •≡±×≡;å〉 ⎟™°∂∂←° ⎩⎛⎛⎢⌠ 
⎩⎡⎨〉⎞ ⊂⎯″⎯±⎯ °±±⎯ ©°±°°←←⎯ ™°∂∂←° ←⎯±°∂⌠ ≡; å←≡≥≥⎯∂←≡←←⎯ ∂≥⎯±≡≡←←⎯⌠ ∝°←←⎯ ≥× °± 
↓⎯± ×∂∂±±∂ ∝⎯ ″≡±±;;± ∝°•°±×∂± ←±⎯⎯± ;ƒ; ⎯•∂⎯⌠ ±∂∂± ←∂≥≥°∂± ⎯⎯← ;•≡″″;± ×ƒ∫
←≡≥≥;;± ∝⎯ ×±±≡≥≥⎯⎯±⌠ ″∂≥≥; ×⎯±±⎯≥≥⎯ ″⎯•≈°≥≥∂←≡←∂ ↓∂≡±≡×∂± ″⎯⎯ °≥∂←∂⎯å ⎟⊄∉∑± •⎯⎯←⎯∫
≡≥ ⎩⎡〉⎩〉⎩⎛⎜⎣⎞〉  ⊃°±±⎯ ⎩⎛⎜⎝ •;± °≡←∂⌠  ≡;  °± ⎯∂×⎯×⎯←∂⎯⌠  ∝°≥≥°∂± ↓∂≡±⎯≥∂°∂⎯  ≡∂  ×±∫
±≡≥≥⎯⌠ ″⎯ °∂←⎯⎯≥⎯ ∝°←×← ±∂∂≈≡± ∂≈≡°∂≥≥≡ °± ″ƒ)← ⎯↑≡⎯ ⎟⊄∉∑± •⎯⎯←⎯≡≥ ⇒∫←≈∂°←←⎯ 
⎩⎡〉⎧〉⎩⎛⎜⎝⎞〉 ™°∂∂←° ↓⎯≥⎯←∂ ←↑⎯≥⎯≡≡″⎯⎯± ∂≡≥; ↓↑≡←∂≈≡±∂×⎯≡±←⎯ ∝;≥×≡≡± ×∂↑∝°∂⎯″⎯≥≥⎯⌠ 
≡; ←↑⎯≥≥⎯ ″;;↑∂;; ↓∂×;≥∂ ↑≡±⎯≡•≈° ∝⎯ ⎯⎯∂″×←≡ °←°∂⎯≡± ←↑⎯≥⎯×≡←×≡∂←≡± 
Kosmopolis 15
Suurvaltaempiristi pienvaltion johtajana
⎯∝⎯≡≥±←⎯ ∝⎯×⎯〉 ⊂≡⌠ ″∂; ←↑⎯≥⎯×≡←×≡∂←ƒƒ← ×≥≥°∂±×∂± ⎯↑×°∂⎯⎯⌠ ≡∂ ™°∂∂←°± ″∫
×⎯⎯± °≥≡ ⎯×∂°〉 ∏°←×← ←≡ ⎯↑×°∂⎯⎯ ↑∂≡↓°≡≥⎯⌠ ″⎯ °∂←⎯⎯≥⎯ ∝°←×← ←↑⎯≥≥⎯ °⎯ ″ƒ)← 
×±≡≥≡⎯≥≥⎯ ×⎯±±⎯≥≥⎯ ⎟™°∂∂←° ⎨⎪⎪⎣⎞〉
 ™°←×⎯ ™°∂∂←° ⎯↑←∂± ←≡≥×≡;←∂ ←×°∂⌠ ≡; ≥×°↓°≥∂∂∂←≡ ⎯°∂≡≡ °∂≈⎯⎯± ∂≡ƒ∝≡± 
°≥°←•≡∂≈≡± ⎯≥≥∂≡←←⎯ ←⎯⎯⎯⎯⌠ •;± ≡∂ ⎯°∂≡∂≈≡± ↑≡⎯≥∂←°∂±±∂± ×⎯±±⎯≥⎯ °≥≥ ↓≡←←∂″∂←∂±≡± 
⎯≥∂°±↓;;″∂≡←〉 ⊄;″; ×;ƒ ƒ•≡≡± •;±≡± ⎯↑←∂± •⎯↑″°±∂←≡± ↓°≥∂∂∂←⎯ ±∂≡↑←″∂⎯ ×°←×≡⎯± 
×;←∂ƒ×←≡±←; ×⎯±←←⎯ ∝⎯ °± ″∂≡≥≡±×∂∂±°∂±≡± •⎯⎯∂±° ↓≡∂≥⎯±⎯ ƒ≥≡∂←∂∂± ×;←∂ƒ×←∂∂± ™°∂∂←°←∫
⎯ ↓≡←←∂″∂←∂±; ⎟×←〉 ™°↑•°±≡± ⎩⎛⎛⎛⌠ ⎧⎢⎪™ ®⎯≥×⎯⎯⎯↑⎯ ⎨⎪⎩⎧⎞ √←≡ ⎯←∂⎯←←⎯ •;±≡± ↑≡°↑∂∂××⎯±∫
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 ×;←∂ƒ← ←∂∂;⌠ ″∂≡± ;←←; 
ƒ″↓;↑∂←)←←; °≥∂←∂ •ƒ; °∂″∂⎯〉 ⊇≥×°↓°≥∂∂∂←⎯ ƒ″↓;↑∂←);⌠ ±∂∂± ←≡± ≥°±≡≡± ×∂± ⊂°″≡± 
°∂″∂±⎯″⎯•≈°≥≥∂←×←∂≡±×∂± ←•≡≡±⌠ ″;;↑∂;; ←↑⎯≥≥⎯〉 ™°∂∂←°± °″⎯←←⎯ °∂″∂∝≈≡←∫
←⎯ ↓°≥≡←⎯⎯± ×°↑°← ≥;•∂±±; ≡″↓∂↑∂←″∂⌠ ⎯∂××⎯ •;±≡≥≥; °≥∂ ∝°∂⎯∂± °•∝≡±°↑∂⎯ ≥×°↓°≥∂∂∂×⎯± 
⎯↑←∂±⎯∂←≡≡± •⎯↑∝°∂⎯″∂←≡≡±〉 ™⎯∂×≡± ×⎯∂××∂⎯⎯± ™°∂∂←°± ←×°″←∝;↑∝≡←≡≥″; ±;ƒ;; ⎯↑←∂± 
∫
←ƒƒ≈≡≥≥;⌠ °± ≈°″∂±°∂⎯ ∝⎯ ″∂⎯ ←×°″×←∂⎯ ″;;↑∂;; ↑°°≥∂〉 ⊇←×°″←∝;↑∝≡←≡≥″;± ⎯±⎯≥ƒƒ←∂± 
↓°•∝⎯≥⎯ ™°∂∂←°⎯ °∂×∂± ×←⎯ ∝°•⎯∝⎯±⎯ å←↑⎯≥⎯≡″↓∂↑∂←∂×←∂å〉 
⇒±⎯≥ƒƒ←∂ •⎯⎯←⎯⎯ ⎯↑←∂± ƒ≥≡∂←; ×;←∂ƒ←; ™°∂∂←°←⎯ ↓≡←←∂″∂←∂±;〉 ™°∂∂←°⎯ °∂ ≥°±∫
±≡•∂⎯ ⎯↑°⎯∂←≡×←∂ °↓∂″∂←∂×←∂⌠ ∝°×⎯ ←×°∂ ⊂°″≡± ≥×°↓°≥∂∂∂×⎯± ↑⎯∝⎯∂•∂± ⎯∂×←″⎯•∫
≈°≥≥∂←×←∂∂±〉 ™°∂∂←°± ≈°×↑∂∂±∂≥≥∂←← °± ⎯⎯← ↓≥″⎯∂←≡″↓∂ ×ƒ←ƒ″ƒ←〉 ∅•;;≥; •;±≡≥≥; °≥∂ 
×≡•∂ƒ±ƒ ±;×≡″ƒ← ↑∂←×∂≡±°°←⎯ ∝⎯ °∂″∂±±⎯± ⎯∝°∂×←≡←⎯⌠ ″⎯ ≥×°↓°≥∂∂∂×⎯± •⎯↑∝°∂⎯∫
″∂←≡± ×≡∂±°∂←⎯ ∝⎯ ≡•°××←×ƒ←ƒ″ƒ×←∂←; •;± ≡∂ ↓•± ≥⎯∂±×⎯⎯±〉 ⊃⎯∂×⎯⎯×∂± ←∂≥;⌠ ≡; 
™°∂∂←°± ≈°×↑∂∂±∂≥≥∂←← °≥∂ ±∂××⎯⎯〉 ⊃⎯∂××⎯ ™°∂∂←° ≡∂ ;ƒ←∂± ←≥×≡± ↓°∂← ⎯∝⎯←⎯⌠ ≡; 
↓∂≡±∂≥≥; ⎯≥∂°∂≥≥⎯ °∂←∂ °≥≥⎯ ≥×°↓°≥∂∂∂←∂⎯ ≈°×↑∂∂±≡∝⎯⌠ •;±≡± ″∂≡≥≡←;;± ≡≈≡← ∂←°∂≥≥⎯ ″⎯∂≥≥⎯ °≥∂ 
•⎯↑°∂± ±∂∂•∂± ⎯↑⎯⎯〉
⇒↑∂××≡≥∂ ⎯⎯⎯ 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≥×°↓°≥∂∂∂×⎯± ×∂″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°∂≈⎯⎯± ↓∂;; ≥;•)≥⎯×⎯×←≡±⎯ ™°∂∂←°∫×≡←×≡∂←≡≥≥≡ 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°∂≈⎯⎯± å°↓≡↑⎯∂°±⎯≥∂←°∂≈⎯å °∂←≡←←⎯⌠ ≡←∂″≡↑×∂×←∂ ⎯↓⎯←×∂″×←≡≥≥∂←≡←←⎯ 
ƒ)←←;⌠ ∝°←←⎯ ⎯↑×⎯←≡≥⎯∂←∂∂± ⎯∂××⎯↓⎯ ™°∂∂←°± °∂″∂±±⎯± ⎯∝°∂⎯″∂←≡≡± ≥∂∂ƒ∂≡± ±;×≡″ƒ←∫
≡± ⎯∂×←⎯ ≥×°↓°≥∂∂∂←≡≡± ↓;;)×←≡±≡×°°±〉 ∇≡ 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⎯ ″ƒ)← °∂″∂⎯ °←⎯±⎯ ″°±∂⎯←°∂←≡″∫
↓⎯⎯ ⊂°″≡± 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∂≡∂←←⎯ ≡∂ °≥≥ ″⎯•≈°≥≥∂←⎯ ↑ƒ•ƒ;〉
3 Kognitiivisen dissonanssin näkökulmasta yksilön on vaikea kestää ristiriidassa olevia uskomuksia ja usko-
musten sekä toiminnan välistä ristiriitaa. Tästä johtuen hän keksii syitä ja perusteluja toiminnalleen. Täten
uskomukset nähdään syntyvän käytöksen muuttumisen jälkeen (esim. Larson 1984, 29–34).
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Kun pienvaltiorealismin hegemonia murtui: 
suomalaiset ulkopoliittiset koulukunnat kylmän 
sodan jälkeisen ajan alussa
MATTI PESU
The study examines Finnish foreign policy at the beginning of the post-Cold War era – more spe-
cifically in 1989–1997. It concentrates on the evolution of Finnish foreign policy thinking, and the 
work’s objective is to outline the Finnish foreign policy schools of thought of the period. In the 
article, schools of thought are understood as competing national identities, or more precisely, as 
alternative self-images, comprising of social purpose, status and worldviews. Throughout the Cold 
War, “small state realism” had been the dominant tradition in Finnish foreign policy, and Finland’s 
Cold War foreign affairs were built on the hegemony of the realistic school stressing the importance 
of history and geography as the fundamental conditions for Finnish national security. The end of 
the Cold War – with the collapse of Soviet Union – implied a transformation as regards to the 
conduct of Finnish foreign policy. The structural change meant more leeway for Finland in its foreign 
affairs. This resulted in the emergence of competing schools of thought. The study identifies alto-
gether four different strands of thinking: small state realism, integrationism, Euro-Atlanticism, and 
globalism – which all left their mark on Finnish foreign policy at the immediate post-Cold War years, 
integrationism having been the strongest school. 
Johdanto
Suomen ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikka kylmän sodan 
loppuessa on noussut viime vuosina tutkimusagen-
dalle. Uusien arkistolähteiden avulla historiantutkimus 
kykenee rakentamaan tarkemman kuvan niistä tapah-
tumista ja päätöksistä, joilla on edelleen suuri merki-
tys Suomen ulkosuhteille. (Ks. esim. Aunesluoma ja 
Rainio-Niemi 2016; Mitzner 2016; Ritvanen 2017.) 
Myös politiikantutkimuksella on kylmän sodan 
lopun tutkimuksen uudessa aallossa annettavaa. Teo-
reettisempien lähtökohtien avulla on mahdollisuus 
päästä käsiksi erityisesti päätösten taustalla vaikut-
taneisiin tekijöihin (Juntunen 2016; Pesu 2016). 
1990-luvun alun ratkaisut, kuten Euroopan unioniin 
liittyminen tai sotilaallisessa liittoutumattomuudes-
sa pitäytyminen, eivät tapahtuneet tyhjiössä. Niiden 
taustalla oli erilaisia historiallisesti rakentuneita sekä 
normatiivisia päätöksentekoa ehdollistavia tekijöitä 
(Pursiainen ja Forsberg 2015, 268) – kuten usko-
muksia, tulkintoja ja näkemyksiä koskien muun 
muassa Suomen maantieteellistä asemaa, Venäjää ja 
kansainvälisen politiikan luonnetta. 
Tämä artikkeli pureutuu näihin tekijöihin. Se 
tarkastelee, millä eri tavoin suomalainen ulkopoliit-
tinen eliitti näki kylmän sodan jälkeisen maailman 
ja edustamansa maan aseman siinä. Jäsentääkseen 
erilaisia näkemyksiä artikkeli hahmottaa suomalai-
sesta ulkopoliittisesta keskustelusta kilpailevia, ide-
aalityyppisiä koulukuntia, jotka tuovat esiin aika-
kauden ulkopoliittisen ajattelun perusjännitteitä. 
Lisäksi se tarkastelee, millä eri tavoin koulukuntien 
ajatukset ilmenivät Suomen turvallisuuspoliittisessa 
linjassa kylmän sodan lopun jälkeisen ajan alussa.
Artikkelin teoreettinen panos liittyy koulukunta-
käsitteen teoretisoimiseen. Aiemmassa tutkimukses-
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sa koulukuntia ei ole joitain poikkeuksia lukuun 
ottamatta teoretisoitu (ks. Nau ja Ollapally 2012). 
Tätä aukkoa artikkeli pyrkii paikkaamaan kytkemäl-
lä koulukuntakäsitteen konstruktivistisen kansain-
välisen politiikan tutkimuksen piirissä käytyyn kes-
kusteluun kansallisesta identiteetistä. Artikkelissa 
koulukunnat ymmärretäänkin valtion ulkopoliitti-
sessa diskurssissa (ks. Hopf 2002; 2012) kilpailevina 
näkemyksinä valtiolle sopivasta identiteetistä eli niin 
sanottuina omakuvina.
Omakuvat taas koostuvat sosiaalisesta tarkoituk-
sesta, statuksesta ja maailmankuvista. Sosiaalinen 
tarkoitus viittaa pääasiassa valtion sisäisiin ominais-
piirteisiin ja status maan ulkoisen asemaan ja sen 
mukanaan tuomiin oikeuksiin ja vastuisiin. Maail-
mankuvat liittyvät tässä tapauksessa näkemyksiin 
esimerkiksi kansainvälisen politiikan luonteesta, ja 
ne ikään kuin pohjustavat näkemyksiä sosiaalisesta 
tarkoituksesta ja statuksesta.
Suomen ulkopolitiikan muutosta kylmän sodan 
loputtua on käsitelty useissa tutkimuksissa (ks. esim. 
Browning 2008; Forsberg ja Vaahtoranta 1993; Joke-
la 2010; Palosaari 2011; Tiilikainen 1998). Tutkimuk-
sien pääasiallinen fokus ei ole kuitenkaan ollut aika-
kauden suomalaisessa ulkopoliittisessa ajattelussa tai 
sen tutkimisessa, mitä tämä artikkeli pyrkii paikkaa-
maan: se on systemaattinen yritys tarkastella suo-
malaista ulkopoliittista ajatusmaailmaa.
Suomen ulkopolitiikan historiallisessa jatkumos-
sa kylmän sodan loppu on ulkopoliittisen ajattelun 
näkökulmasta oivallinen tutkimuskohde. Kyseessä 
oli ajanjakso, jolloin suomalaista keskustelua sekä 
Suomen valintoja rajoittaneet sisäiset ja ulkoiset 
rakenteet murtuivat. Suomi oli lisäksi konkreettises-
sa valintatilanteessa Euroopan unionin jäsenyyden 
suhteen, mikä terävöitti entisestään orastavia kilpai-
levia näkemyksiä. Kylmän sodan ajan ulkopoliittinen 
konsensus oli rakennettu autonomian aikaan juu-
rensa ulottuvan pienvaltiorealistisen lähestymistavan 
ympärille. Kylmän sodan päättymisen aikaansaamat 
rakenteelliset muutokset ja niiden mukanaan tuomat 
ulkopoliittiset muutospaineet alkoivat nakertaa pien-
valtiorealismin ylivaltaa; uusia, eri lähtökohdille 
rakentuvia näkemyksiä alkoi nousta esiin entistä 
enemmän. Suomen ulkopolitiikan perustavanlaatui-
sista valinnoista käytiin jälleen keskustelua. Tutki-
muksen onkin tärkeä selvittää, minkälaisia linjavaih-
toehtoja Suomella lopulta oikeastaan oli.
Tutkimuksen aineistona toimivat sanoma- ja ai-
kakauslehtiaineistot, aikakauden tieteellinen tutki-
mus, ulkopoliittiset lausunnot sekä muu kirjallinen 
aineisto, kuten muistelmateokset. Ajallisesti aineisto 
on rajattu vuosiin 1989–1997. Aineistoa analysoidaan 
laadullisen sisällönanalyysin keinoin hyödyntämällä 
yllämainittuja statuksen, sosiaalisen tarkoituksen ja 
maailmankuvan käsitteitä, joiden avulla eri koulu-
kunnat tunnistetaan ja tyypitellään. Artikkelissa li-
säksi jaotellaan eri ulkopoliittisia keskustelijoita 
koulukuntien edustajiksi sen mukaan, minkälaista 
ajattelua heidän voitiin pääasiassa katsoa edustaneen. 
Tutkimus olettaakin, että yksittäisten henkilöiden 
ajatusmaailmaa voi hahmottaa ”välimatkan takaa” 
(at a distance) (Schafer 2000). Useita henkilöitä tut-
kimalla ja yhtäläisyyksiä hakemalla on täten myös 
mahdollista päästä käsiksi jaettuihin käsityksiin, 
joiden pohjalta koulukunnat lopulta muodostuvat. 
Tutkimus etenee seuraavasti: Aluksi se käy läpi 
ulkopoliittisista koulukunnista ja kansallisesta iden-
titeetistä käytyä keskustelua tuoden esiin työn teo-
reettiset lähtökohdat. Seuraavaksi se siirtyy analy-
soimaan kylmän sodan jälkeistä ulkopoliittista kes-
kustelua hahmottaen neljä ulkopoliittista koulukun-
taa: integrationismin, pienvaltiorealismin euroatlan-
tismin ja globalismin. Ennen johtopäätöksiä artik-
keli vielä lyhyesti keskustelee, miten eri koulukunti-
en ajatukset ilmenivät Suomen turvallisuuspoliittisen 
linjan rakentumiseen kylmän sodan loputtua.
Koulukunnat ulkopolitiikan tutkimuksessa
Ulkopolitiikan tutkimuksessa on tavan takaa kiin-
nitetty huomiota valtioiden ulkopoliittisiin koulu-
kuntiin. Näin on ollut erityisesti suurvaltojen koh-
dalla. Niin Yhdysvaltojen (ks. esim. Mead 2001; Nau 
2002), Kiinan (ks. esim. Shambaugh ja Xiao 2012) 
kuin Venäjänkin (Kuchins ja Zevelev 2012) ulkopo-
liittisia traditioita ja koulukuntia on eritelty. Samoin 
Japanin (Michishita ja Samuels 2012), Intian (Olla-
pally ja Rajapogalan 2012) ja Iranin (Farhi ja Lotfian 
2012) eri koulukunnista on kirjallisuutta. Samoin 
Saksan ulkopoliittisia traditioita on tarkasteltu (Hell-
mann ym. 2004).
Myös Suomessa on vahva perinne tarkastella ul-
kopolitiikkaa eri koulukuntien tai ”linjojen” näkö-
kulmasta. Yleisin tapa on ollut nähdä suomalainen 
ulkopoliittinen keskustelu kahden linjan – myönty-
väisyyslinjan ja perustuslaillisuuden – välisenä kamp-
pailuna. Koulukunnista edellinen on edustanut voi-
mapolitiikkaa ja maantieteen merkitystä korostavaa 
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realistista näkemystä jälkimmäisen painottaessa li-
beralismista kumpuavan oikeusajattelun soveltamis-
ta myös kansainvälisiin suhteisiin. (Apunen 1984; 
Haukkala 2012; Penttilä 2006; Torvinen 1966.) 
Vaikka perinteistä kahtiajakoa on sovellettu vielä 
nykypäivänkin ulkopolitiikkaan (ks. Hämäläinen 
2015), koulukuntajaoista on myös uudempia sovel-
lutuksia (Haukkala ja Vaahtoranta 2016; ks. myös 
Sinkkonen ja Vogt 2015). Haukkalan ja Vaahtorannan 
(2016) mukaan suomalaisessa ajattelussa vaikuttavat 
realistisen ja liberaalin koulukunnan manttelinperi-
jän euroatlantismin rinnalla myös kolmas koulukun-
ta globalismi, joka korostaa erityisesti globaalin so-
lidaarisuuden tärkeyttä. Suomalaisessa koulukunta-
keskustelussa suurin aukko löytyy kylmän sodan 
jälkeisen ajan alun kohdalla. Tutkimus pyrkiikin 
hahmottamaan, miten pienvaltiorealismin kylmän 
sodan ajan hegemoniasta alettiin siirtyä kohti uu-
denlaista koulukuntajakoa.
Kuten johdannossa todettiin, koulukuntia ei ul-
kopolitiikan tutkimuksessa ole kuitenkaan juuri 
teoretisoitu. Artikkelissa koulukuntien teoriapohjaa 
lähdetään hakemaan kansallista identiteettiä käsit-
televästä konstruktivistisesta ulkopolitiikan tutki-
muksesta ja koulukunnan sekä omakuvan käsitteen 
kytkemisestä yhteen. Ulkopolitiikan tutkimuksen 
näkökulmasta koulukuntien mielekkyys käsitteenä 
piilee siinä, että niiden avulla kyetään tiivistämään 
valtioiden ulkopoliittisessa diskurssissa olevia erilai-
sia näkemyksiä ideaalityyppiseksi linjavaihtoehdoik-
si. Artikkeli katsookin, että koulukuntiin tiivistyy 
ulkopoliittista päätöstä ehdollistavia, sosiaalisesti ja 
historiallisesti rakentuneita tekijöitä, jotka vaikutta-
vat muun muassa siihen, minkälainen käytös näh-
dään valtiolle soveliaana (March ja Olsen 1998).
Omakuvat kilpailevina koulukuntina
Kansainvälisen politiikan identiteettikirjallisuuden 
perusidean voi tiivistää yhteen virkkeeseen: valtio ei 
tiedä, mitä se haluaa, ennen kuin se tietää, kuka se 
on (Pursiainen ja Forsberg 2015, 292). Ensimmäiset 
identiteettinäkemykset olivat varsin rakenteellisia; 
toiseuden sekä toimijoiden välisen vuorovaikutuksen 
roolia identiteettien rakentumisessa sekä vakiintu-
misessa painotettiin (Neumann 1996; Wendt 1992; 
1994; 1999). Varsin pian valtion identiteetti yhdis-
tettiin myös sen ulko- ja turvallisuuspoliittiseen 
käyttäytymiseen (Katzenstein 1996). Valtion, tai pi-
kemminkin sen kansalaisten ja eliitin, itseymmärrys 
toisin sanoen rakentaa sen intressejä (Weldes 1996). 
Konstruktivismi katsoo, että valtioiden etunäkökoh-
dat eivät siis ole objektiivisia vaan sosiaalisesti ra-
kentuneita.
Rakenteellinen lähestymistapa identiteetteihin 
alkoi kuitenkin kohdata kritiikkiä. Valtiotoimijat, 
siinä missä yksilötkään, eivät aina heijasta toisten 
heille antamia identiteettejä, eivätkä identiteettien 
muotoutuminen ja merkitys tyhjenny toimijoiden 
väliseen vuorovaikutukseen (Larson 2012, 61). Kon-
struktivismin piirissä alkoi nousta näkemyksiä, joiden 
mukaan identiteettien rakentumisessa pitäisi entistä 
enemmän ottaa huomioon myös valtion sisäiset 
sosiaaliset rakenteet. Ted Hopfin (2002; 2012) mu-
kaan olennaista valtion identiteetin rakentumiselle 
on sen ”sosiaalis-kognitiivinen rakenne”, jossa on 
erilaisia identiteettidiskursseja ja jossa ulkopoliittiset 
päätöksentekijät operoivat sekä tekevät päätöksiä. 
Diskurssit muokkaavat siinä toimivien henkilöiden 
käsityksiä muun muassa uhkista, ystävistä ja liitto-
laisista ja ovat täten olennaisia valtion intressejä 
rakentaville identiteettikäsityksille. Hopf toisin sa-
noen siirsi identiteettitutkimuksen fokuksen valtion 
sisäisiin tekijöihin.
Samalle yhteiskunnan sisäisiä rakenteita korosta-
valle perustalle rakentaa identiteettiteoriansa myös 
Anne L. Clunan (2009). Hopfin ohella Clunan nojaa 
sosiaalipsykologiseen näkökantaan, erityisesti sosi-
aaliseen identiteettiteoriaan (ks. esim. Brewer 2001; 
Brown 2000). Myös hänen mukaansa yhteiskunnan 
sisäisillä sosiaalisilla rakenteilla on merkitystä valtion 
itseymmärrykselle ja täten sen ulkopolitiikan raken-
tumiselle. Clunan poikkeaa Hopfista siinä, että hän 
pelkistää yhteiskunnassa olevat erilaiset näkemykset 
kilpaileviksi ja ideaalityyppisiksi omakuviksi (self-
images), jotka ovat ikään kuin vaihtoehtoisia identi-
teettikäsityksiä, joista valtion identiteetti lopulta 
institutionalisoituu.
Käytännössä Clunanin omakuvat ovat ajatuksel-
taan hyvin lähellä sitä, mitä muissa tutkimuksissa on 
ymmärretty koulukuntina. Clunanin näkemyksen 
avulla tähän mennessä varsin ei-teoreettiseen kou-
lukuntakeskusteluun on mahdollista tuoda teoreet-
tista jämäkkyyttä. Tätä avittaa erityisesti se, että 
Clunan on muista identiteettinäkemyksistä poiketen 
avannut omakuvien eli kilpailevien identiteettien 
sisältöä – avaus, jota kansainvälisen politiikan tutki-
muksessa ja yhteiskuntatieteissä laajemminkin on 
vaadittu (Abdelal ym. 2006; Lebow 2008).
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Clunan (2009, 30–32) katsoo, että kansallinen 
identiteetti koostuu sekä sosiaalisesta tarkoituksesta 
(social purpose) että statuksesta. Sosiaalisella tarkoi-
tuksella (ks. myös Abdelal ym. 2006; Ruggie 1982) 
hän viittaa uskomuksiin valtiolle sopivasta poliitti-
sesta ja taloudellisesta hallinnosta. Käsite sisältää 
myös ideoita siitä, mitkä arvot, periaatteet, piirteet 
ja symbolit ovat maalle luonteenomaisia. Sosiaalinen 
tarkoitus ohjaa pitkälti sitä, keiden valtiotoimijoiden 
kanssa kansakunta haluaa tulla identifioiduksi, mikä 
taasen vaikuttaa muun muassa valtioiden välisen 
yhteistyön syvyyteen. Sosiaalispsykologisin termein 
sosiaalinen tarkoitus toisin sanoen määrittää valtio-
toimijan sisä- ja ulkoryhmät. 
Status taasen viittaa valtion (kuviteltuun) asemaan 
jossain monista kansainvälisten suhteiden hierarki-
oista. Statuksessa on eritoten kyse valtion ulkoisesta 
asemasta suhteessa muihin toimijoihin, siinä missä 
sosiaalinen tarkoitus liittyy ennen kaikkea valtion 
sisäisestä rakenteesta nouseviin tekijöihin. Statukseen 
sisältyvät näkemykset valtion oikeasta asemasta tie-
tyssä hierarkiassa sekä esimerkiksi kunnioituskysy-
myksistä, arvonannosta, oikeuksista ja velvollisuuk-
sista, jotka sille sen statusaseman myötä kuuluvat. 
Statuskäsitteen ympärille on viimeisen vuosikym-
menen aikana syntynyt runsaasti kirjallisuutta, jossa 
korostetaan valtioiden statuspyrkimysten roolia 
niiden ulkopolitiikkojen rakennuspalikkana. (Ks. 
esim. de Carvalho ja Neumann 2015; Dafoe ym. 
2014; Forsberg ym. 2014; Larson ja Shevchenko 2010; 
Paul ym. 2014.)
Clunanin sinänsä pätevää identiteettinäkemystä 
on kuitenkin syytä täydentää. Omakuviin voi status-
käsitysten ja sosiaalisen tarkoituksen ohella liittyä 
myös kognitiivisia malleja, kuten maailmankatso-
muksia (worldviews) (ks. esim. Abdelal ym. 2006, 
699–700). Se, miten yksilöt näkevät (maailman)
politiikan luonteen, voi olla keskeinen tekijä sille, 
miten he ymmärtävät maansa aseman ja politiikan 
kansainvälisten suhteiden kentällä (ks. esim. Herr-
mann 2017; Rathbun 2011). Toisin sanoen maail-
mankuvat pohjustavat näkemyksiä niin statuksesta 
ja sosiaalisesta tarkoituksesta. 
Tässä tutkimuksessa maailmankuvien merkitys 
rajautuu kolmeen tekijään tai kysymykseen. Ensiksi 
se keskittyy siihen, nähdäänkö maailma poliittisen 
realismin vai liberalismin/institutionalismin valossa. 
Toiseksi se kiinnittää huomiota näkemyksiin Venä-
jästä ja sen toimijuuden laadusta. Kolmanneksi se 
tarkastelee sitä, millaiseksi eurooppalaisen turvalli-
suusjärjestyksen katsotaan kehittyvän. Maailman-
kuvaan liittyvistä tekijöistä realismi–liberalismi-jako 
sekä Venäjä-käsitykset edustavat tietynlaista pysy-
vyyttä – ne kaikki ovat olleet läsnä Suomen ulkosuh-
teiden hoidossa aina autonomian ajasta lähtien. 
Eurooppalaisen turvallisuusjärjestyksen muotoutu-
minen on taas hyvin tilannekohtainen tekijä, jonka 
tarkastelu juuri tässä tutkimuksessa on hyödyllistä. 
Järjestykselliset näkemykset paljastavatkin erinomai-
sesti maailmankuvallisia eroja, ja ne ovat hyvin lä-
heisessä yhteydessä kahteen muuhun maailmanku-
valliseen tekijään.
Seuraavaksi artikkelissa siirrytään analysoimaan 
kolmen käsitteen – statuksen, sosiaalisen tarkoituk-
sen ja maailmankuvan – avulla suomalaista ulkopo-
liittista keskustelua kylmän sodan loppuessa ja sen 
lopun jälkeen, ja siinä esitellään neljä kyseisenä ai-
kakautena ilmentynyttä koulukuntaa: pienvaltiorea-
lismi, integrationismi, euroatlantismi ja globalismi. 
Sitä ennen artikkelissa käsitellään lyhyesti suoma-
laista ulkopoliittista ajattelua kylmän sodan aikana 
– toisin sanoen pienvaltiorealismin hegemoniaa. 
Pienvaltiorealismin hegemonia murtuu 
Suomen sotien jälkeisessä ulkopolitiikassa niin kut-
suttu pienvaltiorealistinen malli saavutti käytännös-
sä katsoen hegemonisen aseman viimeistään 1960-lu-
vulle tultaessa. Hegemonia oli erityisen vahva presi-
dentti Urho Kekkosen kaudella, ja siihen vaikutti 
Kekkosen jokseenkin autoritäärinen johtamistapa. 
(Tiilikainen 1998, 157–158.) Suomen ulkopolitiikkaa 
leimasikin konsensushakuisuus. Keskeinen osa niin 
sanottua suomettumisilmiötä oli julkisen mielipiteen 
kontrollointi ja itsesensuuri ulkopoliittisissa kysy-
myksissä. Kekkosen rooli kummankin toteuttami-
sessa oli huomattava. Mauno Koiviston kausi ei 
tuonut asiaan aluksi dramaattista muutosta, mutta 
1980-luvun puoliväliin tultaessa ulkopoliittinen kes-
kustelukulttuuri alkoi hiljalleen vapautua. Esimer-
kiksi virallista ulkopoliittista linjaa Baltian maiden 
itsenäistymiseen kritisoitiin avoimesti. (Forsberg ja 
Pesu 2017.)
Maailmankuvallisesti pienvaltiorealismi kumpu-
si poliittisesta realismista, jossa valtasuhteet sekä 
historia, eivät niinkään laki ja oikeus, määrittävät 
kansainvälispoliittiset realiteetit. Kylmän sodan kan-
sainvälispoliittisessa todellisuudessa Suomi joutui 
täten katsomaan maailmanpolitiikkaa maantieteel-
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lisestä asemastaan käsin. Sen statusasemaa määritti 
suurvallan naapuruus. Jotta Suomi olisi voinut pitää 
sosiaalisesta tarkoituksestaan – ensin autonomiastaan 
ja sitten kansanvaltaisesta järjestelmästään – kiinni, 
sen oli otettava huomioon suurvallan legitiimiksi 
nähdyt turvallisuusintressit. Itään päin nojaavaa 
turvallisuuspolitiikkaa pyrittiin tasapainottamaan 
puolueettomuusstatusta vahvistamalla. 
Realistisen ajattelun juuret ulottuivat aina Ruotsin 
vallan aikaan ja hattujen sekä myssyjen keskusteluihin 
Tukholman Venäjän-politiikasta. Suomen osalta pe-
rinne kumpuaa autonomian ajalta, jolloin Suomen 
”ulkosuhteet” liittyivät käytännössä suurruhtinas-
kunnan suhteisiin emämaahansa Venäjän keisarikun-
taan. Linja kehittyi alun perin muutaman Suomen 
asiain komiteassa työskennelleen virkamiehen, eri-
tyisesti ”Turun realistien” R.H. Rehbinderin ja G.M. 
Armfeltin ympärille. (Volanen 2017.) 1840-luvulle 
tultaessa realistinen näkemys sai fennomanian nou-
sun myötä poliittista voimaa, ja suomalainen ulko-
poliittinen realismi liitetään usein edelleenkin J.V. 
Snellmaniin. Autonomian ajan loppua kohti tultaes-
sa pienvaltiorealismi nivoutui Suomalaisen puolueen 
vanhasuomalaisiin tai suomettarelaisiin. Merkittä-
vimpinä realisteina tunnettiinkin Yrjö-Sakari Yrjö-
Koskinen, J.R. Danielson-Kalmari ja E.G. Palmén. 
(Apunen 1984; Korhonen 1966; Torvinen 1966.)
Toisen maailmansodan jälkeen heikossa suhteel-
lisessa asemassa ollut, mutta sodasta lopulta hengis-
sä selvinnyt Suomi tarrautui jälleen realismin oppei-
hin – sotien välistä aikaa olivat dominoineet muut, 
pääasiassa legalistisemmat katsantokannat kuten 
nojautuminen Kansainliittoon. (Ks. esim. Paasivirta 
1968, 69-70, 100–107.) Ulkopolitiikassa tapahtui 
merkittävä käännös. Danielson-Kalmarin oppipojan 
J.K. Paasikiven johdolla Suomi omaksui myöntyväi-
syyslinjan, jossa Neuvostoliitolla katsottiin Suomen 
suhteen olevan ennen kaikkea defensiivisiä intresse-
jä. (Browning 2008; Rentola 2016, 186.) Kekkosen 
kaudella linjan perustekijät säilyivät, joskin Suomi 
alkoi harjoittaa yhä aktiivisempaa puolueettomuus-
politiikkaa. Koiviston presidenttikaudella Suomessa 
palattiin vähemmän aktiiviseen ja kunnianhimoiseen 
ulkopolitiikkaan, joka edelleen kuitenkin rakentui 
maantieteen ja historiallisen kokemuksen peruste-
kijöille.
Pienvaltiorealismin hegemonia johti siihen, että 
ulkopoliittista keskustelua käytiin ”kehällisistä” asi-
oista, jotka eivät pääasiassa koskettaneet Suomen 
ulkopolitiikan realismista kumpuavaa perusratkaisua. 
Esimerkiksi nuoremman polven tutkijat ja ulkopo-
liitikot Paavo Lipponen etunenässä hahmottivat 
olemassa olevan linjan pohjalle ”uutta ulkopolitiik-
kaa”, jossa vaadittiin aktiivisempaa naapuruus- ja 
kehityspolitiikkaa (ks. Lipponen 2001). 1970-luvul-
la keskustelua herätti erityisesti EEC-vapaakauppa-
sopimus ja globaalit kysymykset, kuten suhtautumi-
nen Etelä-Afrikkaan (Möttölä 1983; Sandén 1979). 
Todellisia vaihtoehtoja olemassa olevalle kansallisel-
le identiteetille ei kuitenkaan ollut ennen kylmän 
sodan loppumista. Kylmän sodan Suomen maaperä 
ei ollut otollinen eri koulukuntien kilpailulle. 
Neuvostoliiton romahtaminen ja kylmän sodan 
loppu olivat Suomen ulkopoliittisessa historiassa 
formatiivinen hetki. Varsin lyhyessä ajassa valtavat 
rakenteelliset muutokset käytännössä katsoen mu-
rensivat puolueettomuuspolitiikan relevanssin vie-
mällä pois sen perustuksena olleen kaksinapaisen 
maailmanjärjestyksen, jonka suurvaltajännitteisiin 
Suomi joutui kiinnittämään huomiota enemmän 
kuin moni liittoutunut eurooppalaismaa. (Browning 
2008, 221; Rainio-Niemi 2014, 9.) Neuvostoliiton 
romahtaminen vei Suomelta ulkopoliittisen kiinto-
pisteen, ja Euroopan integraatiossa tapahtuneet edis-
tysaskeleet sekä maanosan turvallisuusjärjestyksen 
muutos näyttivät tarjoavan Suomen ulko- ja turval-
lisuuspolitiikalle vaihtoehtoisia perusratkaisuja. 
Muutoksen syvyys näkyi aikalaiskommenteissa. 
Erkki Tuomioja (2014, 231) kynäili päiväkirjaansa 
siitä, miten ulkopolitiikka on päästetty kellumaan, 
ja vielä vuonna 1995 Suomen Kuvalehti (28.4.1995) 
kirjoitti laajassa ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikkaa kä-
sittelevässä artikkelissan siitä, miten Suomen ulko-
politiikka ”kellui kuin Suomen markka”. Tutkijakom-
menteissakin heijastui epävarmuus. Keskustelu 
vaikutti jäsentämättömältä, eikä ulkopolitiikan sel-
kärankana tuntunut olevan selvää linjaa eikä arvo-
järjestelmää (Tiilikainen 1992, 15). 
Näin jälkeenpäin keskustelua on mahdollista jä-
sentää. Kylmän sodan lopun ja kylmän sodan jälkei-
sen ajan debatin jäsenteleminen auttaa ymmärtä-
mään, mitä vaihtoehtoisia toimintalinjoja Suomen 
ulkopolitiikalle kylmän sodan loputtua oikeastaan 
oli. Kylmän sodan loppuminen merkitsi niin ulkois-
ten kuin sisäistenkin konsensuspaineiden murentu-
mista. Suomen ulkopolitiikan perusratkaisusta ei 
ollut enää yksimielisyyttä. Tämä artikkeli väittääkin, 
että kylmän sodan loputtua Suomessa oli neljä kil-
pailevaa koulukuntaa: integrationismi, pienvaltio-
realismi, euroatlantismi ja globalismi. Se toisin sa-
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noen omaksuu Haukkalan ja Vaahtorannan kolmi-
jaon, mutta argumentoi, että kylmän sodan jälkeisen 
ajan alussa Suomessa oli myös neljäs koulukunta eli 
”eurorealistista” linjaa edustanut integrationismi.
Tutkimuksessa koulukunniksi kutsutut omakuvat 
ovat ennen kaikkea käsitteellisiä viitekehyksiä, joiden 
avulla suomalaisia ulkopoliittisia ajattelumaailmoja 
voidaan hyvin yleisellä tasolla jäsennellä (ks. esim. 
Nau ja Ollapally 2012, 4). Tämä tarkoittaa sitä, että 
suuri osa tutkimuksessa käsiteltävistä henkilöistä 
tuskin koki tai kokee olevansa osa jotain ulkopoliit-
tista koulukuntaa. Koulukunnat ovat lisäksi vahvas-
ti ideaalityyppisiä. Ne ovat väkisinkin yleistyksiä, 
eivätkä välttämättä ole toisiaan poissulkevia. Saman 
henkilön ajattelumaailmassa voi aivan hyvin olla 
elementtejä useammasta koulukunnasta. 
Vaihtoehtoiset ulkopoliittiset näkemykset terävöi-
tyivät sitä mukaa, kun eurooppalainen turvallisuus-
arkkitehtuuri kehittyi. Tutkimuksessa tarkasteltu 
ajanjakso alkaa vuodesta 1989 ja päättyy vuoteen 
1997, jolloin kylmän sodan jälkeinen maailmanjär-
jestys oli pääpiirteissään jo vakiintunut. Käytännös-
sä vielä vuonna 1990 Suomessa vallitsi vielä varsin 
suuri konsensus politiikan päälinjoista, joskin esi-
merkiksi YYA-sopimuksen mielekkyyttä alettiin jo 
kyseenalaistaa. Epäonnistunut vallankaappaus Neu-
vostoliitossa ja lopulta neuvostoimperiumin hajoa-
minen käynnistivät toden teolla keskustelun Suomen 
jäsenyydestä Euroopan yhteisöissä, mitä vauhditti 
myös ETA-neuvottelujen onnistuminen. Vuodesta 
1992 alkaen ulkopoliittisissa mielipiteissä alkoi olla 
enemmän ja enemmän hajontaa. 
Suurimmat koulukuntien väliset eroavaisuudet 
liittyivät Suomen statusasemaan ja maailmankuviin. 
Ulkopoliittisessa keskustelussa viittauksia Suomen 
sosiaaliseen tarkoitukseen oli huomattavasti vähem-
män, ja näkemyksissä oli merkittäviä yhtäläisyyksiä 
pienin nyanssieroin. Tämä ei ole sinänsä yllättävää. 
Vakiintuneena demokratiana kylmän sodan loppu 
ei edustanut sille yhteiskunta- tai talousjärjestelmän 
dramaattista muutosta toisin kuin esimerkiksi enti-
sille sosialistimaille.
Integrationistit
Integrationistinen koulukunta oli kilpailevista oma-
kuvista voimakkain. Sen piiriin kuului suomalaista 
ulkopoliittista johtoa sekä muun muassa merkittäviä 
tutkijoita. Monella integrationistilla oli sosialidemo-
kraattinen tausta, ja puolueella oli muutenkin erittäin 
vahva asema Suomen ulkopolitiikan määrittämises-
sä kylmän sodan lopun jälkeen. (Ks. Helsingin Sa-
nomat 12.12.1990.) Maailmankuvallisesti integrati-
onistit näkivät Euroopan turvallisuuden perusteki-
jöissä tapahtuneen laadullisen muutoksen. Instituu-
tioiden, erityisesti EY:n ja Etykin merkitys oli kas-
vussa. Voimapolitiikka ei heidän mielestään ollut 
kuitenkaan ollut kokonaan kadonnut. Integrationis-
tit hahmottivat Suomen statusasemaa edelleen Ve-
näjän naapuruuden kautta, vaikka heidän piirissään 
eli usko Venäjän demokratisoitumiseen. Tässä mie-
lessä integrationismi oli eräänlaista ”eurorealismia”. 
Koulukunnan jäsenet kannattivat liittymistä Eu-
roopan unioniin, jonka jäsenyyden katsottiin vah-
vistavan Suomen sosiaalista tarkoitusta eurooppa-
laisena demokratiana, ja he olivat valmiit luopumaan 
puolueettomuudesta, joka arvioitiin yhteensopimat-
tomaksi EU-jäsenyyden kanssa. He eivät toisin sa-
noen halunneet Suomelle minkäänlaista turvalli-
suuspoliittista erityisstatusta EU:n sisällä. He kui-
tenkin tukivat sotilaallista liittoutumattomuutta, joka 
heidän mukaansa avitti Venäjän demokratiakehitys-
tä sekä Itämeren alueen vakautta. Integrationistien 
leiriin voidaan lukea esimerkiksi Mauno Koivisto, 
Martti Ahtisaari, Paavo Lipponen, Jaakko Blomberg, 
Kalevi Sorsa, Esko Antola, Raimo Väyrynen ja Jaak-
ko Iloniemi.
Integrationismin maailmankuva sijoittui realismin 
ja institutionalismin välimaastoon, ja eri lähtökoh-
tien painotus vaihteli henkilön mukaan. Esimerkik-
si Jaakko Iloniemen (1991; 1992) mukaan Eurooppa 
oli muuttunut radikaalilla tavalla, ja turvallisuutta 
sekä yhteistyörakenteita oli ajateltava uudelleen. Hän 
myös kuitenkin näki, että pieni valtio tuskin saattoi 
edelleenkään luottaa kansainväliseen oikeuteen ja 
että kansalliset edut muodostivat edelleen pohjan 
valtioiden toiminnalle.
Iloniemen näkemys jaettiin laajalti integraatio-
myönteisessä piirissä. Tutkija Esko Antola (1994, 23) 
esimerkiksi arvioi, että 
Euroopan turvallisuuskehitys etsii uomaansa jos-
sakin hobbesilaisen Euroopan ja institutionalisoi-
tuneen ratkaisun välimaastossa. Lopputulos on 
yhä epävarma, joskin institutionalisoitunut tur-
vallisuusvaihtoehto on ainakin vielä pääsuunta.
Vuonna 1995 pääministeriksi nousseen SDP:n 
puheenjohtaja Paavo Lipposen näkemykset olivat 
samansuuntaisia. Hänen mukaansa Eurooppaan ei 
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ollut syntynyt vielä vakaata järjestelmää, mistä Ju-
goslavian kriisi oli osoituksena. Toisaalta liennytyk-
sen vuosina syntynyt yhteistyöpohjainen järjestys 
– toisin sanoen Etyk – ja EU näyttäytyivät vakautta 
tukevina tekijöinä, joiden ympärille Euroopan po-
liittinen tulevaisuus rakentui. (Lipponen 2001, 128.) 
Integrationistit eivät halunneet Suomelle min-
käänlaista erityisstatusta Euroopan unionissa. Esko 
Antola (1991) esimerkiksi totesi suoraan jo aikaises-
sa vaiheessa, että puolueettomuus ja integraatio ovat 
vaikeasti yhteen sovitettavissa. Tätä mieltä oltiin 
myös ulkopoliittisessa johdossa. Presidentti Koivisto 
(1993) painotti puheessaan Euroopan parlamentille 
Strasbourgissa, että Suomi ei Unionin jäsenenä va-
paamatkustaisi turvallisuuskysymyksissä eikä myös-
kään hakisi ulko- ja turvallisuuspoliittisia erioikeuk-
sia. Vajaata vuotta myöhemmin presidentiksi nous-
sut Martti Ahtisaari (1994) toisti Koiviston näke-
myksen sanasta sanaan.  
Myös Paavo Lipponen toi hyvin selkeästi esiin 
mielipiteensä EY-jäsenyyden ja puolueettomuuden 
suhteesta. Vuonna 1993 hän linjasi, että 
Suomi ei hae erityisasemaa yhteisön jäsenenä. 
Puolueettomuuden uusi muotoilu tarkoittaa yk-
sinkertaisesti, että Suomi pyrkii ylläpitämään 
ulkopolitiikkaansa jatkuvuutta ja kaikin tavoin 
välttämään sotilaallista vastakkainasettelua Ve-
näjän kanssa. Tämä politiikka heijastaa Suomen 
kansallista etua, joka EY:n täytyy hyväksyä, jos 
Suomi halutaan yhteisön jäseneksi. (Lipponen 
2001, 128.)
Samalla Lipponen tuli maininneeksi integratio-
nistien toisen merkittävän statusnäkemyksen. Huo-
limatta muuttuneesta tilanteesta he edelleen antoivat 
Venäjälle eräänlaisen erityisaseman, jonka katsottiin 
rajoittavan Suomen liikkumatilaa. Täten myös Suo-
men turvallisuuspoliittista asemaa sekä sen muka-
naan tuomia vaatimuksia tarkasteltiin edelleen 
maantieteen kautta. 
Naapuruus ei integrationistien ajattelussa tosin 
enää ollut niin vahva statustekijä, mitä se oli ollut 
kylmän sodan aikana, mutta totaalista uudelleenar-
viointia maantieteen merkityksestä ei kuitenkaan 
tapahtunut. Kansainvälisen politiikan professori 
Raimo Väyrynen (1991, 37–38) esimerkiksi totesi, 
että
Suomen maantieteellisellä asemalla on luonnolli-
sesti edelleen merkitystä, mutta markkinoiden ja 
teknologian korostuessa geopolitiikan suhteellinen 
vaikutus vähenee. Suomen ja Venäjän suhteissa 
tarvitaan jatkossakin molempien osapuolien edut 
huomioivaa turvallisuuspoliittista takuujärjeste-
lyä.
Entinen pitkäaikainen pää- ja ulkoministeri Ka-
levi Sorsa (1992, 206) taas korosti, että 
on selvää, että Suomen on haettava suuren raja-
naapurinsa kanssa turvallisuuspoliittiset ratkai-
sut, järjestettävä taloudelliset ja kulttuuriset suh-
teet tavalla, joka sopii uuteen Eurooppaan, mutta 
tulkitsee samalla aidosti molempien kansojen py-
syviä intressejä.
Integrationistien piirissä katsottiinkin, että idän-
politiikan harjoittaminen oli mahdollista Euroopan 
unionin jäsenenäkin. Esko Antola muun muassa 
arvioi, että Suomi ei voisi Euroopan unionin jäsene-
nä osallistua mahdollisiin Venäjän vastaisiin pakot-
teisiin (Helsingin Sanomat 21.5.1994). 
Integrationistit myös katsoivat, että Suomi toteut-
taa sosiaalista tarkoitustaan, länsieurooppalaista 
demokratiaa, parhaiten aktiivisella sitoutumisella ja 
osallistumisella Euroopan integraatioon, toisin kuin 
pienvaltiorealistit, joille integraatioon osallistuminen 
merkitsi lähinnä Suomen omaleimaisuuden rapau-
tumista. Pankinjohtaja ja entinen suurlähettiläs Jaak-
ko Iloniemi (1992, 40–41) esimerkiksi korosti, että 
[k]ansallisen identiteetin turvaaminen ja suoma-
laisuudesta kiinni pitäminen on meille keskeinen 
tehtävä. Suomalaiseen identiteettiin kuuluu se, 
että olemme osa eurooppalaista kulttuuriperintöä 
ja ennen muuta sen pohjoismaista haaraa. Siihen 
liittyy kansanvaltainen järjestelmämme, oikeus-
järjestyksemme, yhteiskunnallisen solidaarisuu-
den tunnustuksemme.
Pienvaltiorealistit
Pienvaltiorealistinen koulukunta painotti, että muut-
tuneesta kansainvälispoliittisesta tilanteesta huoli-
matta Suomen tuli yhä pitäytyä perinteisellä Paasi-
kiven–Kekkosen linjalla. Täten he edustivat näke-
myksissään pitkää historiallista jatkumoa. Koulu-
kunnan edustajat pääasiassa vastustivat Suomen 
jäsenyyttä Euroopan unionissa ja painottivat puolu-
eettomuuden merkitystä myös uudella aikakaudella. 
EU-jäsenyyden varmistuttua pienvaltiorealistit tu-
kivat Suomen pitäytymistä sotilasliittojen ulkopuo-
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lella. Koulukunnan jäseniksi voidaan lukea muun 
muassa Keijo Korhonen, Pekka Visuri, Paavo Väyry-
nen ja Jan-Magnus Jansson, ja heidän näkemyksilleen 
oli tukea myös keskustan, kristillisen liiton ja myös 
laitavasemmiston piirissä.  
Maailmankuvallisesti pienvaltiorealistit edustivat 
valtiokeskeistä geopoliittista realismia, jonka lähtö-
kohta oli Suomen maantieteellinen asema. He eivät 
nähneet eurooppalaisessa turvallisuusjärjestyksessä 
suurta laadullista muutosta, eivätkä he antaneet pal-
joa painoarvoa institutionaalisille järjestelyille, kuten 
Euroopan yhteisölle/unionille. Pikemminkin he ou-
nastelivat paluuta perinteiseen eurooppalaiseen suur-
valtapolitiikkaan. Kansainvälinen politiikka näytti 
heille varsin muuttumattomalta ja jopa staattiselta. 
Tutkija ja näkyvä turvallisuuspoliittinen kommen-
taattori Pekka Visuri (1995, 13) oli esimerkiksi sitä 
mieltä, että 
voimapolitiikan jatkuminen uusine blokkiutu-
misineen ja suurvaltakilpailuineen on kaikkea 
muuta kuin poissuljettu mahdollisuus […] Geo-
poliittisesti Eurooppa on palannut vanhaan nor-
maalitilanteeseensa, jossa Saksa on keskusvalta, 
lännessä ovat suurvaltoina Englanti ja Ranska 
sekä idässä Venäjä. 
Visurin mielestä Suomessa keskustelu keskittyikin 
aivan liikaa instituutioihin. Pitkän linjan diplomaat-
ti, entinen ulkoministeri ja vuoden 1994 presiden-
tinvaalien ehdokas Keijo Korhonen oli Visurin kans-
sa pitkälti samoilla linjoilla. Hänen mukaansa
[t]ärkein seuraus Euroopan murroksessa on ollut 
paluu takaisin Paasikiven määrittelemään kohta-
lon kolmioon. Vanhan presidentin mukaan se oli 
Tukholma–Moskova–Berliini. Venäjä on nyt tun-
gettu Suomenlahden pohjukkaan samaan tapaan 
kuin neuvostovallan alkuvaiheessa 1920-luvulla. 
(Korhonen 1994, 25.)
Lisäksi Korhonen (1994, 29) näki, että
suhteet, jotka Saksan johtama Euroopan Unio-
ni [sic] kehittää Venäjän ja koko itäisen Keski-
Euroopan kanssa, tulevat jälleen maantieteen ja 
geopolitiikan vääjäämättömyydellä määrittele-
mään Suomen aseman Euroopan suurpolitiikan 
asetelmassa.  
Ulkoministerinä vielä vuonna 1992 toiminut Paa-
vo Väyrynen (1992) taas visioi, että kansainvälinen 
politiikka kehittyy kolminapaiseksi järjestykseksi, 
jossa napoina ovat Japani, Yhdysvallat ja Saksa/EY. 
Väyrynen oli muita pienvaltiorealisteja idealistisem-
pi, ja 1990-luvun puoliväliin tultaessa hän unelmoi 
uudesta paneurooppalaisesta järjestyksestä, joka 
olisi EY:n liittovaltiokehityksestä poiketen nimen-
omaan itsenäisten valtioiden unioni. (Väyrynen 
1997.)
Venäjä oli pienvaltiorealisteille edelleen suurvalta. 
He lukivatkin Suomen statusasemaa erityisesti maan-
tieteen – toisin sanoen Venäjän naapuruuden – kaut-
ta. Pienenä valtiona Suomen tuli yhä ottaa huomioon 
suurvaltanaapurinsa strategiset intressit, ja Venäjäl-
lä oli yhä oltava erityisstatus Suomen ulkosuhteissa. 
Suomen ei myös edelleenkään sopinut sotkeutua 
suurvaltojen eturistiriitoihin, vaan ylläpitää puolu-
eettomuuden statusta myös uudessa maailmanjär-
jestyksessä. 
Pekka Visuri (1995, 18–19) esimerkiksi arvioi, että
Euroopan unionin jäsenenä Suomi on geopoliit-
tisesti ja geostrategisesti selvästi poikkeuksellises-
sa asemassa verrattuna muihin jäsenmaihin. Voi 
olla, ettei poliittisista ja taloudellisista syistä tätä 
seikkaa haluta erityisesti korostaa, mutta strate-
gisessa tilannearvioinnissa maantiedettä ei voi 
ohittaa […] Ilman julkilausuttuja mielipiteitäkin 
voidaan olettaa venäläisten strategisen suunnit-
telun haluavan varmistaa, ettei Suomen alueelta 
jossain tulevaisuuden kriisissä koidu vaaraa eri-
tyisesti Kuolan, Arkangelin ja Pietarin alueille.
Hän oli lisäksi sitä mieltä, että edessä olisi paluu 
1930-luvun asetelmiin, jos Neuvostoliitolla olisi ai-
hetta pelätä Suomen luovuttavan alueensa vihamie-
lisen valtion käyttöön (Visuri 1993, 425.)
Paasikivi-seuraa kahteen otteeseen johtanut Jan-
Magnus Jansson (1991) puolestaan painotti, että 
Venäjän sotilaallinen intressi Suomen alueen käyt-
töön voi aktualisoitua tulevaisuudessa, ja hän arveli 
nationalismin nousevan Venäjän valtiorakenteen 
koossapitäväksi voimaksi. Hän oli tyytyväinen, että 
YYA-sopimuksen korvaavaan sopimukseen tuli viit-
taus siihen, että maat eivät salli aluettaan käytettävän 
aseelliseen hyökkäykseen toista sopimuspuolta vas-
taan. Neuvostoliiton jo hajottua Jansson kirjoitti 
vuonna 1994, että maantieteen tulee edelleen olla 
Suomen turvallisuuspolitiikan peruslähtökohta ja 
että Suomen valtioalueella on yhä korostunut mer-
kitys Venäjälle. (Jansson 1994.)
Venäjän naapuruus Suomen tärkeimpänä kulma-
kivenä johti toiseen statusnäkemykseen – puolueet-
tomuuden korostamiseen. Muun muassa Korhonen 
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oli järkähtämätön sen suhteen, että Suomen on 
maantieteellisestä asemastaan johtuen pitädyttävä 
puolueettomuudessa: 
Suomen historian ja maantieteen antama eh-
doton ohje on, että meidän on pysyttäytyminen 
Keski-Euroopan suurvallan ja Venäjän välisen 
mahdollisen selkkauksen ulkopuolella. Tämä on 
Suomen puolueettomuuspolitiikan ydin ja todel-
lisin sisältö. Me kieltäydymme ottamasta ristirii-
tatilanteessa kantaa yhden suurvallan puolesta 
toista vastaan, saati sitten tukemasta mitään rii-
dan osapuolta poliittisesti, sotilaallisesti ja talou-
dellisesti, kun selkkaus on syntynyt. Emme tietysti 
muutenkaan sekaannu kansainvälisiin ristiriitoi-
hin, sattuivatpa ne missä tahansa maailmalla. 
(Korhonen 1994, 29.)
Paavo Väyrynen (1992; 1996, 249–250) tuli myös 
siihen johtopäätökseen, että puolueettomuus on 
Suomelle oikea ratkaisu. Hän tunnetusti kääntyi 
vimmatusti vastustamaan EU-jäsenyyttä. Jäsenyyden 
lopulta toteuduttua Suomen oli hänen mukaansa 
edelleen mahdollista ilmoittaa pyrkimyksestään pi-
dättäytyä suurvaltaristiriitojen ulkopuolella ja pa-
lauttaa puolueettomuus takaisin ulkopoliittiseen 
kielenkäyttöön. 
Vaikka pääministerinä Esko Aho oli johtanut puo-
lueensa kannattamaan EU-jäsenyyttä, oppositioon 
ajauduttuaan keskusta alkoi yhä enemmän korostaa 
perinteistä pienvaltiorealismia. Kritiikin kohteena 
oli nimenomaan vahvoissa ulkopoliittisissa asemis-
sa olleen sosialidemokraattisen puolueen ulkopoliit-
tinen linja. Keskustan puoluekokouksessa vuonna 
1996 Aho kritisoi hallitusta siitä, että EU-jäsenyys ei 
ole muuttanut Suomen geopoliittista asemaa. Hänen 
mielestään Suomen ei pitänyt tulla osaksi EU:n val-
tavirtaa, ja hän puhui edelleen nimenomaan puolu-
eettomuudesta Suomen kansainvälistä asemaa mää-
rittävänä statuksena. (Helsingin Sanomat 16.6.1996.) 
Mitä poliittiseen tarkoitukseen tulee, pienvaltio-
realistien käsityksissä ei ollut selkeää yhteistä nimit-
täjää. Tässä mielessä heitä sitoivat siis ennen kaikkea 
yhteen yhtenevät näkemykset Suomen kansainväli-
sestä asemasta ja maailmanpolitiikan luonteesta. 
Pienvaltiorealistien piiristä kuitenkin korostettiin 
muun muassa Suomea pohjoismaisena demokratia-
na. Esimerkiksi Korhosen (1994, 26) mukaan Poh-
joismaat olivat käytännössä ainoa Suomelle sopiva 
viiteryhmä maailmalla. Väyrysen (1997) paneuroop-
palaiseen visioon taas kuului pohjoismainen alueel-
linen ryhmittymä. Lisäksi erityisesti Korhonen 
(1994) korosti Suomen omaleimaisuutta ja syrjäi-
syyttä, joiden hän näki luovan etulyöntiaseman ja 
joita eurooppalaiset kehityskulut eivät saisi turmel-
la. Perifeerisyys ei ollut suinkaan haitta vaan etu. 
Euroatlantikot
Euroatlanttisen koulukunnan jäsenet olivat vankko-
ja eurooppalaisen integraation tukijoita jo varsin 
aikaisessa vaiheessa 1980–1990-lukujen taitteessa, ja 
heidän mielestään Suomen tuli sitoutua läntisiin 
rakenteisiin myös turvallisuuspoliittisesti. Osalle 
tämä tarkoitti Nato-jäsenyyttä, osalle ei. He eivät siis 
nähneet Suomen kansainvälistä statusta puolueet-
tomuuden valossa. Statusnäkemyksissään euroatlan-
tikot poikkesivat eurorealisteista siinä, että he eivät 
enää olleet valmiita antamaan Venäjälle erityissta-
tusta Suomen ulkopolitiikassa, eikä Venäjän naapu-
ruutta nähty Suomen valintoja rajoittavana tekijänä. 
Maailmankuvallisesti euroatlantikot yhtäältä tun-
nustivat eurooppalaisten ja transatlanttisten insti-
tuutioiden merkityksen mutta toisaalta korostivat 
voimapolitiikan roolia integrationisteja enemmän. 
Euroatlantismissa olikin selvä realistinen piirre, joka 
kuitenkin korosti enemmän eurooppalaisten voi-
masuhteiden luentaa kuin maantiedettä. Pienvalti-
orealistien tavoin he kyllä suhtautuivat Venäjään 
suurvaltana, mutta vetivät eri johtopäätökset siitä, 
miten Suomen tulisi reagoida Venäjän asemaan. Eu-
roatlantikoille Suomen sosiaalinen tarkoitus oli en-
nen muuta olla länsimainen demokratia. Euroopan 
unionin jäsenyys oli vahvistava tätä tosiasiaa. 
Euroatlantismi ei saanut kovinkaan kummoista 
kannatusta aivan ylimmässä poliittisessa eliitissä, ja 
koulukunnan edustajia löytyikin erityisesti eläköi-
tyneistä diplomaateista ja nuoremmasta tutkija- ja 
poliitikkosukupolvesta. Koulukunnan jäseniksi voi 
lukea esimerkiksi Max Jakobsonin, Risto Hyvärisen 
ja Ilkka Pastisen, jotka olivat ulkoministeriössä ol-
lessaan olleet osa niin kutsuttua johdonmukaista 
puolueettomuuspolitiikkaa korostanutta ”eversti-
junttaa”. Euroatlanttista linjaa veti myös 1995 edus-
kuntaan noussut nuorsuomalainen puolue sen kes-
keisten hahmojen Jukka Tarkan ja Risto E. J. Pentti-
län johdolla. Tutkijoista euroatlantikoiksi voitiin 
lukea Markku Salomaa, Pekka Sivonen, Teija Tiili-
kainen ja Tapani Vaahtoranta. Keskustan piiristä 
euroatlanttisia painotuksia toi esiin Olli Rehn. Vuo-
sikymmenen loppupuolelle tultaessa myös kokoomus 
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alkoi hiljalleen siirtyä entistä vahvemmin euroatlant-
tiselle linjalle, vaikkei sotilaallista liittoutumista vie-
lä kannattanutkaan.  
Euroatlantikot olivat maailmankuvallisesti lähel-
lä integrationistien eurorealismia, mutta heidän 
voimapolitiikkapainotuksensa oli aavistuksen vah-
vempaa, eikä heidän realisminsa ollut geopoliittis-
sävytteistä ja determinististä vaan pikemminkin 
klassista voimasuhteita lukevaa realismia. Integra-
tionismin tavoin koulukunnan sisällä painotukset 
instituutio- ja voimapolitiikka-korostusten välillä 
vaihtelivat.
Suomalaisen ulkopolitiikan harmaa eminenssi 
Max Jakobson (1991; 1992) muun muassa näki, että 
Euroopassa on tapahtunut turvallisuuspolitiikassa 
laadullinen muutos, jossa yksilön ja arvojen merki-
tys on entistä korostuneempi. Hän lisäksi näki uuden 
tilanteen kahden erilaisen järjestelmän kamppailuna:
Eurooppa elää kahden turvallisuusjärjestelmän 
välimaastossa. Vanha järjestelmä nojasi vastak-
kaisten liittoutumien sotilaallisten voimien tasa-
painoon. Uusi perustuu yhteisiä arvoja edustavi-
en valtioiden yhteistoimintaan. (Jakobson 1994.)
Suomen Kuvalehdessä ahkeraan kolumnoinut 
valtiotieteen tohtori Jukka Tarkka (1993) taas arvioi, 
että uusi eurooppalainen turvallisuusjärjestelmä on 
kylmän sodan maailmaa loogisempi:
[K]ylmän sodan aikana yhden etu oli väistämättä 
ja automaattisesti toiselle tappio. Kansainvälisen 
politiikan rakenne ei ole enää sellainen nollasum-
mapeli […] Kansainvälisen politiikan perusviri-
tys on palautunut machiavellistis-metternichläi-
seen ajatteluun. Se maailma on kova ja hyytävä 
kylläkin, mutta sen logiikka on silti jollakin taval-
la kirkkaampaa kuin kylmän sodan aikana.
Instituutioilla voitiin euroatlantikkojen mielestä 
hallita turvallisuutta. Esimerkiksi tutkija Markku 
Salomaa (1996a) katsoi, että Natolla on keskeinen 
rooli uusnationalismin patoamisessa ja että jakama-
ton turvallisuus vaatii valtioiden toisilleen antamia 
turvallisuustakuita. 
Euroatlantikkojen suhtautuminen Venäjään poik-
kesi integrationismin ja pienvaltiorealismin edusta-
jista. Euroatlantikot katsoivat, että Venäjän naapu-
ruus ei vaikuta Suomen statusasemaan. He arvioivat 
jo 1990-luvun puoliväliin tultaessa, että Venäjän 
suurvaltaidentiteetti voi johtaa imperialismiin ja 
isovenäläisyyteen (esim. Helsingin Sanomat 7.5.1996; 
Hyvärinen ym. 1996; Rehn 1994; Sivonen 1994). 
Suomelle ratkaisu ei ollutkaan enää pienvaltiorealis-
tinen myöntyväisyyspolitiikka vaan turvan hakemi-
nen läntisistä instituutioista. Euroatlantikot olivat 
sitä mieltä, että Suomella ei ollut erityistä velvolli-
suutta Venäjän turvallisuusintressien huomioimiseen 
– varsinkaan, kun länsi ei aiheuttanut itänaapurille 
minkäänlaista uhkaa
Esimerkiksi Jakobson (1992) painotti, että enää 
ei ollut olemassa edes teoreettista uhkaa, että lännes-
tä suuntautuisi Venäjän suuntaan sotilaallinen hyök-
käys. Kansanedustajaksi vuoden 1995 eduskuntavaa-
leissa noussut Risto E.J Penttilä (1995, 7) taas pohti, 
että Suomi ei voisi uudessa arvopohjaisessa ulkopo-
litiikassaan antaa Venäjälle erivapauksia edes alueel-
lisessa kriisissä. Tutkija Teija Tiilikainen (1993, 4–5) 
vihjaili, että Suomi ei EU:n jäsenenä voisi toivoa 
itärajalleen mitään erityistä kohtelua. Keskustavai-
kuttaja Olli Rehn (1994) oli Jakobsonin linjalla väit-
täessään, että Nato-jäsenyyden kaltainen liittoutu-
minen ei ole uhka Venäjälle. Samaa mieltä oli tutki-
ja Pekka Sivonen (1994, 73). Markku Salomaa (1995) 
kuvasi asian kenties suorimmin sanankääntein:
Suomen osallistuminen läntiseen yhteistyöhön 
tulee aina herättämään geopoliittisia ja geostra-
tegisia epäilyjä Venäjän johdossa, mutta Suomen 
johdon tulee siitä huolimatta aina pitää huolta 
vain Suomen turvallisuudesta. Venäjän puolus-
tusministeriö ja yleisesikunta takaavat Venäjän 
turvallisuuden kyllä kaikissa oloissa.
Euroatlantikkojen piirissä painotettiin Yhdysval-
tojen roolia Euroopan turvallisuudessa. Max Jakob-
sonin (Helsingin Sanomat 7.5.1996) mukaan Yhdys-
valtojen hallitseva rooli Euroopassa oli realiteetti. 
Risto E.J. Penttilä (1995, 7) puolestaan arvioi, että 
Suomen edun mukaista on olla tiiviissä turvallisuus-
poliittisessa yhteydessä Länsi-Eurooppaan ja Yhdys-
valtoihin. 
Tätä taustaa vasten ei ole yllättävää, että euroat-
lantikot painottivat kaikista voimakkaimmin Suo-
men demokratian länsimaisuutta. Suomen sosiaa-
linen tarkoitus länsimaisena demokratiana ohjasi 
myös ulkopolitiikkaa siten, että Suomen oli euro-
atlantikkojen mukaan syytä terästää kansainvälistä 
asemaansa länsimaana. Samalla euroatlantismin 
piirissä pyrittiin tekemään pesäeroa itäeurooppa-
laisiin valtioihin. Jukka Tarkka (1994) muun mu-
assa huomautti, että
290 Matti Pesu
Suomi on osoittanut konkreettisella toiminnalla 
ja poliittisilla signaaleilla, että se puolustautuu 
aina, jos sen äärimmäisiä etuja loukataan […] 
Tämä on lähitulevaisuuden turvallisuuspolitii-
kan perusta. Olemme länsimaisesti ajatteleva ja 
toimiva eurooppalainen kansa.
Max Jakobson (1993) oli taas huolissaan, että jos 
Suomi päätyisi Euroopan integraation ulkopuolel-
le, sen kohtalona olisi jäädä Itä-Euroopan maiden 
rinnalle ”jäännöserään”.  Vuonna 1997 hän taas 
totesi, että 
Suomen asema poikkeaa muiden rajamaiden ase-
masta olennaisella tavalla. Meillä ei ole niitä his-
toriallisia rasitteita, jotka vaikuttavat Neuvosto-
liiton vallan alaisuudessa eläneisiin kansakuntiin. 
Suomi on jo varmistanut paikkansa läntisessä yh-
teisössä liittymällä Euroopan unioniin. Sitä vah-
vistaa vielä tuleva jäsenyys talous- ja rahaliitossa 
Emussa: yhteinen raha on verta sakeampi side 
kansakuntien välillä. (Jakobson 1997.)
Salomaa (1996b, 4) taas näki integraatiokysy-
myksessä isot panokset: Suomen oli päätettävä, 
halusiko se kuulua aidosti länteen vai jäädä Venäjän 
etupiiriksi. 
Globalistit
Globalismi oli koulukunnista selkeästi idealistisin ja 
normatiivisin. Koulukunnan edustajat näkivät kan-
sainvälisissä suhteissa tapahtuneen merkittävän laa-
dullisen muutoksen, jonka myötä uudet turvallisuus-
uhkat ja -kysymykset pitkälti korvasivat vanhat 
voimapoliittiset kysymykset turvallisuuspolitiikan 
agendalla. Suomen statusta tarkasteltiin moralistis-
normatiivisessa valossa, ja poliittiselta tarkoituksel-
taan Suomen tuli heidän mielestään olla ihmisoi-
keuksia ja vähemmistöjä kunnioittava demokratia. 
Globalistit suhtautuivat EU-jäsenyyteen ja suurval-
toihin kriittisesti ja sotilaalliseen liittoutumiseen 
kielteisesti. 
Globalisteina voidaan pitää esimerkiksi Erkki Tuo-
miojaa, Tarja Halosta, Pertti Joenniemeä, Jyrki Kä-
köstä, Pekka Haavistoa ja Heikki Patomäkeä. Kou-
lukunta nivoutuikin merkittäviltä osin rauhanliik-
keen ja -tutkijoiden sekä punavihreiden poliitikkojen 
ympärille, ja heidän ajatuksensa saivat jalansijaa 
muun muassa Ydin-lehdessä. Koulukunnan historia 
ulottuu jo kylmän sodan aikaan, jolloin sen edusta-
jat pyrkivät nostamaan vahvan normatiivisia, glo-
baaleja asiakysymyksiä Suomen ulkopolitiikan agen-
dalle. (Blomberg 2008.)
Globalistien maailmankuva poikkesi merkittäväs-
ti muiden omakuvien edustajien näkemyksistä. He 
tunnistivat kansainvälisissä suhteissa huomattavan 
laadullisen muutoksen. Kansanedustaja Erkki Tuo-
miojan (1991b, 47–48) mielestä muutos tiivistyi 
kolmeen tekijään: väestönkasvuun, teknologian ke-
hitykseen ja maailmanmarkkinoiden syntymiseen. 
Tampereen rauhan- ja konfliktintutkimuskeskuksen 
johtaja Jyrki Käkönen (1993, 40) puolestaan ounas-
teli, että maailma saattoi olla kulkemassa kohti kan-
tilaista suuntaa, jossa valtion tilalle astuisi kansa-
laisyhteiskunta ja jossa valtion kautta harjoitettavan 
politiikan korvaisi alueiden suora itsehallinto. Toi-
saalta hän tunnisti politiikassa myös edelleen kamp-
pailun elementin. Tutkija Pertti Joenniemen (1992, 
44) mukaan politiikka itsessään oli muuttunut: 
Politiikka sanan varsinaisessa merkityksessä ei 
enää nojaudu erillään oloon ja rajalinjojen yllä-
pitämiseen. Pelisäännöt ovat muuttuneet siten, 
että ratkaisevaksi on muodostunut mukanaolo ja 
vaikuttaminen vallan keskuksissa. Todella mer-
kittäviä uhkakuvia ovat syrjäytyminen ja muiden 
politiikan kohteeksi joutuminen. Kiivaimmat kes-
kustelut käydään usein yhteistyön luonteesta ja 
kattavuudesta.
Reilu pari vuotta myöhemmin hän lisäsi, että 
[e]urooppalainen turvallisuusjärjestelmä pyrkii 
eroon entisistä jaoista ja haluaa välttää uusien 
muodostumista […] Se ei perustu liittolaisten et-
sintään voimatasapainon takaamiseksi ja turval-
lisuustakuiden saamiseksi. Kaikki tämä kuuluu 
jo taaksejääneeseen Eurooppaan. Vanhoilla voi-
mapoliittisilla käsityskannoilla on edelleen jonkin 
verran kannatusta, mutta ne ovat jo pääasiallises-
ti ääniä menneisyydestä eikä niiden vaikutus tur-
vallisuusjärjestelmän muotoutumiseen ole kovin 
merkittävä. (Joenniemi 1995, 17–18.)
Tuore ulkoministeri Tarja Halonen (1995) oli 
ensimmäisessä linjapuheessaan Joenniemen kanssa 
samaa mieltä. Uuden turvallisuusympäristön haasteet 
liittyivät hänen mukaansa ”kansallisuuskiistoihin ja 
vähemmistöjen asemaan, hallitsemattomiin muut-
toliikkeisiin, kansainväliseen rikollisuuteen ja ym-
päristöongelmiin”. Vihreiden ryhmäpuheenvuoros-
sa koskien vuoden 1995 turvallisuuspoliittista selon-
tekoa kansanedustaja Satu Hassi totesi, että perin-
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teisiin turvallisuuskysymyksiin kuten aseisiin tai 
sotilasliittoihin keskittyminen oli itse asiassa fiktioi-
hin keskittymistä. Puheenvuorossaan hän toi ilmi 
useita ”uusia uhkia” sosiaalisista kysymyksistä ym-
päristöongelmiin ja vähemmistöjen asemaan (Edus-
kunta 1995). 
Globalistit hahmottivat Suomen statusta ennen 
kaikkea globaalien vastuiden kautta. Suomen tuli 
heidän mielessään profiloitua ja vahvistaa asemaa 
ennen kaikkea moraalisissa hierarkioissa (ks. de 
Carvalho ja Neumann 2014). Koulukunnan edus-
tajille perinteinen sotilaallinen turvallisuuspolitiik-
ka vaikutti anakronistiselta. Joenniemen (1995, 19) 
mukaan 
ei käy päinsä, että Suomi viestii ulkopolitiikallaan 
tukevansa yhteistyövaraista Eurooppaa ja pitä-
vänsä ovat [sic] auki kaikille normit täyttäville 
toimijoille, mutta lähettää puolustussektorilla 
täsmälleen päinvastaisia eristäviä ja jyrkkiä rajo-
ja piirtäviä peloteviestejä.
Pekka Haaviston (1990, 3) mukaan suomalaiset 
olivat huolissaan siitä, että pienten kansojen itsemää-
räämisoikeus, niiden kulttuurien ja kielten tuhou-
tuminen, kansainvälinen ympäristönsuojelu, ihmis-
oikeudet ja kehitysmaakysymykset eivät näkyneet 
riittävästi Suomen ulkopolitiikassa.  Edellä maini-
tussa vihreiden ryhmäpuheenvuorossa Hassi puo-
lestaan penäsi Suomen aktiivisuutta vähemmistö-, 
ihmisoikeus- ja kehityskysymyksissä. 
Globalistien piirissä Suomen sosiaalinen tarkoitus 
nivoutui ihmisoikeuksien puolustamiseen ja kansa-
laisyhteiskunnan roolin korostamiseen. Erkki Tuo-
mioja (1991a) esimerkiksi arvioi, että snellmanilai-
nen keskitetty kansallisvaltio on vaikuttanut siihen, 
että Suomi on sulkeutunut ja että ihmisoikeuksia ja 
kansalaisvapauksia on alistettu. Kylmän sodan lopun 
mukanaan tuoma suvereenien kansallisvaltioiden 
”viraltapano” saattoi Tuomiojan mukaan vaikuttaa 
positiivisella tavalla esimerkiksi rajojen avautumiseen 
ja kansalaisvapauksiin. Riskinä hän näki taas mark-
kinavoimien vallan lisääntymisen. Tutkija Heikki 
Patomäki (1996) taas pohti muutosta laajemmalla 
eurooppalaisella tasolla. Hänen mukaansa EU:n ke-
hittämisen myötä Euroopassa voitaisiin liberaali-
demokraattisen parlamentarismin sijaan kehittää 
osallistavaa demokratiaa.
Koulukunnat ja Suomen ulko- ja 
turvallisuuspoliittisen linjan rakentuminen 
kylmän sodan loputtua
Seuraavaksi tutkimus analysoi lyhyesti, miten eri 
koulukuntakäsitykset ilmenivät Suomen turvalli-
suuspolitiikassa kylmän sodan loputtua. Fokus on 
nimenomaan päälinjoissa ja perustavanlaatuisissa 
lähtökohdissa, joista politiikkaa harjoitetaan. Asia-
kysymyksiksi on valittu Venäjä-suhteet, Euroopan 
integraatio, puolustuspolitiikka, Nato- ja Yhdysval-
lat-yhteistyö sekä globaalipolitiikka, jotka ovat kaik-
ki keskeisiä turvallisuuspoliittisia kysymyksiä. Kat-
tavaan analyysiin ei tämän artikkelin puitteissa ole 
mahdollisuutta. Valitut tapaukset kuitenkin osoitta-
vat, että Suomen turvallisuuspoliittisessa linjassa oli 
viitteitä eri ajatussuunnista.
Venäjä
Kylmän sodan lopun jälkeenkin Suomen politiikas-
sa näkyi edelleen tietty kunnioitus Venäjän intresse-
jä kohtaan, ja Suomi piti tärkeänä Venäjän sitomista 
muotoutuvaan eurooppalaiseen turvallisuusjärjes-
tykseen. Suomen Venäjän-politiikassa oli yhä mah-
dollista havaita pienvaltiorealistisia sävyjä, mutta 
tosiasiallisesti Venäjälle annettu asema heijasteli 
erityisesti integrationistien eurorealistista linjaa. Täs-
sä yhteydessä Suomi poikkesi selkeästi entisistä Itä-
Euroopan maista, jotka alkoivat heti vapauduttuaan 
määrätietoisesti hakeutua Naton jäseneksi saadakseen 
tasapainoa Venäjän mahdollista uhkaa vastaan. 
Jaakko Blomberg (2011, 651) on osuvasti kuvan-
nut, miten Suomessa Venäjän intressien ja aseman 
kunnioitus ylitti aikakausien muutoksen:
Koko kylmän sodan ajan yksi puolueettomuus-
politiikan keskeisistä merkityksistä oli ollut pe-
rustella pidättäytymistä toimista, jotka olisivat 
vahingoittaneet Neuvostoliiton turvallisuusetu-
ja. Euroopan unionin jäsenyys ei poistanut tätä 
idänpolitiikan motiivia, mutta sen rinnalle oli 
tullut uusia motiiveja.
Idänpolitiikan perinteiset motiivit näkyivät Suo-
men Venäjän-politiikassa kylmän sodan lopun jäl-
keenkin. Suomi ja Venäjä allekirjoittivat naapuruus-
sopimuksen vuonna 1992. Sen neljäs artikla sisälsi 
viittauksen siihen, että maat eivät salli alueitaan 
käytettävän hyökkäykseen toista sopimuspuolta koh-
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taan. Kirjauksessa oli perinteisiä pienvaltiorealistisia 
kaikuja. Uusi sopimus ei kuitenkaan vastannut YYA-
sopimusta, ja Suomen ja Venäjän turvallisuussuhteen 
haluttiinkin nojaavan symmetrisiin sitoumuksiin ja 
monenkeskisiin järjestelyihin. (Möttölä 1998, 339.) 
Kahdenvälisten suhteiden laatu oli muuttumassa pois 
tiukkaa kahdenvälisyyttä korostavasta pienvaltiorea-
lismista (Haukkala 2012).  
Venäjän turvallisuusetujen huomioiminen näkyi 
siinä, että Suomi päätti Itämeren alueen vakauden 
ylläpitämiseen vedoten pidättäytyä sotilasliiton ul-
kopuolella. Blomberg (2011, 648–652) painotti, että 
”pitäytyminen sotilaalliseen liittoutumiseen oli Suo-
men keskeinen panos Pohjois-Euroopan vakauteen 
ja turvallisuuteen” ja että Suomen ulkopoliittiseen 
kielenkäyttöön omaksuttu lause Pohjois-Euroopan 
vakaudesta liittyi nimenomaan Venäjän intressien 
kunnioittamiseen.   
Virallinen Suomi oli myös huolissaan Venäjän 
asemasta kylmän sodan jälkeisessä Euroopassa. Se oli 
aluksi penseä Naton laajenemisen suhteen. Vuoden 
1995 turvallisuuspoliittisessa selonteossa Suomi vies-
titti, että se kunnioittaa maiden oikeutta valita omat 
turvallisuusratkaisunsa, mutta samaan hengenvetoon 
totesi, että niiden vaikutus alueen tai maanosan tur-
vallisuuskehitykseen on huomioitava (Valtioneuvos-
to 1995). Huomautuksella viitattiin tietenkin Venäjän 
mahdollisiin reaktioihin, jotka Suomi näki potenti-
aalisesti heikentävän Euroopan vakautta. 
Presidentti Ahtisaari toi puheissaan useaan ottee-
seen esiin sen, että Venäjän sitominen eurooppalaisiin 
turvallisuusrakenteisiin on maanosan tulevaisuuden 
kannalta tärkeää. Hänen mukaansa Venäjällä on 
turvallisuusetunsa siinä missä muillakin valtioilla. 
Ahtisaari oli sitä mieltä, että ”Euroopan rauhalle 
olisi takaisku, mikäli Venäjän federaation integroi-
tuminen maailmantalouteen ja etenkin eurooppa-
laisiin yhteistyöjärjestelyihin epäonnistuu” (Ahtisaa-
ri 1995; 1996).
Jatkumoista huolimatta Suomen Venäjän-poli-
tiikka alkoi yhä enemmän asettua monenkeskisiin 
viitekehyksiin. Tshetshenian tapahtumat vuonna 
1999 osuivat Suomen ensimmäiselle puheenjohta-
jakaudelle, ja Helsingin toiminta osoitti mukautu-
mista EU:n valtavirtaan. Puheenjohtajamaana Suo-
mi oli tosin ohjaamassa Unionin politiikkaa ”prag-
maattiseen” suuntaan, johon kuului muun muassa 
sanktioista pidättäytyminen. Suomi kuitenkin jakoi 
EU-maiden tilannearvion, ja suhtautui Venäjän toi-
miin tuomitsevasti. (Lintonen 2003.)
Euroopan unioni
Suomen liittyminen Euroopan unioniin osoitti it-
sessään sen, että puolueettomuudessa pitäytymistä 
kannattanut pienvaltiorealismi jäi lopulta selvästi 
paitsioasemaan. Integrationistien ja euroatlantikko-
jen tavoite siis toteutui. Suomi hylkäsi puolueetto-
muusstatuksen ja määritti linjakseen sotilaallisen 
liittoutumattomuuden. Erityisesti Paavo Väyrynen 
pyrki vaikuttamaan siihen, että puolueettomuus 
jäisi osaksi Suomen ulkopoliittista kielenkäyttöä. 
Lopulta käsitteen käyttö kuihtui pois, koska puolu-
eettomuuden ei katsottu sopivan yhteen EU-jäse-
nyyden mukanaan tuomien solidaarisuusvelvoittei-
den kanssa. (Blomberg 2011, 466–475.)
Suomalaisista koulukunnista euroatlantikot suh-
tautuivat myönteisesti myös sotilaalliseen yhteistyö-
hön, jopa liittoutumiseen joko Länsi-Euroopan uni-
onin tai Naton kautta. Integrationistit taas halusivat 
pitäytyä sotilaallisessa liittoutumattomuudessa, ja 
jälkimmäisten tavoite heijastui myös Suomen poli-
tiikkaan EU:n yhteisen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspo-
litiikan muotoutuessa. Suomi, Ruotsin ohella, ajoi 
yhteistä turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikkaa ennen 
kaikkea kriisinhallinnan, ei yhteisen puolustuksen 
suuntaan. Suomessa EU:sta ei haluttu sotilaallista 
liittoa (ks. esim. Palosaari 2016).  Lopulta Suomi 
alkoi Lipposen sinipunahallituksen johdolla harjoit-
taa hyvin integraatiomyönteistä politiikkaa. Se ei 
varannut itselleen erivapauksia vaan päinvastoin 
pyrki kohti ”EU:n ytimiä” kuten Euroopan rahaliit-
toa. Unionin toimintakyvyn ja yhteistyön syventä-
misen politiikka tuli tärkeäksi osaksi Suomen EU-
politiikkaa. (Vuoria ja Luoma 2006, 99.) 
Puolustuspolitiikka
Niin pienvaltiorealistit, integrationistit kuin euroat-
lantikotkin arvioivat, että voimapolitiikka ja sotilaal-
lisen voiman käyttö olivat yhä edelleen osa kansain-
välistä politiikkaa. Tämä maailmankuva heijastui 
vahvasti Suomen puolustuspolitiikan jatkuvuudessa 
kylmästä sodasta kylmän sodan jälkeiseen aikaan. 
Suomi nimittäin päätti pitäytyä edelleen perin-
teisessä aluepuolustusjärjestelmässä, niin kutsutulla 
”konservatiivisella polulla”. Euroopassa katsottiin 
edelleen olevan potentiaalia sotilaallisten uhkien 
nousulle. Edes Itämeren alueen rauhanomaisesta 
kehityksestä ei voitu olla varmoja. Muun muassa 
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Venäjän epävarma demokratiakehitys ja Leningradin 
sekä Muurmanskin alueiden edelleen säilynyt soti-
laallinen merkitys nähtiin epävarmuutta luovina 
tekijöinä, joihin pelotepuolustuksen ylläpitämisellä 
oli mahdollista varautua.  Puolustuksen mitoittami-
seen vaikuttavat uhkamallit, kuten laaja-alaisen hyök-
käyksen mahdollisuus, pysyivät pitkälti samoina. 
Huomionarvoista oli se, että konservatiivisessa puo-
lustuspolitiikassa pitäytymisellä oli lähes koko puo-
luekentän tuki, ja soraääniä tuli lähinnä globalistien 
piiristä. Suomen puolustuspoliittista linjaa ei siis 
käytännössä kyseenalaistettu aikakauden muuttu-
misesta huolimatta, mikä on vahva todistus voima-
politiikkaa korostaneiden maailmankuvien jatkumi-
sesta. (Pesu 2017.)
Nato ja Yhdysvallat
Suomen politiikassa oli mahdollista nähdä myös 
euroatlantikkojen painottamia kysymyksiä: Suomen 
yhteistyö alkoi esimerkiksi hiljalleen syventyä sekä 
Naton että Yhdysvaltojen kanssa. On kuitenkin tär-
keä huomata, että Suomi ei muodostanut yhteis-
työsuhteita mistään itsearvoisista syistä – ennen 
kaikkea Yhdysvallat- ja Nato-yhteistyöllä haluttiin 
tukea kansallista puolustusta. Muutos kylmän sodan 
aikaan tapahtui siinä, että Nato ja Yhdysvallat alkoi-
vat olla yhä soveliaampia yhteistyökumppaneita. 
Suomi päätti vuonna 1992 ostaa yhdysvaltalaisia 
F/A-18-hävittäjiä. Kauppa oli Suomen Yhdys valto- 
jen suhteiden kannalta merkittävä, ja se avasi yhä 
tänäkin päivänä vaikuttavan sotilaallisen kanavan 
Washingtoniin. Kauppoja perusteltiin ennen kaikkea 
sotilasteknisin perustein, ja sen turvallisuuspoliitti-
nen ulottuvuus jopa kiistettiin (Hämäläinen 1998, 
75). Varsinkin jälkeenpäin päätöksenteossa mukana 
olleet ovat perustelleet Hornet-kauppaa sillä, että sen 
avulla Suomi sidottiin entistä tiukemmin länteen – 
sitä ei vain silloin haluttu sanoa ääneen (Vesikallio 
2014). Jotain kertoo kuitenkin se, että erityisesti 
globalistipiireistä jo tuolloin tullut kritiikki korosti 
sitä, että kauppojen avulla Yhdysvallat osallistuu 
Suomen ilmapuolustukseen ja sen suunnitteluun 
(ks. Hiilamo ja Sipola 1994).
Vuonna 1994 Suomi liittyi Naton uuteen rauhan-
kumppanuusohjelmaan. Päätöksen takana on sanot-
tu olleen ennen kaikkea kolme tekijää: Suomi halu-
si olla edelleen mukana rauhanturvaamisessa, ja li-
säksi sitä kiinnosti Naton standardeihin perustuva 
yhteistoimintakyky. Rauhankumppanuus antoi myös 
mahdollisuuden tarkastella Naton ja Venäjän sekä 
entisten sosialistimaiden suhdekehitystä. (Karvinen 
ja Puistola 2015, 78.) Jo tuolloin länsimielinen puo-
lustusministeriö oli ajamassa kumppanuutta, johon 
osallistumista vastustettiin niin pienvaltiorealistien 
kuin globalistienkin piirissä. Muun muassa Paavo 
Väyrynen ja vihreät vastustivat kumppanuuteen 
osallistumista. (Pesu 2017.)
Laajan turvallisuuden legitimaatio ja  
globaalipolitiikka
Globalistien korostukset näkyivät ennen kaikkea 
laajan turvallisuuden legitimoinnissa osaksi Suomen 
kylmän sodan jälkeistä turvallisuuspolitiikkaa. Soti-
laallisten uhkien ohella Suomessa alettiin yhä suu-
remmassa määrin kiinnittää huomiota uudenlaisiin 
uhkatekijöihin, jotka liittyivät muun muassa inhi-
milliseen turvallisuuteen, ympäristöön ja kansain-
väliseen rikollisuuteen.  
Eräänlainen merkkipaalu legitimoinnissa oli vuo-
den 1995 turvallisuuspoliittinen selonteko. Samana 
vuonna Tarja Halosesta tuli vuonna Lipposen en-
simmäisen hallituksen ulkoministeri. Halosen pai-
notukset näkyivät heti uudessa, vuoden 1995 turval-
lisuuspoliittisessa selonteossa, johon hän ministeri-
nä pääsi lisäämään laajan turvallisuuden elementte-
jä. Samalla hän alkoi vaatia ulkoministeriön toimin-
taan vahvempaa ihmisoikeusnäkökulmaa. (Suomen 
Kuvalehti 20.10.1995, 17.) 
Globalismin asema Suomen ulkopolitiikassa vah-
vistui vuosituhannen loppuun mennessä, ja vahvim-
millaan sen voidaan sanoa olleen vasta 2000-luvun 
alkupuolella, jolloin Halonen oli valittu presidentik-
si, ja Erkki Tuomioja toimi ulkoministerinä. Heidän 
vahvalla myötävaikutuksella Suomi muun muassa 
päätti liittymisestään jalkaväkimiinat kieltävään Ot-
tawan sopimukseen, missä globalistinen turvallisuus-
ajattelu selkeästi päihitti realismin traditionaalisem-
mat uhkakuvat (Haukkala ja Vaahtoranta 2016).
Johtopäätökset
Konstruktivistisen ulkopolitiikan tutkimuksen kes-
keisin teesi on se, että valtioiden ulkopolitiikka ei 
perustu pelkästään rationaaliseen päätöksentekoon 
ja laskelmointiin, vaan että päätöksenteon taustalla 
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vaikuttaa koko joukko ehdollistavia tekijöitä nor-
meista aina uskomuksiin nykyhetkestä ja historiasta. 
Suomen ulkopolitiikassa nämä tekijät ovat liittyneet 
muut muassa siihen, mitä Venäjän naapuruus Suo-
melle tarkoittaa ja minkälainen ulkopolitiikka on 
sopivaa pienelle valtiolle. Sopivaisuustulkinnat ovat 
olleet ajamassa Suomen ulkopolitiikkaa – aikakau-
sista riippuen – erilaisiin suuntiin.
Tämä artikkeli paneutui suomalaiseen ulkopoliit-
tiseen keskusteluun kylmän sodan lopulla ja sen 
jälkeisen ajan alussa tavoitteenaan identifioida näitä 
tekijöitä. Erityisesti se halusi löytää kilpailevia näke-
myksiä Suomen kansainvälisestä asemasta ja ulko-
poliittisista linjoista. Kilpailevat näkemykset ymmär-
rettiin erilaisina koulukuntina. Artikkelin teoreetti-
nen panos liittyy nimenomaan koulukuntakäsitteen 
teoriapohjan vankistamiseen. Koulukunnat voidaan-
kin nähdä valtion ulkopoliittisessa keskustelussa 
kilpailevina omakuvina, jotka perustuvat tiettyyn 
maailmankuvaan ja johon sisältyy näkemyksiä val-
tion sosiaalisesta tarkoituksesta ja statusasemasta.
Artikkeli hahmottaa neljä eri koulukuntaa: integ-
rationismin, pienvaltiorealismin, euroatlantismin ja 
globalismin. Sekä integrationismin ja euroatlantis-
min maailmankuvissa elivät rinnakkain realismi ja 
institutionalismi. Jälkimmäisen valtasuhteita lukeva 
realismi poikkesi integrationismiin liittyneestä geo-
poliittisesta realismista, joka taas oli pienvaltiorea-
lismin vallitseva maailmankatsomus. Globalismin 
normatiivis-liberaalinen, realismin ulossulkeva maa-
ilmankuva poikkesi kolmen muun koulukunnan 
maailmankuvista selkeästi. 
Statuksen osalta pienvaltiorealistit korostivat Ve-
näjän suurvaltastatuksesta Suomelle aiheutuvia te-
kijöitä ja puolueettomuutta. Integrationismi hyväk-
syi Venäjän suurvaltastatuksen ja sen Suomelle aset-
tamat reunaehdot, mutta kannatti Suomen jäsenyyt-
tä EU:ssa ja puolueettomuudesta luopumista. Euro-
atlantikot katsoivat, että Venäjän naapuruus ei vai-
kuta Suomen valintoihin ja että Suomen on hylättä-
vä puolueettomuus ja vahvistettava asemaansa län-
simaana. Globalismi halusi taas Suomen korottavan 
statustaan moraalisena toimijana. 
Suomen sosiaalisesta tarkoituksesta ei kylmän 
sodan lopussa väännetty paljoakaan peistä. Uusi 
aikakausi tarkoitti lähinnä kansainvälisen toimin-
taympäristön muutosta. Pienvaltiorealistit näkivät 
Suomen mielellään omaleimaisena ja pohjoismaise-
na toimijana. Integrationistit korostivat Suomen 
demokratian eurooppalaisuutta euroatlantikkojen 
painottaessa Suomen yhteiskuntajärjestelmän länsi-
maisuutta. Globalisteille Suomi oli taasen ihmisoi-
keuksia kunnioittava ja kansalaisyhteiskuntakeskei-
nen demokratia.  
Integrationistien ajatukset ilmenivät Suomen ul-
kopoliittisissa linjavalinnoissa kaikkein vahvimmin. 
Suomi liittyi Euroopan unioniin mutta pitäytyi liit-
toutumattomuudessa korostaen maantiedettä ja 
Venäjän erityisasemaa Suomen ulkosuhteissa. Voi-
mapoliittisen todellisuuden tunnustaneet integrati-
onistit, pienvaltiorealistit samoin kuin euroatlantikot 
halusivat Suomen pitäytyvän vahvassa kansallisessa 
puolustuksessa niin kuin tapahtuikin. Euroatlantis-
min painotukset näkyivät taas Nato-yhteistyön al-
kamisessa. Globalistit onnistuivat taas ajamaan laa-
jaa turvallisuuskäsitystä osaksi turvallisuuspolitiikka. 
Koska kyseinen tutkimus rajattiin kylmän sodan 
jälkeisen ajan alkuvuosiin, koulukuntien kehitys 
1990-luvun puolivälistä tähän päivään asti on vielä 
dokumentoimatta. Kehitystä olisi syytä tutkia. Mie-
lenkiintoiseksi tämän tekee se, että Haukkala ja Vaah-
toranta näkevät Suomessa olevan tällä hetkellä vain 
kolme ulkopoliittista koulukuntaa, joista pienvalti-
orealismi on tällä hetkellä heidän mukaansa laskus-
sa. Suomen ulkopolitiikan tutkimuksen olisi syytä 
paneutua siihen, mistä tämä kehitys johtuu ja mitkä 
ovat olleet sen ajurit. 
Haukkalan ja Vaahtorannan kolmeen ideaalityyp-
piin perustuva näkemys voi hyvinkin kattaa suoma-
laiset ulkopoliittiset näkemykset riittävällä tavalla. 
Maan toimintaympäristö ja eurooppalaiset instituu-
tiot ovat vakiintuneet, mikä on mahdollisesti tar-
koittanut sitä, että ”integrationismi” on hiljalleen 
kuihtunut pois. Yhtäältä pienvaltiorealismi ja integ-
rationistien eurorealismi ovat näkemyksissään voi-
neet yhtyä EU:n jäsenyyden tultua Suomen ulko- ja 
turvallisuuspoliittiseksi realiteetiksi. Toisaalta Nato- 
ja Yhdysvallat-yhteistyön vakiinnuttua niistä on 
tullut normaali ja hyväksytty osa Suomen ulko- ja 
turvallisuuspolitiikkaa. Euroatlantismi saattaa täten 
riittävällä tavalla kattaa suomalaisen liberaalin ulko-
politiikan perinteen. Globalismi taas on säilynyt 
tunnistettavana koulukuntana 2010-luvun maail-
maan, vaikka globaaliagendan ja samalla globalismin 
merkitys Suomen ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikassa 
on ainakin väliaikaisesti laskenut. Voimapolitiikka 
teki kuin tekikin paluun.
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KIITOKSET
Tutkimus on tehty Suomen akatemian Reimagining the Futures 
in the European North at the End of the Cold War -hankkeen 
(SA2501268650) puitteissa ja mahdollistamana sekä Ulkopolitii-
kan tutkimuksen säätiön että Suomen kulttuurirahaston avokä-
tisellä tuella. Kirjoittaja haluaa kiittää käsikirjoitusta vuoden 2017 
Politiikan tutkimuksen päivillä sekä ”Reimag”-hankkeen semi-
naareissa kommentoineita sekä Politiikka-lehden kahta anonyy-
miä vertaisarvioijaa. 
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CHAPTER 6
THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION  
IN FINLAND’S FOREIGN  
AND SECURITY POLICY
Tuomas Forsberg and Matti Pesu
Introduction
When Mauno Koivisto, the President of Finland from 1981 to 1994, 
 published a book about the “Russian national idea” after his retirement, 
he was asked about the “national idea” of Finland. His answer, “to sur-
vive,” reflected his internalized realist wisdom that in a system led and 
shaped by great powers, small states are often at risk of losing their inde-
pendence or sovereignty.1 In such an insecure world, leaders of democratic 
states have to constantly steer the course between Scylla and Charybdis: 
on the one hand they need to make decisions that they feel are necessary 
for national survival, even though such decisions may not be popular 
among the public; on the other hand, they may act in accordance with 
public opinion but risk the country’s international position. President 
Koivisto felt that dilemma very strongly when the Baltic States were look-
ing for assistance from abroad in their struggle for independence at the 
end of the Cold War. 
1 According to Koivisto, Russia’s national idea is “greatness”. See Koivisto, Mauno, Venäjän 
idea (Helsinki: Tammi, 2001), 85–100.
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The Finnish Presidents before and after Koivisto have faced the 
same dilemma but coped with it differently.2 The role of public opinion 
was particularly precarious during the Cold War when unanimity as 
regards the foreign policy line was considered de rigueur — both among 
the elite and public. For the public, the situation was contradictory. On 
the one hand it had to support friendly relations with the Soviet Union, 
but on the other hand it had to be ready to fight for its country if the 
worst had come true. 
In this text, we argue that the role of public opinion in relation to 
 foreign and security policy has varied in Finland during its hundred years 
of independence gained in 1917. From the independence of Finland to the 
early post-World War II years, the conduct of foreign and security policy 
and public opinion were not related at all, and foreign policy was an area 
of public opinion that existed on a somewhat autonomous level. The war-
time in itself was exceptional because the moral of the people was crucial 
in terms of the overall war effort and it generated the basis for the second 
phase, starting in the 1960s, when the decision makers actively shaped 
public opinion. This top-down model lasted until the end of the Cold War, 
when it was replaced by a bottom-up model where public opinion more 
clearly steered foreign policy decision making. This bottom-up model has 
been evident both in the Finnish accession to the European Union (EU) 
after a referendum and in staying militarily non-aligned. 
In this article we substantiate and illustrate this historical evolution 
of the role of public opinion in foreign policy in Finland in light of these 
three models (the autonomous model, top-down model and bottom-up 
model) by referring to relevant public opinion data, memoirs and his-
torical research. Furthermore, we tie our argument about the historical 
evolution of the role of public opinion to earlier research done on the 
issue within the discipline of International Relations. We claim that 
 different factors such as elite belief systems and the perceived threat 
2 On the history of Finnish foreign policy, see e.g. Max Jakobson, Finland in the New 
Europe. The Washington Papers/175 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998); Henrikki 
Heikka, “Republican Realism: Finnish Strategic Culture in Historical Perspective,” 
Cooperation and Conflict 40, no. 1 (2005): 45–66 and Christopher S. Browning, 
Constructivism, Narrative and Foreign Policy Analysis: A Case Study of Finland (Bern: 
Peter Lang 2008), 169–178.
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environment explain the changes in the role of public opinion in foreign 
policy decision-making. 
Foreign Policy and Public Opinion Disconnected —  
Interwar and Early Cold War Years 
The early years of independence
It is commonplace to argue that Finland became a political entity under 
the rule of the Russian Empire as the rather autonomous Grand Duchy. 
Although Finland did not have a foreign policy of its own, its position and 
relations to the outside world were pondered and debated. The Grand 
Duchy had its own interest particularly in foreign trade, but in security 
issues its fate was intertwined with the undertakings of the Russian 
Empire. For example, during the Crimean War, the British and French 
navies bombed Suomenlinna, a fortress on an island just outside Helsinki. 
Finns also discussed different strategies for coping with the Russian 
emperor, and the positions introduced during the Grand Duchy era laid the 
groundwork for Finnish foreign policy after it gained independence. 
Public opinion, conceived as the opinion of the press, played a role in 
these discussions, since the nation-builders at the time, with the Fennoman 
statesman and Hegelian philosopher Johan Vilhelm Snellman at the fore-
front, feared that if foreign countries regarded the Finnish people as being 
disloyal to the Czar and yearning to be back as part of Sweden, then the 
likelihood of foreign intervention would increase. This would be a catas-
trophe to Finland.
Finland became a democratic country before it gained its independ-
ence, when in 1906 a State Electoral Law guaranteeing all citizens, 
including women, a universal and equal right to vote was enacted. The 
1919 constitution, adopted a year after the declaration of independence, 
 stipulated that the President is the leader of foreign policy.3 The de facto 
3 The presidential powers in foreign policy are still significant. In the constitution, which 
came into effect in March 2000, it stands: “The foreign policy of Finland is directed by the 
President of the Republic in cooperation with the Government”. The current President 
Sauli Niinistö has been active as regards foreign policy, and the established practice is that 
the President especially takes care of bilateral relations with the non-EU countries. See The 
Constitution of Finland <https://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1999/en19990731.pdf>.
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situation was, however, not that simple. In fact, it was the foreign minister 
who mainly took care of key foreign policy decisions until World War II, 
because the first four Finnish Presidents did not exhibit a keen interest in 
foreign affairs. 
After the Civil War of 1918, Finnish society remained divided. 
Communists were excluded from Finnish politics, and the non-socialist 
winners eventually diverged. The Agrarian league promoted republican-
ism, but the Right advocated monarchism. Domestic power battles and the 
rift between different lines of foreign policy were closely intertwined. 
Especially for Finnish rightist movements, Russophobia was an integral 
part of their identity project, and they considered Finland and Russia as 
archenemies. As stated by Vilho Harle and Sami Moisio, they were rather 
successful in their efforts, since the image of the Russian threat was over-
arching in Finnish society, and the menace was one of the main themes in 
Finnish political life in the 1920s and 1930s.4 Yet, such a narrative is too 
simplistic: The image of the Soviet Union among the Finnish political left 
in the 1930s was affected by Stalin’s purges that hit the Finnish speaking 
socialist elite in Soviet Karelia hard. Moreover, enemy image propaganda 
was not overwhelming: for example, textbooks in the 1930s described 
Russians as glad and musical people, though lacking self-confidence.
During the inter-war period, Soviet Russia was perceived as an exis-
tential threat, and various policies were adopted to counter that. In its 
foreign policy, Finland first tried to lean on Germany: the government had 
already accepted a German intervention to the Civil War of 1918, and it 
even elected a German King, Prince Frederick Charles of Hesse. The 
German orientation, however, came to an end when Germany lost World 
War I, and the allied powers refused to recognize Finland’s independence 
if it aligned itself with Germany. 
At the beginning of the 1920s, the Finnish government chose to gang 
up with the other new eastern “rimstates”, Poland and the Baltic States. 
The policy was advocated especially by foreign minister Rudolf Holsti, 
but it was buried because Poland’s foreign policy was regarded as too 
adventurous and therefore risky in the aftermath of the Russo-Polish war 
4 Vilho Harle & Sami Moisio, Missä on Suomi? Kansallisen identiteettipolitiikan historia 
ja geopolitiikka (Tampere: Vastapaino, 2000), 83.
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of 1920. The “rimstate policy” was followed by a more abstract orienta-
tion towards the League of Nations, but in fact Finland tried to boost its 
relations with the leading European powers in the organization, England 
and France. When the League of Nations started to appear weak in mid-
1930s with the rise of Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany, which 
challenged the international security order, Finland adopted yet another 
new foreign policy orientation and tried to approach the Nordic countries, 
Sweden, in particular. 
Finnish historian Juhani Paasivirta summed up the history of Finnish 
interwar foreign policy, by stating that a distinctive feature of Finnish for-
eign policy in the early years of independence in the 1920s and 1930s, was 
legalism. Faith in justice’s prevalence was also high with regard to inter-
national politics. At first, the elite was not familiar with the rules of great 
power politics, and for many the main point of reference was domestic 
policy. Over time, the field became fairly scattered in terms of foreign pol-
icy sympathies, and it became important to identify and discuss foreign 
policy orientations. The elite opinions were split in this regard. The radical 
elements of the society leaned either to the Soviet Union or to Nazi 
Germany. The Liberals were mostly anglophile, while the Agrarian League 
and Social Democrats preferred close cooperation with the Nordic 
Countries. The Conservatives had a hard time finding a direction after the 
Nazis took power in Germany, but they eventually grew more sympathetic 
to the Nordic orientation and the idea of closer cooperation with Sweden.5 
The motives for the Nordic orientation stemmed partly from affinity, but 
pure realist logic drove the rapprochement with Sweden by the previously 
anti-Swedish Conservative Party. 
In short, essential to these changes of Finland’s foreign policy orien-
tation in the inter-war period was that none was based on the support, let 
alone, pressure of public opinion. Of course, during that time no public 
opinion polls were conducted, but public opinion was mainly equated 
with the opinions of the leading press and interest groups. The reason for 
the missing link between foreign policy and public opinion was that there 
was little common ground between the political sentiments of the elites, 
and their standpoints were ideological or based on feelings of sympathy. 
5 Paasivirta 1968, 69–70; 100–107. 
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Moreover, in the 1920s, public opinion was partly indifferent to foreign 
policy due to the rather peaceful situation that prevailed in Europe as well 
as the precarious domestic situation in the Civil War’s aftermath. In the 
1930s, this fact changed, and cooperation with Sweden gained in popular 
acceptance.
The war time
The key foreign policy decisions made during World War II were not 
based on public opinion either, although state leadership was interested in 
public sentiments and developed means to monitor and control it. Carl 
Gustaf Emil Mannerheim, Chief of Defense of the Finnish Defense 
Forces during the war and President of Finland from 1944 to 1946, 
acknowledged that in a democracy public opinion sets some limits to the 
leadership even at times of war.6 Nevertheless, the decision to ally infor-
mally with Nazi-Germany against the Soviet Union in 1941 was made by 
a very small circle. Germany was not the favorite ally because it had 
de facto backed the Soviet Union during the Winter War, and aversion 
towards Nazism was widespread. However, it was seen as the lesser of 
two evils by the elite. Additionally, there were those in the background 
who still sympathized with Germany and remembered how it had helped 
Finland in 1918. 
Even more crucially, the decision to conclude the peace with the 
Soviet Union and rebuild friendly relations with the former enemy was 
not supported by the vast masses. The people had been affected by the war 
propaganda, and public perceptions of the Soviet Union did not match 
reality. It was, therefore, not easy for leadership to popularly justify a 
U-turn in foreign policy.7 In 1948, when Finland concluded a treaty of 
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) with the Soviet 
Union no opinion polls were yet carried out, but the message from the 
press and parliamentary groups was clear: people were either reserved or 
pessimistic towards the FCMA agreement. The policy change in relations 
6 Alpo Rusi, Gallup ja kansanvalta (Kokemäki: Satakunnan Painotalo Oy, 1985), 95–96.
7 Alpo Rusi, “Ulkopoliittisen keskustelun sääntely Suomessa sota-aikana,” in Ulkopolitiikka 
ja kansalaismielipide — Keskustelun linjat Suomessa, ed. Aki Hietanen (Tampere: 
Tampereen Paasikivi-Seura, 1983), 18.
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with the Soviet Union has been described as a move from emotionalism 
to cool-headed rationalism, where an unsentimental pursuit of national 
interest prevailed, leaving no room for popular outbursts.8 
Public opinion did not matter in foreign policy decision making in 
those years because the leaders believed that it should not. In fact, the 
post-war leaders of Finland were not too convinced of the intellectual 
abilities of the Finnish nation. Juho Kusti Paasikivi, the President of the 
Republic of Finland from 1946 to 1956, wrote in his diary in 1944 that 
Finns are not particularly gifted people.9 One of his famous quotes is, “the 
sense of political realism is not the strongest trait of the Finnish people”.10 
He believed that Finns should be educated about the realities of foreign 
policy and international relations.11 Urho Kekkonen, who became 
President in 1956 after Paasikivi, pondered the issue of public opinion in 
policy making in his columns and op-eds written under different pseudo-
nyms. In his view, public opinion is oftentimes emotional and incapable 
of seeing the big picture of unfolding events. Nevertheless, there was 
considerable ambiguity in his thinking. On the one hand, especially dur-
ing times of turbulence, state leadership has a duty to guard a nation’s 
existence — even by conducting measures that are against public opinion 
if necessary. On the other hand, Kekkonen recognized that, to be credible, 
a foreign policy line must be supported by a majority of the people.12 
Indeed, it was during Kekkonen’s long presidency during the period 
1956 to 1981, when the role of public opinion started to change in Finland. 
Already during the FCMA treaty negotiations, Paasikivi had used people’s 
pessimism as leverage in the negotiations to argue that Finland could 
accept only an agreement that fulfills the legitimate Soviet interests but 
not an alliance treaty with it.13 For Kekkonen, too, public opinion was a 
8 Browning 2008, 169–175.
9 Paasikivi’s diary entry on September 2, 1944. See Yrjö Blomstedt & Matti Klinge (eds), 
Paasikiven päiväkirjat 1944–1956 1 (Helsinki: WSOY, 1985), 28.
10 See e.g. Osmo Apunen, Paasikiven–Kekkosen linja (Helsinki: Tammi, 1977), 24.
11 Tuomo Polvinen, J.K. Paasikivi, Valtiomiehen elämäntyö 4, 1944–1948 (Helsinki: 
Otava, 1999), 380. 
12 Urho Kekkonen, Nimellä ja Nimimerkillä (Helsinki: Otava, 1977), 7–12; 44–46; 188–191.
13 Unto Vesa, “Suomalaisten suhtautuminen yya:han,” in YYA–Aika ja sopimus, ed. Unto 
Vesa (Tampere: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1998), 107–128.
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resource that could be used in two ways in the relations with the Soviet 
Union. Public opinion had to support him as foreign policy leader as well 
as friendly relations with the Soviet Union, so that Soviet leaders would 
be convinced of the continuity of the foreign policy line. However, at the 
same time it also had to be a deterrent in resisting possible attempts of the 
Soviet Union to interfere in domestic politics of Finland, and ultimately, 
had to reflect a strong will to defend the country by arms if necessary.
The Top-down Model of the Cold War
The era of Finlandization
In the 1960s, under President Kekkonen, Finland started to pursue a policy 
of neutrality more explicitly. The rationale for the policy of neutrality was 
clear. According to Kari Möttölä:
The policy of neutrality is above all an instrument for maintaining 
dynamic Western ties by winning the Western approval for a foreign 
policy which is strongly colored by the priority of Eastern policy.14
The Finnish leadership was convinced that this could not be achieved 
without popular support. Neutrality was to be anchored not to great power 
recognition but to the mentality of the people: “neutrality being under a 
constant test from outside, all neutral countries’ governments searched for 
and needed strong domestic support for their policies”.15 It was of utmost 
importance that the Finnish nation lent support to the official line. 
According to Johanna Rainio:
[Kekkonen] believed that after the Second World War, Finns had to be 
convinced to follow the new conciliatory foreign policy unanimously, 
either in such a way that they understand Finland’s delicate position and 
14 Kari Möttölä, “The Politics of Neutrality and Defence: Finnish Security Policy Since the 
Early 1970s,” Cooperation and Conflict 17 (1982): 287–313. 
15 Johanna Rainio–Niemi, The Ideological Cold War. The Politics of Neutrality in Austria 
and Finland (New York: Routledge, 2014), 12–18.
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observe rigid self-discipline by not stating their differing opinions 
in public.16
Kekkonen’s trusted man in the foreign ministry, Keijo Korhonen, 
claimed in his memoirs that Finnish officials had to praise the Finnish-
Soviet friendship, which was a ritual of the new eastern policy. However 
simultaneously, they dearly hoped that the Finnish media and citizens 
would understand that the official rhetoric was not the whole truth, but 
rather doublespeak to pursue Finnish interests such as independence and 
self-determination.17 
In his book, regarded as his political testament, Kekkonen stated that 
in order to succeed, the policy of neutrality needed the support of the 
Finnish people. Finnish neutrality aspirations in the 1930s failed because 
significant political spheres disagreed about the line. This failure was fate-
ful, and eventually led to war with the Soviet Union. Moreover, Kekkonen 
drew a line between domestic and foreign policies. In the area of foreign 
policy, a single imprudent statement by a (prominent) individual could 
harm the entire nation, while in domestic policy such a statement could 
do harm only to the respective individual. Kekkonen stressed that if 
one wants to ponder foreign policy issues, he or she should always take 
the national interests into account. All in all, Kekkonen was sure that the 
leadership postwar reappraisal was right and justified. He asserted that 
since the line drawn was the right one, the people should unanimously 
lend their support to make it credible. That is to say, Kekkonen was on a 
quest for consensus.18
Kekkonen exercised his large constitutional powers in the area of 
foreign policy in full and legitimated his domestic power position through 
his foreign policy leadership. The key turning point was the so-called note 
crisis in the relations with the Soviet Union that he appeared to solve suc-
cessfully. In the course of the 1960s, he created a power vertical, where 
16 Johanna Rainio, “A people too well Educated. Truths of the second republic and public 
opinion in the Finnish NATO debate,” Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy (2003), 5–18. 
17 
 Keijo Korhonen, Sattumakorpraali — Korhonen Kekkosen komennossa (Helsinki: 
Otava, 1999), 176–177.
18 Urho Kekkonen, Tamminiemi (Espoo: Weilin + Göös, 1980), 160–169. 
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the loyalists to the President made sure that, especially in issues related to 
foreign policy, dissidents were either marginalized or put in line.19 The 
media as well as other key opinion shapers did not challenge the official 
foreign policy stance in public. 
The way public opinion was controlled partly through self-censorship 
and the marginalisation of the alleged Anti-Sovietism was an essential 
element of the political culture of the time called “Finlandization”.20 
Media coverage was often undeniably biased, and particularly the Soviet 
Union was not criticized in the main press or in the TV — neither in edi-
torials, news nor on opinion pages. Kekkonen supervised this personally 
and reminded editors-in-chief with immediate, stormy letters if they 
crossed the line. In the course of time, the Finnish media learned to live 
accordingly.21 Key party organs especially stressed the importance of 
restraint when debating foreign and security policy.22 
Although foreign policy was a sensitive issue, it was still discussed. 
Public debate on foreign policy focused on issues such as the association 
agreement with the European Economic Community and development 
policy.23 The rise of the so-called “new left” and their activity in foreign 
policy intensified discussion. The movement that consisted of young 
Social Democratic foreign policy experts advocated “new foreign policy” 
that questioned attempts to create closer relations with the West and pro-
moted closer ties with the Soviet Union. However, the debate on foreign 
policy took place in a limited context, and the key foreign policy line was 
not challenged. 
19 Osmo Apunen, Tilinteko Kekkosen aikaan (Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä, 1984), 22–29.
20 Tuomas Forsberg and Matti Pesu, “The Finlandization of Finland. The Ideal Type, The 
Historical Model, The Lessons Learned,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 27, no. 3 (2016): 
473–495.
21 Krister Ståhlberg, “Public opinion in Finnish Foreign Policy,” Yearbook of Finnish 
Foreign Policy 1987 (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1987), 17–25.
22 See e.g., Vihavainen Kansakunta rähmällään, 119–145.
23 Although public discourse was limited mainly due to self-censorship, there was debate on 
many foreign policy issues throughout the 1970s. For example, the Finnish free trade agree-
ment with the EEC, “Finlandization,” and development policy were hot potatoes of that 
time. The fundamentals, however, were not questioned. See Christer Sandén, “Ulkopoliittinen 
keskustelu Suomessa 1970–luvulla,” in Ulkopolitiikka 16, no. 1 (1979): 8–17. 
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Public opinion polls testify that the situation was rather abnormal in 
terms of democracy. For instance in 1971, a staggering 96 percent were of 
the opinion that Finnish foreign policy was “Good”. During Kekkonen’s 
rule, the lowest approval rating occurred in 1978, when only 84 percent of 
Finns considered Finnish foreign policy “Good”. Positive views on the 
FCMA treaty also increased. In 1964, 57 percent saw the agreement as 
 having a positive effect, but in 1974, 80 percent perceived it as a positive 
thing. Yet, some had reservations; for example, in 1978, when the overall 
approval rating of foreign policy was at 84 percent, 34 percent of Finns 
still held the view that the Finnish policy of neutrality was leaning too 
much to the East. Nevertheless, public support of foreign policy was solid 
as a rock.24
Yet, Kekkonen acknowledged the limits of the political leadership 
even with the help of media to control the public opinion fully. Kekkonen 
feared that the Soviet behavior would scupper his attempt to uphold public 
24 The Advisory Board for Defense Information and its predecessor, the Planning Board 
for Spiritual National Defense, have conducted official surveys since 1964. See Pertti 
Alanen & Tuomas Forsberg, “The Evolution of Opinions about Foreign Policy in Finland–
from the 1960s till the 1980s,” Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy 1988–89 (Helsinki: 
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1989), 29–33.
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Figure 1.  Finns’ views on the conduct of foreign policy in the Cold War era
Source: Pertti Alanen & Tuomas Forsberg, “The Evolution of Opinions about Foreign Policy in 
Finland from the 1960s till the 1980s,” Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy 1988–89 (Helsinki: 
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1989), 29–33.
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support for his friendship policy. For example, after the Warsaw Pact 
invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, Kekkonen wrote in his diary:
I’ve done my best that our necessary Eastern policy would naturally 
grow into a definite policy of friendship and because of this it would 
become rooted as the common conviction of all Finns and that the mind 
and heart would equally establish a basis for Eastern policy. The events 
in Czechoslovakia have […] torn the achievements and ground from 
this endeavor. 
Indeed, despite the climate of Finlandization and self-censorship in the 
media, Finns were not entirely brainwashed. Contacts with other Nordic 
countries were intense, and a substantial number of Finns had visited the 
Soviet Union by taking part in affordable package tours.25 The shortcom-
ings of socialism became evident, and the so-called “spiritual national 
defense policies” were successful in keeping the will to defend the nation 
strong throughout the Cold War.26 In surveys, the share of Finns who 
believed that “if attacked, Finland should defend itself militarily in all 
situations” was very high in comparison to other countries. In fact, con-
ducting such polls and making them public was considered a cheap way to 
signal deterrence.
The predominant thinking during Kekkonen’s tenure with regards to 
the public opinion–foreign policy nexus was “top-down,” although the 
support of the people was simultaneously regarded as a source of legiti-
macy that was crucial in the relations with the Soviet Union. The era 
of Kekkonen continued into the 1980s, when he resigned due to health 
 reasons, and Mauno Koivisto, a social democrat, became the new President 
by overwhelming electoral support. Although Koivisto was a staunch par-
liamentarian and wanted to dismantle Kekkonen’s domestic power system 
based on personal relationships and loyalty, he continued the foreign policy 
of his predecessor very carefully.27 Friendly relations with the Soviet 
25 See Hanna Kuusi, “Accidental Traders — Finnish Tourists in the Soviet Union,” in 
Finnish Consumption: An Emerging Consumer Society between East and West, eds. Visa 
Heinonen and Matti Peltonen (Helsinki: Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura, 2013), 206–230.
26 Rainio–Niemi, The Ideological Cold War, 105–114. 
27 Hannu Lehtilä, Tuntematon Koivisto (Helsinki: Otava, 1998), 318.









	












 The Role of Public Opinion in Finland’s Foreign and Security Policy 159
Union remained the cornerstone of Finnish foreign policy, but Finland 
started to take small steps toward European cooperation.
The end of the Cold War
At the beginning, the foreign policy of Koivisto was even more popular 
than that of Kekkonen. At the same time the so-called “Finlandization” 
began to disappear, the media was no longer on a presidential leash, and the 
foreign policy debate became more open. Public opinion challenged the 
government particularly in demanding more “ethical” policy, beginning 
with issues not directly related to the Soviet Union, such as participating in 
sanctions against the apartheid regime in South Africa. 
The turning point occurred when many Finns sympathized with the 
fate of the Baltic States at the end of the Cold War. The endeavors of 
Estonia, considered a sister nation, were watched especially closely by the 
Finns. Koivisto’s premises, nonetheless, stemmed from the realist tradition 
of Snellman and Paasikivi. For him, the core national interests included 
stable relations with the Soviet Union, and in the context of the Baltic 
struggle for independence, this manifested also in support for Mikhail 
Gorbachev, whose shaky position Koivisto did not want to endanger. 
Koivisto himself sympathized with Estonians, but he argued that Finnish 
foreign policy could not go along with such sentiments. The national inter-
est was the only true moral guide for policy, and the Balts’ cause was only 
of secondary importance.28 Koivisto articulated the dilemma between 
public opinion and realist foreign policy that had previously only been 
sensed. According to him, a leader must sometimes disappoint his subjects 
in order not to lose their trust.
Eventually, the Soviet Union began to unravel, and the Baltic states 
regained their independence. The independence processes of Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania were in one sense the final act of the Cold War 
for Finland. The end of the Cold War brought a major structural change 
for Finland as well, whose fate had been closely tied to the superpower 
28 For Koivisto, the priority was as follows: first, relations with Moscow; second, relations 
with the current regime in Moscow; third, relations with the Estonians and their endeavors; 
fourth, protection of Finland’s image in the West. See Mauno Koivisto, Historian tekijät. 
Kaksi kautta II (Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä Oy, 1995), 322.
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tensions.29 Subsequently, public opinion started to play a bigger role in 
shaping Finnish foreign policy decision making.
The Post-Cold War Era and the Growing Impact  
of Public Opinion
To the European Union
The collapse of the Soviet Union changed many factors related to the  public 
opinion–foreign policy nexus. The external threat was basically gone — so 
was the core rationale for the policy of neutrality. A weak Russia, which 
was in turmoil and possibly on its way to democracy, did not appear as a 
potential military or societal threat. Kekkonen and his system also were 
long gone, and the media resumed its role as a watchdog of power. The 
public was of the opinion that the Finnish leadership managed to navigate 
through the  turbulent years of the end of the Cold War quite well. In 1992, 
Finns were asked how well Finland has managed its foreign policy over the 
last few years. 64 percent of the respondents answered, “Quite well”. 
Figures were still high, but they were definitely more normal than during 
the Cold War days of approval ratings over 90 percent.30 
Finland entered the post-Cold War world, where public opinion 
 mattered more. It mattered more because public debate on foreign policy 
intensified, more and more public opinion polls were conducted, politi-
cians read them very closely, and they were more willing to adjust their 
political views with it as they were less able to shape it.31 Liberalism as a 
leading philosophy replaced Hegelian collectivism. In some issues public 
opinion mattered less because the forces of globalization narrowed the 
room for political maneuvering, but foreign policy allowed for a greater 
freedom of choice.
When the Cold War ended, public support for the FCMA treaty did 
not vanish overnight. However, the government was quick to renounce 
and negotiate an unconditional normal friendship treaty with Russia, and 
29 Raino-Niemi, The Ideological Cold War, 9.
30 Planning Commission for Defence Information Survey, Autumn 1992.
31 Pertti Suhonen, “The Media, Polls and Political Process: The Case of Finland,” European 
Journal of Communication 12, no. 2 (1997): 219–238.









	












 The Role of Public Opinion in Finland’s Foreign and Security Policy 161
it was clear that public support for the FCMA treaty as a corner stone of 
Finnish foreign policy had been more nominal than real, as the public did 
not show any dissatisfaction with its replacement. 
The more delicate question, however, was EU membership. When 
Sweden announced in October 1990 that it would apply for membership 
in the then-European Communities, Finland did not follow suit immedi-
ately. Swedish reappraisal of its policy came as a surprise, and some 
resented the Swedish policy turn, because the two countries were sup-
posed to negotiate as a unit over the European Economic Area treaty with 
the European Commission (EC). Nevertheless, the Swedish government 
failed to inform Finnish leadership about the decision to apply for mem-
bership beforehand. For a while, the Finns felt abandoned again, but after 
the failed Soviet coup d’état attempt in 1991, Koivisto regarded it pos-
sible to  support Finland’s membership in the EC and motivated the 
membership with general security policy reasons.32 
In this context, public opinion started to matter. Koivisto first wanted to 
avoid public discussion about the EC/EU membership on tactical grounds, 
in order not to endanger the ongoing negotiations over the European 
Economic Area with the EC. But at the same time, it seemed that a major-
ity of the Finnish people were supporting the EC membership. Already in 
1989, when Finnish Business and Policy Forum (EVA) published its sur-
vey, 46 percent thought Finland should apply for EC membership, whereas 
only 12 percent were categorically against. The result was interesting, 
because at the time the Finnish leadership saw the membership incompat-
ible with the policy of neutrality. At the beginning of the 1990s, more 
surveys were conducted, and the results were parallel: the majority of the 
Finns were in favor of joining the EC. Only in one poll in 1993, were the 
majority against membership.33 The role of public opinion was highlighted 
32 Another important argument for the Finnish EU membership according to Koivisto was 
that as a non-member Finland would have to accommodate itself to decisions made in the 
EU anyway but it would not be able to have an influence on the decision. Arguing anything 
else than this would be hiding behind a fig leave. See Jaakko Iloniemi, Vallan käytävillä 
(Helsinki: Wsoy, 1999), 114.
33 Matti Mörttinen & Nina Törnudd, “Suomi, EU, kansalaismielipide ja media” in 
Marginaalista ytimeen — Suomi Euroopan Unionissa 1989–2003, ed. Alexander Stubb 
(Helsinki: Tammi 2006), 384–401.
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because the decision to join the EU was put to a referendum following the 
practice adopted by Norway and Sweden. So when the referendum took 
place on November 16 1994, those in favor unsurprisingly defeated their 
opponents by 57 to 43 percent.34 
It is clear that if Finns had voted no, Finland would not have accessed 
the Union, as had happened in Norway. In that sense, public opinion’s role 
was focal. However, Finnish leadership had made their position known, 
which plausibly had a decisive impact on the result. President Ahtisaari, 
who was elected to office in 1994, spoke of Finland’s membership 
emphatically and considered it a necessity. Prime Minister Esko Aho from 
the Center Party kept a lower profile, although his role in persuading his 
party to support the accession was crucial. Aho, however, was not totally 
sure about the outcome of the referendum, and he did not want to appear 
too active in terms of advocating for membership.35 
It has been argued that the Finnish elite was not completely sincere as 
regards the referendum and listening to public opinion. The referendum 
took place before the referenda in Norway and Sweden, where popula-
tions were more critical of the EU than in Finland. The idea of this alleged 
scheme was to make sure that Finns would vote yes, and the Swedes and 
Norwegians, encouraged by the Finnish result, would follow suit. Another 
common accusation is that the media in Finland was uncritical of the EU 
and that Finns formed their opinion in a biased environment. This again 
may have backfired several years later as pent-up dissatisfaction by the 
Eurosceptic Finns has led to the rise of populism in Finnish political life 
and has forced the government to take positions that challenge the former 
pro-integration line.36
34 Pasi Natri, “Finnish Information on the EU Membership,” Yearbook of Finnish Foreign 
Policy 1994 (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1994), 40–48; Pertti 
Pesonen & Risto Sänkiaho, “The Finnish Referendum on the Membership in the EU,” 
Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy 1994 (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International 
Affairs, 1994), 52–59.
35 Alpo Rusi, Mariankadun puolelta (Helsinki: Otava, 2000). 
36 Johanna Korhonen, Kymmenen polkua populismiin — Kuinka vaikenevasta Suomesta 
tuli äänekkään populismin pelikenttä? (London: Counterpoint, 2012). <http://counterpoint.
uk.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/507_CP_RRadical_Finnish_web.pdf>. 
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Not to NATO 
Public opinion also greatly influenced the decision not to join NATO or 
prevented other military arrangements considered military alignment. 
Starting from the early 1990s when public opinion polls on the issue were 
carried out, a clear majority of Finns resisted the idea of joining NATO. 
The basic critical pattern has not changed much after Russia’s turn to 
more assertive foreign policy. However, after the wars in Georgia and 
Ukraine the  support for membership has slightly increased. Finns have 
clearly shown their support for staying outside military alliances, but they 
have not been against partnership with NATO or closer military coopera-
tion with NATO countries. The majority of Finns have supported NATO 
enlargement and the Finnish partnership with the alliance (see Table 1). 
In the 2000s, only one party, the conservative National Coalition 
party, has been officially in favor of Finnish NATO membership, as have 
been its voters. The Swedish Peoples Party has also been considered 
pro-NATO, but the majority of its voters have been against. All six other 
37 The data is gathered from the annual information surveys (Opinions on Security Policy 
1995 (autumn); 2000 (spring); 2003 (autumn); 2009 (autumn); 2015 (autumn)) of the 
Advisory Board for Defence Information. The data is distributed by Finnish Social Science 
Data Archive <www.fsd.uta.fi>. In this case, military alignment can also mean an 
 alliance with Sweden or the EU’s evolution to a military alliance.
Table 1:  Support for Nato membership in Finland
The Percentage of Finns Supporting Finland’s 
Military Alignment36
1995 37.5%
2000 20.5%
2003 24.7%
2009 32.1%
2015 33.0%
Source: The data is from the annual surveys by the 
Advisory Board for Defence Information and it is 
d istributed by Finnish Social Science Data Archive. Data 
available only on request.
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164 Tuomas Forsberg and Matti Pesu
parties and their voters are against membership, and the most vehement 
opposition comes unsurprisingly from the Left Alliance.38 
In general, the public has lent its support to Finnish foreign policy 
after the Cold War, but the nexus between foreign policy and public 
opinion with regard to NATO membership has functioned more as a 
constraining rather than an enabling factor. President Martti Ahtisaari, 
who was the first President elected by a direct popular vote that under-
lined the growing significance of public opinion, was positively inclined 
towards Finland joining NATO in principle but constrained by other 
leading politicians in his own party and public opinion.39 He did not have 
the means to influence public opinion through media; by contrast, the 
media was often rather critical of the President. There was a strong con-
sensus by leading politicians that if Finland were to decide about joining 
NATO, it should be put to a referendum. Thus, there was no decision 
about applying for NATO membership under Ahtisaari’s term as President. 
Additionally, he also wanted to postpone the decision for identity reasons, 
so that Finland would not join NATO in the same group with the former 
Warsaw Pact countries.
The NATO issue also played a visible role during Tarja Halonen’s — 
also a social democrat — term (2000–2012) as President of Finland. She 
was elected President partly because she strongly opposed Finland’s 
 membership in NATO.40 In fact, she saw herself as a guarantee against 
NATO membership, legitimated by the popular vote, contrary to the 
foreign policy elite who were surreptitiously favorable of Finland’s mem-
38 Ilkka Haavisto, Neljäs Suomi. EVAn arvo- ja asennetutkimus 2014 (Helsinki: Taloustieto 
Oy, 2014), 89–90. In some surveys, the majority of the voters of the tiny Christian Democrats 
have been for NATO membership. See Satu Schauman, “KD-äänestäjät suopeimpia 
Natolle — “tämä ei sinänsä yllätä,” Verkkouutiset, March 7, 2014. <http://www.verkkouuti-
set.fi/politiikka/KD%20ja%20Nato-17022>.
39 After his presidency, Ahtisaari has been a noticeable advocate for Finland’s NATO mem-
bership. See e.g., “Weekly: Ex-President Ahtisaari calls on Finland to join Nato with 
Sweden,” Yle News, 11 April, 2014. <yle.fi/uutiset/weekly_ex-president_ahtisaari_calls_
on_finland_to_join_nato_with_sweden/7185872>. 
40 It has been argued that during Halonen’s twelve years of presidency, Finland moved 
back to a more traditional policy line with Russia, highlighting the importance of good 
personal relations. See. e.g., Alpo Rusi, Etupiirin ote. Suomen valtapeli Euroopan rajalla 
1700–2014 (Helsinki: Gummerus, 2014).
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bership in NATO. “According to opinion polls,” she argued in 2003, “the 
citizens trust our foreign and security policy as well as decision makers: 
internationally, this is not a bad situation”.41 
Public opinion was, indeed, rather stable on the NATO issue, reach-
ing its low points after the Kosovo and Iraq wars, but growing when the 
perception of the Russian threat increased. Nevertheless, the changes 
were not huge, and support was never much higher than 30 percent.42 
Mostly pro-NATO media content did not make Finns’ attitudes towards 
NATO more positive over time.43 However, when asked whether the 
 people would support Finland’s membership in NATO if the leaders so 
recommended, a majority supported it. This motivated some politicians 
and members of the foreign policy elite to suggest that politicians have 
to bear the responsibility of making key decisions in foreign policy, and 
they cannot seek cover from public opinion.44 Halonen, however, 
argued that, “today we have no guarantee that the people would follow 
the President”.45 
President Sauli Niinistö (2012 to present) also has been explicitly 
skeptical vis-à-vis his chances to persuade the public of the benefits of 
NATO membership. In his view, “the membership would also require the 
support of the majority of the public, and we should not think that public 
opinion could be swayed merely by a declaration of intent voiced by the 
41 Interview with President of Finland. Tarja Halonen, Suomen Kuvalehti, December 5, 
2003, http://www.presidentti.fi/halonen/Public/default4310.html?contentid=174578&nod
eid=41417&contentlan=1&culture=fi-FI.
42 For the post-Cold War generation, NATO is often associated with the hegemonic position 
of the United States, not to the dead and buried divide of the Cold War. The anti-NATO 
attitude thus stems, partly paradoxically, from the undertakings of the United States in 
Afghanistan and Iraq that many see against the values of Finnish foreign policy. See Rainio 
2003, 15.
43 Juho Rahkonen, “Public Opinion, Journalism and the Question of Finland’s Membership 
of NATO,” Nordicom Review 28:2 (2007): 81–92.
44 
“Pääministeri: Kansan vastustus on “huono peruste” torjua Nato-jäsenyys,” 
Verkkouutiset, March 29, 2014. http://www.verkkouutiset.fi/kotimaa/katainen%20ja%20
nato%20galluppi-18175.
45 Hannu Lehtilä, Tarja Halonen. Paremman maailman puolesta (Helsinki: Tammi 
2012), 143. 
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political leadership”.46 Indeed, the recent public opinion polls conducted 
on the issue give only mixed support to the view that Finns are loyal to 
the authorities and would change their opinion if the President recom-
mended it. Niinistö has also been an advocate of a referendum in case 
Finland decides to seek NATO membership. As stated by Niinistö, “[t]he 
[NATO] issue must have a national consensus, and a referendum [is] 
required before a final decision could be made”.47 
The post-Cold War situation has been a bit ironic in the sense that the 
successful endeavor of Cold War era leaders to impose a certain foreign 
policy thinking has had a more lasting effect than they believed possible. 
Johanna Rainio has asserted that the Finns are “too well educated” when 
having internalized neutrality during the Cold War; they have not been 
eager to reevaluate the position after the Cold War. This again has been a 
hindrance to the post-Cold War identity project, where Finland has tried 
to adopt a more “Western” identity.48
During Niinistö’s presidency, the change in the security environment 
has been drastic due to Russia’s assertiveness and revisionism in Europe. 
A much-debated topic in this context is “hybrid war,” which entails 
information warfare as a key element of advancing hostile interests. The 
line between war and peace is blurred, and states prepare themselves for 
unforeseen scenarios. It has been said that the fight for the hearts and 
minds of the public is underway.49 In Finland, Russian (dis)information 
campaigns have gained a lot of attention, and Russia-friendly news sites, 
46 Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö at the Ambassador Seminar on 
August 21, 2012, http://www.tpk.fi/public/default.aspx?contentlan=2&culture=en-US&no
deid=44810&contentid=255718.
47 President Niinistö: Possible NATO membership not a joint Finnish–Swedish decision,” 
YLE, May 1, 2016. http://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/president_niinisto_possible_nato_
membership_not_a_joint_finnish-swedish_decision/8850984. 
48 Rainio, “A People too well Educated”. Browning highlights the importance of the 
politicized Westernizing narratives in Finnish post-Cold War foreign policy. One of their 
rationales of the narratives is to show Finland’s “natural” role in the Western world. See 
Christopher S. Browning, “Coming Home or Moving Home? Westernizing Narratives in 
Finnish Foreign Policy and the Reinterpretation of Past Identities,” Cooperation and 
Conflict 37:1 (2002): 47–72.
49 Saara Jantunen, Infosota–“Iskut kohdistuvat kansalaisten tajuntaan,” (Helsinki: Otava, 
2015), 60.
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blogs and comments have been spread directly to the larger public via 
social media. The main goal has been to create doubt in Western news 
reporting, paint a gloomy picture of the West’s overall aims and to per-
suade Finland to have a more “independent” role as regards the EU’s 
policy towards Russia. The “special relationship” between Finland and 
Russia has been highlighted, and exhortations to stay non-aligned have 
been voiced. The awareness of the information war has again high-
lighted the role of public opinion, when direct foreign influence 
endeavors to target the public mind with a malign intent. The public 
appears as potential leverage with which to influence the leadership, 
which has consequences. According to President Niinistö, every Finn, as 
a receiver of information, is a defender of his or her country, and they 
have a duty to be critical and get information from multiple sources.50 
In sum, there has been a clear change in the attitudes of the Finnish 
Presidents with regard to public opinion. During the Cold War they 
were confident of their capability to shape it if necessary, which was 
evident during Kekkonen’s rule, and to make decisions even under 
50 
“Presidentti Niinistö infosodasta: “Me kaikki olemme maanpuolustajia,” ” Yle Uutiset 
http://yle.fi/uutiset/presidentti_niinisto_infosodasta_me_kaikki_olemme_maanpuolustajia/ 
8388624 (October 17, 2015).
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How well has Finland managed its foreign policy over the
past few years? (Data from the surveys of Advisory Board
for Defence Information)
Very well Quite well Not very well Not all very well
Figure 2.  Finns’ views on the conduct of foreign policy in the post-Cold War era
Source: The data is from the annual surveys by the Advisory Board for Defence Information and it is 
distributed by Finnish Social Science Data Archive. Data available only on request.
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168 Tuomas Forsberg and Matti Pesu
 public  criticism like Koivisto during the independence processes of the 
Baltic states. In the post-Cold War period, speaking about big questions, 
the Presidents have been less sure that they are able to shape public 
opinion, and they have felt more bound by it. This is one of the major 
reasons why Finland has stayed out of NATO. In general, Presidents 
have avoided such statements that could be considered as imprudent or 
rocking the boat. Thus they have earned the respect of the public, who 
has largely been satisfied with the conduct of foreign policy in the post-
Cold War era. 
Conclusion
As we have argued in our text, the role of public opinion in Finland has 
evolved considerably during the hundred years of Finland’s independence. 
Three models concerning public opinion’s effect on foreign policy have 
been explained and applied to the Finnish case. 
The role of public opinion has changed from being unrelated to 
 foreign policy decision making, to being subordinated to it during the 
Cold War, and finally to being a determining factor in the post-Cold War 
era. Through the years, public opinion transformed from a Hegelian 
 collectivity that leaders could guide into the sum of privately thinking 
individuals. The changes depended both on the perceived urgency to make 
decisions on purely strategic grounds and on politicians’ own beliefs about 
public opinion. The Finnish case clearly demonstrates, as Douglas Foyle 
has suggested, that “individual beliefs about the proper role of public 
opinion in policy making may be one […] variable affecting how policy 
makers react to public opinion when making foreign policy decisions”. 
Using Foyle’s belief system distinction about the desirability and neces-
sity of public opinion in decision making, the Finnish post-war leaders 
seemed to be pragmatists who were not that enthusiastic about the role of 
public opinion in decision making. However, they regarded it as essential 
in making the foreign policy line credible.51
51 Douglas C. Foyle, “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Elite Beliefs as a Mediating 
Variable,” International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (1997): 141–169.
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The Cold War Presidents, Paasikivi, Kekkonen and also Koivisto, 
were all different practitioners of realpolitik, which was reflected in their 
thinking on the role of public opinion. Kekkonen’s view on the relation-
ship between public opinion and foreign policy conduct comes especially 
close to Hans Morgenthau and his classical realism. Morgenthau had 
argued that public support is an element of national power, and the 
approval of one’s own people must be secured in foreign policy. But 
Morgenthau, like Kekkonen and Paasikivi, was aware of alleged instabil-
ity, moralism and legalism of the popular mind. Thus, public opinion 
needs to be informed and re-created: “the government must realize that it 
is the leader and not the slave of public opinion”.52
Kekkonen indeed led. Self-censorship and media control were two 
of the distinct features of the Kekkonen era, called “Finlandization”. 
Limitations to opinion-forming were set naturally when alternative views 
were not expressed, let alone published. If alternative views were hard to 
express, it is safe to assume that ordinary citizens were unlikely to adopt 
foreign policy stances that were inconsistent with the official line. 
Research has shown that the mass media’s role in determining public 
attention to foreign policy is considerable, and media content has an effect 
on the salience of foreign and security policy in the eyes of the public.53 
The importance of the security environment when analyzing the 
nexus between public opinion and foreign policy also becomes clear in 
the Finnish case. In the view of William Davis, “the presence of an exter-
nal threat causes political leaders to downplay public opinion”; however, 
in Finland public opinion was tamed and actively shaped during the Cold 
War rather than just ignored.54 When the threat diminished at the end of 
52 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace 7th 
 edition (New York: The McGraw-Hill, 2005), 158–162.
53 See e.g. Stuart N. Soroka, “Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy,” Harvard 
International Journal of Press/Politics 8, no. 1 (2003): 27–48. Powlick has discovered 
five factors, which policy makers perceive as the representative of public opinion. These 
 factors are: elites, interest groups, the news media, elected representatives and the general 
public. See Philiph J. Powlick, “The Sources of Public Opinion for American Foreign 
Policy Officials,” International Studies Quarterly 39, no. 4 (1995): 427–451.
54 William Davis, “Swords into ploughshares: The effect of pacifist public opinion on  foreign 
policy in Western democracies,” Cooperation and Conflict 47, no. 3 (2012): 309–330.
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170 Tuomas Forsberg and Matti Pesu
the Cold War, the impact of public opinion on decision making grew 
considerably. The post-Cold War Presidents were all skeptical as to their 
capability to shape public opinion much. As Thomas Risse–Kappen has 
argued, domestic structure also matters in how much public opinion 
influences foreign policy making.55 When the President actively drives 
foreign policy, he becomes less dependent on support in single issues; 
but when political parties compete over votes, public opinion becomes 
more influential, particularly in key issues such as NATO membership 
in Finland.56 
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6 Mistrust within trust
Finnish–Swedish defence 
cooperation and the ghosts of the 
1990 EC application incident
Tapio Juntunen and Matti Pesu
Introduction1
Finland and Sweden are countries sharing a border, history, interests, and 
identities, and hence over the course of history their fates have been tightly 
intertwined. Interaction between the states is close- knit, and cooperation 
takes place across multiple domains. The end of the Cold War and the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union opened up new avenues for Fenno- Swedish 
cooperation. Considering the status quo- oriented foreign policy posture of 
the two states during the Cold War, some of the most prominent oppor-
tunities for completely new forms of cooperation were found in the area of 
security policy. But unlike in many other policy domains and spheres of 
interaction between the states, bilateral cooperation in defence and security 
policy has only started to gain momentum in the last ten years or so.
 Nordic defence cooperation, encompassing all ﬁve Nordic countries, 
has, to a great extent, ﬁgured prominently on the agenda after the end of 
the Cold War, especially since the establishment of the Nordic Defence 
Cooperation structure (NORDEFCO) in 2009. In Finland, bilateral 
cooperation with Sweden has recently begun to be seen as the most 
important approach to and substance of defence cooperation.2 Bilateral 
cooperation appears to provide opportunities for ambitious collaboration 
and, at least nominally, a way to abide by the policy of military non- 
alignment – a doctrine seen as upholding the balance of power in the Baltic 
Sea area and enhancing the region’s strategic stability in an era of notable 
turbulence.
 Establishing a more extensive security policy partnership, or even a 
military alliance, is however more easily said than done. Rather surpris-
ingly, in Finland there seems to be an underlying lack of trust, which 
would have to be overcome in order to take cooperation beyond its 
current, rather nascent and incrementally evolving state to a more mature 
level. Indeed, as the stakes and ambitions of defence cooperation between 
Sweden and Finland have increased, so have historically rooted suspicions. 
In particular, the impression that Sweden betrayed Finland when it 
announced its intention to apply for membership in the European 
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Community (EC) on 26 October 1990 without consulting Finland before-
hand remains vivid in the Finnish foreign policy discourse. In fact, some 
Finnish decision- makers, experts, and public commentators have begun to 
frame the current situation in light of the ‘lesson’ of October 1990. This 
time the fear is a sudden Swedish transatlantic reorientation, namely Stock-
holm applying for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) without properly consulting Finnish interests on the decision.
 The underlying puzzle in this chapter, approached from the perspective 
of trust research in International Relations (IR), is why progress in the 
defence and security policy cooperation between these two historically con-
nected Nordic states, which otherwise enjoy a mature and evolved partner-
ship, has been so circumspect. At ﬁrst glance, the Swedish–Finnish 
inter- state relationship seems to be a rather superﬂuous object of study, 
especially from the perspective of trust research in IR; after all, the rela-
tionship between the two Nordic countries has been described as that of a 
model security community (see Waever 1998, 72).3
 Moreover, if Finland and Sweden in fact belong to a model security 
community – that is, a ‘group of states among whom trust is so high and 
trusting relationship so robust that war between them has become 
unthinkable’ (Ruzicka and Keating 2015, 9; see also Wiberg 2000) – 
their relationship can also be presented as a paradigmatic case of what 
interstate trust is and how it is maintained (on security communities see 
Adler and Barnett 1998; Deutsch 1957).4 As Ruzicka and Keating (2015, 
9) suggest in their explorative article on the latest developments in the IR 
trust research, ‘trusting relationships rarely feature as something to be 
explained’ in international politics. Instead preoccupying itself with ques-
tions of how to build trust between adversaries and (former) enemies, we 
suggest that the study of Finnish–Swedish bilateral relations should 
endeavour to offer valuable insights into the question proposed by 
Ruzicka and Keating.
 In the spirit of analytical eclecticism, we approach the Finnish–Swedish 
case through the lenses of social and psychological approaches in IR trust 
research (see Haukkala et al. 2015, 4).5 This means that we highlight the 
centrality of shared norms and political values when understanding the 
general identiﬁcation- based conditions of trustful relations between col-
lective units (e.g. Weinhardt 2015, 32). That said, conceptions more famil-
iar from the psychological approach to international trust also need to be 
considered – the role of cognitive biases, beliefs, emotions, and, especially 
in our case (collectively shared) historical experiences and narratives – if 
we want to explain the role and effect of mistrust and suspicions even 
within generally trustful interstate relationships (see especially Michel 
2012). In other words, whereas the constructivist orientation’s focus on 
shared norms seems to highlight mutual trust in Swedish–Finnish bilateral 
relations, the role of suspicions (or even the historical experience of 
‘betrayal’) in the context of this essentially non- conﬂictual small- state 
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relationship seems to provide clues how factors more familiar to psycho-
logical approaches can at the same time have negative effects, especially 
when stratiﬁed into collective narratives of mistrust.
 Moreover, our study aims to broaden the existing discussion on inter-
national trust by avoiding the prevalent inclination towards studying 
trust in the contexts of profound tensions, disagreements, disputes, and 
processes of post- conﬂict reconstruction, with the usual addition of a 
great power being at least one part of the dyad (see for example Brugger 
2015; Brugger et al. 2013; Hoffmann 2002; Larson 1997; Rathbun 
2011a; Wheeler 2009).6 Our study shows how historically rooted suspi-
cions regarding another’s intentions, together with the general feel of 
uncertainty stemming from the immediate geopolitical environment, can 
have decisive effects in generally trustful small- state relations where 
interdependencies between states are high. Indeed, there are myriad 
levels of trust and variations of trusting relationships in world politics: 
the potential beneﬁts of building trust are not only signiﬁcant in 
inherently conﬂictual dyads but can also play a major role for the 
security policy interests of states that have profoundly non- conﬂictual 
relationships.7
 Finally, Finnish–Swedish defence cooperation offers an interesting case 
illustrating what Keating and Ruzicka (2014, 22) describe as ‘complex 
relationships where trust varies across different issue areas’. Questions of 
national security policy seem to form a domain that can be separated 
historically from the wider bilateral issue areas such as questions of cul-
tural, social, and economic integration in Finnish–Swedish relations. 
Indeed, the case of building cooperation in the area of foreign and security 
policy and coordinating grand strategy at large between Finland and 
Sweden shows that there can be deeply rooted and historically sensitive 
sources of latent mistrust and other asymmetries within bilateral relations 
that are otherwise understood to be based on a high level of an institution-
alised, functional, and even mundane sense of reciprocal trust.
 The study applies qualitative content analysis to research material con-
sisting predominantly of statements and comments given by relevant 
foreign policy ﬁgures in Finland and Sweden. The outline of our chapter is 
the following. We ﬁrst introduce the theoretical contributions, followed by 
the presentation of the social- psychological standpoints of the study and 
further elaboration of the theoretical framework. Then, we brieﬂy review 
the October 1990 incident, before proceeding to an examination of con-
temporary defence cooperation between Finland and Sweden. Prior to 
exposing the latent misplaced trust in Sweden found in Finland, we con-
cisely evaluate trajectories within Sweden and in the Baltic Sea region that 
have resulted in the (re)appearance of mistrust among Finnish decision- 
makers and the Finnish political elite. Lastly, we sum up our arguments 
and ﬁndings, and suggest avenues for further research.
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Trust research in IR and its application to the relations 
between Finland and Sweden
We introduce three key conceptual distinctions that help to understand the 
dynamics of trust in the post- Cold War bilateral defence and security 
cooperation between Finland and Sweden. First, it is important to separate 
the general condition of distrust between states from the historically sens-
itive experiences of mistrust (or misplaced trust). Indeed, we suggest that a 
more profound understanding of the mistrust- distrust nexus is needed in 
IR trust research. Essentially, it is important to increase our understanding 
of how and where historical experiences of misplaced trust have evolved 
into full- blown distrust and where they have not.
 Second, we suggest that the distinction between experiences of betrayal 
and disappointment seems to be especially salient in the Finnish–Swedish 
case. Here we follow the lead of the trust researchers who have drawn a 
distinction between, on the one hand, conceptions of strategic trust 
inspired by the rational choice theory, in which a breach of trust leads to a 
more nonchalant and ‘calculated’ sense of disappointment, and, on the 
other, emotionally and morally loaded conceptions of general trustfulness 
and moral trust, in which a breach of trust leads to a sense of betrayal and 
a more comprehensive re- evaluation of the relationship itself (see Rathbun 
2011a, 2011b; Michel 2012).
 Finally, we claim that interstate trust should be understood as a complex 
phenomenon that can have competing manifestations even within a single 
interstate relationship. There can exist a high level of institutionalised trust 
within certain policy sectors between states A and B, but for some reason 
this mundane trust that characterises certain everyday practices does not 
translate into trust that would pervade the relationship at large – a situ-
ation we can clearly sense in the Finnish–Swedish case. In more general 
theoretical terms, this leads us to consider the idea of scaling trust along an 
axis that moves from minimal trust towards the ideal type of maximal 
trust among states (see Booth and Wheeler 2008, 230). But before we 
introduce these conceptual innovations, a few preparatory words are in 
order on the theoretical standpoints informing the different approaches to 
trust research in IR and the theoretical and analytical commitments our 
approach builds on.
Merging psychological and social approaches to 
international trust
There is no conclusive way to deﬁne trust in interstate relations. Ruzicka 
and Keating (2015), for example, trace three interrelated approaches to 
studying trust in IR – rationalist, social, and psychological paradigms. In 
an eclectic spirit (see Sil and Katzenstein 2010), we combine elements from 
both the social and psychological approaches in our analysis, rejecting the 
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consequentialist and deterministic formulations of trust derived from the 
rational- actor framework, developed in international settings by neoliberal 
institutionalists (see for example Keohane 1984; Kydd 2001). As Rathbun 
(2011b, 2) observes, in the rational institutionalist conceptualisation ‘trust 
emerges when [actors] have information that leads them to believe that 
speciﬁc others have a self- interest in reciprocating cooperation rather than 
violating their commitments’. We agree with Rathbun’s criticism of the 
rather counterintuitive idea proposed by the neoliberal institutionalists that 
cooperation starts from a state of distrust. Trust must precede cooperation 
and institution building.
 Instead of tracing the calculation of costs and beneﬁts in ‘mutually 
advantageous arrangements’, we opt to focus on the role of non- 
rationalistic and relational ‘variables’ relating to trust such as the burden 
of historical experiences and their stratiﬁcation into collective lessons 
(see for example Jervis 1976, 220–222; Rasmussen 2003; Snyder 1991, 
13–14; Weinhardt 2015). In social approaches to trust the ﬁduciary 
nature of trusting relationships supersedes the rational weighing of self- 
interests as the ultimate source of trust: a trusting relationship emerges 
from the ‘conﬁdence in expectations that others will “do what is right”, 
not (necessarily) from cool calculation of mutual beneﬁts’ (Ruzicka and 
Keating 2015, 16).
 Here the verb ‘to trust’ relates to being able to make a series of (gener-
ally successful) judgements about the other parties involved even where 
direct information on their intentions is scanty. Social trust is thus not 
understood as a situationally isolated moment of calculation of pros and 
cons but as ‘a belief that one will not be harmed when his or her fate is 
placed in the hands of the other’ (Rathbun 2011b, 10). Any sense of being 
exposed to opportunism should be transcended or suspended in a trusting 
relationship beyond the moments of isolated decisions. Indeed, to para-
phrase Rathbun (2011b, 11): ‘Trust is critical for cooperation when there 
is no simultaneous exchange for beneﬁts’ (see also Larson 1997, 19; 
Ruzicka and Keating 2015, 19).
Scaling trust – from minimal trust- as-reliance to a maximal sense 
of habitual trust
Although difﬁcult to establish in absolute terms, the scale of trustfulness 
can be imagined as going all the way from complete distrust (an example 
being the Soviet Union and the United States bilateral relationship during 
the early 1980s) to a habitual sense of trust- as-bond between states, reﬂect-
ing the Deutschian notion of ‘amalgamated security communities’ (Booth 
and Wheeler 2008, 184, 229; Deutsch 1957). For example, conﬁdence- 
building as a strategic instrument of enhancing predictability in order to 
avoid conﬂict between states implies a profound lack of trust. Michel 
(2012, 879), for example, labels this as mere reliance, juxtaposing it with a 
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praxeological sense of trust that ‘does not derive from a calculated 
deliberative process but describes an inarticulate disposition which mani-
fests itself in a social orientation with a strong moralistic element that 
carries an inarticulate belief about how others should behave’.
 The distinction between moral trust and mere reliance echoes Rathbun’s 
(2011a, 2011b, 3–6) distinction between generalised and strategic trust. 
According to Rathbun’s reading, inspired by social- psychological trust 
research and the work of Ulsaner, generalised trust, that is, ‘the belief that 
others are largely trustworthy’, differs from the institutionalists’ rationalis-
tic assumptions of international cooperation as a calculative mode of 
behaviour activated to cope with distrust. The idea of generalised trust, 
which Rathbun (2011a, 245) applies to the settings of multilateral 
cooperation, reverses the order of trust and cooperation: by deﬁnition, 
social trust must precede cooperation. Unlike strategic trust, general/social 
trust ‘allows actors to make more binding commitments and to reap the 
gains of cooperation without the protections that rationalism expects’.
 The crude dichotomy between generalised/moralistic trust and strategic 
trust/reliance shares features with Booth and Wheeler’s distinction between 
minimal (trust- as-predictability) and maximalist trust (trust- as-bond). For 
Booth and Wheeler (2008, 230), a minimal level of trust
exists when two or more actors, based on the mutual interpretation of 
each other’s attitudes and behavior, believe that the other(s) now and 
in the future, can be relied upon to desist from acting in ways that will 
be injurious to their interests and values.
In the maximalist conception of trust the goal of avoiding inﬂicting harm 
on the other is not enough. Instead, it requires more than functional 
cooperation, a sense of habitual care where the ‘actors mutually attempt to 
promote each other’s interests and values, including in circumstances that 
cannot be observed’ (ibid.). Minimal and maximal trust are, of course, 
ideal types, not empirical but analytical categories. We deploy the scale 
from minimal to maximal trust as a heuristic device to illustrate how 
experiences of misplaced trust can linger on even where bilateral relations 
between the states are highly functional as a whole.
 To return to the Finnish–Swedish case, the discussion on the possibility 
that Sweden could once again leave Finland high and dry revolves around 
the question whether Sweden might apply for NATO membership alone 
without consulting Finland properly before making such a move. Interest-
ingly, as we point out later in this chapter, the foreign policy elite in both 
states have recently made reassuring comments, highlighting the interde-
pendence between the states in the area of security policy. From the per-
spective of moralistic/maximalistic trust, however, this signals that there 
are at least doubts as to whether Sweden will take Finnish interests into 
consideration in making its key national security decisions. In this respect, 
Trust in International Relations : Rationalist, Constructivist, and Psychological Approaches, edited by Hiski Haukkala, et al., Taylor
         and Francis, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/tampere/detail.action?docID=5306793.
Created from tampere on 2018-03-05 01:14:31.
C
o
p
y
ri
g
h
t 
©
 2
0
1
8
. 
T
a
y
lo
r 
a
n
d
 F
ra
n
c
is
. 
A
ll 
ri
g
h
ts
 r
e
s
e
rv
e
d
.
Mistrust within trust  135
where security policy is concerned, the relationship between Finland and 
Sweden does not fulﬁl Booth and Wheeler’s deﬁnition of maximal 
(habitual) trust or Michel’s notion of phronetic trust.
 Indeed, there are constant suspicious voices in the Finnish public debate 
on whether Sweden will commit itself fully to the promotion of both coun-
tries’ interests and values.8 More speciﬁcally, we go on to claim that the 
case of Finnish–Swedish defence cooperation and Finland’s experience of 
misplaced trust in 1990 indicate how important a role historical precedents 
and learned lessons can play in trust building. At the same time, it should 
be acknowledged that the maximalist reading of trust as an all- 
encompassing moralistic disposition has difﬁculties when it comes to 
explaining why the wider framework of bilateral relations between Finland 
and Sweden is clearly based on a high level of conﬁdence and everyday 
cooperation. In this respect, the signiﬁcance of the aforementioned histor-
ical experience of misplaced trust should also be interpreted against what 
we term, following Deborah Welch Larson (1997, 714), the overall expec-
tation of benevolent intentions in the bilateral relations as a whole. As 
Larson (ibid., 714–715) argues:
This form of trust need not correspond with credibility; the other 
person may not keep all her promises and undertakings toward us, 
because of competing demands, or circumstances beyond her control, 
but we nevertheless trust her because her actions and words are well- 
intended. Similarly, we may trust another state because we believe that 
it has fairly benign intentions and will not take advantage of use 
(emphasis added).
The problem here, however, is that this kind of relationship should be 
based on the idea that any conﬂicts of interests between the two states 
‘should concern only minor issues’ (ibid.). From the perspective of small 
states, the future orientation of one’s foreign and security policy is not a 
‘minor issue’,9 but a core matter of national interests. And if, in the present 
case, we agree that the fates of the national security policies of Finland and 
Sweden – two small states – are intertwined, the level of trust speciﬁcally 
perceived within the realm of security becomes a deﬁning element in rela-
tion to the expectations of benevolent intentions in the states’ bilateral 
relations as a whole. As Larson suggests (ibid., 709):
More trust is needed for large decisions, where the potential losses 
from betrayal would be devastating […] the extent to which states 
must trust each other to enter into an international agreement depends 
on how catastrophic would be the consequences of betrayal […]. 
Agreements affecting the relative balance of military power between 
two states require more trust than cultural exchanges.
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Historical experience of misplaced trust and centrality of 
promises – disappointment or betrayal?
Honouring promises and obligations indeed proves to be an important 
element in the Swedish–Finnish case. It was, as the popular sentiment in 
Finland suggests, the informal agreement not to surprise its neighbour to 
the east in terms of foreign policy that Sweden ‘broke’ when announcing it 
intended to apply for EC membership in autumn 1990 without informing 
the Finnish foreign policy elite of its intentions beforehand. According to 
Ruzicka and Wheeler (2010, 73; see also Nicolaïdis 2007), who follow 
Martin Hollis, ‘[t]he binding approach to trust rests on the notion that 
actors will honour their promises’. Moreover, as Ruzicka and Keating 
(2015, 17) suggest, ‘a trusting relationship […] leads states not to hedge 
against the potentially negative consequences of other’s actions because 
such actions are cognitively considered to be zero’. In the following obser-
vation, one particularly salient to the case at hand, Hoffmann (2002, 394) 
expresses how important honouring obligations seems to be in maintaining 
a trusting relationship:
Trusting relationships are behavioral manifestations of trust. They 
emerge when actors leave the fate of their interests to the discretion of 
others with the expectation that those actors will honor their obliga-
tion to avoid using their discretion in a manner harmful to the ﬁrst.
 Moreover, the scope of actions and decisions that can lead to injurious 
consequences in small- state relations is not exhausted on issues of war and 
peace. Small states play a different game from that played by great powers, 
especially when it comes to deﬁning what is and what is not a matter of 
core national interest (see for example Elman 1995; Hey 2003). The point 
here is to problematise what ‘injurious effect’ means and how it can have 
different manifestations in different contexts, whether they are measured 
against great power politics, asymmetric power relations, or symmetrical 
relations between small states. Even within the context of peaceful and 
trustful relations between small states A and B, a unilateral decision made 
by state A – a decision that need not even be directed against state B – can 
have injurious consequences for the latter and weaken the trust between 
the states.
 We suggest, as the case at hand shows, that it is important to make a 
distinction between a sense of disappointment and of betrayal. According 
to Michel (2012, 881), a sense of disappointment ‘can be caused by both 
animate and inanimate entities in response to a speciﬁc let- down following 
a rational and conscious process of decision- making after […] which we 
decide to rely on someone or something’. Understood in this way, a feeling 
of disappointment follows when calculated strategic reliance is somehow 
misplaced or broken. It might not affect the fundamental feeling of 
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trustfulness felt by actor B towards actor A. The feeling of being betrayed, 
on the other hand, indicates that a deeper, more profound trusting rela-
tionship has been undermined: ‘[T]he experience of betrayal is attached to 
a moral judgment about the respective other as compared to a strategic 
judgment in cases of reliance’ (ibid.). Moreover,
the experience in cases where our normative belief in the trustworthi-
ness of the other is violated, that is, in cases of betrayal, the form of 
harm we suffer exceeds disappointment qualitatively as it involves a 
deeper emotional as well as existential challenge.
(Ibid., 882)
 The question remains whether the Finnish experience of misplaced 
trust in autumn 1990 would fulﬁl the description of either disappoint-
ment or betrayal. And against the present puzzle, we might ask whether 
the incremental deepening of the Swedish–Finnish security policy 
cooperation amidst the Ukraine crisis is used as a mere hedging strategy, 
or whether we should see it as an indicator of a genuinely (morally) 
trusting relationship at work. Our analysis suggests that the level of 
trustfulness between Finland and Sweden in matters of defence and 
security policy has only reached a rather minimal level. If the experience 
in October 1990 (and the reiteration of this experience as a common 
narrative) falls into the category of being betrayed, this indicates that the 
Finnish foreign policy elite did not have any prior ‘strategically held 
reservations’ before Sweden ‘broke’ its promise in autumn 1990, in 
which case the experience can be seen as signalling a more serious 
rupture in the states’ bilateral relations.
 Here we can discern that the ability of at least some members of the 
Finnish foreign policy elite to brush aside a latent and historical source of 
mistrust might be crucial even for the fate of bilateral relations between 
Finland and Sweden as a whole. Moreover, the stakes of reaching an agree-
ment on these terms are even higher amidst the post- Ukraine crisis geopo-
litical environment in the Baltic Sea area. The inability to mitigate this 
predicament would echo what Larson (1997, 702) describes in her social- 
psychological reading of interstate trust as ‘a missed opportunity for agree-
ment’10 (see also Rathbun 2011a, 246, 2011b, 5).
‘The seed of mistrust’ was sown: October 1990 and 
Sweden’s EC announcement
The good relations between the neighbours almost broke down 
because Sweden played a two- faced game: ﬁrst by concealing its inten-
tions, then by betraying the promises given to Finland and ﬁnally by 
trying to sneak into the EC. This was the sentiment held by the Finnish 
state leaders, president and cabinet. Sweden’s chicanery has left its 
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mark on our national memory; it is an event that is always brought up 
when friction emerges between the neighbours.11
(Hämäläinen 2015)
The quotation above is taken from Unto Hämäläinen, an eminent Finnish 
journalist and popular historian who analysed the October 1990 debacle 
in which Sweden announced its intentions to apply for membership in the 
EC. In his article, Hämäläinen traced the Finnish foreign policy elite’s sen-
timents regarding Sweden’s surprise decision in late October 1990 using 
material in the archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. His somewhat 
unnecessary mystiﬁcation of the classiﬁed archival material aside, 
Hämäläinen corroborated the popular understanding that Sweden indeed 
seemed to have taken Finnish foreign policy elite by surprise, although the 
surprise was not as total as the popular memory in Finland seems to 
suggest.
 Helsinki in fact knew that something was going on in Sweden. Finnish 
diplomats informed Finnish state leaders of Sweden’s internal discussions 
throughout the summer and early autumn in 1990. The general expecta-
tion was that the Social Democratic government of Sweden was preparing 
to announce its plan to apply for EC membership soon.12 Pressure from 
industry and commerce on the Social Democrats was especially high and 
widely known in Finland (Blomberg 2011, 213).
 In addition, Finnish foreign policy commentators, such as Max 
Jakobson, a renowned former diplomat, took note of the evolving opinion 
and process in the neighbouring country in his much- read op- eds (see e.g. 
Wahlbäck 2011). If Sweden’s tendency towards unilateralism as such did 
not come as a major surprise, the fact that it did not even keep its promise 
to inform Finland before making the announcement got under the skin of 
the Finnish foreign policy elite, especially the then- President Mauno 
Koivisto. The Finnish foreign policy elite felt that Sweden had jumped the 
gun (Jakobson 2003, 367–372).
 Sweden had promised Finland that it would continue the negotiations 
on establishing the European Economic Area (EEA) between the EC and 
the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) – an initiative by the then- president 
of the European Commission Jacques Delors. The Finnish foreign policy 
elite, in particular President Koivisto, prioritised EEA negotiations over the 
EC membership process. According to his memoirs, Koivisto felt strongly 
that the process would involve too many uncertainties, although Koivisto’s 
discussions with François Mitterrand earlier the same year indicated that 
the prospects of the EEA negotiations were also perceived somewhat pessi-
mistically by the Finnish president (Koivisto 1995, 517–529).
 Moreover, even though Austria had already applied for EC membership 
in 1989, Finnish bilateral relations and commitments vis- à-vis the Soviet 
Union remained an obstacle, notwithstanding the constant decline of the 
eastern superpower. The proximity of the Soviet Union, even if badly 
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crippled, as well as the ofﬁcial Finnish policy of peacetime neutrality, 
reinforced these tendencies towards self- restraint when it came to choosing 
the appropriate strategy for western integration in 1990.
 Things looked very different from Sweden, where the tide started to 
turn in favour of the EC track. The Swedish government, led by the Social 
Democrats, came under increasing pressure by the Liberals and the Conser-
vatives, especially after their respective leaders Bengt Westerberg and Carl 
Bildt announced already in May 1990 that they would make EC member-
ship a theme in their forthcoming election campaign in autumn 1991. 
Together with the deteriorating economic situation, the domestic political 
pressure towards the Social Democratic government pushed Ingvar 
Carlsson’s government to hasten the prospects of EC membership, eventu-
ally leading to the ‘shock’ announcement on 26 October 1990 (Blomberg 
2011, 213).
 Koivisto was left shell- shocked when the information on Sweden’s 
breakaway reached him. It was a ‘complete surprise’, as Koivisto (1995, 
522) describes his sentiments in his memoirs. Koivisto made his disap-
pointment known in his emblematic and discreet style. In an interview 
given immediately after hearing about Sweden’s actions, he contemplated 
Sweden’s break with tradition in the Nordic cooperation whereby states 
give one another an opportunity to express their views when it comes to 
making statements on matters of shared interests so ‘that we would not be 
forced to face a fait accompli time after time’. Koivisto continued by noting 
that it would be desirable, considering that it had just been agreed in the 
EEA negotiations, that promises made on how to proceed would be kept.
 In other words, Koivisto’s initial reactions implied that Sweden had not 
only broken a promise but also fundamental tacit rules, or codes of 
conduct, among the Nordic countries on how to proceed in such matters. 
The sense of betrayal and its later social stratiﬁcation to the Finnish foreign 
policy discourse thus had personal and individual origins, something the 
psychological approach to trust would emphasise. On the other hand, to 
understand the later depth and signiﬁcance of the experience of misplaced 
trust on the collective level, one should take into account the wider cul-
tural context – shared social norms and expectations between the two 
Nordic countries – in a way that also incorporates a constructivist under-
standing of the conditions of trust into the analysis.
 The Finnish experience of misplaced trust seems imminent. Eventually, 
Finland and Sweden joined the European Union (EU) hand in hand in 1995. 
But this clearly did not do enough to dispel the underlying and latent sense 
of mistrust in Finland. As Jaakko Blomberg (2011, 214), head of the Foreign 
Ministry’s political department in 1990, recalls in his memoirs regarding the 
overall mood in Finland, the true lesson of Sweden’s behaviour was to think 
about international politics increasingly from the perspective of pure self- 
interest. This was especially true inasmuch as it had become apparent that 
‘one could not trust that others would care about us’.
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 Thus, the experience of October 1990 was more than a blow to what 
could be deﬁned as strategic trust and a sense of reliance on functional 
cooperation with Sweden. The blow evidently penetrated deep, implying 
that Finland had invested a high amount of generalised/moralistic trust 
into the countries’ bilateral relations with Sweden in 1990. Indeed, reliance 
came to be seen more as a challenge than as a solution. It is in this context 
that any parallels with the events of October 1990 and the experience of 
misplaced trust during the Ukraine crisis should be understood.
Bilateral defence cooperation in a security community
As we have described in our introduction, the Nordic countries, including 
Finland and Sweden, often serve as a standard example of a security com-
munity where the predictability of peace and degree of integration are high 
and where mutual contacts on different levels of society are abundant (see 
e.g. Waever 1998, 72; Wiberg 2000, 133–135). The common labour 
market and language community, cultural afﬁnities, cooperation in taxa-
tion, and the agreement on social security, inter alia, facilitate close norm- 
and rule- based interaction on the ofﬁcial level and, also, between civil 
societies and individuals. In short: the elements of identiﬁcation- based trust 
between Finland and Sweden are strong.
 Despite the extremely close relations, practical cooperation in security 
and defence policy is a rather new ﬁeld for Finland and Sweden. During 
the Cold War both took active part in the United Nations’ (UN) peace-
keeping efforts and, along with other Nordic countries, endeavoured to 
ﬁnd ways to coordinate their policies and ﬁnd beneﬁts on the ground (see 
e.g. Forsberg 2013). Yet, this cooperation did not incorporate territorial 
defence or any other integral area of national security. For Finland, abiding 
by absolute sovereignty and autonomy in national security was considered 
sacred (see Möttölä 1982). Sweden again cherished its alliansfrihet, while 
nevertheless cooperating closely with the United States (Holmström 2009).
 For Finland, geographical location, namely proximity to the Soviet 
Union, mattered greatly. Although both countries pursued policies of 
neutrality, albeit with different variants (see Karsh 1988), there was not 
enough common ground for substantial cooperation on security, since their 
standpoints were so different (Forsberg and Vaahtoranta 2001). As Max 
Jakobson (1983; see also 1980, 97–98) has aptly described the differences 
between Swedish high- proﬁle and Finnish low- proﬁle neutrality, Sweden 
could afford to feed its people the caviar of moralising foreign policy, 
whereas Finland forced its citizens to swallow the oatmeal of realpolitik.
 The end of the Cold War opened up new possibilities in Nordic defence 
cooperation. The nature of neutrality changed and was eventually replaced 
by a much less restrictive policy of military non- alignment in both Sweden 
and Finland. Until the end of the 2000s this cooperation encompassed 
rather low- key issue areas such as peace education and training. Financial 
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difﬁculties at the end of the decade changed the name of the game; nations 
in Europe, allied and non- allied alike, had to reconsider how to make the 
most of the available resources in an era of shrinking defence budgets. The 
time was ripe for initiatives such as Smart Defence within NATO or 
Pooling and Sharing within the EU. Cost- efﬁciency became a guiding prin-
ciple of the Nordic collaboration as well.
 In 2009, the NORDEFCO was established, bringing the existing forms 
of cooperation under one umbrella. The initiative encompasses all ﬁve 
Nordic countries, and it has ﬁve cooperation areas: capabilities, human 
resources and education, operations, armaments and training and exercises 
(NORDEFCO 2017). Cooperation has yielded new results. One well- 
known achievement is the cross- border training (CBT) between the 
Finnish, Swedish, and Norwegian air forces, in which ﬁghter jets convene 
in joint exercises in the High North on a weekly basis, utilising the air 
spaces of all the three countries.
 However, due to different defence choices, robust and deeper 
cooperation between all ﬁve states has not made headway. The allied 
Nordic countries, Norway and Denmark at the forefront, have little reason 
and interest to extend Nordic cooperation. Since 2013, at least in the 
Finnish debate, Nordic defence cooperation has predominantly referred to 
bilateral cooperation with Sweden, and it is ‘the Stockholm way’ where the 
most promising opportunities lie (Valtioneuvosto 2017). Indeed, through-
out the last decade it has become clear that Sweden and Finland are 
increasingly in the same boat in terms of their national security concerns. 
Back in 2008, Foreign Minister Ilkka Kanerva stated that Finland and 
Sweden should make focal foreign policy decisions hand in hand, while 
Swedish Defence Minister Sven Tolgfors endorsed Kanerva’s statement by 
underscoring that Sweden would not join NATO without Finland joining 
as well (Giles and Eskola 2009, 23).
 One of the most striking features of Finnish–Swedish defence cooperation 
– distinct from the outset – has been its practicality. For quite some time, the 
main and exclusive driver was cost- efﬁciency. Hence, Nordic cooperation 
has not been threat- driven, and the Russian menace did not play a signiﬁcant 
role in pushing the states to cooperate until the overall security situation in 
Europe became aggravated in 2014. The fact that two states are cooperating 
does not yet indicate that a trusting relationship exists, at least in the 
phronetic sense of the term presented earlier (Keating and Ruzicka 2014, 
758; Michel 2012). As we will soon point out, there are clear signs in the 
Finnish public debate of latent mistrust as regards to collaborating with the 
western neighbour on defence policy. This mistrust and its signiﬁcance has 
already been identiﬁed by Finnish security policy commentators. Salonius- 
Pasternak (2014, 6) has pointed out that trust in defence cooperation 
between Sweden and Finland is in short supply.
 In addition, a well- known Finnish journalist Olli Ainola (2015) has 
stressed the signiﬁcance of trust, or rather the lack of it, in Finnish–Swedish 
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defence cooperation. Ainola suggests that both the Finnish and Swedish 
foreign policy elites should trust each other if the states are to cooperate 
not only in time of peace but also in time of crisis. The tentative and incre-
mental style of the defence cooperation implies a shortfall of trust (cf. 
Michel 2012, 873; Wheeler 2009). Indeed, the small steps taken regarding 
defence cooperation may indicate that proceeding in an incremental 
manner is itself a (strategic) trust- building exercise. Recent reassuring com-
ments made by the Finnish and Swedish politicians in this context, 
analysed in the next section, further corroborates this conclusion.
 Then again, the negotiations on the evolving defence cooperation 
between the two states have thus far proceeded without major disagree-
ments, implicating an underlying sense of trustworthiness. A good track- 
record, even incremental in nature, might not only erase the experiences of 
mistrust but also ignite a positive spiral of deepening partnership, echoing 
Rathbun’s (2011b, 12) idea of the reciprocity circle of social trust. On the 
other hand, for Finland, deepening cooperation on security policy is not 
taken for granted given the historical policies of autonomy, and for Sweden 
new commitments in the East would indeed indicate a profound reorienta-
tion from ’The Policy of 1812’, that is, nearly 200 years of alliansfrihet.
Minimal trust in defence cooperation
Swedish defence policy and the Russian aggression: implications 
for bilateral cooperation
In order to understand what created circumstances for mistrust to surface 
in Finland, one must pay attention not only to the aggravated state of 
affairs in the Baltic Sea area but also to the impact of domestic trajectories 
in Sweden that played a signiﬁcant role also in Sweden’s decision in 
autumn 1990. At the end of the year 2012, the then commander- in-chief 
of Swedish Defence Forces Sverker Göranson dropped a bombshell. 
According to Göranson, Sweden would have been able to stand its ground 
and defend itself for only a week should it encounter military aggression 
(Holmström 2012).
 The statement was given against the backdrop of defence reforms where 
Sweden considerably scaled down its conventional military capabilities and 
discontinued conscription in favour of recruiting professional defence 
forces. These decisions were a logical continuation of Sweden’s post- Cold 
War defence policy, which has put an emphasis on expeditionary opera-
tions instead of old- school territorial defence, the latter being one of the 
cornerstones of the Finnish defence policy.
 More fuel was added to the ﬁre in the spring of 2013, when Russia 
allegedly carried out a simulated nuclear attack on Stockholm in the early 
hours of Good Friday. Swedish planes were not prepared, and eventually 
Danish ﬁghter jets from Lithuania were sent out to intercept the Russian 
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planes conducting the manoeuvre (Holmström 2016). Various incidents 
kept occurring in the Baltic Sea region (see Frear et al. 2014), and in 
August 2014 Sweden hunted an assumed Russian submarine in the Stock-
holm archipelago. No intruder was found, but commander Göranson was 
‘convinced’ that a foreign submarine had indeed violated Swedish territory 
(The Local 2015).
 The cases cited are the result of increased Russian assertiveness in Euro-
pean and global politics. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the Ukraine 
crisis at large have been a game changer in the post- Cold War European 
security architecture. In his annual New Year’s speech in 2016, Finnish 
President Sauli Niinistö (2016) stated that ‘Russia’s reprehensible actions 
in Crimea and Ukraine disrupted our oasis of peace’, referring to the Baltic 
Sea area. The disruption has not gone unnoticed in security policy debates 
in Finland and Sweden or elsewhere in security policy communities. Rather 
intense speculation has begun among security policy experts as to whether 
Helsinki and Stockholm will discard the policy of military non- alignment 
and apply for NATO membership, and arguments have been put forward 
for and against Finland’s and Sweden’s membership (see e.g. Bertelman 
2015; Braw 2015; Dempsey 2014; Gay 2015; Giraudo 2014; Lucas 2015; 
Moreland 2015; Seip 2015).
 In Finland, public opinion has remained critical of NATO membership 
irrespective of Russia’s actions (see e.g. Forsberg and Pesu 2017). Support 
for membership has not surged. The foreign policy leadership has also 
underscored that, for the time being, Finland will remain outside NATO, 
maintaining the possibility of military alignment in the future (Valtio -
neuvosto 2016, 19). Sweden’s ofﬁcial policy, on the other hand, is even 
more explicit in that it intends to postpone NATO membership during the 
current government’s term. However, the centre- right opposition now 
unanimously advocates Sweden joining (Dahl 2017, 84; Reuters 2015b). 
Hence, the ruling Social Democratic Party is the gatekeeper as regards 
Swedish NATO membership application.
 To top it all off, Swedish public opinion is more positive toward military 
alignment, and some recent polls have indicated that there are more 
Swedes supporting than opposing the country’s NATO membership (Milne 
2014). In liberal democracies, public opinion tends to matter in foreign 
policy if certain conditions are met (see e.g. Davis 2012; Foyle 1997; Risse- 
Kappen 1991). Therefore, the trajectory of public opinion understandably 
sparks speculation concerning Sweden’s future actions.
 The turbulent environment has given an extra boost to defence 
cooperation – between Finland and Sweden and in Norden at large. In 
May 2014, Finland and Sweden took considerable steps forward in their 
partnership when Defence Ministers Carl Haglund and Karin Enström 
signed an action plan outlining how the two countries should deepen 
cooperation. Several possible areas for bilateral cooperation were identi-
ﬁed, including enhancing the interaction between the defence ministries 
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and exploring the possibilities to deepen cooperation between the coun-
tries’ navies, armies, and air forces. The ﬁnal reports, made in accordance 
with the action plan, were published in February 2015. According to the 
report by the Defence Forces of Finland and Sweden,
[T]he long term commitment to deepened defence cooperation between 
Finland and Sweden aims for better security in a regional context and 
strives for the better use of resources and cost- efﬁciency in defence- 
related areas. Furthermore, the cooperation increases interoperability 
and the capability to act jointly both domestically and internationally.
(Swedish Defence Forces and Finnish Defence Forces 2015, 2)
Again, many opportunities for cooperation were recognised – most notably 
the combined units of the navies and air forces that had been mentioned in 
the 2014 action plan. The report also stated that cooperation is a ‘signi-
ﬁcant signal for the surrounding region’. It also suggested the countries 
should study the possibility of extending cooperation to cover not only 
peacetime but times of crisis as well (ibid.). This argument was reiterated 
in a joint op- ed written by the Prime Minister of Finland Juha Sipilä and 
his Swedish colleague Stefan Löfven in winter 2016 (Sipilä and Löfven 
2016). Along with the report, there are other indications of increased 
ambition as regards the partnership between Helsinki and Stockholm.
 A possible defence alliance looms on the horizon. For example, 
Finland’s Defence Minister Jussi Niinistö has argued that the possibility of 
an alliance between Finland and Sweden should not be excluded (Iltalehti 
2016). The former and the longest- serving foreign minister in the history 
of Finland Erkki Tuomioja also expressed the same opinion, although he 
did not see the alliance as a realistic possibility at the time (Uusi Suomi 
2015). In Sweden, the chair of the Defence Committee, Allan Widman, has 
advocated the idea of a defence alliance, but in Finland enthusiasm seems 
generally higher.
 When it comes to the changed reality in the region, the Nordic countries 
have also reacted on the multilateral level encompassing all ﬁve states. In 
an opinion piece and joint declaration published in various Nordic news-
papers and signed by the defence ministers of the Nordic countries in April 
2015, the ministers made known their respective countries’ readiness to 
deepen cooperation in the face of Russia’s aggressive policies. For the ﬁrst 
time, Nordic defence cooperation publicly echoed deterrence against 
Russia and cooperation was no longer merely a pragmatic way to achieve 
cost- effectiveness (Reuters 2015a).
 To sum up the recent developments in defence cooperation between 
Finland and Sweden, one could argue that both the stakes and the level of 
ambition are higher than ever, and collaboration has become an integral part 
of Finland’s and Sweden’s national security policies. There is a will to 
proceed in tandem, and cooperation is not only a matter of cost- effectiveness 
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in a time of austerity but also one of reacting to the worrisome and worsened 
state of affairs in the Baltic Sea region. The increased stakes and ambitions 
also mean that if they are to go forward on the road of defence partnership, 
Sweden and Finland need to build trust, as has already been suggested.
The ‘lesson’ of October 1990 as an indicator of misplaced trust
Instability in the security environment and uncertainty stemming from the 
domestic debate as regards Swedish foreign and security policy moves have 
brought back the bitter memories of October 1990 in Finland. The recol-
lection is evident when one examines various statements in Finnish foreign 
policy discourse suggesting that the present situation is analogous to that 
which prevailed in 1990. Several foreign affairs notables have voiced their 
concern that Sweden might desert what thus far has been fruitful bilateral 
cooperation and seek security guarantees from NATO without consulting 
Finland. A peculiar feature of the analogy is that it is invoked rather 
latently; the memories of the lesson from October 1990 seem to loom in 
the background.
 The case of trust between Finland and Sweden differs greatly from the 
stakes at hand in superpower relations, where actions fuelled by distrust 
might lead to consequences threatening the existence of humankind. In the 
case of Finland and Sweden, the stakes of possible disappointment or 
betrayal are not weighed in a context of mutual hostility and conﬂict. 
Instead, being betrayed means facing the possible negative repercussions 
for security policy of being abandoned by the other state should it make a 
unilateral move to reorient its foreign policy. However, the relevant 
Finnish stakeholders are aware that the future of Fenno- Swedish 
cooperation is integral to Finnish national interests and that Sweden’s 
feared jumping the gun or unexpected foreign policy reappraisal might 
have even more direct security policy implications than the rather optim-
istic race towards European integration in the early 1990s.13
 Mistrust towards Sweden, usually hidden in the analogy of the 1990 EC 
incident, is easily observable in the Finnish foreign policy discourse. 
According to former defence minister and leader of the Swedish People’s 
Party of Finland Carl Haglund, for example, Sweden might apply for 
NATO membership soon and if it did, Finland would ﬁnd itself in a posi-
tion similar to that in 1990, when Stockholm ‘rather surprisingly’ decided 
to announce its EU bid (Iltalehti 2015). The former chair of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee and a Member of Parliament Pertti Salolainen, who 
personally experienced the October 1990 as a member of the Finnish 
foreign policy decision- making elite, has again implied that Sweden’s posi-
tion towards NATO could turn unexpectedly if the country’s Social Demo-
crats change their foreign policy orientation (Suomenmaa 2015). Alpo Rusi 
(2015), a former ambassador and professor, has also joined the chorus by 
warning that the pro- NATO stance of the Swedish centre- right opposition 
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may soon spill over into the left–green government, bringing about the 
anticipated change in Sweden’s position on NATO membership.
 Moreover, the various reassuring statements being made signal that the 
issue troubles not only heavyweights and pundits but also incumbents. 
When Finland’s Prime Minister Juha Sipilä paid his ﬁrst ofﬁcial visit to 
Stockholm in June 2015, he reassured all concerned that Sweden and 
Finland have agreed not to surprise each other regarding NATO and that 
Helsinki and Stockholm will keep one another informed on matters of 
foreign policy. In the same breath, he asserted that Finland would refrain 
from any unexpected actions in terms of foreign policy (Yle Uutiset 
2015b). Sipilä’s assertion can be seen as an effort to reinforce certain social 
norms between Finland and Sweden. An understanding of the social pre-
requisites for a trusting relationship are clearly present in Sipilä’s concerns; 
enhancing predictability is seen as a virtue in the present uncertain security 
environment.
 In June 2015 during his visit to Sweden, the new Defence Minister Jussi 
Niinistö underscored that if Finland and Sweden ever joined NATO, it 
would be ‘natural’ to do so hand in hand (Helsingin Sanomat 2015a). 
However, Niinistö has since stated that Finland should ‘unceasingly’ 
monitor what Stockholm is up to in its relations with the United States and 
NATO and that it is not self- evident that Finland and Sweden would 
submit their applications to Brussels simultaneously. To avoid any sur-
prises concerning NATO, Finland and Sweden have decided to keep each 
other up to date and, according to Niinistö, the parties have better chances 
of doing so today than in 1990 (Helsingin Sanomat 2015b).
 The Finnish media’s role in invoking the lesson of October 1990 and 
hence reproducing the ‘mistrust narrative’ cannot be underestimated. For 
instance, former Prime Minister Alexander Stubb was once asked in a live 
interview to predict what his reaction and subsequent policies would be 
should Sweden catch Finland off guard by announcing its NATO bid (Yle 
Uutiset 2015a). The article by Unto Hämäläinen, mentioned earlier, is an 
example of the reproduction of the mistrust narrative through overt specu-
lation that Sweden might take Finland by surprise yet again (Hämäläinen 
2015). The most widely circulated daily newspaper Helsingin Sanomat 
(2016) has also speculated, in direct reference to October 1990, whether ‘a 
surprise from the other side of the Gulf ’ is due in the near future.
 The Finnish discourse of mistrust has not gone unnoticed across the Gulf 
of Bothnia. In the annual Folk och Försvar defence conference in Sälen in 
January 2016, Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström recognised Fin-
land’s anxiety. However, she pleaded for military non- alignment as the best 
way to uphold the balance in the Baltic Sea area and reassured Finland that 
Sweden’s existing foreign policy line will hold fast – irrespective of the 
worsened state of affairs in its security environment. In addition, Wallström 
referred to the joint op- ed of the Finnish and Swedish prime ministers, pub-
lished just before the conference, as an act of alleviating suspicions.
Trust in International Relations : Rationalist, Constructivist, and Psychological Approaches, edited by Hiski Haukkala, et al., Taylor
         and Francis, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/tampere/detail.action?docID=5306793.
Created from tampere on 2018-03-05 01:14:31.
C
o
p
y
ri
g
h
t 
©
 2
0
1
8
. 
T
a
y
lo
r 
a
n
d
 F
ra
n
c
is
. 
A
ll 
ri
g
h
ts
 r
e
s
e
rv
e
d
.
Mistrust within trust  147
 In the piece, Prime Ministers Sipilä and Löfven emphasised the feasib-
ility of non- alignment and ever- deepening cooperation and information 
sharing between the militarily non- aligned Nordic countries (Hufvudstads-
bladet 2016; Sipilä and Löfven 2016). Moreover, in autumn 2016, Prime 
Minister Löfven himself, echoing Wallström, underlined that Sweden rules 
out such a surprise move, and further highlighted that a change in the 
Swedish foreign policy line would be irresponsible and would bring about 
a change in the status quo (Ilta- Sanomat 2016). The message from Sweden 
to Finland was once more ampliﬁed later on in autumn 2016 when 
Defence Minister Peter Hultqvist strongly emphasised that his nation’s 
NATO membership is not in the cards (Helsingin Sanomat 2016).
 What is important to note here is that Wallström’s, Löfven’s, and 
Hultqvist’s comments can be interpreted as reassuring signals towards 
Finland, implicitly reminding it of the unresolved historically rooted suspi-
cions. The level of trust between Helsinki and Stockholm, at least in the 
moralistic/maximalist sense proposed by Michel, Booth, and Wheeler, is 
not as high as it could be. This does not imply that the relationship as a 
whole would be distrustful, but the puzzle remains of how to explain the 
latent experience of misplaced trust within a generally trustful partnership.
 The fact that the experience of misplaced trust in 1990 pops up recur-
rently in the Finnish debate is not that surprising if one considers how heu-
ristically strong historical analogies, lessons, and myths generally are in 
world politics (see especially Rasmussen 2003 and Juntunen 2017). There 
are superﬁcial similarities between the present and the latter days of the 
Cold War – namely an unsettled security environment inciting delibera-
tions regarding the feasibility of existing foreign policies. Moreover, in the 
2010s, Sweden is once again being governed by the Social Democrats, and 
it has an opposition challenging the present foreign policy line.
 At the beginning of the 1990s, Sweden went through economic dif-
ﬁculties. This time, Stockholm has encountered a national security chal-
lenge in terms of capabilities. In addition to exhibiting a number of 
parallels with the present, the incident of October 1990 is a recent episode, 
and therefore it is rather available to the generation of Finnish politicians 
in power now. But there are also differences: whereas in 1990 the dilemma 
was essentially ’positive’ in nature – a European- wide race towards western 
integration – the present case, marked by the Ukraine crisis and Russia’s 
provocative behaviour, is even more about leaving a friend out in the cold.
 What do all these statements tell us about the trusting relationship 
between Finland and Sweden? It gives the impression that Finnish foreign 
policy elites cannot exclude the possibility of Sweden potentially acting 
against Finnish interests. Thus, following Michel’s reading of trust as a 
moralistic commitment, we should contest the idea that there is a habitual 
sense of trust at work in Swedish–Finnish bilateral national security 
cooperation. Rather, the pragmatic and incremental step- by-step progress 
made in the defence cooperation in recent years points towards strategic 
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trust- building efforts to mitigate the lack of trust in the sphere of national 
security using the ‘social trust capital’ inherited from the wider 
identiﬁcation- based framework and expectations of benevolent intentions 
between the states. Indeed, the Finnish–Swedish case shows that trust can 
be understood both as a result or objective of cooperation (to overcome 
historically stratiﬁed mistrust within a certain policy area) and as a con-
dition for cooperation (in the form of a general affective identity relation-
ship between the collective units) at the same time (Weinhardt 2015, 
32–35; see also Möllering 2006, 79).
Conclusion
[B]ecause the amount of trust required for an agreement varies, states 
can overcome the barrier of mutual suspicions by starting with small 
agreements where less is at stake so that each state can test the other’s 
intentions without putting too much at risk. In this way, states can 
acquire more information about the other’s values and reliability, 
before they move on to riskier agreements.
(Larson 1997, 716)
As regards to questions of national security, the overall framework in 
Finland seems to start from the appreciation of the social prerequisites and 
the overall value of identiﬁcation- based trust with Sweden. This sense of 
trust and its social value is overshadowed by the shared and mediated 
experience of misplaced trust dating back to October 1990, thus implying 
that there is also a psychological dimension at work in the Finnish percep-
tion of cooperation with Sweden. Indeed, the gradually evolving style of 
the countries’ defence cooperation – visible in the way it has concentrated 
on building peacetime defence interoperability and coordination – indicates 
that there are background suspicions and issues that affect the depth and 
pace of the cooperation.
 Moreover, the way in which the scope of this cooperation has been 
incrementally but constantly widened might be interpreted as a trust- 
building exercise in itself, at least on Finland’s part. Therefore, the ques-
tion is not about pre- existing trust but (strategic) trust built in piecemeal 
fashion. It is interesting to note that in the above quotation Larson, 
together with the majority of trust researchers in IR it seems, mainly 
focuses on the nature of trust building in dyads that can be easily described 
as hostile or otherwise conﬂictual.
 From the perspective of small states, where countries’ security policy 
orientations and decisions are usually highly interdependent, we need to 
weigh the signiﬁcance of trustful relations and cooperative endeavours 
against the wider (sub-)regional security environment. In other words, the 
stakes of mutually reinforcing trust between small states should be meas-
ured against the question of how the level of trust and cooperation might 
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affect the wider international position and posture of these states. To 
measure the stakes of small- state trust building from a purely conﬂictual 
perspective is to succumb to what could be called the ‘great power fallacy’ 
(see also Juntunen 2017).
 Put in more analytical terms and looked at from the perspective of trust-
 theorising in IR, the Finnish–Swedish case poses an outright paradox: as 
the illustrations in the analysis show, there is historically rooted mistrust 
within the Finnish foreign and security policy elite towards Sweden’s future 
foreign policy decisions. Both high- level policy- makers, such as the Finnish 
prime minister and defence minister, and experts seem to fear that Sweden 
might suddenly make a security policy reorientation – something similar to 
what happened in October 1990, causing disappointment that, having left 
unresolved, has since evolved into a narrative of betrayal.
 This time Stockholm would however join NATO – a move that, from 
the Finnish point of view, would render Finland strategically vulnerable 
and hence violate the spirit of the close- knit relationship between the two 
Nordic neighbours. It, therefore, seems that the Finns cannot be totally 
doubtless about the benevolence of Sweden’s intentions and its recognition 
and consideration of Finnish interests. As a result, the Swedish foreign 
policy leadership has tried to reassure Helsinki of Stockholm’s adherence 
to the shared sense of interdependence and common fate.
 How should we then explain this seemingly deeply ingrained Finnish 
suspicion towards Sweden in the realm of security and defence policy 
within the framework of bilateral relations that could be described as being 
as trustful as one can imagine in world politics, framed as they are in a 
general expectation of benevolent intentions and even held up as a model 
example of a security community? To unlock this paradox or tension, we 
have made three analytical and conceptual moves.
 First, we distinguished historically engrained and socially stratiﬁed 
experiences of misplaced trust (mistrust) from distrust as a more compre-
hensive depiction of the overall condition of the relationship between states 
and political units. This distinction gives us clues on how the Finnish 
experience of mistrust in autumn 1990 can linger on even in mature rela-
tionships where social norms and mutual expectations maintain a pro-
found sense of trustfulness. Second, and closely related to the ﬁrst 
distinction, our analysis on the latent suspicions on Finland’s part towards 
Sweden in the realm of security policy shows that it is important to distin-
guish the experiences of betrayal and mere disappointment. Whereas dis-
appointment ﬁts better into a situation where the motives of the actors are 
more strategic and calculated (reliance), the sense of betrayal implies that 
something more profound and deeper in the relationship itself has been 
violated (moral trust).
 Moreover, because the sense of disappointment was not dealt with 
properly in the early 1990s, it gradually stratiﬁed into a narrative of 
betrayal in the Finnish foreign policy discourse and now overshadows the 
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prospects of defence cooperation with Sweden. Additionally, the role of 
historically signiﬁcant experiences of misplaced trust, especially in relation 
to sentiments of disappointment and betrayal, demonstrates that the puzzle 
cannot be approached from a purely rationalistic standpoint without redu-
cing the role of history to the strategic and situational calculation of states 
that are acting with full information on the intentions of other parties.
 Third, our analysis supports Booth and Wheeler’s (2008, 230) idea on 
placing trust on an ideal scale from minimal to maximal trust. This is to 
say that the conditions and nature of interstate trust are highly context- 
dependent and relational (see also Weinhardt 2015). This is accompanied 
by the notion of sectoral trust, or what Ruzicka and Keating (2014, 22) 
describe as ‘complex relationships where trust varies across different issue 
areas’. This seems especially relevant in small- state contexts as the Finnish–
Swedish case quite well illustrates. Defence and security policy seem to 
form a sector of cooperation between Finland and Sweden where all the 
elements in the otherwise mature and fully evolved trusting relationship do 
not yet fully apply.
 Moreover, coming back to the question of how to dispel the latent mis-
trust and its potentially harmful consequences between Finland and 
Sweden depends on how we deﬁne (and value) trust in international rela-
tions in the ﬁrst place. If we deﬁne it as a form of strategic calculation, the 
way forward might well be the already established incremental process in 
defence and security political cooperation. This would indicate that a 
rather modest level of trust would be enough to steer the states towards a 
framework that enhances a reciprocal sense of credibility as regards this 
relationship. Theoretically this would point, in the words of Larson (1997, 
714), to a mere reliance ‘on a state to fulﬁl its commitments and promises’ 
without further expectations of enhancing mutual trust and interests 
beyond explicit agreements.
 We therefore go on to suggest that the sense of strategic trust – or trust- 
as-reliance – describes the nature of Finnish–Swedish bilateral defence 
cooperation, therefore making the case that the level of trust is closer to 
minimal than maximal trust. And if this is the level of trust that can be 
reached between two states within a model security community, this con-
clusion tells a great deal about the levels of achievable trust in international 
politics in general, that is, not very high above the minimalistic level. 
Moreover, coming back to the Finnish–Swedish case, during an era deﬁned 
by turbulence in the external security environment, the level of trust experi-
enced in the realm of national security is in danger of ‘spilling over’ to 
deﬁne the overall expectations of benevolent intentions between the states. 
One should remember that the incremental process can also take on a neg-
ative spin. This implies that the latent experience of mistrust, once left 
unresolved, might have even deeper ramiﬁcations than ﬁrst acknowledged.
 But the demands of this relationship could also be read from the per-
spective of maximal/phronetic trust. Here, a mere signing of agreements 
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and pragmatic- functional forms of everyday cooperation are not seen as 
signiﬁcant enough developments, especially if read against the changing 
geopolitical environment in the Baltic Sea region. Maximal trust and its 
emotive basis echoes the idea of perceiving one’s partner in the general 
framework of benevolent intentions in all possible sectors of cooperation. 
Here it becomes crucial that any experience of misplaced trust should be 
dealt with accordingly (Michel 2012, 881). The Finnish–Swedish case 
shows that the ability to deal successfully with past experiences of mis-
placed trust (and thus the explicit acknowledgement of latent mistrust in 
the present) can have a crucial role in pushing the interaction between 
states from a mere pragmatic hedging strategy towards a genuine process 
of trust building – a process that never starts from a historical and 
social void.
 A moralistic leap into uncertainty, as Booth and Wheeler (2008, 
234–243) describe the effort that is needed if one wants to pursue maxi-
malist trust, should be made so that the bilateral security political 
cooperation could thrive beyond the pragmatic understanding of trust as 
mere reliance. Even in its maximalist reading it should be acknowledged 
that the existential sense of future uncertainty in international politics can 
only be transcended, or suspended – the possibility of being let down, even 
betrayed, cannot be fully escaped (see also Brugger et al. 2013, 443; 
Möllering 2006, 111).
Notes
 1 This article was written as a part of a research project Reimagining Futures in 
the European North at the End of the Cold War, funded by the Academy of 
Finland (SA268669). We would like to thank the editorial team of this book for 
their helpful comments on the manuscript, as well as the following colleagues 
who have provided constructive criticism on the previous versions of the study 
that we have presented at the project’s research seminar and the annual confer-
ence of the Finnish Political Science Association in Helsinki in 2016: Ville Sink-
konen, Tuomas Forsberg, Sinikukka Saari, Kimmo Rentola, Kari Möttölä, 
Marjo Uutela, Aino Hakovirta, Juha- Matti Ritvanen, and Lisa Dellmuth.
 2 In the recent white paper on defence policy, published by the government of 
Finland (Valtioneuvosto 2017, 17) in February 2017, bilateral cooperation with 
Sweden is described as having a ‘special status’ (erityisasema) in the totality of 
Finland’s international cooperation on defence policy. Moreover, the white 
paper explicitly says that no limitations have been set in advance on the depth 
of this cooperation in the future.
 3 According to Wiberg (2000, 133–135) the forces behind the Nordic security 
community are predominantly internal. Mutual contacts with migration, a lan-
guage community – Swedish is second ofﬁcial language in Finland – and the 
long tradition of neutralism are the core features underpinning the community. 
There are no indications of military contingency plans made against the other 
members of the community and the idea of a military conﬂict between the 
nations sounds utterly unthinkable. Moreover, over 600,000 people of Finnish 
ancestry live in Sweden. In addition to a common history, Finland and Sweden 
both adhere to the same social system, the Nordic welfare model. According to 
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the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (Ulkoasiainministeriö 2015), 
‘Sweden is the closest partner of Finland in the world’, and the relationship and 
connections between the states are described as ‘unique’.
 4 Booth and Wheeler (2008, 183) highlight that the deﬁning features of a security 
community are, inter alia, the predictability of peace, a high degree of integra-
tion, the delegitimized use of force, transparency, and trust.
 5 According to Sil and Katzenstein (2010, 412) analytical eclectism attempts to 
generate ‘[…] complex causal stories that forgo parsimony in order to capture 
the interactions among different types of causal mechanisms normally analyzed 
in isolation from each other within separate research traditions’.
 6 For example, on the face of it, it seems to be quite hard to apply Hoffmann’s 
rules for measuring trusting relationships to the context of peaceful small- state 
relations, as the rules are heavily inﬂuenced by empirical examples taken from 
settings of multilateral institutions or power relations involving great powers 
(see also Rathbun 2011b).
 7 Although it provides a compelling critique of the ontological and epistemologi-
cal assumptions of the rationalistic mainstream in the IR trust literature, 
Torsten Michel’s (2012) phronetic and emotion- driven conceptualisation of 
trust also relies on empirical examples based on conﬂictual dyads (such as that 
of Brazilian–Argentine relations in the 1970s) (ibid., 877–878; see also Wheeler 
2009).
 8 Whether this suspicion is well- grounded or not is an empirical issue and beyond 
the scope of this chapter. From the perspective of trust research, the mere exist-
ence of this suspicion amongst the foreign policy elite in Finland, whether latent 
or explicit, is already an indicator of a certain level of historical pathologies 
clouding the bilateral relationship.
 9 Joining (or forming) a military alliance and thus abandoning the long history of 
military non- alignment policy could be interpreted as an international orienta-
tion change, although membership in the EU already imposes security policy 
requirements on Finland and Sweden that would make NATO membership a 
less sweeping change, one that would operate on the level of reorienting one’s 
foreign policy programme or its driving goals. See Hermann (1990, 5) for a 
typology on major foreign policy changes.
10 Larson uses US–Soviet/Russian post- Cold War arms control discussions as a 
prime example of this kind of missed opportunity that might eventually increase 
mistrust.
11 Naapurimaiden hyvät välit menivät melkein poikki, koska Ruotsi pelasi 
kaksinaamaista peliä: ensin se salasi aikeensa, sitten petti Suomelle anta-
mansa lupaukset ja lopulta yritti yksin livahtaa Euroopan yhteisön jäseneksi. 
Tätä mieltä oli Suomen valtiojohto, presidentti ja hallitus. Ruotsin 
välistäveto jätti kansalliseen muistiimme jäljen, johon aina palataan, kun 
naapurimaiden väleissä ilmenee kitkaa.
(Translation by authors)
12 For example, on 19 October 1990, seven days before Sweden made its 
announcement, Finnish ambassador to Stockholm, Björn-Olof Alholm, 
informed Pertti Salolainen, then Minister for Foreign Trade of Finland, that ‘the 
social democratic government [in Sweden] is probably intending to take 
the initiative into its own hands before the opposition parties move forward [on 
the EC question].’ Alholm further highlighted that the reasons for this lay in 
Sweden’s domestic politics and economy, thus implying that Finnish interests 
did not matter that much in the equation. On the other hand, on 24 October, 
only two days before Sweden’s announcement, Undersecretary of State Veli 
Suncbäck wrote a conﬁdential background paper to President Koivisto, Foreign 
Trust in International Relations : Rationalist, Constructivist, and Psychological Approaches, edited by Hiski Haukkala, et al., Taylor
         and Francis, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/tampere/detail.action?docID=5306793.
Created from tampere on 2018-03-05 01:14:31.
C
o
p
y
ri
g
h
t 
©
 2
0
1
8
. 
T
a
y
lo
r 
a
n
d
 F
ra
n
c
is
. 
A
ll 
ri
g
h
ts
 r
e
s
e
rv
e
d
.
Mistrust within trust  153
Minister Pertti Paasio, and Secretary of State Åke Wihtol in which he stated 
that Sweden’s minister for foreign trade, Anita Gradin, had just promised her 
Finnish counterpart, Salolainen, that Sweden would inform Finland before 
making any declarations concerning Sweden’s position vis- à-vis the EC and 
ETA processes. See archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (UMA) 35–00 
EY, Ruotsi 1990, telegram from Stockholm ‘Ruotsin mahdollinen lähentyminen 
EY:n’, 19.10.1990 (two pages) and UMA 35–00 EY, Ruotsi 1990, memoran-
dum no. 936 ‘Ruotsi/EY- jäsenkysymys’, 24.10.1990 (three pages).
13 In April 2016, an expert group commissioned by the Finnish Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs published a study on the effects of possible Finnish NATO 
membership which argued that Sweden and Finland constitute a common stra-
tegic space. Therefore, the countries should make their decisions concerning 
NATO hand in hand. According to the report, different choices, especially 
Swedish accession to NATO, would render Finland vulnerable, (Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs of Finland 2016).
References
Adler, E. and Barnett, M. (1998) Security Communities Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge
Ainola, O. (2015) ‘Näkökulma: Suomen puolustus tarvitsee Ruotsin apua’ Iltalehti 
23 December 2015 www.iltalehti.ﬁ/uutiset/2015122320873461_uu.shtml
Bertelman, T. (2015) ‘Coming into alignment’ The American Interest October 
2015 www.the- american-interest.com/2015/10/05/coming- into-alignment/
Blomberg, J. (2011) Vakauden Kaipuu. Kylmän sodan loppu ja Suomi WSOY, 
Helsinki
Booth, K. and Wheeler, N.J. (2008) The Security Dilemma. Fear, Cooperation and 
Trust in World Politics Palgrave Macmillan, London
Braw, E. (2015) ‘Sweden and Finland’s awkward Nato tango’ Politico.eu (www.
politico.eu/article/sweden- ﬁnland-nato- russia-defense- nordic-military/) accessed 
24 August 2015
Brugger, P. (2015) ‘Trust as a discourse: Concept and measurement strategy – ﬁrst 
results from a study on German trust in the USA’ Journal of Trust Research 5(1), 
78–100
Brugger, P., Hasenclever, A., and Kasten, L. (2013) ‘Theorizing the impact of trust 
on post- agreement negotiations: The case of Franco- German security relations’ 
International Negotiation, 18(2013) 441–469
Dahl, A.-S. (2017) ‘Sweden and Finland. To be or not to be NATO members’. In 
Friis, K. (ed.), NATO and Collective Defence in the 21st Century London and 
New York, Routledge
Davis, W. (2012) ‘Swords into ploughshares: The effect of paciﬁst public opinion on 
foreign policy in Western democracies’ Cooperation and Conﬂict, 47 (3) 309–30
Dempsey, J. (2014) ‘Judy asks: Should Finland and Sweden join Nato?’ Judy 
Dempsey’s Strategic Europe (http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=55657) 
accessed 21 May 2014
Deutsch, K. (1957) Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: Inter-
national Organization in the Light of Historical Experience Princeton University 
Press, Princeton
Elman, M.F. (1995) ‘The foreign policies of small states: Challenging neorealism in 
its Own Backyard’ British Journal of Political Science, 25(2) 171–217
Trust in International Relations : Rationalist, Constructivist, and Psychological Approaches, edited by Hiski Haukkala, et al., Taylor
         and Francis, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/tampere/detail.action?docID=5306793.
Created from tampere on 2018-03-05 01:14:31.
C
o
p
y
ri
g
h
t 
©
 2
0
1
8
. 
T
a
y
lo
r 
a
n
d
 F
ra
n
c
is
. 
A
ll 
ri
g
h
ts
 r
e
s
e
rv
e
d
.
154  T. Juntunen and M. Pesu
Gay, J.A. (2015) ‘Better of alone: Sweden makes single work’ The National Interest 
(http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the- buzz/sweden- makes-single- work-12257) 
accessed 14 February 2015
Giles, K. and Eskola, S. (2009) ‘Waking the neighbor: Finland, NATO, and Russia’ 
Defence Academy of the United Kingdom Special Series, 09/14 (www.ﬁnlandnato.
org/public/download.aspx?ID=49566&GUID=%7B7CB8A086-C30A-4246-8355-
411A3BDE2FE7%7D) accessed 24 February 2017
Giraudo, P. (2014) ‘Why Finland and Sweden should not join NATO’ The 
National Interest (http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the- buzz/why- ﬁnland-sweden- 
should-not- join-nato- 10901) accessed 17 July 2014
Haukkala, H., Vuorelma, J., and van de Wetering, C. (2015) ‘Trust in international 
relations: A useful tool?’ Journal of Trust Research, 5(1) 3–7
Forsberg, T. (2013) ‘The rise of Nordic defense cooperation: A return to regionalism’ 
International Affairs, 89(5) 1161–1181
Forsberg, T. and Pesu, M. (2017) ‘The role of public opinion in Finnish foreign 
and security policy’. In Cheng, T.J. and Wei- chin, L. (eds), National Security, 
Public Opinion and Regime Asymmetry: A Six Country Study World Scientiﬁc, 
Singapore, 147–174
Forsberg, T. and Vaahtoranta, T. (2001) ‘Inside the EU, outside NATO: Paradoxes 
of Finland’s and Sweden’s post- neutrality’ European Security, 10(1) 68–93
Foyle, D. (1997) ‘Public opinion and foreign policy: Elite beliefs as a mediating 
variable’ International Studies Quarterly, 41(1) 141–69
Frear, T., Kulesa, L., and Kearns, I. (2014) ‘Dangerous brinkmanship: Close 
military encounters between Russia and the West in 2014’ European Leadership 
Network Policy Brief, November 2014 (www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/ 
medialibrary/2014/11/09/6375e3da/Dangerous%20Brinkmanship.pdf ) accessed 
24 February 2017
Helsingin Sanomat (2015a) ‘Jussi Niinistö: Jos Nato- jäsenyyttä haetaan, luontevaa 
olisi tehdä se käsi kädessä Ruotsin kanssa’, 5 June 2015 (www.hs.ﬁ/ulkomaat/
art- 2000002829714.html) accessed 24 February 2017
Helsingin Sanomat (2015b) ‘Naton Stoltenberg Tukholmassa: Elämme vaarallisem-
massa maailmassa’, 10 November 2015 (www.hs.ﬁ/ulkomaat/a1447136684901) 
accessed 24 February 2017
Helsingin Sanomat (2016) ‘Voiko lahden takaa tulla yllätys? Ruotsi ei sido pohdin-
tojaan muiden maiden ratkaisuihin’, 22 September 2016 (www.hs.ﬁ/ulkomaat/
a1447136684901) accessed 24 February 2017
Hermann, C.F. (1990) ‘Changing course: When governments choose to redirect 
foreign policy’ International Studies Quarterly, 34(1) 3–21
Hey, J.A.K. (2003) ‘Introducing small state foreign policy’ in Hey, J.A.K. (ed.), 
Small States in World Politics Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1–11
Hoffmann, A.M. (2002) ‘A conceptualization of trust in international relations’ 
European Journal of International Relations, 8(3) 375–401
Holmström, M. (2009) Den dolda Alliansen. Svenska hemliga Nato- förbindelsen 
Atlantis, Stockholm
Holmström, M. (2012) ‘Försvar med tidsgräns’ Svenska Dagbladet, 30 December 
2012 (www.svd.se/forsvar- med-tidsgrans) accessed 24 February 2017
Holmström, M. (2016) ‘Ryssland övade kärnvapenanfall mot Sverige’ Dagens 
Nyheter, 2 February 2016 (www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/ryssland- ovade-karnva 
penanfall- mot-sverige/) accessed 24 February 2017
Trust in International Relations : Rationalist, Constructivist, and Psychological Approaches, edited by Hiski Haukkala, et al., Taylor
         and Francis, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/tampere/detail.action?docID=5306793.
Created from tampere on 2018-03-05 01:14:31.
C
o
p
y
ri
g
h
t 
©
 2
0
1
8
. 
T
a
y
lo
r 
a
n
d
 F
ra
n
c
is
. 
A
ll 
ri
g
h
ts
 r
e
s
e
rv
e
d
.
Mistrust within trust  155
Hufvudstadsbladet (2016) ‘Wallström: Rädsla i Finland för Svenskt Natobeslut’, 
10 January 2016 (http://gamla.hbl.ﬁ/nyheter/2016-01-10/785140/wallstrom- 
radsla-i- ﬁnland-svenskt- natobeslut) accessed 24 February 2017
Hämäläinen, U. (2015) ‘Syksyllä 1990 Ruotsi katalasti petti Suomen’ HS Kuukaus-
iliite 11/15 (www.hs.ﬁ/kuukausiliite/a1446527021833) accessed 24 February 2017
Iltalehti (2015) ‘Ruotsin Nato- kannatus kasvussa – Haglund: Suomen pitää olla 
valmis reagoimaan’, 15 September 2015 (www.iltalehti.ﬁ/uutiset/2015091520 
356611_uu.shtml) accessed 24 February 2017
Iltalehti (2016) ‘Suomen ja Ruotsin sotilasliitto on mahdollinen’, 31 January 2016 
(www.iltalehti.ﬁ/uutiset/2016013021031420_uu.shtml) accessed 24 February 2017
Ilta- Sanomat (2016) ‘Ruotsin pääministeri vakuutti IS:lle: ‘Ruotsi ei aio yllättää 
Suomea Nato- kysymyksellä’, 27 September 2016 (www.iltasanomat.ﬁ/ulkomaat/
art- 2000001270418.html) accessed 24 February 2017
Jakobson, M. (1980) Veteen piirretty viiva. Havaintoja ja merkintöjä vuosilta 
1953–1965 Otava, Helsinki
Jakobson, M. (1983) 38. kerros. Havaintoja ja muistiinpanoja vuosilta 1965–1971 
Otava, Helsinki
Jakobson, M. (2003) Tilinpäätös Otava, Helsinki
Jervis, R. (1976) Perception and Misperception in International Politics Princeton 
University Press, Princeton
Juntunen, T. (2017) ‘Helsinki syndrome: The parachronistic renaissance of 
Finlandization in international politics’ New Perspectives: Interdisciplinary Journal 
of Central & East European Politics and International Relations, 25(1) 55–83
Karsh, E. (1988) Neutrality and Small States Routledge, London
Keating, V.C. and Ruzicka, J. (2014) ‘Trusting relationships in international 
politics: No need to hedge’ Review of International Studies, 40(4) 753–770
Keohane, R.O. (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy Princeton University Press, Princeton
Koivisto, M. (1995) Historian Tekijät. Kaksi Kautta II Kirjayhtymä Oy, Helsinki
Kydd, A. (2001) ‘Trust building, trust breaking: The dilemma of NATO enlarge-
ment’ International Organization, 55(4) 801–828
Larson, D.W. (1997) ‘Trust and missed opportunities in international RELA-
TIONS’ Political Psychology, 18(3) 701–734
Lucas, E. (2015) ‘Russia’s driving the Nordic’s in NATO’ The Daily Beast, 28 
September 2015 (www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/09/28/russia- s-driving- the-
nordics- into-nato.html) accessed 24 February 2017
Michel, T. (2012) ‘Time to get emotional: Phronetic reﬂections on the concept of 
trust in international relations’ European Journal of International Relations, 
19(4) 896–890
Milne, R. (2014), ‘Swedes lean towards NATO membership, poll shows’ Financial 
Times, 29 October 2014
Moreland, W. (2015) ‘Finland: Just say no to NATO’ The National Interest, 6 
January 2015 (http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the- buzz/ﬁnland- just-say- no-nato- 
11978) accessed 24 February 2017
Möllering, G. (2006) Trust: Reason, Routine, Reﬂexivity Elsevier Science Ltd, 
Amsterdam
Möttölä, K. (1982) ‘The politics of neutrality and defence: Finnish security policy 
since the early 1970s’ Cooperation and Conﬂict, 17 287–313
Nicolaïdis, K. (2007) ‘Trusting the Poles? Constructing Europe through mutual 
recognition’ Journal of European Public Policy, 14(5) 682–698
Trust in International Relations : Rationalist, Constructivist, and Psychological Approaches, edited by Hiski Haukkala, et al., Taylor
         and Francis, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/tampere/detail.action?docID=5306793.
Created from tampere on 2018-03-05 01:14:31.
C
o
p
y
ri
g
h
t 
©
 2
0
1
8
. 
T
a
y
lo
r 
a
n
d
 F
ra
n
c
is
. 
A
ll 
ri
g
h
ts
 r
e
s
e
rv
e
d
.
156  T. Juntunen and M. Pesu
Niinistö, S. (2016) ‘New Year Speech by President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö 
on 1 January 2016’, Ofﬁce of the President of the Republic of Finland (http://
presidentti.ﬁ/public/default.aspx?contentid=339663&nodeid=44807&contentla
n=2&culture=en- US) accessed 24 February 2017
NORDEFCO (2017) ‘The cooperation areas’ (www.nordefco.org/The- Cooperation-
Areas) accessed 4 April 2017
Rasmussen, M.V. (2003) ‘The history of a lesson: Versailles, Munich and the social 
construction of the past’ Review of International Studies, 29(4) 499–519
Rathbun, B.C. (2011a) ‘Before hegemony: Generalized trust and the creation and 
design of international security organizations’ International Organization, 65(2) 
243–273
Rathbun, B.C. (2011b) Trust in International Cooperation: International Security 
Institujackstions, Domestic Politics and American Multilateralism Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press
Reuters (2015a) ‘Nordic nations agree on defense cooperation against Russia’, 9 
April 2015 (www.reuters.com/article/us- nordics-russia- defence-idUSKBN0N02E 
820150409) accessed 24 February 2017
Reuters (2015b) ‘Swedish centre right in favor of NATO membership’, 9 October 
2015 (www.reuters.com/article/us- sweden-nato- idUSKCN0S32HX20151009) 
accessed 24 February 2017
Risse- Kappen, T. (1991) ‘Public opinion, domestic structure, and foreign policy in 
liberal democracies’ World Politics, 40 (4) 479–512
Rusi, A. (2015) ‘Ruotsin Nato- kanta vaikuttaa Suomeen’. Iltalehti, 10 September 
2015 (www.iltalehti.ﬁ/uutiset/2015091020315575_uu.shtml) accessed 24 
February 2017
Ruzicka, J. and Keating, V.C. (2015) ‘Going global: Trust research and inter-
national relations’ Journal of Trust Research, 5(1) 8–26
Ruzicka, J. and Wheeler, N.J. (2010) ‘The puzzle of trusting relationship in the 
Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty’ International Affairs, 86(1) 69–85
Seip, M. (2015) ‘Is It Time for Finland to Join NATO?’ The National Interest, 
4 June 2015. (www.nationalinterest.org/blog/the- buzz/it- time-ﬁnland- join-nato- 
13044) accessed 24 February 2017
Salonius- Pasternak, C. (2014) ‘Deeper defense cooperation: Finland and Sweden 
together again?’ FIIA Brieﬁng Paper 163 (www.ﬁia.ﬁ/ﬁ/publication/459/deeper_
defence_cooperation/) accessed 24 February 2017
Sil, R. and Katzenstein, P.J. (2010) ‘Analytical eclectism in the study of world 
politics: Reconﬁguring problems and mechanisms across research traditions’ 
Perspectives on Politics, 8(2) 411–431
Sipilä, J. and Löfven, S. (2016) ‘Pitkäjänteinen ulkopolitiikka luo vakautta’ Lännen 
Media newspapers, 10 January 2016
Snyder, J. (1991) Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca
Suomenmaa (2015) ‘Salolainen: Ruotsin Nato- linja voi muuttua nopeasti’ 1 
October 2015. (www.suomenmaa.ﬁ/?app=NeoDirect&com=6/3/25344/08471ff4
6b) accessed 24 February 2017
Swedish Defence Forces and Finnish Defence Forces (2015) Final Reports on Deep-
ened Defence Cooperation between Finland and Sweden (www.defmin.ﬁ/
ﬁles/3074/Final_reports_on_deepened_defence_cooperation_between_Finland_
and_Sweden.pdf ) accessed 24 February 2017
Trust in International Relations : Rationalist, Constructivist, and Psychological Approaches, edited by Hiski Haukkala, et al., Taylor
         and Francis, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/tampere/detail.action?docID=5306793.
Created from tampere on 2018-03-05 01:14:31.
C
o
p
y
ri
g
h
t 
©
 2
0
1
8
. 
T
a
y
lo
r 
a
n
d
 F
ra
n
c
is
. 
A
ll 
ri
g
h
ts
 r
e
s
e
rv
e
d
.
Mistrust within trust  157
The Local (2015) ‘ “I’m convinced there was a foreign sub in Sweden” ’ 1 October 
2015 (www.thelocal.se/20151001/sweden- made-discoveries- on-land- in-submarine- 
hunt-says- sverker-goranson) accessed 24 February 2017
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (2016) The Effects of Finland’s 
Possible NATO Membership: An Assessment Ministry for Foreign Affairs of 
Finland, Helsinki
Ulkoasiainministeriö (2015) Maatiedosto, Ruotsi: kahdenväliset suhteet, 10 August 
2015. (http://formin.ﬁnland.ﬁ/public/default.aspx?nodeid=18017&contentlan=1
&culture=ﬁ- FI) accessed 24 February 2017
Uusi Suomi (2015) ‘Tuomioja: Tämän takia Suomi- Ruotsi-puolustusliitto ei 
kannata’, 3 February 2015 (www.uusisuomi.ﬁ/kotimaa/77358-tuomioja- taman-
takia- suomi-ruotsi- puolustusliitto-ei- kannata) accessed 24 February 2017
Valtioneuvosto (2016) Valtioneuvoston ulko- ja turvallisuuspoliittinen selonteko, 
Valtioneuvoston kanslian julkaisusarja, 7/2016, Valtioneuvoston kanslia, Helsinki
Valtioneuvosto (2017) Valtioneuvoston puolustusselonteko, Valtioneuvoston 
kanslian julkaisusarja, 5/2017, Valtioneuvoston kanslia, Helsinki
Waever, O. (1998) ‘Insecurity, security, and asecurity in the West European non- 
war community’ in Adler, E. and Barnett, M. (eds), Security Communities, Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, 69–78
Wahlbäck, K. (2011) Jättens andedräkt: ﬁnlandsfrågan i svensk politik 1809–2009 
Atlantis, Stockholm
Weinhardt, C. (2015) ‘Relational trust in international cooperation: The case of 
North- South trade negotiations’ Journal of Trust Research, 5(1) 27–54
Wheeler, N.J. (2009) ‘Beyond Waltz’s nuclear world: More trust may be better’ 
International Relations, 23(3) 428–445
Wiberg, H. (2000) ‘The Nordic security community: Past, present, future’ in 
Heurlin, B. and Mouritzen, H. (eds), Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2000. 
DUPI Publications, Copenhagen, 121–137
Yle Uutiset (2015a) ‘Miten toimisi pääministeri Alexander Stubb? “Ruotsi liittyy 
Natoon” ’, 8 April 2015 (http://yle.ﬁ/uutiset/miten_toimisi_paaministeri_alexander_
stubb_ruotsi_liittyy_natoon/7916589) accessed 24 February 2017
Yle Uutiset (2015b) ‘Pääministeri Sipilä Tukholmassa: Emme yllätä Ruotsia Nato- 
kannallamme’, 8 June 2015 (http://yle.ﬁ/uutiset/paaministeri_sipila_tukholmassa_
emme_yllata_ruotsia_nato- kannallamme/8058316) accessed 24 February 2017
Trust in International Relations : Rationalist, Constructivist, and Psychological Approaches, edited by Hiski Haukkala, et al., Taylor
         and Francis, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/tampere/detail.action?docID=5306793.
Created from tampere on 2018-03-05 01:14:31.
C
o
p
y
ri
g
h
t 
©
 2
0
1
8
. 
T
a
y
lo
r 
a
n
d
 F
ra
n
c
is
. 
A
ll 
ri
g
h
ts
 r
e
s
e
rv
e
d
.

  
PUBLICATION 
V 
The “Finlandisation” of Finland: The Ideal Type, the Historical Model, 
and the Lessons Learnt  
Tuomas Forsberg & Matti Pesu 
Diplomacy & Statecraft 27(3), 473–495 
 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2016.1196069  
Publication reprinted with the permission of the copyright holders. 
  
  
 
 
 
ϭ

The ³Finlandisation´ of Finland:  The Ideal Type, the Historical Model, 
and the Lessons Learnt 
 
Accepted manuscript 
August 2016 
 
Tuomas Forsberg & Matti Pesu 
 
Abstract 
³Finlandisation´has become a buzzword and suggested solution to the on-going Ukrainian crisis. However, 
in Finland, Finlandisation tends to be a pejorative term because of its negative effects on Finnish domestic 
politics. Negative effects notwithstanding, Finland¶s Cold War experience often appears as a success: it 
preserved its democratic system, prospered economically, and strengthened its international status. This 
analysis examines the historical evidence of what role Finlandisation² understood as a policy of 
collaboration and friendship with the greatest potential security threat to a country¶s sovereignty and as a 
political culture related to that policy²played during the Cold War era. Did the strategy of accommodation 
go too far and was it superfluous to Finland¶s survival and success? In this context, the article also discusses 
the ³dangers´of Finlandisation and the gradual end of the policy. 
 
 
 ³Finlandisation´ has become a buzzword and a potential, suggested solution to the 
Ukrainian crisis after 2012. American foreign policy veterans like Zbigniew Brzezinski 
and Henry Kissinger have proposed that Finland could serve as a model for Ukraine¶V
international position.1 Ukraine would stay outside of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation [NATO] and avoid hostility with Russia, benefit from close economic co-
operation with both the European Union [EU] and Russia, whilst nobody would question 
its independence and status as a sovereign nation. Robert Kaplan and Bruce Gilley, in turn, 
have talked about the FinlandisDWLRQRI&KLQD¶Vneighbours in East Asia.2 Armenian scholar 
Sergei Minasyan has considered the model concerning his own country, contending, 
³)LQODQGL]DWLRQLVQRWWKHLGHDORUPRVWDGYDQWDJHRXVIRUHLJQSROLF\OLQH\HWLWLVWKHVDIHVW
PHWKRGDWWKHYHU\OHDVW´.3 Moreover, some Russian pundits have seen Finland as a desired 
model: Alexander Dugin ± the geopolitical ideologue behind the Russian annexation of 
Crimea in 2014 ± has supported the Finlandisation of all of Europe.4  
In most cases, Finlandisation refers to a foreign policy strategy where a smaller 
state adapts its policy to the interests of a bigger neighbouring country, typically a Great 
Power.5 During the Cold War, Finland¶V relations with the Soviet Union exemplify this 
kind of adjustment.6 However, debates on Finlandisation often occur in terms of an abstract 
ideal-type without referring directly to Finland. Some scholars have even used the notion 
to build a generalised theory of political adaptation.7 
Talk of Finlandisation was most intensive in the 1970s when it emerged as a highly 
politicised concept. During the process leading to the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe process, some conservative European politicians and American ³&ROG
Warriors´ identified the Finlandisation of Western Europe as a threat looming large if 
promoting détente.8 Domestic debates used the notion. For instance, in West Germany, 
Christian Democrats warned of the potential consequences of WKH6RFLDO'HPRFUDWV¶Willy 
%UDQGW¶V, collaborative opening to communist Eastern Europe ± Ostpolitik. In the 1980s, 
the concept started to acquire both connotations that were more positive and suggestions 
Ϯ

that the Finnish model ± ³)LQODQGL]DWLRQ LQ UHYHUVH´ ± was a potential solution for the 
Eastern European states.9  
This analysis, nevertheless, focuses on the Finnish experience of Finlandisation. It 
assesses the historical evidence of what the Finnish policy of collaboration and 
accommodation with the Soviet Union during the Cold War era actually meant.10 In this 
context, Finlandisation constituted not only a foreign policy strategy but also a political 
culture with questionable features peculiar to Finland, especially in the 1970s. Did 
)LQODQG¶V success depend on the extensive nature of the collaborative strategy or did it 
unnecessarily go too far in its ³appeasement´? Analysing Finlandisation also helps to 
retrieve some of its original meanings and, perhaps, increase historical sensitivity when 
certain elements reminiscent of the Cold War are returning and related analogies are 
applied.11 
There is a relatively broad consensus that Finnish foreign policy was successful 
during the Cold War. Yet, some emphasise that ³VXUYLYDO´ was enough for success, whilst 
others see success in much broader terms, including economic growth, social welfare, and 
political freedoms.12 Compared to alternative histories, that is, the fate of the Eastern 
European countries that became communist-led Soviet satellites or, like the Baltic States, 
incorporated into the Soviet Union with much reduced political freedoms and lower 
economic well-being, the Finnish case clearly is a success but not without a price. The 
criticism relates to details ± the negative side effects and, in particular, to the process. Could 
Finland have been able to survive the big game without the negative side effects? 
This analysis finds basis on a thorough review of existing research literature and 
memoirs dealing with the Finnish-Soviet relations during the Cold War ± much of which 
outside of Finland remains little known because of language barriers. Furthermore, the 
collaborative policy of friendship worked; but structurally embedded in the policy were 
many negative side effects, and there was the potential of danger when the strategy was 
close to turning from an instrument to an end in itself. 
Even though this exegesis focuses on Finland, Finlandisation as a notion is not 
homespun; rather its roots lay in Central Europe. Richard Löwenthal, a professor at the 
Free University of Berlin, is usually considered the father of the notion, and the debate 
dates back to the 1960s.13 7KH 6RYLHW 8QLRQ¶V VZD\ RYHU )LQODQG EHcame evident in 
Western Europe during the so-called ³Night Frost´ and 1961 ³Note´FULVHV. ³Night 
Frost´ was an episode when Moscow refused to accept the newly formed Finnish 
government and withdrew its ambassador from Helsinki resulting in the new government¶V
resignation. The ³Note´ Frisis in turn emerged when Moscow requested military 
consultations with Finland on the basis of the 1948 Soviet-Finnish Treaty of Friendship, 
Co-operation and Mutual Assistance [FCMA] referring to the supposed increased military 
threat posed by Germany and its allies. A political meeting in Novosibirsk in late 1961 
between Urho Kekkonen, the Finnish president, and Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet 
chairman of the Council of Ministers, UHVROYHGWKH³1RWH´FULVLV.14 These cases contributed 
to the negative image of Finland in the West, which saw them as a cautionary tale of what 
collaboration with the Soviet Union could potentially cause. The concept became popular 
in the 1970s when West German RSSRQHQWV RI %UDQGW¶VOstpolitik adopted it for their 
domestic debate on West German policy.15 
There are many definitions of Finlandisation and the above-mentioned pundits did 
not use it in a uniform manner. For some, Finlandisation meant a policy of voluntarily 
ϯ

accommodating interests and restricting sovereignty to preserve the independence of a 
country and avoid causing political tensions with a more powerful neighbouring country. 
From such a realist perspective, represented amongst others by George Kennan, the 
architect of United States containment policies towards Soviet Russia in the late 1940s, 
Finlandisation appeared as an honourable way to solve challenging security problems and, 
in that sense, interpreted as a beneficial, legitimate, and justified strategy.16 Some have also 
stressed the role of economic benefits that the policy of friendship brought as a positive 
factor. 
On the other extreme, Finlandisation can appear as political remote control from 
abroad.17 This argument played a significant role in the security debate in Western Europe 
in the 1970s. Raymond Aron, the French political scientist and philosopher, saw Finland 
as a semi-independent state, whilst some regarded it as a de facto province of the Soviet 
Union.18 Walter Laqueur, the American historian, stated that Finland, although managing 
to preserve its freedom, lacked independence ³LQDQ\DFFHSWHGVHQVHRIWKHWHUP´19 The 
final negative depiction of Finlandisation comes from Alain Minc, a French political 
advisor, who in the mid-1980s envisioned three possible futures for Europe in the 2000s. 
One contemplated a bleak ³Finlandized´ ³+RQJ.RQJ-(XURSH´, with preference given to 
neutrality and good relations with the Soviet Union.20  
Another way to comprehend Finlandisation is to see it as a political culture, one 
that blossomed especially in the 1970s and was idiosyncratic to Finland, closely related to 
but not necessarily part of a general appeasement strategy. The professor of Russian 
history, Timo Vihavainen, who wrote a seminal work on the phenomenon, described 
Finlandisation as a pseudo-morphism ± a political culture that embraced the ideals, 
conventions, and principles of totalitarianism without being totalitarian.21 Jukka Tarkka, a 
Finnish historian and journalist, as well as a former Member of Parliament, argued that 
Finlandisation bore resemblance to WKH³Stockholm Syndrome´ to the extent that it was a 
way to react to pressure by acting sympathetically towards its source.22 Because an integral 
part of Finlandisation was its denial, the subject itself could neither see its own 
Finlandisation nor prove claims of Finlandisation incorrect. 
In Finland, Finlandisation remains largely a pejorative term.23 During the Cold War, 
Finnish diplomats fought hard against its usage, trying WR FRQYLQFH RWKHUV RI)LQODQG¶V 
neutrality and arguing that for Finland, Finlandisation did not exist.  For them, the only 
acceptable way to see Finlandisation attached to Finland was to perceive it as an 
embodiment of peaceful co-existence between states with different political systems. If 
Kekkonen tried to give Finlandisation a positive spin and argued that Finland should be 
proud of it, the former Finnish diplomat, Max Jakobson, admitted that Finland was 
³Finlandised´ to the extent that it tried not to antagonise the Soviet Union.  However, the 
point of Finnish foreign policy, according to Jakobson, was not to antagonise the United 
States or any other important Power.24   
From the 1970s until 1987, the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs was very active 
in reporting on and responding to accusations of Finlandisation internationally. At the 
beginning of the 1970s, the Ministry archived almost every reference or mention on 
Finlandisation no matter how minor the source. When discussion increased, the archiving 
became more selective, but the Ministry formed a working group that sketched a strategy 
to respond to the accusations.25 A part of Finnish policy was to be active. If some eminent 
foreign politician mentioned Finlandisation in an unacceptable way, Finnish officials 
ϰ

brought the issue up with the respective VWDWH¶V officials or the individual.26 Newspapers, 
researchers, and other commentators also separated into sheep and goats depending on how 
they used the term.27 In 1987, a Ministry memorandum, which summed up the usage of the 
term from the 1970s until to the end of the 1980s, circulated and reporting on the issue 
gradually ended.28 
Understood as a policy of collaboration and friendship with the source of the highest 
potential security threat to a country¶V VRYHUHLJQW\ DQG LQGHSHQGHQFH, Finlandisation 
should be regarded as an instrumental policy and not in terms of identity politics. In 
Finland, too, debate on policies towards Russia often finds basis on identity: some 
suggesting that Russia is an archenemy or QHHGHGDVD³QHJDWLYHRWKHU´ for the construction 
RI )LQODQG¶V identity. Equally, claims exist that neutrality and a realistic but friendly 
attitude towards Russia is a SDUW RI )LQODQG¶V LGHQWLW\.29 It follows, however, that if 
Finlandisation stands primarily as a policy based on identity, it is flawed as an instrumental 
strategy WRVDIHJXDUGDFRXQWU\¶VVRYHUHLJQW\.  
After all, the policy of collaboration and friendship is historically not the only 
Finnish strategy vis-à-vis Russia ± tsarist, Soviet, or otherwise. Ever since mid-nineteenth 
century, Finland has adopted two policy traditions: a more political realist approach 
seeking to balance Finnish and Russian interests, and a more liberal and legal approach 
defining the interests of Finland on the basis of Western values and legal sovereignty. The 
foundations for the policy of collaboration were laid by the thought of Johan Vilhelm 
Snellman, a Hegelian philosopher and statesman in the 1800s, a period when Finland was 
still a Grand Duchy and an autonomous part of the Russian Empire. The nineteenth century 
Hegelian Fennoman nationalist movement in the Grand Duchy emphasised that Finland 
should not abuse temporary Russian weakness to widen its room for manoeuvre. The 
counterpart of this realist approach was constitutionalism advocated by Leo Mechelin, an 
academic and senator. This more liberal camp underlined that as Finland was a society 
based on legality, Russo-Finnish relations embodied, in fact, a question moulded by 
principles of law ± not a question of power, history, or prevailing circumstances.30 
The policy of friendly relations with Russia entertained perceptions, however, as an 
instrument to strengthen domestic sovereignty by the Fennomans and not as an end in itself. 
With the approach labelled ³separatist loyalism´, it saw good relations with the tsarist 
regime as a means to maximise domestic political room for manoeuvre ± an idea that then 
became predominant in Finnish thinking toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War 
era.31 The idea of separatist loyalism was that collaboration and obedience had their limits. 
When preserving core interests proved impossible by showing loyalty, then active 
resistance would come into play. Although maintaining good relations with Russia was of 
utmost importance, Finland did not have to accommodate itself to the potential arbitrariness 
of St Petersburg. For Finland, it was also vital to distant itself economically and politically 
from Russia, but preserving a loyal relationship with the tsar ± LUUHVSHFWLYHRI5XVVLD¶V
relative strength. $FFRUGLQJWR-DNREVRQ³OR\DOW\WRWKHUXOHUSDLGRIILQterms of freedom 
RIDFWLRQLQLQWHUQDOPDWWHUV´32   
The Fennoman policy of collaboration ended when a period of Russification of 
Finland commenced with the manifesto of Tsar Nicholas II in February 1899. The 
manifesto placed most Finnish legislation under the direct surveillance of St. Petersburg, 
with the previously granted constitutional rights of Finland successively scaled down, for 
example, Nicholas ordered that Russian was the principal administrative language in 
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Finland. However, this period of Russification ended with the Russian revolution of 1905. 
Nevertheless, a new period of Russification started soon afterwards, in the context of 
anticipating the coming war, but this effort ended with the October Revolution in 1917, 
after which Finland declared its independence. In the first decades of independence prior 
to the Second World War, Finnish policy towards the Soviet Union was clearly antagonistic 
although, by the late 1930s, based on the idea of neutrality along the Swedish model. 
However, the declarHGSROLF\RI³VWULFWQHXWUDOLW\´ did not save Finland from the Second 
World War that started with the invasion of Finland by Soviet forces in November 1939. 
There was no real strategic choice for Finland after the Second World War, and it 
had to re-orientate its foreign policy: in the Finnish self-narrative, the reappraisal marked 
a shift from the pre-war emotionalism to rationalism.33 The war was lost and a new 
relationship with the Soviet Union needed building on that basis. FinlanG¶VUHODWLYHSRVLWLRQ
was weak: tKH(DVWZDVHYHQFORVHUDQGWKH:HVWRXWRI)LQODQG¶V UHDFK.34 Finland had 
limited connexions with the West and was at the mercy of the Soviet-dominated Control 
Commission that monitored the implementation of the Moscow Armistice. The obligations 
of the treaty included some contested and unpopular issues such as prosecuting wartime 
leaders as war criminals based on retroactive legislation. Finland was also obligated to pay 
war reparations, which subsequently formed the basis for extensive trade relations with the 
Soviet Union.   
In 1948, Finland and the Soviet Union signed the FCMA treaty, which is 
fundamental to understanding Finlandisation. According to Tarkka, the treaty became a 
basic reality, which had an influence on daily political life and repercussions in general 
societal behaviour, academic analysis, civic activity, and customs.35 The treaty was the 
bedrock of Finnish-Soviet relations throughout the Cold War.  Finns saw the FCMA treaty 
as WKHJXDUDQWHHRI)LQODQG¶VGHPRFUDF\ and, still in 1983, one prominent Finnish politician 
called the treaty ³WKH 0DJQD &DUWD RI )LQODQG´. In 1988, when 0LNKDLO *RUEDFKHY¶V 
perestroika reforms started in the Soviet Union, 80 percent of the Finns still supported the 
treaty.36 
Signing the FCMA treaty symbolised FiQODQG¶Vadaptation to the new foreign policy 
line. An essential part was the critical evaluation of pre-war foreign policy, seen as 
irresponsible despite based on neutrality between the Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. 
The new line did not emerge from a vacuum but had inspiration from the old realist 
tradition of separatist loyalism. Juho Kusti Paasikivi, the Finnish president from 1946 to 
1956, was an apprentice of Yrjö-Sakari Yrjö-Koskinen ± a Finnish politician who had been 
a follower of Snellman.37 
During the immediate post-war years, Finland needed to fulfil its peace treaty 
obligations and convince the Soviet Union that it did not pose a threat. However, gaining 
trust was not easy when the Soviet Union, led by an ever more paranoid Josef Stalin, still 
assumed that in the event of a general war, Finland would take the Western side.38 Stalin 
nevertheless respected Finland because it fought hard for its independence, one reason why 
Finland avoided harsher measures by the Soviet Union and managed to keep its 
independence.39 At the same time, a more benign image of the Soviet Union was easier to 
accept by the Finnish people: because Finland remained unoccupied, the civilian 
population did not encounter Soviet atrocities of the magnitude that would have left deep 
traumas, unlike the Baltic States or Poland. 
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In Finland, there were similarly suspicions towards the ultimate objectives of the 
Soviet Union. After the war, the Finnish communists controlled the Finnish Security 
Intelligence Service and Ministry of Interior: hence, the period between 1944 and 1948 still 
remembered as the ³years of danger´. Eventually, Finland did not take the 
³CzechoslovakiaQ URDG´. Dominated by communists, the Finnish People's Democratic 
League lost its position as the biggest party in the 1948 elections, were ousted from the 
government, and the security police was reorganised. Subsequently, enhanced democracy 
created stability and a solid ground for a Cold War foreign policy based on neutrality. 
Paasikivi stressed the importance of good neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union but 
also thought that with the acceptance of the FCMA treaty, Finland had gone as far as 
possible. It was conceivable to develop further economic relations but avoid creating 
economic dependence. Moreover, Paasikivi thought that Finland was lucky because 
Finnish culture was so different from Russian and few Finns spoke the Russian language. 
Finally, it was important that the Finnish parliament and president decided who formed the 
government and served as ministers; otherwise, it would be a slippery slope, although 
consideration of Russian opinion remained possible.40  
In many ways, Finnish policy towards the Soviet Union was consistent until the end 
of the Cold War, although the strategic room for manoeuvre did increase when compared 
to the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. The Finnish paradox, as explained 
by Kekkonen in a speech at Washington in 1961, was that the better Finland succeeded ³in 
maintaining the confidence of the Soviet Union in Finland as a peaceful neighbour, the 
better were our opportunities for close co-operation with the countries of the Western 
world´.41 The core idea of this policy of ³PDLQWDLQLQJFRQILGHQFH´ was not to violate Soviet 
interests, which meant however that Finland stayed out of international organisations when 
the Soviet Union resisted. :KHUHDV 0RVFRZ¶V ³no´ to Finland joining organisations 
labelled anti-Soviet, such as NATO and the European Economic Community [EEC], was 
clear, participation in Nordic co-operation was acceptable ± others like the formation of a 
Nordic Economic Union the late 1960s, seen by Moscow as a stepping stone to the EEC, 
was not. Moscow also accepted that Finland could conclude a free trade treaty with the 
EEC in 1973, but this agreement contained special provisions that included a shorter time 
than normal for abrogation and no political development clause. Furthermore, Finland did 
not publicly criticise Soviet domestic or foreign policy, for example, no Finnish 
condemnations of the Soviet invasions of Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and 
Afghanistan (1979). Hence, in foreign policy )LQODQG³)LQODQGisHG´LPPHGLDWHO\DIWHUWKH
Second World War when the new line of policy was embraced; the strategy lasted until 
Finland started to steer its foreign policy towards Europe and especially the EU.  
There were, nevertheless, ritualistic elements in Finnish-Soviet relations that only 
belonged to the worst era of Finlandisation. Kekkonen was keen to have close personal 
relations with the Soviet leadership and visited the country frequently. Flattering and talk 
of friendship, irrespective of the actual state of affairs, sugar coated official Finnish-Soviet 
interaction. 7KHNH\ZRUGZDV³WUXVW´, so often repeated that it started to raise questions 
whether its use was meant to hide its non-existence. In a banal way, the production of a 
joint motion picture on Finnish-Soviet relations entitled ³7UXVW´ elevated the semantic 
status of the concept.42 
Yet, Finlandisation was also a political culture that affected the entire society. 
Directly after the war, public opinion remained generally unaffected and, in any event, 
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Paasikivi believed that he had to conduct his friendly policy towards the Soviet Union 
despite public opinion. But after the ³Note´Frisis, Kekkonen wanted public opinion more 
actively to support his foreign policy. It resulted in a top-down endeavour to imprint official 
foreign policy ideas onto the whole society ± from the top ranks to ordinary citizens. Yet 
Kekkonen feared that the Soviet Union could spoil the attempt to uphold the friendly 
image. For instance, after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, he 
was shocked because the hard-won devotion and popular support for his policies could 
evaporate through the unpopularity of the Soviet behaviour.43  
As a political culture, Finlandisation reached its climax in the 1970s when the 
Soviet Union ± despite the general détente in East-West relations ± tried to tighten its grip 
on Finland.  During this period, Moscow ± and particularly its two active ambassadors at 
Helsinki, Alexei Beljakov and Vladimir Stepanov ± were increasingly hostile toward the 
policy of neutrality and eager to intervene in Finnish domestic affairs. Simultaneously, 
Finnish governments were short-lived, and speculation RYHU.HNNRQHQ¶V VXFFHVVRUwas 
intense.44 The 1972 CIA report asserted, 
the very existence of [the Soviet tools of leverage], no matter how remote 
the possibility of their use, has created a state of mind in Finland which is 
now as important as the leverage weapons themselves: the Finns tolerate 
considerable Soviet influence over their national destiny, accepting the need 
to do so as a fact of life.45 
During that period, the negative side effects of Finlandisation were most palpable, 
increasingly inter-woven with Kekkonen and his dominance and the consolidation of his 
hegemony in the Finnish political life.46 .HNNRQHQ¶V domestic position was shaky at the 
beginning of his time in office but his victory in the presidential elections in 1962, held in 
the aftermath of the ³Note´Frisis, sealed his position as a guarantor of good relations with 
the Soviet Union. .HNNRQHQ¶V dominance went unchallenged until 1981 when Prime 
Minister Mauno Koivisto refused to accept his call to resign.47 
Kekkonen produced many questionable practices of Finlandisation like conducting 
undemocratic measures by exceeding his constitutional powers, working through 
personalised networks, and concealing relevant information from others as a means of 
control.48 On the other hand, the élite as well as the populace were willing to grant these 
rights and allow him to continue his pre-eminence because continuation would uphold the 
system where the alternatives seemed worse.49 .HNNRQHQ¶VGRPLQDQFHZDVPRVWHYLGHQW
in 1973 with an emergency law enacted ± as part of a package deal together with the EEC 
free trade agreement ± to extend his presidency by four years.  
At times, Soviet influence on Finnish domestic affairs is called the key aspect of 
Finlandisation. Unarguably, the Soviet Union held considerable sway over Finnish 
domestic policy, the eastern neighbour often referred to with euphemisms such as 
³KHDGTXDUWHUV´ RU ³WKH JUHDW HDVWHUQ FRQVWLWXHQF\´50 The Soviets were particularly 
concerned over what they considered aspects of ³revanchism´ LQ )LQQLVK VRciety, like 
publishing maps of the Karelian areas of Finland lost to Russia in the 1939-1940 Winter 
War. Yet, it is unclear what the Soviet Union really demanded, and what the competing 
political forces within Finland interpreted as such for reasons of political expediency.  
Soviet influence manifested in a myriad of ways. The most notable instance was 
the exclusion of the conservative National Coalition Party from the government for 21 
years. Although well known, the main reason for doing so ± Soviet objection ± was not 
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often expressed publicly. Another sign of 0RVFRZ¶V infOXHQFHZDV.HNNRQHQ¶VUHIXVDO to 
appoint officials who did not enjoy Soviet trust to occupy key government positions.51 In 
Finnish political life, loyalty to the Soviet Union was not necessarily a trump card, but if 
stigmatisHGDV³DQWL-6RYLHW´politicians were black balled and their chances of pursuing a 
significant career in politics and government became slim. Kekkonen had the final word 
with regard to this issue. For instance, the Agrarian League ± later Centre Party ± chairman, 
V.J. Sukselainen, was ousted from that position in 1964 because of his alleged connexions 
with Estonian emigrants. The Party made the decision bending WR.HNNRQHQ¶VZLOO for 
reasons of foreign policy, but others suspected that Kekkonen also torpedoed the career of 
his potential rival.52  
A significant feature of Finlandisation, seen as obnoxious by critics, was the self-
censorship of the Finnish media.53 In the 1950s, there were still critical comments about 
the Soviet Union and )LQODQG¶V foreign policy orientation towards its neighbour, but then 
self-censorship started to rear its head.  Not necessarily a champion of the liberal 
understanding of freedom of speech, Kekkonen demanded that Finnish media reports 
accord with the official foreign policy line. It meant no criticism of the Soviet Union ± 
either in editorials or on opinion pages. Kekkonen supervised this personally and reminded 
editors-in-chief immediately if they crossed the line. Over the course of time, the Finnish 
media learnt to live accordingly.54 In 1973, Finland and the Soviet Union issued a 
declaration wherein the media in both countries acquired a special responsibility in 
sustaining friendship and trust between the two nations.55  
The joint declaration made the climate for self-censorship even more favourable.  
Self-censorship spread from publishing and journalism to culture in general. The fate of 
WKH 6RYLHW GLVVLGHQW¶V$OH[DQGHU 6RO]KHQLWV\Q¶V, The Gulag Archipelago, published in 
1973, became a cause célèbre in the era of Finlandisation. The Finnish publishing house, 
Tammi, which planned a translation, refused to publish the book because of the pressure 
put upon it and, eventually, the Finnish edition appeared in Sweden.56 Another example of 
the sensitivities was the cancellation of a concert by a Canadian choir consisting of 
Estonian emigrants.  
Yet, there are a number of counter-examples and everyday resistance of the culture 
of Finlandisation. Civil society remained strong and many associations including the 
church, most sports clubs, the boy scouts, girl guides, and Rotarians and Lions represented 
patriotism and Western values. Additionally, over 2,000 Finnish academics, awarded with 
the American Society of Landscape Architects and Fulbright scholarships, travelled to the 
United States between the 1950s and the 1980s to visit different universities and research 
institutions. A number of the scholarship holders educated in the United States later served 
in senior positions in academia and the government, which enhanced the Western ideals of 
pluralism in Finland, at least as a one factor. 
A peculiar part of Finnish Cold War history was the appeal of Moscow-led 
Marxism-Leninism amongst the generation born in late 1940s and early 1950s. A 
considerable number of the youth were members of the so-called ³Stalinist´ minority bloc 
of the Communist Party of Finland and found themselves in oppositiRQWRWKH³SDWULRWLF
FRPPXQLVWV´ who had fought against the Soviet Union in the Second World War. The 
³StalinistV´ had particular influence in cultural and academic spheres as well as in 
journalism. Hence, the communist-led student movement lobbied for an equal amount of 
Western and Eastern textbooks, and they tried to ban textbooks that were, according to 
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their interpretation, anti-Soviet or included research findings that contradicted the results 
of communist studies. The movement was not successful in driving through their agenda 
in toto, but there was hardly any Finnish research literature critical of the Soviet Union, 
and only a couple of Finnish researchers were part of the Western community of Soviet 
studies.  
Another somewhat successful agenda of the radical left was in their resistance to 
nationalist ideals related to the support of Finnish security. In particular, the leftist radicals 
undermined attempts to build up a ³VSLULWXDO national defence´.57 For them, the ideals of 
national unity sustaining spiritual defence were bourgeois. Due to public criticism towards 
its work, the government Committee for Spiritual National Defence was eventually 
discontinued and replaced by another committee that was politically composed but had 
more moderate goals.58 Afterwards, many former members of the ³Stalinist´ movement 
did show signs of self-criticism. A former radical and subsequent minister and Member of 
Parliament of the Green Party, Satu Hassi, has VDLGWKDW³we indeed tried really hard [to 
create a revolution], but luckily we did nRWVXFFHHG´.59 However, some have also defended 
their actions. The former editor-in-chief of Tiedonantaja, the organ of the so-called 
minority communists, believed that the radicals did not really defend the Soviet Union for 
the sake of glorification of the totalitarian Soviet state but because of it being a counter-
force to American imperialism.60   
With regards of its own history, Finland adjusted the official interpretation of key 
historical events. Kekkonen explained that Finland was partly culpable for the Winter War, 
not to mention the so-called ³Continuation War´ along with Nazi Germany against the 
Soviet Unionm after June 1941. Or that Vladimir Lenin, a great friend of Finland, granted 
independence to the Finns ± a construction that Kekkonen held dear because he thought 
WKDWVXEVHTXHQW6RYLHWOHDGHUVZRXOGQRWGDUHFKDOOHQJH/HQLQ¶VGHFLVLRQV. Yet, the writing 
of history remained nationalist, and when an attempt to introduce the Soviet approach into 
the education curriculum emerged, it fostered a quick renunciation.61 The memory culture 
related to the Finnish war history was alive and vivid.62 
If passive assimilation had continued and the radical left had been more successful 
in driving its agenda, the consequence would have been catastrophic. Although avoided in 
the end, a Finlandisation of consciousness was therefore potentially looming. There was 
indeed a peculiar and distorted political culture regarding the Soviet Union in Finnish 
society, but it was layered and many of its features were not wholeheartedly accepted or, 
let alone, embraced by the majority of Finns. The strategy of collaboration with the Soviet 
Union would have failed if the public had not understood that it was just an instrumental 
strategy to preserve the core of sovereignty. The diplomat and short-term foreign minister, 
Keijo Korhonen, explained in his memoirs how the Foreign Ministry worried over the 
effects of the liturgical ³friendship´ talk.63 It pondered over how to convince the public that 
what the leadership was saying was not what it was doing. If the ³kitchen talk´ ± or in the 
case of Finland, the ³sauna talk´ ± had changed into the official canon, then it thought 
independence had been lost.  
So where did Finland succeed, what was the red line that protected the hard core? 
First, Finland retained its independent defence capability and rejected joint military 
exercises with the Soviet Union, not to mention accepting Soviet bases in Finland after the 
return of Porkkala in 1955.64 The most famous event came in 1978, when Marshal Dmitri 
Ustinov, the Soviet minister of defence, visited Finland to pressure Kekkonen into 
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accepting joint military exercises.  Kekkonen tacitly but clearly refused to respond to the 
initiative.65 The leadership, however, did not want to boast about these successes. Second, 
efforts occurred to ensure that the economic relationship with the Soviet Union did not 
become too dominant, although the eastern trade largely benefited Finland. An illustration 
of the sensitivities related to trade was the Soviet Union wanting to sell two nuclear reactors 
to Finland in the 1970s and making an offer that Finland could not refuse.  However, 
Finland developed nuclear engineering to be able to rebuild the Soviet model to match the 
:HVWHUQVWDQGDUGVWR³transfRUPD0RVNYLWFKLQWRD0HUFHGHV´ as it was said at the time. 
Moreover, no significant Russian migration to Finland ensued and the existing minority 
consisting of a few thousand-tsarist era emigrants were rather critical of the communist 
rule in their former home country. The cultural contacts between the societies were, despite 
the rhetoric, rather thin. Finally, the hard core of Finlandisation included the principle that 
the key decision-makers should be patriotic Finns who would instinctively understand the 
name of the game. The majority of Finnish communists, who were otherwise willing to 
support socialism in Finland, turned out to be rather patriotic in any crisis concerning 
)LQODQG¶VVRYHUHLJQW\. 
Finlandisation began to evaporate in the late 1970s and early 1980s, one key 
explanation for its decline found on the leadership level. Kekkonen, born in 1900, was 
showing visible signs of aging, and he started to lose his former authority. His successor 
as president, Mauno Koivisto, had a twofold role, both a cause as well as a consequence, 
of the process. On the one hand, a popular movement transcending party lines backed 
.RLYLVWR¶VULVHWRWKHSUHVLGHQF\and drew people fed up with the old élite and its practices; 
on the other, Koivisto used his power to normalise the political system. He was interested 
in Russia but not seen as a candidate supporting the old power structures.66 Another clear 
sign of the changes in the political climate during the 1982 presidential elections was that 
in the run-up to the election, the Centre Party presidential candidate, amongst all candidates 
seen as 0RVFRZ¶V IDYRXULWH, Ahti Karjalainen, lost the race to his competitor Johannes 
Virolainen.  The Soviet leadership regarded Virolainen as having a bad reputation towards 
the Soviet Union and none of the Soviet favourites found nomination even as candidates.  
In fact, dissatisfaction with the political establishment had been visible already in the 1979 
parliamentary elections when the National Coalition Party gained a considerable electoral 
victory. Although excluded from the government at that time, it eventually formed a 
coalition government in 1987. Indeed, as a staunch supporter of parliamentarianism, 
.RLYLVWRUHYLVHG.HNNRQHQ¶VSUHVLGHQWLDOSRZHUV\VWHPZLWKRXWFKDQJLQJWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQ
Unlike Kekkonen, he did not construct a personalised network of power but preferred to 
run day-to-day business through official channels.67 1HYHUWKHOHVV.RLYLVWR¶V UROH LQ WKH
collapse of Finlandisation was not straightforward, since he also had a tendency to control 
public discourse in foreign policy matters.68 
Another factor in FinlandisDWLRQ¶Vdisappearance in the political culture was simply 
the change of generation. Finnish youth who had embraced Moscow-led communism in 
the 1970s moderated their ideology whilst getting older and, in youth politics, a new, more 
³DSROLWLFDO´ or environmentally engaged generation replaced it. The change was gradual, 
but eventually the intellectual claim to hegemony RI WKH ³6WDOLQLVW PRYHPHQW´ and its 
influence in cultural and academic circles was broken.69 According to the renowned 
journalist, Unto Hämäläinen, the self-censorship of the Finnish press began to loosen in 
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1984-1985, but the Finnish political élite still occasionally saw the SUHVV¶behaviour and 
comments as irresponsible if critical of the Soviet Union.70    
Moreover, the change in the Finnish political culture was dependent on the real 
progress of socialism in the Soviet Union. The shortcomings of the socialist system in terms 
of its economic and technological performance became evident in the late 1970s, which 
took away its appeal. When affordable package tours to the Soviet Union became popular, 
Finns were able to see the realities of socialism ± although often interpreting the realities 
through thick ideological lenses.71  In particular, the arrival of computers and the shift in 
technology that the Soviet Union could not match made the gap between the West and the 
East plain to the public. *RUEDFKHY¶Vglasnost was the nail in FinlandisDWLRQ¶VFRIILQ the 
Moscow card lost its value in domestic politics as 6RYLHWLQWHUHVWLQ)LQODQG¶V doings simply 
began to lessen due to *RUEDFKHY¶VQHZWKLQNLQJLQIRUHLJQSROLF\.  
As a foreign policy strategy, however, Finlandisation continued until the collapse 
of the Soviet Union in 1990-1991 and allegedly in some aspects thereafter. Koivisto was 
very cautious in his foreign policy, not wanting to test the limits of Finland¶V freedom of 
action.72 He avoided using the term ³QHXWUDOLW\´ WRRRIWHQ, preferring instead ³hold the 
positions from where we do not neeGWRZLWKGUDZ´.73 Public opinion changed slowly and 
did not challenge the leadership. For example, a clear majority of Finns supported the 
FCMA treaty until the end of the 1980s.74 Koivisto himself stated that he was doctrinally 
closer to Paasikivi than Kekkonen, who had personified the era of Finlandisation; his ideas 
may explain the continuation of the foreign policy line and the changes in the domestic 
political culture.75 Vihavainen, the professor of Russian studies at the University of 
Helsinki, interpreted Koivisto¶VDFWLRQV as discarding the mechanisms of Finlandisation, 
not only in domestic politics but also in foreign policy; still, they continued along the well-
tried historical line of collaboration and friendship towards Russia.76 Although Finland 
joined the European Free Trade Association and the Council of Europe, it did so belatedly 
and, although starting European Community membership negotiations GXULQJ.RLYLVWR¶V
tenure, the major features of traditional realism such as prudence remained at the core of 
)LQODQG¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\WKLQNLQJ. During the independence processes of the Baltic States 
in 1990-1991, in one instance, Finland was reluctant in expressing support publicly; rather, 
it gave advice that the States should negotiate first with Moscow and, after their 
independence, reminded them of the principles of political realism as understood in Finland 
vis-à-vis Russia.  
The Finnish debate on Finlandisation continued after the end of the Cold War. Some 
commentators alleged that by that time, Finland became ³SRVW-Finlandised´: a better term 
actually ZRXOGKDYHEHHQ³FRXQWHU-FinlandisHG´PHDQLQJWKDW5XVVLDQRZappeared in a 
negative light and the media refrained from reporting positive news on Russia.77 Others 
have claimed WKDW)LQODQGLVQRZ³)LQODQGisHG´towards the EU or the United States; it is 
obeying them loyally without the capacity for expressing public criticism.  
Furthermore, there have also beeQ FODLPVRI ³UH-FinlandisDWLRQ´ in Finland. The 
main argument in these claims has been that Finland has been naïve and too cautious in its 
relations with Vladimir 3XWLQ¶VRussia after 2000.78 The principal target of critics was 
former Social Democrat President Tarja Halonen, in office from 2000 to 2012, who saw 
KHUVHOI DV D JXDUDQWRU RI )LQODQG¶V PLOLWDULO\ QRQ-allied status and an interlocutor with 
Putin.  Yet, the same foreign policy line has continued despite the change of the state leader. 
Sauli Niinistö, who succeeded Halonen in March 2012, has also argued that Finland has 
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not joined NATO because it would damage good relations with Russia, which are 
SUHUHTXLVLWHVIRU)LQODQG¶VVHcurity.79 According to the critics, this ³re-Finlandisation´ also 
reflected the fact that Finland has not properly addressed Russian problems with democracy 
and human rights. Moreover, these pundits stress that the root problem is that the era of 
Finlandisation requires critical examination.  They have even suggested the establishment 
of a truth commission to disclose the wrongdoings of the Finlandisation era.80  
Finlandisation has also emerged as a political weapon in environmental and energy 
issues as well as in foreign policy during the Ukrainian crisis. The Green Party left the 
government in 2014 because the government decided to build a joint nuclear power plant 
with the Russian nuclear energy company, Rosatom, in northern Finland, whereby 
characterisations of the nuclear decision as a dangerous move in creating vulnerable 
dependencies invoked accusations of Finlandisation.81 Furthermore, one of the most visible 
critics of this Finlandisation was the author of historical plays and novels about Estonia, 
Sofi Oksanen, who emphasised that appearance does matter ³7KDW )LQODQG ORRNV
µFinlandisHG¶ suits Moscow, because it makes Finland look like an unreliable partner to the 
West".82  Otherwise )LQODQG¶Vpolicy on Russia during the Ukraine crisis was in line with 
and backed the key EU decisions, that is, condemnation of the annexation of Crimea and 
the imposition of sanctions but also supporting continuous dialogue and negotiations with 
Russia.  
For the contemporary advocates of good neighbourly relations with Russia, 
Finlandisation was positive to Finland$OWKRXJKLWOLPLWHG)LQODQG¶Vde facto sovereignty 
domestically and room for manoeuvre internationally, with negative side effects beyond 
these restrictions, it was nevertheless a success as a foreign policy instrument. Regardless 
RI .HNNRQHQ¶V UROH LQ )LQODQGisation, he had an interest in VWUHQJWKHQLQJ )LQODQG¶V
international position that the West would also approve. Finland also tacitly enhanced its 
defence capabilities and avoided military co-operation with the Soviet Union. Most 
importantly, Finland avoided the worst problems of becoming either internally 
dysfunctional or SovietisHGE\D³ILIWKFROXPQ´.  
In this sense, Finland pursued its national interest by the means of realpolitik, and 
it endeavoured to satisfy the SovieW8QLRQ¶VGHIHQVLYH VHFXULW\ LQWHUHVWV.83  Yet, loyalty 
towards Moscow had its limits. A former Finnish ambassador to the Russian Federation 
has called the FinniVK&ROG:DUSROLF\³FRQWDLQPHQW´ whereby Soviet initiatives on closer 
collaboration were rejected.84 As Keijo Korhonen Korhonen, a former foreign minister, has 
put it, behind the scenes of flattering, a constant war was fought on the formation of joint 
Finno-Soviet communiques. The Finnish goal was to preserve references about its 
neutrality, whereas the Soviets tried to remove such references ± especially after the 
invasion of Czechoslovakia.85 Another clear sign of )LQODQG¶VDELOLW\WRSXWlimits to Soviet 
influence was denying entry into Finland of the former Finnish communist leader and head 
of the wartime puppet-government, Otto-Wille Kuusinen.86  
For the Soviets and later Russians, the relationship with Finland worked as a model 
case. Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet leader from 1964 to 1982, asserted that Soviet-Finnish 
ties were an illustration of ³good, correctly established relations´ between a big Power and 
a comparatively small neighbour.87 Moreover, the views of Viktor Vladimirov, a highly 
influential former KGB resident and liaison to the top ranks of the Soviet leadership who 
served many years in Finland, are instructive.  The Soviet leadership were of the opinion 
that the cordial and functional relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union was a 
ϭϯ

showpiece for the entire world of peaceful co-existence between a communist giant and a 
small democratic state.88 
A former American ambassador to Finland, James Goodby, has emphasised two 
characteristics of the Finnish political culture that helped Finland survive: ³[O]ne is a 
stubborn defence RIQDWLRQDOSRVLWLRQV´ ³another is a willingness to be accommodating on 
VPDOO WKLQJV´*RRGE\ HPSKDVised that ³,f you put these two admirable traits together 
you¶OO JHWZKDWIRUHLJQFULWLFVKDYHVKRUWVLJKWHGO\FDOOHGµ)LQODQGLVDWLRQ¶´. According to 
*RRGE\)LQODQG¶V VWUDWHJ\ZDV not subservience to the Soviet Union ± it was quite the 
opposite.89 Another former North American ambassador to Finland, the Canadian Paul 
Malone, argued that Finland is a country that has gone through much, and it is a success 
story in terms of economy and foreign policy. Malone emphasised that Finland has nothing 
to apologise for to the outside world.90  
Therefore, Finlandisation was not simply a policy of limitless accommodation. It is 
clear that various Soviet demands were regularly blocked. Moreover, sometimes it was 
wise to resist accepting all the smallest demands of the Soviet representatives, particularly 
if they came for the lower levels of hierarchy.91 This course occurred because it would then 
have opened the doors of increasing political pressure and, from this, secondary but morally 
detrimental consequences initiated by all kinds of people who were able to act in the name 
of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Finlandisation was not a policy that would have 
led to radical gains ± like Kekkonen unable to restore the lost parts of Karelia, although 
that goal seemed to be part of his agenda when building the relationship on trust.  
However, some political manoeuvres and initiatives undertaken to please Russia 
were clearly excessive, even in terms of courtesy such as the nation-wide campaign to 
collect signatures for a peace address commenced in 1974 to mark the thirtieth anniversary 
of the peace treaty with the Soviet Union. The purpose of the campaign was to unite all the 
³peace forces´ in Finland to support friendly relations and co-operation between Finland 
and the Soviet Union. Foreign Minister Ahti Karjalainen then presented the peace address 
to the Soviet president, Nikolai Podgorny, in May 1975. Another famous case of such 
obsequious initiatives was Eino Uusitalo, the deputy prime minister and minister of interior 
in the 1970s, suggesting that the date of signature of the Moscow Armistice should be 
elevated to the second Independence Day.92  
In addition, Finlandisation definitely led to some undemocratic and unhealthy 
practices on the domestic scene, which eroded social cohesion and morale. Kekkonen often 
exceeded his constitutional powers, political corruption was rampant as career promotions 
depended on arbitrary foreign policy suitability criteria, and the media failed to fulfil its 
role as the Fourth Estate. The 1973 emergency law enacted to bypass regular presidential 
elections, as well as the 1978 presidential elections, regarded commonly as a farce, 
XQGHUPLQHGWKHHOHFWRUDWH¶VWUXVWWRWKHSROLWLFDOV\VWHP93 The exclusion of the National 
Coalition Party from the government for two decades despite electoral victories also 
signalled that voting did not really matter. However, the way that the communists found 
integration in the coalition governments appears generally as a positive practice that 
fostered the building large coalitions in the left-right divide in Finland. 
The question is therefore whether, or where, the policy went too far or was 
superfluous. The moral evaluation of the phenomenon depends upon whether one considers 
Finlandisation forced or not. There is no easy answer, as any counter-factual analysis on 
ZKDWZRXOGKDYHKDSSHQHGLI)LQODQG¶VVWUDWHJ\KDGEHHQGLIIHUHQW rests on a thin ice. Yet, 
ϭϰ

the fact that little happened in Soviet-Finnish relations when Koivisto was elected president 
and the political culture of Finlandisation ended suggests an exaggeration of the extent of 
domestic accommodation. Moreover, RWKHU IDFWRUV VKDSHG 0RVFRZ¶V policy towards 
Finland beyond its collaborative policy concerning the Soviet Union. Realpolitik)LQODQG¶V
independent defence capability, the threat that Denmark and Norway would abandon the 
restrictions in their NATO policy, and Sweden¶V possible move closer to NATO if Finland 
faced too much Russian pressure were factors that the Kremlin had to consider. 
Whilst the role of economic benefits was never a key to the success or failure of the 
policy of Finlandisation with the Soviet Union, the trade relationship had some bearing. It 
kept part of the establishment satisfied and explains why the business lobby was slow to 
support EC membership for Finland before Soviet trade collapsed at the end of the Cold 
War. 5XVVLD¶V ILUVW SRVW-Soviet ambassador to Finland, Yuri Deryabin, described the 
Finnish-Russian relationship in terms of the comic book figures, Tom, the cat, and Jerry, 
the mouse, implying that Finland was driving the relationship although it was the weaker 
party.94 Although, Finland economically benefitted from trade, particularly in the 1980s 
when the price of oil went up and with trade based on bilateralism, economic dependence 
was far from being the ideal choice. Indeed, Finland paid the price, as the 1990s recession 
hit very hard after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and it quickly became clear that the 
sectors dependent on Russian trade were not competitive enough in the European or global 
markets. Moreover, during the Cold War, Finland was not able to participate fully in many 
Western co-operative programmes in the field of new technologies. 
What are the lessons learnt from the Finnish case of Finlandisation? It was a relative 
success but not without a price and involving considerable risks. The naïve interpretation 
of Finlandisation as simply a policy of friendship towards Moscow combined with military 
neutrality as the keys to success is misleading. It needs understanding in that the image of 
friendship involved more as a tool than an objective in itself. Some of the negative side-
effects ± over-extended self-censorship, general political corruption based on the 
importance of having a reputation of being not anti-Soviet, as well as the habit of actively 
using the Moscow card for tripping up otherwise honourable political competitors ± could 
certainly have been possible to avoid. But these tendencies were not just individual choices; 
they were in-built in the structures of Finlandisation as a political culture.  
Besides friendly relations in foreign policy, the success of Finlandisation as a 
strategy for survival in an anarchic international system for the small state with a potentially 
offensive Great Power neighbour depended on the preservation of a hard core: keeping the 
military intact, avoiding economic dependence, a patriotic spirit of the leadership, and the 
society at large with cultural distance. Perhaps Finland was lucky that the limits of Soviet 
material resources started to become evident in the 1980s and the ideological offensive 
died down when WKH SROLWLFDO REMHFWLYHV LQ 0RVFRZ FKDQJHG ZLWK *RUEDFKHY¶V QHZ
thinking; but before then, the worst era of Finlandisation in terms of political culture that 
had started to challenge the hard core had already ended. In any case, care is indispensable 
when transferring any lessons, even if correct when applied to Finland during the Cold 
War, to a different era, a different place, and different people. As far as drawing parallels 
between Cold War Finland and present day Ukraine, some key differences need 
highlighting. First, Finland is a much smaller Power than Ukraine but, second, it also is, 
and was, much more homogeneous than Ukraine as a nation. Moreover, if present day 
Finland would work as a model for solving the Ukraine conflict ± as Brzezinski and 
ϭϱ

Kissinger seemed to suggest ± 0RVFRZ VKRXOG EH ZLOOLQJ WR DFFHSW 8NUDLQH¶V deeper 
integration with and even a membership in the EU. 
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